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he environment in which African financial systems operate has changed dra-
matically over the past years. The global financial system has undergone a major 
transformation after the recent financial crisis, with the center of economic and 
financial power shifting from developed to several emerging countries, including 
China, India, and Brazil. Additionally, the crisis has led to regulatory reform discus-
sions among developed and emerging countries, with repercussions on financial 
sector regulation in Africa. Finally, technology has changed the economics of retail 
banking, revealing its potential to increase access to financial services dramati-
cally, but also posing new regulatory challenges. 
Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond takes a fresh look at Africa’s finan-
cial systems in light of these recent changes. Benefiting from better data and a 
wide array of experiences across the continent, the book looks at the challenges of 
expanding the outreach of financial systems, lengthening financial contracts, and 
safeguarding financial systems. The authors identify three priority areas for policy 
action: the positive role of innovation and competition; a stronger focus on nontra-
ditional financial service providers; and more emphasis on addressing demand-side 
constraints. Recognizing that all financial sector policy is local, the authors carefully 
distinguish between different country groupings, differentiating between low- and 
middle-income and small and larger economies among others, with a special focus 
on resource-based economies and post-conflict countries. And unlike other publi-
cations on this topic, this book includes analysis of the North African countries.
A joint collaboration between the African Development Bank, BMZ (Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development), and the World Bank, this book is a 
valuable asset to practitioners, development partners, and policy makers concerned 
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For too long, firms and households in Africa have faced severe constraints to afford-
able finance—costly fees and commissions, insufficient and inefficient financial 
infrastructure, and short tenor, to name a few. But things are changing, albeit 
slowly. This book, a joint effort of the African Development Bank, the German 
Federal  Ministry  of  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  and  the World 
Bank, demonstrates that Africa is making progress in relaxing these constraints. 
New players and products, enabled by new technologies and business models, have 
helped broaden access to financial services, especially savings and payment prod-
ucts. Critically, African finance has been stable for quite a while now; after a peak of 
banking crises in the 1980s, there have been few systemic banking crises since then. 
Despite the recent global financial crisis, banks in Africa are, on average, well capi-
talized and liquid.
At the same time, Africa faces persistent but not insurmountable challenges, 
namely its small scale, informality, volatility, and poor governance. Many firms and 
most households are still excluded from access to financial services, especially long-
term finance. Infrastructure financing needs remain largely unmet. Agricultural 
finance has been ignored by commercial financiers for being too high-cost and 
high-risk, aggravated by the same challenges enumerated above. 
Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond is a call to arms for a new 
approach to Africa’s financial sector development. First, policy makers should focus 
on increasing competition within and outside the banking sector to foster innova-
tion. This implies a more open regulatory mindset, possibly reversing the usual 
timeline of legislation-regulation-innovation for new players and products. It also 
implies expanding traditional infrastructure, such as credit registries and payment 
systems beyond banks. Second, the focus should be on services rather than exist-
ing institutions and markets. Expanding provision of payment, savings and other 
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financial services to the unbanked might mean looking beyond existing institu-
tions, products, and delivery channels, such as banks, traditional checking accounts, 
and brick-and-mortar branches. Third, we should focus on the demand constraints 
as well as the supply ones; expand financial literacy programs for households and 
enterprises; and address nonfinancial constraints, especially for small enterprises 
and in rural areas.
All financial sector policy is local. To reap the benefits of globalization, regional 
integration, and technology, policy makers have to recognize the politics of finan-
cial deepening and build constituencies for financial sector reform. While the chal-
lenges of expanding access, lengthening contracts, and safeguarding the financial 
system are similar, the ways of addressing them will depend on the circumstances 
and context of each country. 
With its cautiously optimistic tone, this book creates an opportunity for Africa’s 
policy makers, private sector, civil society, and development partners to harness the 
progress of the past as a way to address the challenges of the future and enable the 
financial sector to play its rightful role in Africa’s transformation.
Shantayanan Devarajan
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C
autious hope is in the air for finance in Africa. While the global crisis may 
have dented some of the progress made since the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, one feels the optimism and sees the positive trends. A deepening of fi-
nancial systems can be observed in many African countries, with more financial 
services, especially credit, provided to more enterprises and households. New play-
ers and new products, often enabled by new technologies, have helped broaden 
access to financial services, especially savings and payment products. Innovative 
approaches to reaching out to previously unbanked parts of the population go be-
yond cell phone–based M-Pesa in Kenya and basic transaction accounts, such as 
Mzansi accounts in South Africa. Competition and innovation dominate African 
financial systems, and, for every failure, there is now at least one success. However, 
many challenges remain, and the journey toward deeper, more-efficient, and more-
inclusive financial systems will be long and fraught with many difficult choices in 
many countries in Africa.
Africa’s financial systems have progressed over the past 20 years. Yes, the prom-
ise of the efforts at liberalization, privatization, and stabilization in the 1980s has 
only been partly fulfilled, though African finance has been stable for quite a while 
now. Since the peak of the banking crises in the 1980s, there have been few systemic 
banking crises, though pockets of fragility persist, often related to political crisis or 
deficiencies in governance. On average, banks in Africa are well capitalized and 
liquid. Still, the benefits of deeper, broader, and cheaper finance have not yet been 
reaped. Finance in Africa still faces problems of scale and volatility. And the same 
liquidity that helps reduce volatility and fragility in the financial system is also a 
sign of the limited intermediation capacity on the continent. Nonetheless, as we 
discuss below, globalization, technology, and increasing regional integration may 
provide new opportunities for finance in Africa.
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As a consequence of recent positive trends, African financial sectors entered the 
crisis with a cushion of high levels of capitalization and liquidity. Financial institu-
tions on the continent largely evaded the direct impact of the global financial crisis. 
Low levels of integration with international financial markets limited the exposure 
to toxic assets and to the volatility of international markets. With a number of im-
portant exceptions, nonperforming loans remained stable despite the slowdown in 
economic growth. Notwithstanding the limited impact of the global financial crisis 
and the improvements in overall stability, several countries have been suffering 
from homegrown financial fragility related to governance challenges and socio-
political unrest.
Africa’s economies have been hit by the ensuing Great Recession through re-
duced trade flows and reduced portfolio flows and remittances. The fall in demand 
and, consequently, in the prices of commodities has hit commodity-based econo-
mies significantly. The rapid decline in global trade that started in late 2008 (by up 
to 45 percent in real terms year on year) affected all African economies and, to a 
large extent, explains the lower growth the region experienced in 2009. The in-
creasing spreads and reduced maturities resulting from the shortage of liquidity in 
the global financial system have made investment and trade more difficult as well. 
Africa has also experienced a rapid reduction in capital flows, which has depressed 
stock exchange indexes throughout the continent and forced governments and 
companies to cancel bond and stock issues. Nonetheless, the overall impact of the 
Global Recession seems to have been milder on Africa than on other regions of the 
world, and the continent is already expected to match precrisis growth rates of   
5 percent in 2011 (IMF 2011).
More importantly, Africa will be affected by long-term trends that started before 
the crisis and have been reinforced by the crisis, especially the shifts in the distribu-
tion of global economic power. The shift of weight away from the North (the G-7) 
toward the East (especially China and India) and the South (to the G-20) has been 
another consequence of the crisis not only for Africa, but also for the global finan-
cial and economic system. In the context of globalization, the BRIC countries, es-
pecially China and India, but, more recently, also Brazil, are playing a growing role 
in Africa.
1 This is reflected in capital flows and also the structure of banking sys-
tems. While Indian banks have long had a presence in East African countries, the 
purchase of a 20 percent stake by a Chinese bank in Standard Bank in South Africa 
represents a new trend for China. The foreign direct investment of Brazil, China, 
and India has been increasing across the continent. It began mostly in natural re-
source extraction and agriculture, but has now extended to other sectors. Addi-
tional funds have been forthcoming from the Gulf region, often in the form of 
sovereign funds. This shift in capital flows and international governance offers op-
portunities and challenges for Africa: opportunities in terms of urgently needed 
resources and challenges in terms of managing the resources properly.
This chapter opens with a description of the book’s objectives and contribu-
tions, including the main policy messages. It then develops the basic analytical 
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framework through which we view financial sector development in Africa, distin-
guishing among beneficiary concepts and groups so as to focus our policy mes-
sages. We highlight the importance of financial sector development for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation and conclude with a summary of the persistent 
problems in Africa—limited scale, informality, volatility, and governance issues—
that require new solutions. Opportunities for solutions are possible within the new 
trends of globalization, regional integration, and technology.
Financing Africa, the Book
This book targets the stakeholders in Africa’s financial systems. Stakeholders are 
understood widely: policy makers, regulators, practitioners, development partners, 
academics, and others. The book includes a stocktaking and forward-looking exer-
cise that indicates viable paths to financial sector deepening and broadening. It 
represents an effort to document new and existing trends in Africa’s financial sec-
tors, taking into account Africa’s many different experiences. It focuses on general 
trends and, thus, does not encompass an exhaustive, detailed discussion of the de-
velopment and structure of each of the 53 African financial systems (for example, 
see Allen, Otchere, and Senbet 2010).
The book intends to contribute to the efforts of African policy makers to cap-
ture opportunities and overcome challenges. It outlines broad policy messages for 
financial systems in Africa on the premise that one size does not fit all. It does not 
outline strategies for the financial sector in every country across the continent,   
but, rather, offers general policy messages. It also discusses specific segments of the 
financial sector, such as rural and housing finance; it does not, however, offer an 
exhaustive and conclusive coverage of these segments. We leave that to more spe-
cialized publications in these areas.
The book builds on and extends substantially the World Bank publication Mak-
ing Finance Work for Africa, which drew attention to the opportunities and chal-
lenges of financial system development across Africa (see Honohan and Beck 2007). 
First, it relies on a much broader array of data than the previous publication. Sec-
ond, it includes North African countries in the analysis, which, along many dimen-
sions, have followed a different path of financial sector development. Finally, it ex-
pands on the analysis of the previous publication, including a thorough discussion 
of the regulatory challenges of finance in Africa. Critically, the world is different in 
2011 from the world in 2007. Box 1.1 summarizes the main differences between the 
two publications.
An Analytical Framework
In theory, financial institutions and markets exist to help overcome market fric-
tions that make direct exchanges between economic agents difficult. Academics 
typically distinguish between specific functions of financial service providers, such 
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Financing Africa is a follow-up to Making Finance Work for Africa. What has changed since 
early 2007, and what distinguishes this publication from the previous one?
The environment has changed
The environment in which African financial systems operate has changed dramatically over 
the past four years. The number of African countries experiencing a systemic banking crisis 
has fallen from a peak of 15 in the mid-1990s to a sporadic outlier in the 2000s. Credit to the 
private sector (as a ratio of gross domestic product [GDP]) has risen by more than 20 per-
centage  points  since  1990.  There  has  been  a  growing  trend  toward  regional  integration 
within the continent in recent years, though this trend started well before 2007. Kenyan, Mo-
roccan, Nigerian, and South African banks are rapidly expanding operations in the region. 
Over the past four years, the transformational impact of the deepening and broadening of fi-
nancial system technology has become clear as well. With over 13 million clients in Kenya, 
M-Pesa is the world’s most widely used telecommunications-led mobile money service.
Globally, too, the environment is different. We might be at the tail end of the first global 
financial crisis of the 21st century and the Great Recession, but the global financial system 
has changed dramatically. The center of economic and financial power has shifted to the 
South and East, which is also reflected in the replacement of the G7 by the G20 as the major 
international policy coordination body.
The set of information and experiences is larger
Relative to four years ago, we have a much richer and more detailed set of data available. 
Specifically, we can draw on a systemic data collection effort by the African Development 
Bank and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit of indicators on the 
development  and  structure  of  financial  systems  across  Africa,  as  well  as  the  regulatory 
framework. Furthermore, the international community has made enormous progress in col-
lecting data on the outreach of financial systems and the barriers to access among enter-
prises and households; we draw on this experience.
A critical difference with respect to the previous publication is the inclusion of the North 
African subregion. The inclusion of these countries—different in income level and economic 
and financial structure—and the comparison with other parts of Africa enrich the discussion 
in the book and provide additional insights into the process of financial sector deepening 
and broadening. The recent turmoil in this part of Africa, however, makes many conclusions 
on the related financial systems appear tentative.
While Africa can learn from the rest of world, the world can learn from Africa, as we lay 
out in this publication. The experience with mobile phone banking, for example, shows the 
power of technology and the potential that payment-led inclusion strategies possess relative 
to credit- or savings-led inclusion strategies. We therefore refer to experiences in other re-
gions, but also experiences in different African countries and how these experiences may 
be used across the continent.
The focus has expanded
The altered global environment also calls for a somewhat different emphasis. In light of the 
recent regulatory reform debate in Europe and the United States and in the context of the 
Box 1.1  What’s New?
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as (1) facilitating the exchange of goods and services by providing a medium of 
exchange; (2) pooling society’s savings for investment in large investment projects 
beyond the savings capacity of small individual savers; (3) screening potential in-
vestment projects, thus putting society’s savings to the best use; (4) monitoring 
enterprises and thus making sure money is used for the best purpose; and (5) in-
vesting in risk management services, such as diversifying across different projects 
or smoothing volatility over time.
2 These functions overlay with the practitioner’s 
distinction among (1) payment and transaction services, (2) deposit and savings 
services, (3) credit services, and (4) insurance and risk management services. These 
services are often provided by different institutions or in different markets. Yet an-
other, partly overlaying distinction is based on different beneficiary groups and 
time horizons. Expanding on a distinction made by Honohan and Beck (2007), 
this book distinguishes between three concepts: Finance for Markets, Finance for 
Growth,  and  Finance  for  All.  This  distinction  helps  us  frame  our  discussion 
throughout the book.
•    Finance for Markets relates to financial services that underlie short-term com-
mercial market transactions, such as trade finance, remittance payments, and 
various types of short-term credit facilities. This concept relates primarily to the 
financial  system  function  of  enabling  market-based  transactions  within  the 
economy and across borders. By facilitating commerce, financial systems allow 
the market-based exchange of goods and services beyond the immediate family 
G20 process, we focus more prominently on the regulatory framework. We argue that the 
reform suggestions developed in response to the recent crisis have to be adapted with cau-
tion to the African context and, even within the African region, to the level of development of 
different financial systems.
Including North Africa also reemphasizes the benefits of focusing on differences across 
Africa. Thus, needs and policy options vary between small and large and between low- and 
middle-income  countries,  while  landlocked,  resource-rich,  and  fragile  states  face  yet  an-
other set of challenges.
Honohan  and  Beck  (2007)  present  two  main  policy  recommendations:  (1)  strengthen 
credit and property registries and streamline court procedures and (2) establish independent 
supervisors. This publication follows a different path by presenting three main general mes-
sages, which are then fine-tuned in each of the thematic chapters and also detailed for dif-
ferent country groups.
Some themes and contrasts are maintained from the previous book. The contrast be-
tween the modernist and the activist approach is also used in this publication to highlight 
the advantages of a careful assessment of the role of government, a role that should help 
create and develop markets rather than replace them. We also build and expand on the dis-
tinction between Finance for All and Finance for Growth by highlighting the importance of 
  finance for basic market transactions beyond fostering long-term investment activities.
Box 1.1  What’s New? (continued)
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and community. Finance for Markets refers to financial services for enterprises 
and households, thus cutting across all possible beneficiary groups. The concept 
covers transaction and payment services, including remittances from emigrant 
workers to their families back home. It covers deposit services for households 
and enterprises, as well as short-term credit facilities for enterprises of all sizes, 
including trade credit. These basic services are provided by almost every finan-
cial system in the world, even the most rudimentary ones, although at different 
degrees of efficiency. They are mostly provided by banks, but may also be pro-
vided by nonbank financial service providers, including telecommunications 
companies. The recent crisis and the reduction in the supply of trade finance 
underline the importance of Finance for Markets.
•    Finance for Growth relates to the finance for enterprises, households, and govern-
ments that supports medium- and long-term activities (longer than 12 months). 
Finance for Growth is finance mainly for investment purposes, and it is here that 
financial institutions and markets fulfill their key function of the maturity trans-
formation of short-term liquid claims—be they deposits or marketable securi-
ties—into long-term investment finance. Finance for Growth thus involves a key 
function of financial systems: pooling society’s savings and putting them to their 
best use. This comprises risk management techniques and the screening and 
monitoring of entrepreneurs and projects. It relates to large-scale finance, in-
cluding for infrastructure and agriculture, and finance for small and medium 
enterprises and to debt and equity instruments, as well as hybrid instruments, 
such as mezzanine debt and guarantees. These services are provided by an array 
of institutions, including banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual 
funds, and private equity funds, and relate to activities on different financial 
markets, including stock and bond markets. Moving from Finance for Markets 
to Finance for Growth constitutes a major challenge for many low-income coun-
tries, including in Africa.
•    Finance for All relates to the process of expanding financial services both for 
markets and for growth to the largest possible segment of the population, in-
cluding households, small enterprises, and large firms. Finance for All overlaps 
the concepts of Finance for Markets and Finance for Growth, but refers to the 
process by which short- and long-term financial services, including payment, 
savings, credit, and insurance services, are pushed out to previously unserved 
segments of the population. It overlaps with Finance for Markets to the extent 
that access to basic transaction services is being extended to all segments of the 
population. It overlaps with Finance for Growth to the extent that more seg-
ments of the population gain access to contractual savings services, while mi-
croenterprises gain access to investment finance. In discussing Finance for All, 
we refer to all types of formal financial institutions, but also semiformal financial 
institutions such as cooperatives or savings and credit cooperatives. Finance for 
All has been a challenge throughout the world not only for low-income coun-
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tries, but also for many middle-income countries that have made substantial 
progress in the dimensions of Finance for Markets and Finance for Growth.
The three concepts overlap, including in policy prescriptions, but it is important 
to keep in mind the different focus of each. Countries at different levels of eco-
nomic and financial development might focus on different concepts. Postconflict 
or low-income economies might focus mainly on the basic services implied by Fi-
nance for Markets, and middle-income and socioeconomically more stable coun-
tries might focus on Finance for Growth strategies.
3 Finance for All has remained a 
challenge for low- and middle-income countries and even for some high-income 
countries, such as the United Kingdom or the United States.
It is important to note that these three concepts do not involve a trade-off, least 
of all the Finance for All approach. It is more about sequencing than trading off. 
For instance, the existence of efficient financial services for market exchange is the 
basis for longer-term financial contracts.
The Main Messages and a Caveat
In Africa, distinguishing among these three concepts is critically important for 
policy design. While African economies and financial systems share many features, 
there are critical differences along notable dimensions. Financial systems face dif-
ferent challenges in low- and middle-income countries across the continent. Basic 
financial services for commercial transactions and short-term credit (Finance for 
Markets) characterize the financial systems of many low-income countries, where 
formal financial services are often limited to a small share of enterprises and house-
holds. Middle-income countries are characterized by a much larger outreach of 
banking systems to households and enterprises, a larger variety of financial services 
and products, and a diversification of financial institutions and markets. Size mat-
ters: even among low-income countries, larger economies are able to sustain larger 
and more diversified financial systems.
There are also important geographical differences. North African financial sys-
tems are dominated by government-owned financial institutions to a much larger 
extent than systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, where many systems are weighted to-
ward foreign-owned banks. Even there, though, governments are preponderant in 
other segments of the financial system, such as the pension sector and the bond 
market. However, there are also important differences in the challenges that finan-
cial systems in densely populated economies, such as Rwanda and Uganda, face 
from systems in countries with more dispersed populations, such as Ethiopia or 
Tanzania. There is an important distinction between common law and civil code 
countries. Common law countries typically have a more flexible legal and regula-
tory framework that offers more room for innovation, while civil code countries 
rely more steadily on written codes and often take longer to adjust the legislative 
and regulatory framework to new developments. Finally, postconflict countries 
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and economies with abundant natural resources face their own unique set of chal-
lenges in achieving financial deepening and broadening.
We refer to these distinctions throughout the book and provide policy recom-
mendations for the various subgroups in chapter 6.
Taking into account these large differences across the continent, we use the 
framework above to develop the three main messages resulting from our analysis, 
as follows:
•    Competition is the most important driver of financial innovation that will help Af-
rican  financial  systems  deepen  and  broaden.  Competition,  in  this  context,  is 
broadly defined and encompasses an array of policies and actions. On the broad-
est level, it implies a financial system that is open to new types of financial service 
providers, even if they are nonfinancial corporations. It allows the adoption of 
new products and technologies. The example of cell phone–based payment sys-
tems across the continent is one of the most powerful illustrations in this cat-
egory. Within the banking system, competition implies low entry barriers for 
new entrants, but also the necessary infrastructure to foster competition, such as 
credit registries that allow new entrants to draw on existing information. To 
achieve more competition in smaller financial systems, more emphasis has to be 
placed on regional integration. However, this might also mean more active gov-
ernment involvement by, for example, forcing banks to join a shared payment 
platform or contributing negative and positive information to credit registries. 
While it is important to stress that the focus on innovation and competition 
should not lead to the neglect of financial stability, there has been a tendency in 
many African countries to err too much on the side of stability.
•    A second and related message is that there should be an increasing focus on finan-
cial services rather than on specific institutions. Across all three dimensions dis-
cussed above (Finance for Markets, Finance for Growth, and Finance for All), we 
care primarily about the necessary financial services and, only in a second in-
stance, about the institutions or markets that provide the services. Banks are an 
important component of every financial system, but if nonbanks are better at 
providing certain financial services, they should be allowed to do so. If the small 
economies of Africa cannot sustain organized exchanges, the emphasis should 
be placed instead on alternative sources of equity finance, such as private equity 
funds. If the local economy is not sufficiently large to sustain certain segments of 
a financial system, then the import of such services should be considered. One 
size does not fit all: smaller and low-income countries are less able than larger 
and middle-income countries to sustain a large and diversified financial system 
and might have to rely more heavily on international integration.
•    Finally, there is a need for increased attention on the users of financial services. 
Turning unbanked enterprises and households into a bankable population and 
ultimately banked customers involves more than pushing financial institutions 
down-market. Achieving such a change requires financial literacy, that is, knowl-
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edge about products and the capability to make good financial decisions among 
households and enterprises. It also means that nonfinancial constraints must be 
addressed, such as, most prominently, in agriculture. It includes a stronger em-
phasis on equity financing for often overleveraged enterprises. It also includes a 
consumer protection framework, though what suits South Africa, for example, 
may be too costly in resources and skills for Malawi.
Financial Sector Development: Why Do We Care?
The provision of financial services for specific beneficiary groups is important, but 
the ultimate goal is economic development. What is the role of finance in the devel-
opment process in Africa? How important is financial sector development relative 
to development in other policy areas? Where should the emphasis lie: in banks or 
markets? Broad cross-country comparisons, but also experiences in the region, 
have provided insightful evidence in this respect.
Ultimately, financial deepening and broadening can contribute to Africa’s move 
out of poverty and low-income status toward middle-income and emerging mar-
ket status. The vision is of a financial system that fulfills the three concepts dis-
cussed above by providing a sound and effective platform for the market-based 
exchange of goods and services, attracting and intermediating the necessary re-
sources for long-term private and public investment, and expanding financial ser-
vices to larger segments of the population so as to offer, at least, access to transac-
tion services.
Two decades ago, financial system development was an afterthought in the mind 
of a development economist designing a policy agenda. Today, financial sector pol-
icies have become a centerpiece in the debate on how to foster growth in low- 
income countries, reduce stark poverty levels, and, ultimately contribute to the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Over this period, ample evi-
dence based on various levels of aggregation and distinct methodologies has been 
accumulated on the growth-enhancing effect of financial sector development. Even 
accounting for reverse causation, research has established the robust positive im-
pact of financial sector deepening on economic development. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
the conclusion of a well-established body of empirical evidence: countries with 
higher levels of credit to the private sector relative to GDP experienced higher aver-
age annual real GDP per capita growth rates over the period 1980–2007. The rela-
tionship holds not only for a broad cross-section of countries, but also within 
  Africa. The conclusion is confirmed by cross-country, panel, and time-series esti-
mation techniques.
4
The effect of finance on growth is not only statistically, but also economically 
significant. To illustrate the effect of financial deepening, compare Ethiopia with 
Thailand. Over the period 1980–2007, the ratio of private credit to GDP averaged 
18 percent in Ethiopia, but 87 percent in Thailand. The cross-country comparisons 
illustrated in figure 1.1 suggest that Ethiopia’s real GDP per capita would have 
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grown by 1.3 percentage points more had the country been at the same level of fi-
nancial development as Thailand, or 1.4 percent instead of the actual 0.1 percent. 
Under this scenario, GDP per capita would have been over 40 percent greater in 
2007.
5 We can also compare the financial development and corresponding growth 
performance in Africa with that in low- and middle-income countries in East Asia. 
While financial development measured according to the ratio of private credit to 
GDP stood, on average, at 21 percent across Africa over the period 1980–2007, it 
was 32 percent in East Asia. During the same period, the East Asian economies 
grew 2.3 percent per year on average, while the African economies grew 0.7 percent 
on average. The estimates illustrated in figure 1.1 suggest that 0.4 of a percentage 
point of this difference in average annual growth—a quarter of the difference—
was caused by the lower level of financial development. Thus, the estimates suggest 
that, today, Africa could have a GDP per capita greater by 13 percent than the ac-
tual GDP per capita. This is, indeed, a significant loss.
The positive impact of financial development on growth does not mean that 
growth has no influence on financial deepening and broadening. On the contrary, 
by helping to increase incomes, financial deepening can create additional demand 
for financial services, thus generating a positive feedback loop. Policies that help 
Source: Author calculations.
Note: Sample size: 99 countries. The figure shows a partial scatter plot of private credit to GDP and GDP per capita 
growth averaged over 1980–2007 and controlling for initial GDP per capita, government consumption, inflation, trade 
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Figure 1.1  Finance and Growth across Countries, 1980–2007
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foster financial sector development ultimately also help establish a virtuous growth 
cycle. Moreover, many of the policies that foster financial sector deepening and 
broadening, including an effective contractual and information framework and 
macroeconomic stability, also have a direct positive impact on economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation.
What are the channels through which financial development helps increase eco-
nomic growth? While financial systems assist in pooling savings, transforming ma-
turity, and converting savings into capital accumulation, it is ultimately through 
improvements in resource allocation and productivity growth that finance helps 
economies grow more quickly (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Love 2003; Wurgler 
2000).  The  functions  of  attracting  deposits  and  investment  and  transforming 
short-term claims into long-term assets, thereby financing investment, should ob-
viously not be ignored; they are the basis for the ultimate function of finance, which 
is to put the savings of society to the best use, that is, put savings where they can 
reap the highest (expected) returns, thus translating into growth. Financial deep-
ening especially helps industries that rely heavily on external finance, but it also 
helps reduce the financing constraints on enterprises, particularly smaller firms 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005). Financial 
deepening thus has a transformative effect on economies by shaping industrial 
structure, distribution by firm size, and even organizational structures (Demirgüç-
Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic 2006). It is the facilitating role of financial systems 
that helps foster economic growth. Finance provides opportunities for new entre-
preneurs and fosters innovation and competition as well.
Providing external finance to enterprises in the form of equity, debt, or some 
hybrid thus seems critical to the positive impact of finance on growth. Recent cross-
country comparisons have indeed found that it is enterprise credit, rather than 
household credit, that explains the positive impact of finance on growth (Beck et 
al. 2009). This does not mean that credit services for households are not important; 
the growth effect of financial development, however, seems to come mainly from 
enterprise finance. One therefore has to look beyond credit services to other finan-
cial services in discussing the welfare impact of financial service provision on 
households. This casts doubt on the credit-led inclusion strategy often propagated 
by microcredit institutions and puts a premium on enhancing access to savings and 
transaction services. We return to this topic in chapter 3.
Financial sector development is important not only for fostering the economic 
growth process, but also for dampening the volatility of the growth process. As 
shown by Aghion et al. (2010), financial systems can alleviate the liquidity con-
straints on firms and facilitate long-term investment, which ultimately reduces the 
volatility of investment and growth. Similarly, well-developed financial markets 
and institutions can help dampen the negative impact that exchange rate volatility 
has on firm liquidity and thus investment capacity (Aghion et al. 2009). This is es-
pecially important in economies that depend heavily on natural resources and are 
thus subject to high terms of trade and real exchange rate volatility.
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What has the recent crisis taught us about the importance, but also the risks of 
financial deepening?
6 First and foremost, it has shown us the enormous risks that 
financial system fragility can create in the overall economy and for people’s liveli-
hoods. The global crisis and the ensuing Great Recession have put in doubt the 
paradigm that financial deepening is good for growth under any circumstance. 
Consumer  credit  booms  in  several  European  countries  and  the  United  States,   
fueled by the combination of regulatory neglect, the feeling that “this time is differ-
ent,” and the liquidity glut linked to global macroeconomic imbalances, ended in 
the  global  financial  crisis.  International  links  through  global  financial  markets 
helped propagate the shock, first, through financial markets, while trade links ulti-
mately resulted in the propagation of the real sector slump. For students of finan-
cial systems, the bright (growth-enhancing) and dark (instability) sides of financial 
development go hand in hand. The same mechanism through which finance helps 
growth also makes finance susceptible to shocks and, ultimately, fragility. Specifi-
cally, the maturity transformation from short-term savings and deposit facilities 
into long-term investments is at the core of the positive impact of a financial sys-
tem on the real economy, but also renders the system susceptible to shocks. The role 
that finance has as a lubricant for the real economy likewise exacerbates the effect 
of financial fragility on the real economy. However, the externalities that the failure 
of financial institutions and markets impose on the real economy and the heavy 
government support for incumbent financial institutions that financial fragility 
therefore typically triggers are taken into account by the stakeholders in financial 
systems and give these stakeholders an incentive to be aggressive in the face of risks. 
It is thus critical to harness financial market forces for the benefit of the real econ-
omy and the population at large, rather than focus on finance for its own sake.
Instead of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, it is therefore important to 
construct a regulatory and governance framework that minimizes the risk of fragil-
ity and provides policy makers with better possibilities for managing bank failures 
in a way that is incentive-compatible. If there is a lesson to be learned in Africa from 
the crisis, it seems to be that the growth benefits of a well-developed financial sys-
tem can only be reaped in a stable macroeconomic environment protected by an 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework and strong internal bank gover-
nance. This means there should be more transparency and accountability in bank 
management, less direct government intervention in the regulatory and supervisory 
process, and a focus on building up mechanisms of market discipline. However, the 
situation also highlights the demand-side constraints in terms of financial literacy 
and consumer protection, a topic we take up in several parts of the publication.
Ultimately, the financial systems of Africa are significantly less sophisticated 
than systems elsewhere, and most are far from becoming overheated as several fi-
nancial systems in Europe and North America did before the crisis. This does not 
mean that there is no fragility (see chapter 5). Nonetheless, most of the fragility in 
recent years has not arisen because of too much finance, but because of misallo-
cated finance generated by governance challenges. In a nutshell, Africa’s financial 
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systems stand to gain significantly from deepening and broadening. If there is a 
decreasing marginal benefit from financial deepening or even a threshold where 
more financial deepening may have a negative effect, Africa’s financial systems are 
far from reaching it.
7
Who benefits the most from financial deepening? While theory provides con-
flicting analyses about whether it is the rich or the poor who benefit most from fi-
nancial  sector  development,  cross-country  comparisons  indicate  that  financial 
deepening has a pro-poor effect (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007). Figure 
1.2 illustrates the pro-poor effect of finance: countries with deeper financial sys-
tems see poverty levels drop more rapidly. As in the case of economic growth, the 
economic effect of financial deepening on poverty reduction is strong. Again, a 
comparison  between  Ethiopia  and  Thailand  illustrates.  Specifically,  the  cross- 
country comparisons shown in figure 1.2 suggest that, instead of a reduction in the 
poverty headcount from 33 to 23 percent over the period 1981 to 2000, a level of 
financial development similar to that of Thailand would have allowed a reduction 
of the headcount to 9 percent in Ethiopia.
8
Financial deepening can have broader effects on socioeconomic development 
than those captured by GDP per capita and the poverty headcount. While eradicat-
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007).
Note: Sample size: 68 countries. The figure shows a partial scatter plot between the ratio of private credit to GDP 
and growth in the headcount—the share of the population living on less than a dollar a day—averaged over the 
period 1980 to 2003 and controlling for the initial headcount. For a complete listing of 3-letter country codes and the 
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Figure 1.2  Finance and Poverty Alleviation across Countries
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ing extreme poverty by 2015 is one of eight Millennium Development Goals ad-
opted in 2000, financial development may also be linked to the other seven goals, 
which refer to education, gender equality, health, the environment, and global part-
nerships.
9 In the case of education and health, one important outcome of access to 
financial services occurs through the income effect: better access to financial ser-
vices improves incomes and therefore the possibility of accessing health and educa-
tion services, while, at the same time, reducing the need to rely on children as la-
borers in the household. Allowing women direct access to financial services might 
improve the possibility they could become entrepreneurs, thus increasing their in-
dividual incomes and their chance to be more independent. This is reflected in 
greater female participation in family and community decision making. There is 
also an important insurance effect: better access to credit, savings, or insurance 
services reduces the need to use child labor as a buffer in the case of seasonal in-
come fluctuations and transitory income shocks and allows consumption smooth-
ing in the case of transitory income reductions caused by health shocks. It also 
  allows more rapid attention to health problems. Finally, there is an aggregate infra-
structure effect: more efficient financial institutions and markets allow more pri-
vate and public investment in the construction of schools and health facilities.
What are the mechanisms of this poverty-reducing impact of financial deepen-
ing? Theory suggests different channels. On the one hand, providing access to credit 
among the poor might help the poor overcome financing constraints and allow 
them to invest in microenterprises and human capital accumulation (Galor and 
Zeira 1993; Galor and Moav 2004). On the other hand, there might be indirect ef-
fects through enterprise credit. By expanding credit to new and existing enterprises 
and allocating society’s savings more efficiently, financial systems can expand the 
formal economy and pull larger segments of the population into the formal labor 
market. The first explorations of the channels through which finance affects in-
come inequality and poverty levels point to an important role for such indirect ef-
fects. Specifically, evidence from Thailand and the United States suggests that an 
important effect of financial sector deepening on income inequality and poverty is 
an indirect one. By changing the structure of the economy and allowing more entry 
into the labor market by previously unemployed or underemployed segments of 
the population, finance helps reduce income inequality and poverty, but not by giv-
ing access to credit to everyone (Beck, Levine, and Levkov 2010; Giné and Townsend 
2004). It is important to stress that this is preliminary evidence to be confirmed or 
refuted by future research, but it has centered the debate on an important question: 
should policy makers focus on deepening or on broadening financial sectors? It has 
also helped widen the debate on financial services for the poor beyond microcredit 
to other financial services, such as savings services, payment services (especially in 
the context of remittances from family members who have emigrated to other parts 
of the country or outside the country), and insurance services.
10
A long-running discussion has centered on whether policy makers should focus 
more on banks or on capital markets. While both provide important financial ser-
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vices, the related technologies are different. Banks create proprietary information 
about their clients, especially borrowers, while capital markets collect and process 
information from different sources and reflect this information in prices. Banks 
offer better intertemporal risk diversification tools, while markets are better in di-
versifying risk cross-sectionally. Markets are better at offering standardized prod-
ucts, while banks are better at offering tailored solutions. However, banks and mar-
kets can also be complementary through the application of instruments such as 
securitization, by allowing exit strategies for venture capitalists, and by providing 
competition with each other. However, cross-country comparisons have shown 
that it is not really the structure of the financial system that matters, but rather the 
provision of financial services, whether these are supplied by banks or markets 
(Levine 2002; Beck and Levine 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2002). The 
attempts of policy makers to push artificially for the development of a specific seg-
ment of the financial system over another are typically not fruitful. Yet, comparing 
financial systems across countries, one can discern clear patterns. Such a compari-
son suggests that there is an ordering in the development of different segments of 
the financial system. Systems in low-income countries are typically based much 
more on banks, while capital markets and contractual savings institutions, such as 
insurance companies, develop at a later stage.
11 Beck et al. (2008) estimate an in-
come elasticity for different components of the financial system, which illustrates 
the different speeds at which different segments develop as GDP per capita rises 
(see table 1.1). Given the level of GDP per capita on the continent, it is not surpris-
ing that all African financial systems are based heavily on banks and exhibit under-
developed markets. Not only is the capital market segment of these financial sys-
tems  underdeveloped,  but  also  the  contractual  savings  component  (insurance, 
pensions, and mutual funds) is small in most African countries. Finally, there is a 
Table 1.1    Income Elasticities across Different Segments of the Financial 
System
 Variable Rank Income elasticity
Public bonds to GDP  1 0.20
Bank deposits to GDP  2 0.35
Bank assets to GDP  3 0.44
Pension funds to GDP  4 0.45
Bank credit to GDP  5 0.49
Stock market capitalization to GDP  6 0.56
Insurance assets to GDP  7 0.66
Institutional investor assets to GDP  8 0.77
Mutual funds to GDP  9 0.88
Private bond capitalization to GDP 10 1.20
Value traded to GDP 11 1.30
Source: Beck et al. (2008).
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scale element to the development of capital markets, and small economies there-
fore have difficulty—even in the developed world—in sustaining liquid markets.
The above discussion does not imply that policy makers in Africa should be 
content with the underdeveloped nonbank segments of the financial system. There 
is a need to diversify the financial center away from a heavily bank-dominated sys-
tem, but it is also important to recognize that artificially creating certain compo-
nents of the financial system without the necessary demand and infrastructure will 
have limited economic benefit.
Time for New Solutions to Old Problems
Financial institutions and markets exist to help overcome market frictions related 
to transaction costs and risk. However, the efficiency with which financial institu-
tions and markets can overcome these market frictions is critically influenced by 
country characteristics. Fixed transaction costs in financial service provision result 
in decreasing unit costs as the number or size of transactions increases. These fixed 
costs exist at the level of the transaction, client, institution, and even financial 
  system. Processing an individual payment or savings transaction entails costs that 
are, at least in part, independent of the value of the transaction. Maintaining an 
account for an individual client also implies costs that are largely independent of 
the number and size of the transactions the client makes. At the level of a financial 
institution, fixed costs span a wide range—from the brick-and-mortar branch net-
work to computer systems, legal and accounting services, and security arrange-
ments—and are independent of the number of clients served. Fixed costs also arise 
at the level of the financial system, including regulatory costs and the costs of pay-
ment, clearing, and settlement infrastructure, which are, up to a point, indepen-
dent of the number of institutions regulated or participating in the payment sys-
tem. The resulting economies of scale at all levels make it unprofitable to stay in the 
business of financial service provision unless the associated scale economies are 
captured in some form.
12
In addition to costs, the outreach in the supply of financial services, especially 
credit and insurance services, is constrained by risks, particularly the risk of de-
fault. The risks can be either contract specific or systemic. Systemic risk can be de-
fined as risk that is nondiversifiable within a given economy and that, as a conse-
quence,  affects  all  financial  contracts.  Systemic  risk  typically  stems  from  high 
macroeconomic uncertainty (reflected in high inflation and exchange rate volatil-
ity), weaknesses in the contractual and informational environment, or geographi-
cal limitations. Regardless of its origin, systemic risk hinders the supply of financial 
services because it raises the default probability or the loss, given default, for all 
contingent contracts written in a given jurisdiction. This leads to a higher cost for 
funds and, hence, a higher floor for the interest rate required to grant a loan, shorter 
maturities as risk increases with the loan horizon, or higher premiums to write in-
surance policies. As systemic risk increases, it enlarges the set of borrowers and 
projects that find the cost of credit unaffordable and are thus priced out of the 
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credit market. Similarly, this makes insurance policies unaffordable for larger seg-
ments of the population.
Idiosyncratic credit risks are specific to individual borrowers or projects and 
therefore are not correlated with systemic risk. As a result, the cost of finance and 
the availability of credit or insurance services differ across debtors and projects 
depending on the related differences in idiosyncratic riskiness. Importantly, how-
ever, the ability of the lender to manage idiosyncratic risk is influenced by the sys-
temic risk environment. Two factors are particularly important in explaining the 
differences in interest spreads across debtors (for a given type of loan) that are in-
duced by idiosyncratic risk: agency problems and limits to the diversification of 
risks that are not related to agency problems. The first can be linked to the lack of 
information, but also to volatility, while the second can be linked to diseconomies 
of scale. Agency problems arise from information asymmetries between debtors 
and creditors, whereby a debtor is privy to relevant information about herself and 
her project that the creditor may not be able to secure or only at a prohibitively 
high cost; this can lead to two conceptually distinct sources of credit risk: adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
13 The former refers to higher interest rates that attract 
riskier borrowers and projects, while the latter refers to the borrower’s incentive to 
use the proceeds of the loan in endeavors that are riskier than those specified in the 
credit contract, while concealing this behavior from the creditor.
A lack of scale and a lack of tools to deal with idiosyncratic and systemic risk can 
limit the capacity of financial systems to effectively serve the host economy, foster 
growth, and reduce poverty. However, the characteristics of the host economy pro-
vide the backdrop before which financial institutions and markets have to operate. 
African economies are characterized by several adverse circumstances—pointed 
out by Honohan and Beck (2007)—that make it more difficult to overcome the 
two market frictions of size and risk, as follows:
•    The small scale of many economies does not allow financial service providers   
to reap the benefits of scale economies. The small size of African economies,   
as shown in figure 1.3, is driven by the low income level across the continent, 
but also by the small size of countries. The limited demand for savings, insur-
ance, credit, or even simply payment transactions means that large parts of the 
population of African economies are not commercially viable customers. The 
dispersed populations in many African countries means that financial service 
provision outside urban centers is not cost-effective. Despite the increasing 
trend toward urbanization, large parts of populations in Africa still live in rural 
areas. The small size of financial systems does not allow financial institutions to 
recover the fixed costs of basic systems and might undermine competition if the 
system does not sustain more than a small number of institutions.
•    As documented in figure 1.4, large parts of the economy and a large share of all 
economic agents operate in the informal sector and do not have the necessary 
formal documentation, such as enterprise registration, land titles, or even formal 
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addresses. This increases the costs and risks for financial institutions and ex-
cludes large segments of the population from formal financial services.
•    Volatility on the individual and aggregate levels increases costs and undermines 
risk management. At the individual level, volatility is related to informality and 
Source: World Bank (2010a).
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Figure 1.3  GDP across Countries, 2009
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Figure 1.4  The Informal Economy across Countries, 2007
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the consequent fluctuations in the income streams of many microenterprises 
and households. This means these agents are less attractive for financial institu-
tions. At the aggregate level, volatility refers to the dependence of many African 
economies on commodity exports, which makes economies vulnerable to the 
large price swings characteristic of commodities (see map 1.1). Volatility at the 
aggregate level also refers to political and social unrest, from which Africa has 
suffered over the past 50 years of independence. Volatility increases the costs, but 
especially the risks faced by financial institutions and markets.
•    Governance problems continue to plague many private and government institu-
tions throughout the continent and undermine not only the market-based pro-
vision of financial services, but also reform attempts and government interven-
tions aimed at fixing market failures. These governance challenges are widespread 
and affect many financial institutions, ranging from banks, microfinance institu-
tions, and cooperatives to government institutions, including development fi-
nance institutions. Governance problems have been at the root of many financial 
crises on the continent. They also affect directly the ability of financial institu-
Source: Gylfason (2010).
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tions and markets to manage idiosyncratic and systemic risks. The governance 
challenge and the related agenda contain a large number of dimensions, ranging 
from political stability and accountability in the control of graft to the rule of 
law. Along all these dimensions, Africa ranks significantly below other countries, 
although there are positive examples of reforms (figure 1.5).
Not all countries show these four characteristics. Africa has large economies, 
such as Kenya and Nigeria. Middle-income countries such as Mauritius and South 
Africa are able to benefit from their higher income levels in terms of scale econo-
mies. The prevalence of the informal economy is significantly lower in the middle-
income countries of North Africa than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Noncommodity ex-
porters are subject to much less volatility than commodity exporters, and countries 
such as Botswana and Mauritius have shown significant and increasing levels of 
governance. However, many countries across the continent are affected by at least 
one of these characteristics, which make them less receptive to hosting a thriving 
financial system.
In analyzing the long-standing challenges described above, the book draws at-
tention to three recent trends and phenomena—globalization, regional integra-
tion, and technology—that offer new solutions, but also represent new challenges.
•    Globalization: Integration in international financial markets has been an impor-
tant, but controversial aspect of financial sector policy throughout the world in 
past decades and even more so since the recent crisis. While most African coun-
Source: Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).
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Figure 1.5  Governance across Countries, 2008
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tries have opened up their financial systems to the entry of foreign banks, capital 
account restrictions are still in place in many countries, although often more de 
jure than de facto. Capital account liberalization has long been considered an 
important component of the modernist agenda of the Washington Consensus 
(Rodrik 1998). Yet, the crisis experience in East Asia and other emerging markets 
in the 1990s has led to a more cautious approach. The underlying economic 
model has also faced severe criticism: cross-country comparisons do not yield 
consistent results on the benefits of capital account liberalization. In addition, 
there may be a threshold value in economic, institutional, and financial develop-
ment below which countries do not benefit from capital account liberalization 
because capital inflows critically depend on financial markets and institutions.
14 
Foreign investors need capital markets to invest in equity or debt, unless they 
create subsidiaries or joint ventures. Even portfolio investors need institutions or 
markets in which to invest. Governance is therefore important so that countries 
may reap the benefits of international capital flows, as shown by the example of 
resource-based economies in which the corresponding capital inflows are not 
always properly accounted for or used in the public interest. Overall, a cautious 
approach is called for that focuses more on long-term capital inflows (foreign 
direct investment) rather than short-term portfolio flows and that imposes ad-
ditional safety lines on macroeconomic management. This debate has gained 
fresh significance in light of the current attempt of emerging markets to use cap-
ital flow restrictions to counter the negative repercussions of the capital inflows 
from developed markets that are a consequence of the application of quantita-
tive easing policies.
•    Regional integration: Regional integration has been on the agenda of African 
policy makers since many countries achieved political independence. The suc-
cessful example of Europe in creating a large regional market with a joint cur-
rency, joint institutions, and coordinated policy making has been inspiring, 
although the recent euro crisis may have dampened the enthusiasm somewhat. 
Prima facie, there is an enormous potential for Africa in overcoming scale dis-
economies by coming together. Not surprisingly, there have been numerous 
attempts at such cooperation. However, the results have been limited. Apart 
from three currency unions, two joint bank regulation and supervision au-
thorities, a joint insurance regulatory authority, and two regional stock ex-
changes, most efforts have occurred at the level of coordination and the ex-
change of experiences. One reason for the limited success at integration has 
been political; another is overambition, as is obvious from the failure to estab-
lish a pan-African currency union; yet another is weak implementation. It is 
important to note that—as in the European Union—regional integration can-
not and will not move at the same speed in all areas and all segments of the fi-
nancial sector. For this reason, focusing on smaller and economically and insti-
tutionally more homogeneous subregions, such as East Africa, might be more 
promising than trying to integrate larger regions with countries at different 
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levels of financial development and relying on different institutional and legal 
structures. By harmonizing the bank regulatory framework, authorities can   
reduce the regulatory costs for banks active across several countries of the   
respective subregion (World Bank 2007a). Integrating payment systems can 
significantly reduce the cost of crossborder transactions, including remittances, 
and help increase intraregional trade. Creating regional stock exchanges and 
allowing cross-listing can assist in creating the necessary scale for liquid capital 
markets in the region.
•    Technology: Technology can help mitigate scale- and risk-related frictions. Tech-
nology can help reduce transaction costs, especially the fixed cost component. It 
can help reduce operational risk, while it minimizes the opportunities for theft 
and fraud. Financial services via mobile phones offer African financial systems 
the chance for a transformational banking model that leapfrogs conventional 
banking models by substantially reducing transaction costs. Moving away from 
the brick-and-mortar model of banking with high fixed costs toward mobile 
phone technology, where most of the costs are variable, can help overcome dis-
economies of scale. Similarly, weather insurance built on exogenous indicators 
can help resolve information asymmetries between the insured and insurance 
companies at low cost.
Globalization, regional integration, and technology offer new opportunities, 
but also represent challenges, which we discuss throughout the book. All three 
trends will also have an impact on the relative role of the private and public sectors. 
There will be more space for private service providers to deepen and broaden   
financial systems, while the public sector has to redefine its role and face new   
challenges in regulation and supervision. Globalization, regional integration, and   
technology will raise new challenges to financial sector regulators. Globalization 
and regional integration will require home and host country regulators to cooper-
ate more closely in regard to crossborder banks, and these home and host countries 
will increasingly be outside the developed world. Technology, especially in mobile 
financial services, will require closer cooperation among regulators across sectors, 
but also a more agile regulatory approach.
The changes in globalization and the new opportunities that technology pro-
vides also raise new challenges for governments. The crisis has reinforced the need 
for an open debate on the role of government. Honohan and Beck (2007) address 
this debate by distinguishing two approaches to financial sector policy: modernism 
and activism. While modernism focuses on creating the necessary conditions for 
the emergence of modern financial markets, including the necessary legal and reg-
ulatory reforms, activism aims at replacing nonexistent markets through govern-
ment intervention, including government-owned financial institutions.
Many elements of this debate are reflected in this book as well. The recent crisis 
might trigger an increasingly activist role for governments throughout the conti-
nent, partly driven by the examples set in industrialized countries, but also by the 
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different role of government in Brazil, China, and India, three emerging countries 
with growing influence and weight in Africa. This trend toward an activist role of 
government can also be seen in the desire of African governments to establish new 
development banks. Still, the memories of activist failures are too fresh to expect a 
full-fledged return to government-dominated financial systems. However, the limi-
tations of the modernist approach are also evident.
As Honohan and Beck (2007) emphasize, we, too, stress a nuanced view that 
recognizes the limitations of modernism while pointing to the pitfalls of activism. 
Government has to play an important role in (1) expanding outreach, (2) length-
ening financial contracts, and (3) safeguarding financial systems. This role goes 
beyond setting the rules of the game and building institutions. Government might 
have to play an important part in fostering competition, but also cooperation. The 
important message is that one size does not fit all; while learning from other coun-
tries in the region and other regions is important, the contextual framework has to 
be stressed. We are also far from possessing a rigorous metric that can be used to 
categorize and judge government interventions; there will be a lot of trial and 
error. It is thus important to put in place better assessment tools for government 
interventions.
The Outline of the Book
The remainder of the book is organized into five chapters. In the next chapter, we 
landscape financial systems in Africa. We use an array of (new) data on the country, 
firm, and household levels to quantify the development and structure of financial 
systems across the continent. We show that Africa’s financial systems continue to be 
small in absolute and relative terms. They are based heavily on banks; few stock 
markets have sufficient liquidity; and the contractual savings industry is small and 
weak in most countries. The small size of financial systems also explains the high 
costs of intermediation and financial service provision, as well as the limited com-
petition. The chapter also documents the progress Africa’s financial systems made 
before the crisis and recent trends since the crisis. Africa’s banking systems are well 
integrated in global financial systems, as shown by the dominance of many bank-
ing systems by foreign-owned banks. However, the face of globalization has changed 
in Africa: the multinational banks of the former colonial powers have been slowly 
replaced in importance by regional banks based in southern and western Africa, 
while capital flows from emerging markets such as Brazil, China, and India have 
slowly overtaken the capital flows of the industrialized world. Access to financial 
services by households and enterprises is still limited across Africa, though recent 
trends are promising.
Chapter 3 focuses on the challenge of expanding financial systems in Africa. We 
build on the issues of scale and risk introduced in this chapter to derive the concept 
of an access possibilities frontier. This provides a framework for benchmarking ac-
cess to formal financial services and discussing policies that help turn the unbank-
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able into the bankable population and the bankable into the banked population. 
We then focus on four specific dimensions of the access agenda. First, we discuss 
the role of different financial service providers, and, in line with our main messages 
mentioned elsewhere above, we focus on the importance of competition in allevi-
ating supply-side constraints. Second, we discuss the need to concentrate on users 
of financial services as much as on suppliers through financial literacy programs. 
Third, we discuss the possibilities and challenges that technology represents in the 
need to promote an expansion in access. In this context, we discuss the possibility 
that a new transaction-led approach toward financial inclusion might be more 
promising in Africa than a credit- or savings-oriented approach. We discuss the 
role of government in pushing the frontier outward through institution building, 
as well as in pushing toward the frontier by fostering competition. We also focus on 
specific sectors, such as the ongoing challenges of agricultural and rural credit and 
the challenges of finance for small and medium enterprises.
Chapter 4 focuses on the issue of lengthening financial contracts. Financial ser-
vices for households and enterprises are characterized by short maturities. At the 
same time, Africa faces enormous gaps in infrastructure, housing, and long-term 
firm finance. We discuss the current landscape among providers of long-term re-
sources, including banks and capital markets, as well as institutions with unused 
potential to contribute to long-term finance, such as contractual savings institu-
tions. We explore the possibilities that globalization offers in the form of sovereign 
wealth funds and private equity funds. We offer policy options for expanding long-
term finance by adopting a similar approach as in the previous chapter and distin-
guishing between policies that help Africa optimize the current possibilities to ex-
pand long-term finance—partial risk guarantee schemes, public-private partnership 
structures, and the use of development finance institutions, among others—and 
policies that push the frontier outward, such as policies aimed at macroeconomic 
stability and institution building.
Chapter 5 focuses on safeguarding finance. Africa has made enormous progress 
over the past 20 years in improving the regulation of banking, with the result that 
financial systems are much more stable. However, progress in banking regulation 
has not always been accompanied by progress in the quality of supervision. Fur-
thermore, the recent crisis has reinforced the lesson that safeguarding a financial 
system requires constant updating and adaptation to new circumstances. The rele-
vance for Africa of the regulatory reform in the North, including Basel III capital 
requirements, are discussed. One specific issue we focus on is bank resolution and 
crisis preparedness, an area where there is a significant need for reform, especially 
in view of the increase in regional integration in banking. Expanding the regulatory 
and supervisory perimeter beyond banking has to be undertaken carefully, distin-
guishing between segments in which the savings of the poor may be at risk and in 
which there is a call for regulatory oversight and segments with sophisticated inves-
tors in which a caveat emptor approach might be more appropriate. Governance 
challenges are as important as regulation, especially in the contractual savings seg-
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ment of the financial system. User protection, however, is as important as the su-
pervision of suppliers, and we therefore discuss issues of consumer protection.
Chapter 6 is the “who does what” chapter, highlighting the role of different 
stakeholders. It focuses on the facilitating role of governments and the changing 
role of state-owned financial institutions. It also highlights the potential for re-
gional integration in Africa and how to go about achieving it. It discusses the poli-
tics of financial sector reform and the challenge of the creation of a constituency 
for financial sector reform. Finally, we revisit a theme developed throughout the 
book—one size does not fit all—by discussing challenges and priorities among cer-
tain subgroups of countries.
Notes
1.  The BRIC countries are Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China.
2.  See Levine (2005) for an in-depth discussion.
3.  This does not imply that postconflict countries do not have enormous funding 
needs; however, their financial systems may not be the best conduit for the funding of re-
construction efforts.
4.  See Levine (2005) for a literature review. It is important to note that, while figure 1.1 
illustrates a partial correlation, numerous studies using different aggregation levels have 
shown that this relationship is robust to controls for reverse causation and biases arising 
from the omission of other potential factors influencing growth.
5.  Such comparisons are only illustrative because the coefficient estimates measure 
marginal changes rather than large discrete changes.
6.  Among many others, see the following on the recent financial crisis: Acharya and 
Richardson (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Levine (2010), Rajan (2010), and Stiglitz (2010).
7.  A recent paper by Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2011) shows that, above a threshold 
of private credit to GDP of 150 percent, the effect of finance on growth is significantly 
negative.
8.  As in the case of figure 1.1, the significant relationship between finance and poverty 
reduction illustrated in figure 1.2 is only a partial correlation, but is confirmed if one con-
trols for reverse causation and the omitted variable bias.
9.  See Claessens and Feijen (2006) and Littlefield, Morduch, and Hashemi (2003) for a 
closer discussion.
10.  For an in-depth discussion of these issues and the relevant literature, see World 
Bank (2008a).
11.  This is also consistent with theory; see, for example, Boyd and Smith (1998).
12.  See Beck and de la Torre (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
13.  For the classic article on the effects of information asymmetry on credit supply, see 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
14.  See Kose et al. (2009), and, for a discussion on Uganda, see Kasekende (2001).
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T
he global economy and the global financial system are at the tail end of the 
Great Recession, the worst crisis since the Great Depression, and a first as-
sessment of the impact on African financial systems can be made. This is not 
to say that risks of additional shocks and heightened volatility do not exist, but, ac-
cording to all indications, the worst of the crisis is over, notwithstanding the ongo-
ing crisis in several European countries and recent political turmoil in North Afri-
can countries. However, it is also clear that there will be no return to the easy, cheap 
money of the early years of the 21st century, a theme we pick up below. Moreover, 
continuing global imbalances will make the global financial system susceptible to 
further shocks and fragility.
In this chapter, we (1) assess the impact of the crisis on Africa’s financial systems 
and (2) present a broad quantitative analysis of these systems. In doing so, we ben-
efit from a much broader set of data sources than did Honohan and Beck (2007). 
Specifically, we draw on a data collection exercise that was undertaken for this book 
and that focuses on the structure and various segments of financial systems in Af-
rica, including the market, portfolio, and maturity structure of financial institu-
tions and instruments. We also draw on significant advances in measuring access to 
financial services achieved at the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and the 
World Bank. Finally, we benefit from the growing interest of academics and ana-
lysts in African financial systems and the consequent data collection efforts.
The Effect of the Crisis
As the recent global financial crisis starts to fade into the distance, the debate on the 
impact of the crisis on Africa and the related long-term implications is alive with 
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varying degrees of relief and caution.
1 Many are relieved that the direct impact has 
not been as severe as it might have been. Others remain concerned that the impact 
on the financial sector, through the secondary effects on the real economy, may 
actually be more significant and long-lasting than was first assumed. This chapter 
argues that, more important than either position, is the fact that the crisis not only 
stalled the gains in financial inclusion achieved in Africa in the run-up to the crisis, 
but also exposed the structural weaknesses in the sector that had remained unre-
solved even as the continent was making progress on key access indicators.
The conventional wisdom at the height of the crisis was that, with the exception 
of large and globally more connected economies such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South 
Africa, the crisis would have little impact on Africa because the transmission mech-
anisms between the financial systems in Africa and the systems in the rest of the 
world were weak. African financial institutions, it was argued, were not exposed to 
the risks emanating from the complex instruments in international financial mar-
kets because most of the banks in Africa rely on deposits to fund their loan portfo-
lios (that they keep on the books to maturity), most of the interbank markets are 
small, and the markets for securitized or derivative instruments are small or non-
existent. African financial institutions reportedly experienced increases in their in-
ternational lending costs and shorter maturities as a consequence of the crisis, but 
the effect remained small given the modest level of external lending.
In time, however, this conventional view started to give way to concerns about 
the second-round effects through the real sector. In addition, the impact was sig-
nificant through reduced capital flows, especially lower portfolio flows, but also 
lower foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid flows. International capital flows to 
African dried up. Africa also suffered from a drop in remittances from Europe, 
though with a lag after the onset of the Great Recession and though part of this ef-
fect was caused by devaluations in local currencies (see figure 2.1).
2 Finally, there 
was a wealth effect in countries with stock markets: stock indexes dropped substan-
tially, though they recovered in most cases. The initial expectations during the cri-
sis, the current view, and the anticipated policy implications of these trends are 
discussed below.
Stock market performance
Initial hopes that investors, weary of the markets in developed countries, would 
seek opportunities in African and other developing economies were misplaced. 
The most immediate effect of the crisis was felt on stock markets throughout the 
region. The small size and illiquidity of Africa’s stock markets were amplified 
rather than overlooked because local and international investors had become more 
cautious in their investment strategies. Thus, while the price-earnings ratios on 
many African stock markets were above comparators in mature markets in 2007, 
the fallout from the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States dampened in-
vestment plans significantly (figure 2.2). In 2008, the market turnover on the 
Uganda Bourse dropped 60 percent during the third quarter, the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange 20 share index in Kenya fell 31 percent, and the Johannesburg Stock 
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Figure 2.2  Stock Market Performance through the Crisis, 2008–10
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  Exchange all-share index lost 22.6 percent in October, following a 14 percent de-
cline in September, all in all a 42 percent decline since May the same year. African 
stock exchanges also experienced limited issues during the crisis, which further 
delayed market recovery. Box 2.1 summarizes the experience on some stock ex-
changes during the crisis.
This was disappointing. Until the recent crisis, African stock markets had been 
experiencing a resurgence and displaying an energy that had not been felt for years. 
Prior to 1989, there were only five stock markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, and only 
three in North Africa. By 2010, there were more than 20 stock exchanges, ranging 
from  start-ups  in  Mozambique  and  Uganda  to  the  well-established  Lagos  and 
  Johannesburg stock exchanges. With the exception of South Africa, most African 
stock markets had doubled their market capitalization between 1992 and 2002, 
while total market capitalization for African markets had increased from US$113.4 
billion to US$244.7 billion during those years. Ghana had five new equity listings in 
2004; the initial public offering of Kenya Electricity Generating Company in 2006—
the country’s first in five years—attracted strong demand and enormous public 
interest. The 2008 initial public offering for the cell phone companies Safaricom 
and Celtel in Kenya and Zambia, respectively, had both been oversubscribed. This 
emerging confidence in African stock markets was negatively affected by the crisis.
Real sector performance
As the financial crisis surged into all parts of the real economy in developed coun-
tries, African countries experienced a substantial decline in exports when the rapid 
pace of trade expansion in the early 2000s decelerated sharply (figure 2.3). The 
sectoral  and  geographical  concentration  of  exports  in  most  African  countries 
exacer  bated the impact. Growth among Sub-Saharan African countries fell to 5 
percent in 2010 compared with 6.6 percent over 2004–08 (IMF 2011). In countries 
where the fall in investments was coupled with a decline in export earnings, a slow-
down in the growth of gross domestic product (GDP), and a sharp drop in domes-
tic asset prices (for example, a local housing market correction), the result was 
weakened bank balance sheets and, in some cases, bank failures. Overall, the impact 
of the Great Recession varied with the economic structure of countries. Mauritius 
and South Africa, both middle-income countries and financial centers, suffered be-
cause of reductions in crossborder bank flows and because of their dependence on 
export markets in Europe. Meanwhile, Morocco was affected through a reduction 
in revenues that was observed mainly in the secondary and tertiary sectors, as well 
as through the luxury segment of the real estate market. Commodity exporters 
such as Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, and Zambia suffered because of the rapid decline in 
commodity prices. Finally, several countries—most prominently Nigeria—experi-
enced domestic crises that were triggered by the exogenous shocks of the global 
crisis. In Nigeria, the crisis was initiated by a vicious cycle of capital outflows and 
commodity price drops that affected local investor sentiment and the appetite for 
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In Nigeria, the stock market witnessed a sharp decline beginning in March 2008, and the Ni-
geria all-share index lost more than 60 percent of its value. The correction (from high price-
earnings ratios) was triggered, among other causes, by foreign investor withdrawal and led 
to margin calls and increases in the required collateral, precipitating additional declines. The 
decline in the Nigerian stock market was of particular concern to banks in Nigeria. Not only 
did it generate increases in the nonperforming loans of the banks, which had provided loans 
for stock purchases, but it also raised the cost of issuing new capital. (Banking shares ac-
counted for over 60 percent of the total market capitalization.)
In Kenya between July 2008 and April 2009, the Nairobi Stock Exchange 20 share index 
fell 48 percent. To some extent, this reflected domestic factors, such as rising domestic po-
litical uncertainty following the postelection political turbulence in early 2008 and the third in 
a series of broker fraud scandals that reflected the underlying weaknesses in governance in 
the Kenyan capital market. Kenya’s macroeconomic prospects were also heavily impacted 
by food and fuel price inflation in early 2008, which resulted in growing pressure on con-
sumer prices. Some part of the fall in the Nairobi Stock Exchange index may also be as-
cribed to the Safaricom initial public offering in June 2008, which, although heavily oversub-
scribed at the time, drowned the market with a massive increase in equity supply at the 
moment  sentiment  was  turning.  As  a  result,  the  many  small  investors  who  had  been  at-
tracted by the issue suffered sizable losses. Subsequently, the initial public offering by Co-
operative Bank in November 2008 was 30 percent undersubscribed against a target of K Sh 
6.7 billion.
In Ghana, the Ghana Stock Exchange all-share index, which had experienced an impres-
sive 64 percent increase between January and October 2008, while stock markets around 
the world were collapsing, lost almost 46.6 percent during 2009, making it the world’s most 
poorly performing stock market over this period. The effect of the financial crisis was exacer  - 
bated by the migration to a new automated trading system to which investors needed time 
to adjust and the rise in domestic interest rates, which made money market instruments 
more attractive. Domestic mutual funds were under pressure as investor redemptions could 
not be offset by sales in the illiquid equity markets; indeed, at least one fund had to borrow 
for redemptions.
In Tunisia, despite a 14 percent correction during the last quarter of 2008, the Bourse de 
Tunis Tunindex closed the year with a moderate 10.7 percent increase. Similarly, the Bourse 
de Tunis led African markets in 2009, closing the year with a 48 percent return on the Tun-
index. Countercyclical measures taken by the government during the crisis helped sustain 
the performance of listed companies, which experienced a 10 percent rise in profits during 
the first semester of 2009. The confidence of investors was also strengthened by the imple-
mentation of a guarantee fund (Fonds de Garantie de la Clientèle du Marché des Valeurs 
Mobilières et des Produits Financiers), which covered noncommercial risks arising from the 
failure of financial intermediaries, as well as the enactment of a new code governing the 
provision of financial services to nonresident investors.
Sources: Data of the World Bank; data of the Ghana Stock Exchange; Bourse de Tunis (2010).
Box 2.1  Performance on Selected Stock Markets during 2008–09
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Source: Analytical Trade Tables (database), International Merchandise Trade Statistics Section, UN Statistics 
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Figure 2.3  African Exports through the Crisis and Beyond, 2006–10
The  Zambian  economy  was  significantly  impacted  by  the  global  crisis  as  a  result  of  the 
sharp decline in copper prices, which, during the third and fourth quarters of 2008, fell by 
more than 60 percent relative to the peak in mid-2008. The mining sector, a mainstay of the 
Zambian economy, was hit hard by this decline. Mining accounts for some 70 percent of 
Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings, and Zambia’s revenue earnings from copper sales tum-
bled from US$3.6 billion in 2008 to US$2.9 billion in 2009, an 18 percent drop (figure a). Banks 
responded by cutting loans and advances to the private sector. Economic activity in commu-
nities dependent on mining stuttered; loan impairment increased; and bank liquidity and prof-
itability declined. The slump in copper prices led to mine closures, which rendered thou-
sands of people jobless.
The International Monetary Fund approved US$256.4 million in financial support to Zam-
bia during the second quarter of 2009. Despite a recovery in copper prices, economic growth 
was still slow in the aftermath of the crisis: the government revised the GDP growth esti-
mate downward to 4.5 percent compared with the 5.0 percent projected at the beginning of 
2009. During the first six months of 2009, the government received US$339 million less in tax 
receipts and aid. The shortfall was offset largely by cuts in government expenditures to keep 
the fiscal deficit within the target of 3.1 percent of GDP for 2009.
At  the  peak  of  the  recession,  many  western  investors  scaled  back  their  presence  in 
Zambia’s copper belt. Their departure at the height of the recession saw the FDI of Chinese 
investors taking up the abandoned positions. At the height of the price slump, Chinese firms 
Box 2.2  The Real Economy Impact of the Financial Crisis in Zambia
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bank risk. Box 2.2 reports the experience of one country during the crisis, Zambia, 
a typical natural resource–based economy. The case illustrates the feedback pro-
cesses from real to financial sectors and policy reactions.
In this environment, large projects in Africa that required external financing   
to complement shorter-term bank financing faced difficulties in sourcing these   
finances, and, where they did find the resources, they faced higher interest rates   
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Figure a.  Zambian Exports Figure b.    The Performance of Three 
Large Banks
leveraged  the  low  prices  to  stockpile  copper  and  purchase  mines.  China  invested  over 
US$400 million in FDI in the Zambian mining industry in 2009 and pledged more than 60 per-
cent of the expected FDI in the following years. Zambia’s mining industry is now benefiting 
from the global recovery. Closed mines have reopened, and growth in the copper belt region 
is forecast at 5.0–6.5 percent between 2010 and 2012.
While the Zambian banking system is currently stable and well capitalized, the slowdown 
in economic activity and the steep decline in copper prices resulted in an increase in nonper-
forming loans from 8.8 percent of total assets at the end of March 2009 to 10.4 percent at the 
end of June 2009 (figure b). In addition, banking system lending to the private sector deceler-
ated as a result of sluggish economic activity, and there was an increase in average bank 
lending rates owing to a rise in yields on government short-term treasury bills. As the pressure 
on the exchange rate eased, short-term yields on government securities began stabilizing.
Sources: Losse-Müller (2010); data of Bankscope; Direction of Trade Statistics (database), International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921 
(assessed in 2010).
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and short maturities because of the flight to safety and the greater risk aversion of 
lenders. At the same time, portfolio outflows exerted pressure for currency devalu-
ations. Reductions in official development assistance, remittances, and tourism re-
ceipts also had an initial negative impact on the economy. As investments fell, some 
projects could not be completed, causing them to be unproductive and saddling 
bank balance sheets with nonperforming loans. Lower commodity prices, com-
bined with a credit crunch and increased risk aversion, made the financing and 
development of capital investments more difficult.
Private sector lending and loan portfolio performance
An immediate concern at the time of the crisis was that banks would become exces-
sively conservative in their policies and curtail the growth of private sector lending 
on the continent, especially long-term finance. To analyze the effect of the crisis at 
the microlevel, we consider bank balance sheets (figure 2.4). While the majority of 
banks on which we have data still expanded their loan books in 2009, one-fifth re-
duced their loan books, and some quite aggressively. Asset quality and profitability 
also do not seem to have been affected by the crisis, as shown by only a small uptick 
in nonperforming loans to 8 percent, high in international comparison, but low by 
historic comparison in Africa. A closer look at the group of banks that reported an 
increase in nonperforming loans reveals that most of them are located in Ghana 
Source: IMF (various).
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Figure 2.4  Bank Stability in Africa, 2005–10
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and Nigeria, two countries that suffered from domestic crises triggered by the 
global economic recession. The banking systems in Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Re-
public of Congo, and Togo also suffered from systemic distress for longer periods; 
this was related to political turmoil and governance deficiencies in these countries. 
In most other countries, large increases were confined to individual banks, while 
the performance of other banks was better. (Here, we measure large increases as 
year-on-year increases in nonperforming loans by 150 basis points or more relative 
to gross loans.)
In the aftermath of the crisis, early indications, according to a World Bank study, 
are that fears of large increases in nonperforming loans were premature (see Losse-
Müller 2010). More than half of the 152 African banks reviewed for the study data 
on credit quality reported stable or declining nonperforming loans.
So far, the performance is encouraging, especially because loans in Africa have 
relatively short maturities, and banks therefore register poor loan performance 
relatively rapidly. Also, the risk of portfolio deterioration was larger when GDP 
growth tapered off in 2009, and, provided growth holds up, the risk might not be 
that great anymore. However, this benign picture should not be misunderstood: 
the rapid pace of growth in the past might still entail a buildup of credit risks in the 
region’s banking systems. In general, country experiences around the world high-
light that rapid credit growth often challenges the ability of banks to manage risk 
and the supervisory capacity of regulators.
Where credit is still available, banks have increased the cost and shortened the 
tenor of finance. This is disappointing after recent years, when funds had started to 
enter African markets looking for equity and portfolio investments. Real private 
sector credit, in particular, has been growing at an accelerating rate, and its median 
value has doubled over the past decade. Even as a share of GDP, it has turned   
the corner; the median share approached 18 percent in 2007, about a third higher 
than at the anemic trough in 1996. Much of this increase was on the back of inno-
vative noncollateralized lending practices. Salary and other cash flow–based lend-
ing have been emerging, with positive outcomes for customers in the form of con-
sumer loans.
To their credit, banking systems across Africa entered the crisis equipped with 
low leverage, high levels of capitalization, and ample liquidity, putting them in 
good shape in the face of a potential worsening in credit performance as a result of 
the domestic and global economic downturns. Early indications are that credit 
growth picked up again throughout 2010 and that credit provision might be about 
to return to the previous high-growth path. Nonetheless, in African countries, as in 
other developing countries, policy makers must face a new reality: the times of 
cheap, easy money are over. This is true of private funds, but also of official funds. 
In the wake of severe budget cuts in most industrialized countries, foreign aid bud-
gets are likely to be cut. This will put a higher premium on private funding, includ-
ing commercial and private donor money. It will also put a premium on domestic 
financial intermediation and regional integration.
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Africa’s Financial Systems in International Comparison
With the benefit of hindsight, one should not be surprised by the performance of 
Africa’s financial sector through the crisis given the size of the sector, its lack of in-
ternational and domestic integration, and the nature of the structural deficiencies 
that remained in financial systems even as they were achieving progress prior to the 
crisis. The recent global crisis mainly served to remind policy makers how vulner-
able Africa is to shocks. While the absence of financial sophistication helped Africa 
reduce the contagion effects through financial market channels, it also prevented 
the financial sector from mitigating the impact of the shocks on the real economy. 
Policy design and development should therefore focus beyond the crisis and ad-
dress these structural deficiencies.
A first step in the analysis of Africa’s financial systems is an assessment and ex-
ploration of key statistics on the depth, breadth, efficiency, stability, and compo-
nents of the systems. Such an analysis has to compare Africa with other regions, but 
also within a historical African perspective over the past, while focusing as much 
on similarities across the continent as on differences among countries within the 
continent. Critically, such an analysis has to benchmark Africa’s financial systems 
by considering the low income level of most African economies and other country 
characteristics. Such an analysis is a first, though important step in better under-
standing Africa’s financial systems. The remainder of this chapter thus sets the stage 
for the subsequent chapters, in which we look more closely at the challenges of the 
outreach, maturity structure, and stability of these financial systems.
In the following, we use an array of indicators at the country, firm, and house-
hold levels to document the development of finance in Africa. We point to the 
overall low level of development, but also positive trends over the past 10 years. 
We highlight strengths, such as strong and stable banks, and weaknesses, such as 
limited nonbank financial service providers, and discuss the trend away from 
North-South  toward  South-South  capital  flows.  Africa’s  financial  systems  are 
based heavily on banks, and banks are therefore a large emphasis in the following. 
However, we also discuss other segments of these financial systems, including cap-
ital markets and contractual savings institutions, such as insurance companies 
and pension funds.
Relative to Honohan and Beck (2007), we have a much richer set of data sources 
we can use to assess quantitatively the development, efficiency, and outreach of fi-
nancial systems in Africa. In addition to broad cross-country databases on the de-
velopment and structure of financial systems (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
2010), this publication uses much better cross-country data on the access to finan-
cial services by households and firms (CGAP and World Bank 2010), financial in-
frastructure (World Bank 2008b; World Bank and IFC, various; and so on), and 
remittance prices across corridors. In addition, we have available a detailed Africa-
specific database on financial structure and the regulatory framework that contains 
data on 46 of the 53 countries on the continent.
02--chapter 2--27-76.indd   36 8/18/11   9:49:33 AMLandscaping African Finance  37
The size of African banking systems
Standard indicators of banking system development show that Africa’s banking 
systems are small in absolute and relative size. Many African banking systems would 
be mid-sized banks in high-income countries. Using a sample of banks included in 
Bankscope, which typically covers 90 percent of a country’s banking system, we 
find that the average African bank has total assets of US$220 million, while the total 
balance sheet size of a non-African bank is, on average, almost US$1 billion. Be-
hind this average, however, is a large variation. Standard Bank of South Africa has 
total assets of over US$100 billion, while the average bank in Madagascar has assets 
below US$200 million. Figure 2.5 shows the log of liquid liabilities—currency, plus 
demand and the interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial inter-
mediaries—in U.S. dollars. Most African banking systems are toward the right of 
the scale, with the notable exception of banking systems in Algeria, the Arab Re-
public of Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa, which are relatively large. If measured 
in relative size based on the claims on the private domestic nonfinancial sector 
relative to GDP (private credit), for example, we find that most African financial 
systems have relatively small banking sectors (figure 2.6). While the median for 
African countries was 19 percent in 2009, it was 49 percent for non-African devel-
oping countries. Behind this median, however, is significant variation across Africa. 
While private credit to GDP is less than 3 percent in Chad, it is over 70 percent in 
Mauritius, Morocco, and South Africa. The North African subregion shows the 
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
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Figure 2.5  Absolute Size of African Banking Systems, 2009
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highest levels of financial development, a median of 48 percent, which is at the 
same level as non-African developing countries, while Central Africa and West Af-
rica show the lowest level, with a median of 16 percent.
African banking systems are not only small, but also characterized by low inter-
mediation. One simple method of gauging intermediation efficiency is the loan-
deposit ratio. Banks have funding sources other than deposits and other purposes 
besides lending to the private sector, but the loan-deposit ratio gives a good, though 
crude indication of intermediation efficiency. The loan-deposit ratio ultimately 
captures one of the core tasks of financial intermediaries, that is, putting society’s 
savings to its best use: private sector development. We see that African banking 
systems intermediate, on average, only 74 percent of their deposits, while banks in 
non-African developing countries intermediate 109 percent of their deposits. As 
pointed out by Honohan and Beck (2007), countries in Africa showing lower levels 
of deposits intermediate an even lower share of these scarce deposit resources into 
private sector loans. While in the Republic of Congo the ratio of liquid liabilities   
to GDP is 33 percent and the loan-deposit ratio is 17 percent, the corresponding 
ratios in Tunisia are 62 and 107 percent, respectively (figure 2.7). It seems that, for 
most banking systems in Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the resource 
constraint is not currently binding; yet, these systems suffer from an intermedia-
tion constraint.
The low intermediation ratios point to a critical problem in African banking: 
while the lack of resources might be a longer-term impediment to the economic 
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
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Figure 2.6  Relative Size of African Banking Systems, 2009
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growth of the continent, a more immediate problem is the fact that existing re-
sources are not intermediated efficiently into the private sector, where they are 
needed most. This is consistent with the observation across the African region that 
banks prefer to invest in government securities rather than private sector loans and 
that the credit channel of monetary policy only functions weakly. Banks react little 
to the changes in interest rates set by monetary authorities by lending more or less 
to the private sector, but, rather, they shift assets among government bonds and 
foreign asset holdings.
The relatively limited intermediation efficiency is confirmed if one digs deeper 
into the asset side of bank balance sheets to explore where banks invest their re-
sources. Figure 2.8 shows the asset composition of banks across different regions. 
Unlike banks in other regions of the world and banks in high-income countries, 
African banks hold a much smaller share of their assets in private sector loans and 
a much larger share in government securities, foreign assets, and liquid assets.
There were significant improvements across African financial systems in the 
years leading to the global crisis. There was a persistent increase in the ratios of 
liquid liabilities to GDP, bank deposits to GDP, and private credit to GDP that were 
not driven by individual countries, but that occurred throughout the region (figure 
2.9). In the years leading up to the global crisis, 75 percent of all countries experi-
enced financial deepening. Africa’s banking systems now also intermediate a larger 
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
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Figure 2.7  Intermediation Efficiency Versus Financial Depth, 2009
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Source: International Financial Statistics (database), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://elibrary-
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Figure 2.8  Asset Composition of Banks across Regions, 2009
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
Note: Sample size: 25 countries. The number of countries indicated represents the situation following the balancing 
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Figure 2.9  Financial Deepening across Africa, 1990–2009
02--chapter 2--27-76.indd   40 8/18/11   9:49:38 AMLandscaping African Finance  41
share of deposits into loans. This has led to a broad increase in the ratio of private 
credit to GDP across the continent (figure 2.10).
Banking outreach and maturity structure
African banking systems lack not only depth, but also breadth. In the absence of 
reliable indicators of the share of households that use bank accounts across a large 
number of countries, we have used proxy indicators to gauge the outreach of bank-
ing systems. The number of branches per capita shows the limited outreach of Af-
rican banking systems compared with systems in other regions (figure 2.11). While 
Benin has less than one branch per 100,000 people, Bolivia has almost seven. While 
Egypt has four branches per 100,000 adults, Malaysia has 11. Data on the penetra-
tion of automated teller machines and point-of-sale systems shows a similar pic-
ture. While Morocco has nine automated teller machines per 100,000 adults, Ma-
laysia has 47.5.
African banking is mostly short term, as evidenced by the maturity structure on 
the asset and liability sides of bank balance sheets. More than 80 percent of deposits 
are sight deposits or are deposits with a maturity of less than one year; less than   
2 percent of deposits have a maturity of more than 10 years (figure 2.12, chart a). 
The maturity distribution is not as extreme on the loan side, though it is biased 
toward the short end. Almost 60 percent of loans are for less than one year, and less 
than 2 percent of loans are for more than 10 years (figure 2.12, chart b). This matu-
rity structure of African banks is consistent with the low level of financial develop-
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Figure 2.10  Private Credit across Africa, 1990–2009
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ment in the countries and the focus of African financial systems on transaction 
services and short-term finance. It is also consistent with a banking system that 
focuses on Finance for Market services rather than Finance for Growth services.
African banks do not extend loans equally across sectors. This is not surprising 
because different economic sectors have different needs for external finance. Even 
Source: CGAP and World Bank (2010).
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Figure 2.11  Branch Penetration across Countries, 2009
Source: Making Finance Work for Africa (database), Partnership Secretariat, African Development Bank, Tunis, 
http://www.mfw4a.org/.
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Figure 2.12    The Maturity Structure of Deposits and Loans across Africa, 
2005–09
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within specific sectors, different industries have different financing needs, as doc-
umented by Rajan and Zingales (1998) for Canada and the United States. That   
a  specific  sector  gets  less  than  its “fair”  share  of  bank  loans,  that  is,  a  lower   
share in lending than in GDP, may thus be driven as much by lack of demand as by 
supply constraints.
Figure 2.13 provides interesting insights in that it confirms the anecdotal evi-
dence: the agricultural sector is significantly underrepresented in bank loan books, 
as is the transportation sector. (We return to the issue of agricultural and, more 
broadly, rural finance in chapter 3.) The relatively low amount of lending to the 
transportation sector is somewhat more surprising because one would expect this 
sector to be able to use its assets as collateral more easily. Manufacturing, trade and 
commerce, and construction, in contrast, are overrepresented on the loan books of 
African banks. It is important to stress that the objective is not an equal representa-
tion of all economic sectors in bank loan portfolios and in GDP, but these stark 
discrepancies indicate that more than inherent demand or financing needs are at 
play in the allocation of loan resources across sectors in Africa.
Concentration and competition
Consistent with their small size, Africa’s banking systems are mostly concentrated, 
and few banks share the small universe of clients. Figure 2.14 presents the Herfin-
dahl index, which is the sum of the squares of market shares; higher numbers thus 
indicate a more concentrated banking system.
3 Of the countries with a Herfindahl 
index above 2,000, 50 percent are in Africa, while only a fifth of the countries with 



















Figure 2.13  Sectoral Lending Share Relative to GDP Share, 2005–09
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a Herfindahl index below 2,000 are in Africa. The high concentration of African 
banking systems is also captured by cruder measures such as CR3 concentration 
measures, that is, the market share of the largest three banks, which, on average, 
stands at 68 percent. Behind this average is a large cross-country variation. While 
the CR3 concentration ratio is well below 50 percent in larger financial systems, 
such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, it is above 85 percent in Algeria, Angola, 
Malawi, Mauritius, and Sudan. This concentration can be related to the absolute 
and relative size of African banking systems. The fixed cost element in banking 
limits the possibility for a large number of players in markets with a low deposit 
and lending volume and, accordingly, a small potential customer base for spread-
ing the costs. Similarly, the low income level and limited depth of African financial 
systems constrain the space for a large number of banks in the banking systems. In 
recent years, there has been a trend toward consolidation in some banking markets, 
as regulatory authorities have increased minimum capital requirements. Box 2.3 
examines the experience of Nigeria.
Concentration, however, is not the same as competition: even oligopolistic mar-
kets can show a certain degree of competitiveness.
4 However, consideration of an 
indicator of competition provides a similar picture. A comparison across countries 
of the Lerner index—the ratio of the difference between the market price and the 
marginal cost of financial services to marginal cost—shows that this indicator of 
the market power of banks is significantly higher in African countries than in other 
Source: Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2011).
Note: Sample size: 80 countries. HHI index = the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of the concentration of total assets.
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Figure 2.14  Banking Sector Concentration across Countries, 2006
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The debate on market structure, competition, bank size, and stability has not been settled; 
rather, it has been reignited by the current global crisis. In the African context, the Nigerian 
experience provides interesting insights. Before the crisis, the Nigerian banking sector was 
characterized by a large number of small banks, which taxed supervisory capabilities, and 
this fragmentation, in turn, coincided with instability. Against this backdrop, the governor of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria announced, on July 6, 2004, that banks would be required to 
achieve a minimum capital level of = N   25 billion (US$200 million), up from = N   2 billion (US$15 
million), by December 31, 2005. The increase was intended to help bring about a diversified, 
stable financial sector that would ensure the safety of deposits, while contributing more to 
economic development via intermediation. The larger banks were also expected to compete 
more effectively in regional and global financial systems.
The consolidation occurred along different paths. The largest traditional banks achieved 
the capital threshold more or less on their own, while other, mostly younger, banks used the 
consolidation process to make an exponential jump in capitalization often via share issues. 
The rest of the banks achieved the capital threshold by forming groups. A small number of 
foreign-owned institutions relied on capital injections from their parent banks, if necessary, 
to meet the new standard. A careful comparison of these banks (or groups) before and after 
the consolidation process shows some improvement in cost-efficiency, but no reduction in 
spreads, suggesting a possible decrease in competitiveness. There was an increase in loans, 
partly to customers of the banks who used the loans to finance share purchases. There was 
also regional expansion among Nigerian banks.
The boom ended in a bust, a rather typical end to a financial reform and liberalization 
episode without the corresponding regulatory upgrade to sustain and monitor bank growth, 
coordinate among regulators, and ensure proper enforcement. The Nigerian experience also 
highlights the importance of appropriate corporate governance in terms of regulation and 
enforcement at the level of the banks and the supervisory authorities. As stated by Dr. Sa-
nusi,  the  governor  of  the  central  bank,  “consolidation  created  bigger  banks  but  failed  to 
overcome the fundamental weaknesses in corporate governance in many of these banks.” 
As a result of special inspections carried out by the central bank in mid-2009, the extent of 
the buildup of risk and the inaccuracies in financial reporting in the banking system became 
apparent. Interventions were conducted in nine banks, which were rescued (some through 
convertible loans) by the central bank; the central bank simultaneously moved to guarantee 
all interbank transactions and replace senior management and executive directors. These 
banks  not  only  depleted  their  capital,  but,  together,  accounted  for  additional  losses  esti-
mated at over US$9 billion. There was a flight toward secure assets, including government 
securities,  although  there  is  little  evidence  that  there  was  a  full-fledged  credit  squeeze. 
While contemporaneous with the global financial crisis, the Nigerian crisis was homemade, 
though the global crisis, with the subsequent drop in stock market indexes throughout the 
world, might have accelerated the onset of the crisis in Nigeria.
The Nigerian experience underlines that rapid changes in market structure have to be 
carefully  monitored  and  accompanied  by  the  necessary  regulatory  and  supervisory  up-
grades, as well as proper corporate governance structures. It also drives home the point 
that consolidation can lead to the too-big-to-fail phenomenon (see the discussion in chapter 
5). Through regional expansion, this can have repercussions beyond borders.
Sources: Cull and Trandafir (2010a); World Bank (2010b).
Box 2.3  Bank Consolidation: Learning from the Nigerian Experience
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regions. The six countries with the highest markup are all in Africa (figure 2.15).
5 
The lack of competition is not only a concern in itself, but has direct negative re-
percussions for the depth and breadth of financial systems. Higher market power 
results in higher interest rate spreads and, ultimately, lower levels of bank lending.
The concentration ratios and competition indexes discussed so far consider a 
country’s banking system as one banking market and do not take into account the 
differences  between  deposit  and  lending  markets  or  among  different  segments 
within the lending market. Though not captured in such data, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that deposit markets are typically more competitive than lending markets 
and that, within lending markets, the blue-chip segment of large domestic and mul-
tinational corporations is significantly more competitive than the small and me-
dium enterprise segment. This segmentation of the banking market also has impli-
cations for competition across banks, a topic to which we return elsewhere below.
Increasing integration
Africa’s banking systems are small, concentrated, and mostly foreign owned. This 
last has not always been a characteristic. Rather, the ownership structure has under-
gone significant changes over the past 50 years since independence. At the time of 
independence, Africa’s banking systems were mostly dominated by colonial banks, 
many of which were subsequently nationalized (or “Africanized,” though the re-
Source: Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2011).
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Figure 2.15  Banks’ Market Power across Countries, 2006
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sult—state ownership—was often the same). Structural adjustment and privatiza-
tion programs in the 1980s saw a return to private ownership among many of these 
banks, sometimes in favor of the same European banks that had once been the pro-
prietors. Now, Africa is the region with the highest share of foreign-owned banks 
(figure 2.16), with the exception of the transition economies of Europe and Central 
Asia. The last 10 to 15 years saw yet another new trend: the transition from interna-
tional to regional banks (figure 2.17). After the end of Apartheid, several South Af-
rican banks, most notably Absa and Standard Bank, started expanding throughout 
the continent. More recently, two West African banks—Bank of Africa and Eco-
bank—have started expanding throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Moroc-
can banks started to expand south. Finally and as consequence of the recent con-
solidation wave in Nigeria, Nigerian banks started expanding throughout West 
Africa, but increasingly also throughout the rest of the continent (see box 2.3). In 
addition to an increase in foreign bank ownership, there has thus been a marked 
increase in the share of regional, that is, African, banks among foreign banks, reach-
ing 45 percent in the median country in 2009, while, in the mid-1990s, such banks 
had constituted only around a third of all foreign banks and less than 15 percent of 
total banking assets in the median African country. It is important to note that most 
international and regional banks have expanded throughout the region in the form 
Source: Claessens et al. (2010).
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Figure 2.16  Foreign Bank Shares across Regions, 1995–2009
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of subsidiaries, which implies higher costs, but can have positive repercussions for 
supervisors  in  case  of  trouble  because  subsidiaries  are  somewhat  easier  than 
branches (though not perfectly) to ring-fence. We return to this topic in chapter 5.
What has been the effect of the increase in foreign bank ownership on the devel-
opment, efficiency, stability, and outreach of African banking?
6 Foreign bank entry 
seems to have several advantages that are specific to Africa: international banks can 
help foster governance; they can bring in much-needed technology and experience 
from other regional economies that should translate into increased efficiency in fi-
nancial intermediation (in the case of South African or West African banks); and 
they can help exploit scale economies in small host countries. Nonetheless, espe-
cially in Africa, with its many small, risky, and opaque enterprises, the dark side of 
foreign bank entry can become obvious, even more so in countries in which for-
eign banks have captured almost 100 percent of the banking market. Specifically, 
the greater reliance of foreign banks on hard information about borrowers as op-
posed to soft information can have negative repercussions for riskier and more 
opaque borrowers if foreign banks crowd out domestic banks (for example, see 
Gormley 2007; Sengupta 2007; Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 2008). In addition, 
there are many factors that can prevent countries from reaping the potential bene-
fits of foreign bank ownership. The presence of dominant government-owned 
banks can reduce competitive pressures and allow other banks—be they domestic 
or  foreign  owned—to  earn  rents  from  the  inefficiency  of  government-owned 
banks, as the example of Kenya in the early 2000s shows. The absence of a sound 
contractual and informational framework reduces the feasibility of small business 
lending further. The small size of many financial markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Figure 2.17  Foreign Bank Ownership across the Continent, 1995–2009
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may make foreign banks reluctant to incur the fixed costs of introducing new prod-
ucts and technologies. The small size of many markets also does not allow for the 
necessary competitive pressure. The result in many African countries has been the 
concentration of domestic and foreign bank portfolios on government paper and 
international assets (see above). However, the diversity among the international 
banks in Africa suggests that there are differential and context-specific variations in 
the effects. This diversity is reflected in the finding of C ˇ    ihák and Podpiera (2005) 
that foreign banks in Tanzania and Uganda lend more and charge lower spreads 
than domestic banks, while foreign banks in Kenya lend less than their domestic 
counterparts. This might reflect differences in policies. (The effect of bank market 
and ownership structure on the depth, outreach, and stability of African banking 
systems is discussed in more depth in the following three chapters.)
Interest rate spreads and margins
One striking characteristic of banking in Africa is the high interest rate spreads and 
margins (figure 2.18). True, Africa is not the only region with costly financial inter-
mediation: several Latin American countries also exhibit high spreads. Yet, persis-
tently high margins have been among the top concerns raised by policy makers 
throughout the region, and closer analysis is certainly warranted. As we argue in the 
following, these high spreads and margins are mostly caused by the small scale of 
most African financial systems and the great risks banks still face in most countries.
High interest rate spreads can be seen simply as the complement of shallow 
  financial systems with little depth and breadth, given that countries with more de-
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
Note: Sample size: 134 countries. The figure shows the minimum, maximum, and median of the net interest margin. 
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Figure 2.18  Interest Rate Margins across Regions, 2009
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veloped financial systems exhibit lower net interest margins. There is one impor-
tant caveat concerning the interpretation of high spreads in cross-country variation 
and in within-country variation over time in relation to the outreach of the finan-
cial system: higher spreads might indicate the inefficiencies discussed above, but 
also greater outreach to riskier clients who are more costly for banks.
There are two different ways to analyze spreads and margins: one is to under-
take a decomposition of spreads into components; the other is to analyze the rele-
vant underlying bank-, industry, and country-level traits. Another important dis-
tinction that is more than semantic is the distinction between spreads and margins, 
whereby the former refers to the difference between ex ante lending and the deposit 
rate, while the latter refers to the actual net interest revenue. This is an important 
distinction on the lending side; the main difference is the lost interest revenue be-
cause of loan losses, as well as possible timing issues (that is, the contracted lending 
rates that affect interest revenues in subsequent periods). While net interest mar-
gins are readily available on a consistent cross-country basis, interest rate spread 
data are much more difficult to find and are mostly inconsistent across countries. 
We therefore focus on a specific country, Uganda, where detailed data are available 
across banks and over time for lending and deposit rates at different maturities. 
Analysis on other African countries has, however, provided similar findings.
The data in table 2.1 illustrate persistently high interest rate spreads, with not 
only (in real terms) low deposit rates, but also high average lending interest rates. 
High operating costs are one important factor, while loan loss provisions reflecting 
loan losses and reserve requirements are rather minor components of the interest 
rate spread. Perhaps most striking is the high share that profits (and the taxes on 
profits) constitute in the interest rate spreads. High profits driving high interest 
rate spreads are, however, consistent with the significant market power of banks in 
Africa that is documented above. They are also consistent with a high risk pre-
mium on banking in Africa that even applies to relatively stable economies such as 
Uganda. Finally, high profit rates might also be explained—at least in the case of 
subsidiaries of large multinational banks—by the relatively small scale of opera-
Table 2.1    Decomposition of Weighted Average Spreads, All Banks, Uganda, 
2005–08
 Indicator 2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q2
Average lending rate 14.66 15.17 15.31 16.72
Average deposit rate 1.57 1.70 2.00 1.97
Spread 13.09 13.48 13.31 14.75
Overhead costs 4.77 4.09 3.47 4.66
Loan-loss provisions 1.17 0.74 1.67 0.72
Reserve requirements 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.22
Taxes 2.01 1.85 1.51 2.51
Profit margin 4.97 6.61 6.44 6.65
Source: Cull and Trandafir (2010b).
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tions, which might result in an absolute rather than relative profit target for these 
subsidiaries.
A second approach is to relate bank-level variations in net interest margins to dif-
ferences in bank characteristics, such as size, liquidity, and ownership, to industry-
level variations in market and ownership structure, and to country characteristics 
such as the institutional framework and the level of economic development. Table 
2.2 shows some of the factors; the data refer to the period 2000 to 2007 (thus, be-
fore the onset of the global financial crisis). Estimations of the bank- and country-
level factors associated with bank-level variation in overhead costs and computa-
tion of the contribution that each of these factors makes to the higher margins and 
costs in Africa compared with the rest of the world point to size and risk as two of 
the dominant factors. The small size of African banks can explain 42 basis points of 
the difference in the overhead costs between African banks and rest of the world 
banks and 20 basis points of the difference in net interest margins. The deficient 
contractual framework explains 55 basis points of the overhead costs and 95 basis 
points of the net interest margins in Africa compared with the rest of the world. 
Finally, still higher inflation in Africa compared with the rest of the world explains 
24 basis points of the higher overhead costs and 23 basis points of the higher net 
interest margins. Other differences between African and non-African banks can 
also explain the differences in margins and spreads. The higher capitalization of 
African banks—a topic to which we return in chapter 5—is positively associated 
with overhead costs and margins, while the stronger reliance of African banks on 
(relatively) cheaper sight deposits shave off a few basis points from operating costs 
and margins. Finally, the higher volatility of banking in Africa (as measured by the 
variation in the return on assets over the period 2000 to 2007) increases overhead 
costs and margins, while the higher fee income in Africa raises operating costs and 
decreases margins.
The variables discussed above are certainly not the only factors influencing mar-
gins and overhead costs and might proxy for other important characteristics of 
  financial systems and economies in Africa. Behind the small size of African banks is 
Table 2.2    Explaining the Interest Margins and Overhead 
Costs in Africa
 Indicator Interest margin Overhead costs
African banks 482 500
Rest of world banks 334 332
Difference 148 168
  Contractual framework 95 55
  Bank size 20 42
  Other bank characteristics −12 31
  Inflation 23 24
  Africa residual 23 16
Source: Author calculations using data of Bankscope.
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the high degree of informality, which results in a small base of potential clientele. 
The deficient contractual framework is a symptom of larger challenges in the gov-
ernance agenda of African economies. The high volatility in bank profits reflects 
the high volatility of African economies. The positive Africa residual might be re-
lated to the lack of competitiveness documented above.
Behind these averages are important differences across financial systems within 
Africa. However, the same factors that explain the differences between the averages 
in Africa and the averages outside Africa can also explain the differences within 
Africa. The important roles of scale and the contractual framework are illustrated 
as examples in figures 2.19 and 2.20 on the aggregate level. The negative relation-
ships between the contractual framework and banking system size, on the one 
hand, and between net interest margins, on the other hand, hold not only for broad 
cross-sectional samples of countries, but also within the African continent. The 
higher efficiency of the contractual framework—here measured by an aggregate 
meta-indicator of the rule of law (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009)—is asso-
ciated with lower interest margins, as are larger financial systems, as measured by 
liquid liabilities in U.S. dollars. Net interest rate margins are lower in Mauritius 
than in Angola partly because of the more effective contractual framework in 
  Mauritius. Similarly, net interest margins are lower in Egypt than in Mali partly as 
a result of the larger scale of banking in Egypt.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
Note: Sample size: 178 countries. Liquid liabilities are taken in log scale. For a complete listing of 3-letter country 
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Figure 2.19  Small Scale Comes with High Margins, 2009
02--chapter 2--27-76.indd   52 8/18/11   9:49:49 AMLandscaping African Finance  53
Interest rate spread analysis of a specific banking market also facilitates a deeper 
analysis of the competition within a system. The analysis of the spreads in the 
Ugandan banking market provides evidence of segmentation among banks of dif-
ferent ownership (Cull and Trandafir 2010b).
In Uganda, domestic banks show much higher spreads because of the higher 
lending rates, which most likely reflect a riskier loan portfolio. The comparison 
between domestic and foreign banks across the different components of the spread 
shows, however, even more interesting differences. The spread decompositions in-
dicate that domestic banks generate high profit margins from a group of borrowers 
who repay their loans at a rate that is higher than the rate on the loans of clients of 
foreign banks. One would expect foreign banks to compete for this clientele, exert-
ing downward pressure on these spreads and profit margins, and, yet, the decom-
position of the interest spreads of foreign banks shown in table 2.3 suggests that 
these banks deal with a different segment of the market. The overhead costs of for-
eign banks are substantially higher than those of domestic banks (6.0 versus 2.5 
percent), and, yet, their spreads are much lower. The relatively high overhead costs 
and low profit margins for the foreign banks may be consistent with the idea that 
they deal with a set of blue-chip clients whose projects are more costly to evaluate 
and maintain. In addition, higher wage costs might add to the costs of the foreign 
banks, though the higher costs might also result from the propensity of foreign 
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010); Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).
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banks to invest more, including in information technology and technology to de-
velop new products. Over time, these overhead costs might decrease as economies 
of scale are achieved and may translate into higher profit margins. Two tentative 
conclusions from the simple decomposition exercise are that (1) there is little com-
petitive pressure in the Ugandan banking sector, which is reflected in the persis-
tence of the high interest rate spreads and their determinants, and (2) there is mar-
ket segmentation between foreign and domestic banks, which is reflected in the 
different spread levels and the determinants of these spreads.
Looking beyond banking
The nonbank segments of Africa’s financial systems show an even lower degree of 
development than banking. This is consistent with the bank-based character of 
Africa’s financial systems.
Only 21 of the 53 African countries have stock markets, and only a few of these 
are liquid. This number does not include Cameroon, Gabon, and Rwanda, which 
recently established stock exchanges, but have not yet attracted listings. Few stock 
exchanges have histories going back before independence. While most stock ex-
changes are national, the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, headquartered 
in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, caters to the eight-country West African Economic and 
Monetary Union. It was expanded from the Abidjan Stock Exchange, which was 
created in 1976. Similarly, the Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Afrique Centrale, 
headquartered in Libreville, Gabon, caters to the countries of the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa. Box 2.4 discusses the example of the 
Egyptian stock exchange—the Egyptian Exchange—and how the general business 
environment and specific policies have influenced its development.
With the exception of the stock exchange in South Africa, African stock ex-
changes are small as gauged by the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (figure 
2.21). African stock exchanges are also dominated by few stocks: the average num-
ber of listed companies per 10 million people is around 36 (figure 2.22). This re-
Table 2.3    Interest Spreads in Uganda: Domestic Versus  
Foreign, 2008
 Indicator Domestic Foreign
Average lending rate 18.44 15.24
Average deposit rate 2.31 1.90
Spread 16.13 13.34
Overhead costs 2.74 6.22
Loan-loss provisions 0.38 1.01
Reserve requirement 0.26 0.21
Taxes 3.34 1.64
Profit margin 9.42 4.26
Source: Cull and Trandafir (2010b).
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flects the small scale of stock exchanges across Africa and shows the limitations on 
the use of stock exchanges as funding tools in the host countries. The small number 
of listed companies also suggests that the concentration among listed companies is 
high: few companies dominate the market in most African stock exchanges.
Africa’s stock exchanges are not only small, but also illiquid. With the notable 
exception of the exchanges in Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa, Africa’s stock ex-
The Alexandria and Cairo stock exchanges, today called the Egyptian Exchange, date to 1883 
and 1903, respectively, thus effectively constituting the oldest stock exchange on the conti-
nent. Before folding up in 1961 because of the state-sanctioned demise of Egypt’s private 
sector, they ranked together as the fourth largest stock exchange worldwide. Because of the 
nationalization post-1961, the number of listed companies sharply declined and brokers left 
their jobs. After a dormancy of 31 years, the stock exchange was revived in 1992 and was the 
first Arab stock exchange to become a member of the World Federation of Exchanges.
The government took important steps to revive the stock market after its reopening in 
1992. First, the foreign ownership of securities was again allowed, which attracted foreign 
funds into the economy and thus promoted the stock exchange index. Second, arbitration 
was introduced to circumvent the regular legal system with all its well-known deficiencies. 
Most critical, however, tax incentives were introduced to attract listings and investors. Tax 
exemptions on capital gains and dividends for retail and institutional investors were aimed 
at enticing investors to use their savings in listed equity rather than bank deposits, while ex-
emptions on corporate tax payments were offered for listing firms. Via public offerings, 52 
state-owned enterprises were privatized in Egypt.
These incentives led to a rather large boom in listings. Egypt’s stock market capitaliza-
tion reached a staggering 107 percent of GDP in 2007, ahead of countries at similar income 
levels, such as Colombia, Peru, and the Philippines. However, many firms floated only a small 
share of their total equity. Feyen (2010) reports that more than 50 percent of firms have free 
floats of less than 15 percent, and only 5 percent have free floats exceeding 70 percent. This 
also explains why the boom in listings and market capitalization was not accompanied by a 
similar increase in liquidity; the turnover ratio, reaching 47 percent in 2007, is similar to the 
ratios in other middle-income countries.
In 2005, an amendment of the tax law canceled the tax exemption, which led more than 
500 companies to delist. More recently, in 2008, in a move to show preference for quality 
over quantity, the exchange changed its listing rules. The changes were aimed at strength-
ening governance and improving disclosure among listed companies to enhance market li-
quidity. This reduced the number of listed companies to 218, down from 550. Trading statis-
tics significantly improved after these changes were implemented. Recently, the exchange 
also launched Nilex, a trading segment with relaxed listing rules that is expected to facilitate 
the  access  of  small  and  medium  enterprises  to  financial  markets  (see  the  discussion  in 
chapter 4).
Source: Feyen (2010).
Box 2.4  The Egyptian Exchange
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changes are among the least liquid capital markets across the globe as measured by 
the ratio of traded to listed stocks (figure 2.23). The low trading levels indicate the 
degree to which a large fraction of the shares in developing markets is effectively 
locked up in the strategic stakes of controlling shareholders and not normally avail-
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
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Figure 2.21  Stock Market Capitalization across Countries, 2009
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).




















































rest of the world African countries
Figure 2.22  Listed Firms across Countries, 2009
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able for trading. Given that the positive contribution of stock market development 
to economic growth derives through liquidity more than size, the low degree of li-
quidity is indeed worrying and calls into question the role of stock exchanges as 
drivers of growth (for instance, see Levine and Zervos 1998). We discuss this issue 
in more depth in chapter 4.
The limited size and liquidity of stock markets are mirrored on the bond side 
of capital markets. The primary bond markets are small and dominated by gov-
ernment and financial institutions (figure 2.24). Table 2.4 shows that short-term 
securities dominate most African bond markets as well. Even in South Africa, 
over-the-counter trading is still prevalent on the debt market (Ambrosi 2009). 
With the exception of Nigeria and South Africa, no countries have secondary 
bond markets.
The small size and limited liquidity of African capital markets have many ex-
planatory factors, and we return to the policy implications in chapter 4. Briefly, the 
nascent character of capital markets is driven by the lack of market culture, high 
listing costs, the fear of losing family ownership, and inefficient investor protec-
tions. The limited success of market segments with relaxed listing rules shows that 
the development stage of the enterprise population across Africa—few firms are 
large enough to sustain trading in their stocks—is an important, but not sufficient 
factor in explaining the small size and low liquidity of African markets. These 
  features make capital markets less attractive as funding instruments for firms or   
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
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Figure 2.23  Stock Market Liquidity across Countries, 2009
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as investment vehicles for personal and institutional investors, resulting in a self-
sustaining vicious cycle of low liquidity.
The insurance sector is in its infancy in most African countries as well, as illus-
trated by the low insurance penetration across Africa (figure 2.25). With the ex-
ception of Lesotho, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia, insurance penetration is 





Figure 2.24  Bond Market Structure in Africa

















Note: n.a. = not applicable.  — = not available.
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below 1 percent. In addition, the insurance business is dominated by non–life in-
surance business lines, such as automobile, health, and industrial insurance poli-
cies, while the life segment constitutes less than 30 percent in most countries. This 
reflects the fact that, in most countries, insurance development is driven by com-
pulsory business lines, such as the motor line. Many countries have fragmented 
insurance systems characterized by many small, underfunded, and weak compa-
nies. The lack of regulatory oversight, including in consumer protection, under-
mines the development of insurance markets. In many countries, insurance super-
vision is still undertaken by an office within the ministry of finance, although there 
is an increasing trend toward a separate nonbank financial institution supervisor. 
Notable is the development in francophone West and Central Africa of a joint in-
surance supervisor for 14 countries. In some North African countries (Algeria, 
Egypt, and Libya), the dominance of state-owned insurance companies may also 
explain the limited development of the insurance sector. Low incomes explain 
much of the low insurance penetration; monetary instability and the weak con-
tractual framework contribute as well.
Explaining Financial (Under)Development in Africa
What are the factors explaining the low level of financial development across most 
African countries and the variation of financial development within Africa? In the 
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
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Figure 2.25  Life Insurance Penetration across Countries, 2008
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following, we discuss several factors, including (in box 2.5) a benchmarking model 
that takes into account these factors simultaneously.
Size and income level
A first explanation is the small size and low income levels of African economies. 
(We refer to the scale argument discussed in chapter 1.) At the same time as eco-
nomic development implies that a larger share of the population is participating in 
market-based transactions and thus demanding formal financial services, higher 
incomes imply lower costs and greater skills, resulting in more cost-effective supply. 
Figure 2.26 shows that, indeed, financial depth increases with GDP per capita. 
However, we also see that many African countries have even lower levels of private 
credit to GDP than we would predict based on their level of economic develop-
ment. This applies to many low-income countries, such as Cameroon, the Republic 
of Congo, Gabon, and Senegal, but also several middle-income commodity export-
ers, such as Algeria and Botswana. Closely related to income levels is the share of the 
population living and working in the informal economy. Because of the documen-
tation requirements, formal financial institutions are less likely to supply services to 
households and firms in the informal sector, resulting in less supply; by the same 
token, however, the demand for formal financial services will be lower in the infor-
mal sector because of the need to avoid tax payments and regulatory requirements.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010); World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, 
Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/.
Note: Sample size: 119 countries. GDP per capita is taken in log scale. For a complete listing of 3-letter country 
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Figure 2.26  Financial Development and GDP Per Capita, 2009
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Inflation
Figure 2.26 controls for inflation, which is a second important factor explaining 
financial underdevelopment. A low and stable rate of inflation provides incentives 
for financial rather than nonfinancial forms of savings. By providing monetary cer-
tainty, it is also conducive to long-term contracting and, thus, long-term savings 
and investment. The absence of monetary stability is therefore directly related to 
the volatility that undermines financial contracting. Savers are more likely to en-
trust their savings for a given interest rate if they can be quite confident of receiving 
the expected return in terms of real consumption units. Similarly, monetary stabil-
ity allows investors to compute the return on projects adequately and commit to 
payments in real terms. Empirical research has shown the relationship between 
monetary stability and financial development, which also holds for African econo-
mies (see Boyd, Levine, and Smith 2001). However, as we discuss in chapter 4, 
monetary stability is a broader concept than low and stable inflation and is a neces-
sary, but far from sufficient, condition for financial deepening.
Low savings rates
On the resource and deposit sides, aggregate indicators are consistent with the gen-
erally low savings rates across the continent. These, in turn, can be explained by the 
low and volatile incomes and the demographic structure of African populations, 
which are dominated by young age-groups, high illiteracy rates, and low life expec-
tancy. In some countries, life expectancy has recently decreased again because of 
AIDS. The median savings rate in Africa is 10.2 percent, which is lower than the 
rate in all other regions of the world except the Middle East (figure 2.27). It is im-
portant to note, however, that there is wide cross-country variation within the con-
tinent, ranging from −121 percent in postconflict Liberia to 72 percent in oil- 
exporting Equatorial Guinea. The low aggregate financial development indicators 
documented above are also consistent with the high degree of capital flight docu-
mented in the literature on Africa. While exact numbers are missing because of the 
informal methods used to expatriate domestic savings, aggregate data point to Af-
rica as the continent with the largest share of private wealth held abroad (Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2001). Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) estimate capital flight 
from 25 low-income Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1970–96 at 
US$193 billion, while Ndikumana and Boyce (2008) estimate capital flight from 40 
Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1970–2004 at US$420 billion, 
making these countries effectively net creditors to the rest of the world.
A rough indicator of the private capital flight is the ratio of offshore to domestic 
deposits.
7 This is significantly higher in Africa than in other regions (figure 2.28). 
However, it has been declining significantly in recent years, which may be inter-
preted as a sign of the increasing confidence of Africans in their domestic financial 
systems (figure 2.29). Because this indicator is a ratio of offshore and domestic 
  deposits, however, the reduction may be driven as much by a lower return on 
  expatriated savings (which could also be caused by tightened legislation in Europe 
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Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
data-catalog/world-development-indicators/.
Note: Sample size: 161 countries. The figure shows the minimum, maximum, and median of the ratio of gross 
domestic savings as a percent of GDP. The shaded boxes indicate the interquartile range.
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Figure 2.27. Domestic Savings across Regions, 2008
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).
Note: Sample size: 144 countries. The figure shows the minimum, maximum, and median of offshore to domestic 
bank deposits. The shaded boxes indicate the interquartile range. Outliers have been omitted.
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Figure 2.28    The Ratio of Offshore to Domestic Deposits across Regions, 2009
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and other industrialized countries against money laundering) as by the increase in 
domestic deposits documented above.
Previously, this capital flight could not be offset by private inflows. Until a few 
years ago, Africa was the only continent in which donor funding exceeded private 
portfolio funding (Senbet and Otchere 2006). As in almost all other parts of the 
developing world, however, Africa has benefitted from the global liquidity glut in 
the form of high capital inflows, though the increase has not been as steep as in 
other regions, for example Central and Eastern Europe (figure 2.30).
Population density
Population density is another important driver of financial depth, especially within 
Africa (Allen et al. 2010; Beck et al. 2008). Directly related to scale, a more disperse 
population is more difficult to serve, especially in the context of Africa and its dete-
riorated transportation infrastructure. Most African countries have significantly 
lower population densities than other developing countries (figure 2.31). To illus-
trate the importance of population density, take the example of Burundi and Zam-
bia. Despite its low income level and an ongoing conflict, Burundi has a ratio of 
private credit to GDP of almost 20 percent, a higher level than Zambia, which has 
half the population density, but which has been socioeconomically and politically 
stable over the past 50 years.
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Figure 2.29    The Ratio of Offshore to Domestic Deposits over Time, 
1995–2009
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Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010).











































Africa Europe and Central Asia Middle East
East Asia and Pacific South Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean high-income countries
year
Figure 2.30  Capital Flows across Regions, 2000–09
Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators/.
Note: Sample size: 209 countries. The highest African values are for Burundi, the Comoros, Mauritius, Mayotte, and 
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Figure 2.31  Population Density across Countries, 2008
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Governance
Financial contracts depend on the certainty of the legal rights of borrowers, credi-
tors, and outside investors and the predictability and speed of the fair and impartial 
enforcement of these rights. International comparisons have provided ample evi-
dence for the critical role of legal system efficiency and its different elements in fi-
nancial sector development (for example, see La Porta et al. 1997; Levine, Loayza, 
and Beck 2000). However, the governance agenda is broader than the contractual 
framework. Corruption can undermine relationships between banks and custom-
ers, as well as between regulators and banks. Political interference can have a nega-
tive effect on the optimal allocation of resources.
African economies still face serious governance challenges. Figure 2.32 shows 
the relative position of African countries in a composite indicator of the rule of law. 
On a scale that has been normalized to give a worldwide average of 0 and a stan-
dard deviation of 1, the median across African countries is 0.73. With the exception 
of a few middle-income countries, most African countries are below the average   
of 0. An assessment of the evolution of this indicator from 1996 to 2009, the period 
for which this composite indicator is available, shows no firm trend toward im-
provement over these 13 years. Nonetheless, the African countries lagging the most 
caught up somewhat, as can be seen from the trend in the 25th percentile. It is im-
portant to note that this indicator is a relative one, that is, if all countries in the 
world improve, this would not be picked up by the indicator because, by construc-
Source: Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).
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Figure 2.32  Rule of Law over Time in Africa, 1996–2009
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tion, it has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. So, the statement we can 
make based on figure 2.32 is that, relative to the rest of the world, Africa has not 
improved, notwithstanding improvements in the legal system.
Variation in financial sector development across the continent
Box 2.5 shows that there is substantial variation across Africa in the depth, breadth, 
efficiency, and diversity of financial systems, which we point out throughout this 
chapter. It is worthwhile recapturing this. The financial systems of most African 
Building on a large literature that assesses the relative importance of different country char-
acteristics in explaining financial development, Beck et al. (2008) construct a benchmarking 
model that allows a comparison of the actual level of financial development of a country with 
the expected level also allows the progress of countries to be tracked over time. Deviations 
of the actual from the expected level of financial development can be explained by country-
specific circumstances not captured in the regression model (for example, civil strife) or by 
the impact of policies that are intentionally not included in the regression model. In its most 
basic form, the regression model includes the log of GDP per capita to account for the posi-
tive relationship between income and finance, as well as the square of the log of GDP per 
capita to account for nonlinearities in the relationship between income and finance, country 
size measured by the log of population to capture scale effects, population density to capture 
the infrastructure costs of outreach, the age dependency ratio to capture differences in sav-
ings trends and the demand for financial service products, and dummies for offshore centers, 
transition economies, and oil-exporting countries.
The level of private credit to GDP has been, on average, at the expected level for African 
countries (figure a). Figure b, in contrast, shows that the average low-income country in   
Africa has not achieved the level of financial development expected according to country 
Box 2.5  Benchmarking Financial Development
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characteristics. Data for North Africa show a persistently higher level of actual financial de-
velopment  than  is  predicted  by  the  benchmarking  model  (figure  c).  The  variables  in  the 
model contribute to the low expected level of financial development in Africa. The lower in-
comes in Africa explain 7 percentage points of the lower ratio of private credit to GDP in Af-
rica compared with South Asia. The much lower population density in Africa compared with 
South Asia explains 14 percentage points of the lower level of private sector lending in the 
Africa  region,  while  population  size,  in  itself,  does  not  seem  to  matter  much.  The  higher 
share of the young population segment in Africa also contributes to a much lower level of fi-
nancial development compared with other developing regions, such as South Asia.
Source: Beck et al. (2008).
Box 2.5  Benchmarking Financial Development (continued)
Figure b. Private Credit to GDP: Expected Versus Actual across Low-Income Africa



















Figure c. Private Credit to GDP: Expected Versus Actual across North Africa
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countries essentially consist of banking systems that provide basic transaction and 
short-term credit services, thus fulfilling the Finance for Markets role, but at high 
cost. Some of these countries have stock exchanges (see elsewhere above), but these 
have a limited role, if any, in the impact of finance on the real economy. None of 
these countries has a significant contractual savings industry.
Several groups stick out from this sketch of a typical African financial system 
(Alawode 2003). First, there is a group of middle-income countries, such as Egypt, 
Mauritius, Morocco, and South Africa, that not only have much more developed 
banking systems, but also exhibit much more diversified financial systems. These 
countries also have better institutional capacity. However, even within this group, 
there are important differences. Consumer credit, for example, plays an important 
role in South Africa, but not in Mauritius, mostly for cultural reasons. A second 
important group is large low-income countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nige-
ria. The financial systems in these countries do not have the same degree of sophis-
tication. Yet, unlike their smaller low-income peers, they have the capacity to sus-
tain more diversified financial systems, including a diversified nonbank financial 
sector  and  capital  markets. A  third  important  group  consists  of  commodity- 
exporting countries. As shown by Beck (2011), financial systems are as susceptible 
to a Dutch Disease phenomenon as any other part of the institutional framework 
of countries. Commodity exporters have, on average, less well developed financial 
systems and banks that are more liquid, more well capitalized, and more profit-
able, but give fewer loans to firms. Firms in resource-based economies use less ex-
ternal finance, and a smaller share of them use bank loans, although there is the 
same level of demand as in other countries, thus pointing to supply constraints.   
A fourth group consists of offshore centers, such as Mauritius, with a segmented 
financial system.
An additional important difference is that between common and civil law coun-
tries, a difference that has been explored in depth by Honohan and Beck (2007). 
Common law countries—all former British colonies—not only show, on average, a 
higher level of financial development (private credit to GDP shows a median of 24 
percent as opposed to 15 percent in civil code countries), but also have different 
regulatory approaches. The different profiles of financial systems across countries 
have implications for the discussions in the following chapters and for the formula-
tion of policy, a topic to which we return in chapter 6.
The Firm and Household Usage of Financial Services
Limited access to enterprise finance
The limited outreach of Africa’s financial systems also appears on the user side. 
Enterprise surveys give a good overview of the obstacles enterprises face and the 
financing patterns of enterprises. These microlevel data have been used exten- 
sively by researchers to understand the challenges faced by enterprises in countries 
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in Africa and other developing regions (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido 2007; 
Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés 2007). Figure 2.33 shows the limited access 
to external finance by enterprises in Africa. On average, only 23.1 percent of enter-
prises have loans or lines of credit, while the corresponding share among enter-
prises in non-African developing countries is 46.1 percent. This is also reflected in 
obstacles identified by the enterprises themselves.
The bank-based nature of African finance also becomes clear if one considers 
the various sources of external financing for enterprises. Figure 2.34 shows that 
more than 75 percent of the external funding for a cross-section of African coun-
tries and enterprises comes from private commercial banks, while less than 12 per-
cent comes from nonbank sources.
In addition, there is limited access to other nonbank sources. We have docu-
mented the shallow nature of organized equity and debt markets elsewhere above, 
but other segments of finance that are prominent in developed countries and many 
emerging markets of Asia and Latin America are missing in Africa as well. Figure 
2.35 shows the limited penetration of private equity across Africa compared with 
other regions of the world as measured using the ratio of private equity to GDP.
Cost and documentation barriers in deposit and payment services
The high cost of banking affects not only borrowers through high lending interest 
rates, but also deposit customers through high account fees and high minimum 
Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC,  
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed in 2010).
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Figure 2.33  Access to Bank Loans across Countries, 2006–10
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Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC, 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed in 2010).
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Figure 2.35  Private Equity Penetration across the World, 2009–10
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balances. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2008) document the signifi-
cant monetary barriers that potential bank customers face throughout the devel-
oping world, but especially in African countries, in opening and maintaining bank 
accounts. By themselves and abstracting from other barriers, banking fees can ex-
clude more than 80 percent of a population from accessing formal checking ac-
counts (World Bank 2008a). More recent data collection efforts have confirmed 
this. Take, for instance, the fees for a current account. They amount to more than   
4 percent of monthly income across African countries, compared with less than   
3 percent across a set of comparable non-African developing countries (figure 
2.36). It is important to stress that these high ratios are driven not only by low GDP 
per capita, but also by the absolute levels of the fees, which tend to be much higher 
in Africa than elsewhere. The same holds for specific products, such as debit or 
credit cards, for which the average annual fee is much higher in Africa (US$12.54) 
than in other developing countries (US$9.93) (figure 2.37).
Another important barrier for many potential customers in Africa involves the 
documentation requirements, that is, the number of documents that applicants 
have to show to open an account (figure 2.38). In countries where few have formal 
documentation, such as identity cards (which, in some countries, Uganda for in-
stance, do not exist), passports, or driver licenses, where large segments of the pop-
ulation work in the informal economy, and where few have formal residential 
  addresses that they can prove, documentation requirements constitute an often in-
surmountable hurdle. We return to this topic in chapter 3 to discuss alternative 
solutions and in chapter 5 to discuss the regulatory implications.
Source: World Bank (2009a).
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Figure 2.36  Account Fees across Countries
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What explains the high costs of deposit and payment services in Africa com-
pared with the costs in other parts of the world? There are certainly many country- 
and bank-level factors that explain these costs. A rigorous analysis unearthing causal 
factors will require more data over long time periods, but the initial correlations 
Source: World Bank (2009a).
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Figure 2.37  Card Fees across Countries
Source: World Bank (2009a).
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Figure 2.38  Documentation Requirements across Countries
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reported by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2008) are suggestive. They 
indicate that cost and documentation barriers are greater in countries in which 
there is less competition within the banking system and in which there are more 
stringent restrictions on bank entry and activities. Poorly developed physical infra-
structure is, not surprisingly, another critical factor explaining the high costs in 
many African countries. Finally, a more vibrant media sector that can disseminate 
information about interest rates and fees is associated with lower barriers. Also, the 
barriers faced by bank customers are greater if banking systems are predominantly 
government owned, but lower if there is more foreign bank participation. Larger 
banks seem to impose fewer barriers on customers, perhaps because they are better 
positioned to exploit economies of scale and scope. This last finding adds another 
interesting perspective to the issue of bank consolidation in Africa.
Remittances
The high costs of financial services are also reflected in the costs of transferring 
international remittances. Figure 2.39 shows remittance costs across corridors, 
that is, from a specific sending to a specific receiving country, with cost informa-
tion averaged across the largest formal remittance providers. As the figure shows, 
corridors that include African countries have significantly higher costs. Beck and 
Martínez Pería (2011) point to familiar factors explaining the cost variation across 
corridors. Corridors with a smaller number of migrants and with less competi-
tion among providers have higher costs. As in the case of interest margins, this 
points to a lack of scale and a lack of competition as the dominating factors ex-
plaining the high remittance costs in Africa. Beck and Martínez Pería also show 
Source: Beck and Martínez Pería (2011).
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Figure 2.39  Remittance Costs across Countries
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that remittance corridors dominated by banks have higher fees, which emphasizes 
the need for broadening the institutional landscape. It is important to note that 
these  data  only  refer  to  formal  remittance  services. According  to  estimates  by 
  Freund and Spatafora (2008), at least a third of total remittances are sent through 
informal channels, such as in-kind or cash transfers, transfers through domestic 
shops and businesses or social networks, or the underinvoicing of import receipts, 
commonly referred to as the hawala system (literally, in Arabic, bill of exchange, 
promissory note, or letter of credit). Mazzucato, van den Boom, and Nsowah- 
Nuamah (2004) show that 65 percent of the remittances going to Ghana are sent 
through informal channels.
Conclusions
Over recent decades, the financial sectors of Africa have slowly begun to realize 
their potential to mobilize domestic resources and finance African growth. The ag-
gregate indicators presented in this chapter show only the surface of the much 
deeper processes and the progress ongoing within African finance. Across the con-
tinent, there are numerous examples of finance firmly finding its role as a catalyst 
in transforming African economies by providing capital and credit to new busi-
nesses or supporting the expansion of productive capacity in established firms; by 
providing cheap and rapid transfer channels for remittances from abroad, within 
subregions, and from the growing urban centers to rural communities using mo-
bile technology; by offering new products such as weather insurance to help farm-
ers manage climate risks, or equipment leasing to help small enterprises, or using 
warehouse receipts as security to push financing into agricultural value chains; by 
providing governments and firms with a reliable and growing source of domestic 
long-term funding through liquid capital markets; and by supporting low-income 
households in the more effective management of their lives through microcredit, 
no-frills accounts, or microhealth insurance. These developments are key trans-
mission channels for growth. For firms, financial development is important in 
helping promote start-ups, which, at the country level, means growth potential and 
economic diversification.
However, despite the significant growth in the financial sector, many firms and 
most households are still excluded from access to financial services in far too many 
countries. African finance continues to be short term and costly. Although African 
financial systems have proven reasonably resilient to the shock waves of the global 
crisis, weak governance and the weak regulatory and supervisory framework ex-
plain the fragility in several countries. In the next three chapters, we discuss each of 
these challenges.
The analysis in this chapter has clearly shown the bank-based nature of finance 
in Africa, which, to a large extent, is consistent with the level of economic and fi-
nancial development of the continent. It also goes hand in hand with the limited 
services, the short maturity of services on both sides of the balance sheet, and the 
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limited competition. Financial services that are provided by other institutions and 
markets outside Africa are not available in Africa because of the lack of a more di-
versified financial system. The limited access can be documented on the supply side 
and on the demand side. In the following chapters, we argue that fostering compe-
tition, focusing on new providers to expand the availability of services, and looking 
beyond the supply-side constraints to the demand-side constraints are critical to 
deepening and broadening the financial systems in Africa.
Notes
1.  For a recent comprehensive discussion on the effects of the crisis on Africa, see Allen 
and Giovannetti (2011).
2.  In addition to the reduction in remittances, there was also apparently some return 
migration of Africans to their home countries, exacerbating the economic pressures.
3.  As an example, a banking system with a Herfindahl index of 2,000 might be a system 
consisting of five banks in which the banks have equal market shares or in which two banks 
capture a total of 50 percent of the market, while the other three capture the remainder.
4.  Claessens and Laeven (2004) show that there is no significant correlation between 
concentration and a measure of competition, the H Statistics.
5.  These countries are Angola, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Malawi, Morocco, and Sudan. The 
two African outliers on the right in the figure, which show low levels of market power, are 
Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire.
6.  For a general overview of the literature on the effects of foreign bank entry, see Cull 
and Martínez Pería (forthcoming).
7.  As pointed out by Honohan and Beck (2007), the level of offshore deposits might also 
arise because of factors unrelated to capital flight, such as use by multinational enterprises or 
exporters. However, the level of capital flight may be understated by the level of offshore 
deposits because it does not include capital flight through nonbank channels.
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Introduction
The outreach of financial systems in Africa is still extremely limited (see chapter 2). 
Honohan and Beck (2007) report that, on average, fewer than one in five adults in 
Sub-Saharan Africa has an account with a formal financial institution. Nonethe-
less, we have seen lots of innovation in recent years that has led to greater access. 
Technology has played an important role in this expansion, but so have new actors, 
such as telecommunications companies. We may also observe a move away from   
a credit-led inclusion strategy to savings- and payment-led inclusion strategies. 
These developments put a premium on financial literacy and on an open and 
adaptable regulatory framework to maximize the benefits.
This chapter takes a fresh look at the access to financial services in Africa and the 
efforts to expand it. In undertaking our analysis, we have benefited from much bet-
ter tools to measure the outreach of financial institutions and markets, including 
information on the geographical and product outreach of financial institutions, 
the use of financial services by households, and access barriers through documen-
tation requirements. We detail the plethora of innovative efforts and experiences 
involved in expanding outreach that are ongoing throughout the region, many of 
which are built on technology.
Our analysis leads us to a somewhat different emphasis than previous analyses. 
First, we stress more than others the benefits of competition and the consequent 
financial innovations (without ignoring the risks and challenges) that can help ex-
pand the outreach of financial systems. Second, we emphasize the need to look be-
yond existing institutions and models; innovation often comes from unexpected 
quarters. Among other steps to enhance outreach and inclusion, this implies that 
one must look beyond the credit-led approach toward an approach based more 
closely on payment services. Finally, we would like to push the conversation beyond 
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a purely supply-based analysis toward demand-side constraints, including the limi-
tations in financial literacy.
The chapter opens with a description of the current knowledge about access to 
finance in Africa, thereby expanding on the discussion in the previous chapter. We 
then provide a framework—the access possibilities frontier—for the discussion in 
the remainder of the chapter. Using this framework, we focus on four specific areas: 
the current providers of financial services and innovative approaches, the role of 
technology, the role of demand-side constraints, and the role of government and 
policy reforms. We end the chapter with a focus on two specific areas of concern: 
rural finance and the finance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
What Do We Know about Access to Finance?
In chapter 2, we chronicle the limited outreach to financial services across Africa in 
comparison with other regions of the world. Most of the indicators—the relative 
number of branches, accounts, and so on—are proxies for the overall level of fi-
nancial service use. Detailed numbers on the banked share of populations across all 
53 countries of the region are currently not available, though efforts are under way 
to make progress in this respect (see box 3.1). Recent enterprise and household 
Until five years ago, no cross-country data on the outreach of financial systems and few da-
tabases at the national level were available. In 2004, the World Bank launched an effort to 
collect aggregate proxy indicators on outreach by measuring the number of branches, auto-
mated  teller  machines  (ATMs),  and  deposit  and  loan  accounts  (Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt  and 
Martínez Pería 2007). These indicators complemented traditional indicators of financial depth, 
such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to gross domestic product (GDP) and the ratio of private 
credit to GDP, but it was not until 2010 that the International Monetary Fund started to main-
stream these indicators in the International Financial Statistics database by collecting them 
systematically. In parallel efforts, Christen, Jayadeva, and Rosenberg (2004) collected data on 
socially oriented or alternative financial institutions with a double bottom line, while Peachey 
and Roe (2006) collected relevant information on member institutions of the World Savings 
Bank Association. Using these proxy indicators and other aggregate variables such as GDP 
per capita and financial depth, Honohan (2008) estimates the share of households with ac-
cess to formal financial accounts; these estimates are also reported in World Bank (2008a) 
and Honohan and Beck (2007). Estimates that less than 20 percent of the households in Sub-
Saharan Africa have access to formal financial accounts are based on these extrapolations.
Household survey instruments capturing the use of formal financial services are being 
applied more consistently across countries. The FinScope and FinAccess exercises in south-
ern and eastern Africa and, more recently, in several West African countries allow compari-
sons across countries, though their primary purpose is the in-depth analysis of the outreach 
of national financial markets.
 Such consistent survey instruments and similar questionnaires 
allow a more rigorous analysis across countries and over time.
Box 3.1  Measuring Access to Financial Services: Recent Advances
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Since around 2007–08, a more systematic approach to the collection of cross-country 
survey-based access indicators has been implemented. Gallup has recently undertaken a 
household survey in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries. The World Bank, with support from 
the  Bill  and  Melinda  Gates  Foundation,  is  initiating  a  broad  cross-country  exercise—the 
Global  Financial  Inclusion  Survey—by  including  financial  questions  in  an  existing  Gallup 
global poll so as to generate baseline data on financial inclusion levels across 150 countries 
using samples of 1,000 individuals per country. The survey will be run every three years to 
measure and track specific data on the use of and access to formal and informal financial 
services.
It is important to note that these indicators, even the more refined ones, are estimates of 
access to financial services and not exact numbers because they are based on representa-
tive samples and not a census. Comparisons across countries and over time should there-
fore be treated with caution, and even more care should be applied in making subnational 
comparisons based on small samples.
A related, but separate data collection exercise is going on to gauge the size and effect of 
barriers, such as the costs of opening and maintaining accounts and documentation require-
ments, as discussed in chapter 2. First reported by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería 
(2008), such indicators show the substantial barriers in Africa compared with other regions of 
the developing world and the negative repercussions this has for the use of financial services. 
Assuming, somewhat arbitrarily, that poor people cannot afford to spend more than 2 percent 
of their annual income on financial services, the fees on checking accounts alone can ex-
clude more than 80 percent of the population in some African countries, such as Kenya, Ma-
lawi, and Uganda, from opening bank accounts.
a Efforts are under way to expand this exer-
cise to a broader set of countries and financial institutions.
By relating aggregate proxy indicators of banking system outreach and barrier indicators 
related to cost, eligibility, and geographic access, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería 
(2007, 2008) show that financial breadth is significantly, though not perfectly correlated with 
financial depth indicators. Financial breadth is significantly correlated with the overall level 
of institutional and economic development, credit information sharing, and the development 
of physical infrastructure, though less correlated with more detailed indicators of the con-
tractual framework.
These data collection exercises—aggregate cross-country indicators, in-depth country 
household and enterprise surveys, and supply-side data collection on barriers to access—
are complementary and will allow researchers and analysts not only to obtain a better quan-
titative picture of the access to and use of formal financial services, but also to identify bot-
tlenecks and gaps and, ultimately, the policy areas in which reforms will have the greatest 
effect. The first attempts at measuring the access possibilities frontier in South Africa have 
provided additional insights, and, as detailed data collections proceed for other African coun-
tries, similar exercises can be undertaken elsewhere.
a.  The 2 percent limit is based on unpublished research by the South African Universal Services Agency in 
the context of a mandated rollout of telecommunications services for lower-income families. Because 
financial transaction accounts and telecommunications services can be considered network products, 
similar assumptions on affordability for both types of service seem reasonable.
Box 3.1    Measuring Access to Financial Services: Recent Advances 
(continued)
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surveys on individual countries, however, give us a first indication of the share of 
households and enterprises that use financial services and thus offer a better pic-
ture of who has access to which financial services, even if only in a selected number 
of countries.
A recent Gallup survey provides aggregate data for 18 African countries, thus 
representing a third of the countries on the continent (see table 3.1). The data 
broadly confirm other estimates. They show that the use of formal financial prod-
ucts ranges from 49 percent in South Africa to 1 percent in the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo and Niger. They also show that households in urban areas are more 
likely than households in rural areas to have accounts, that men are more likely 
than women to have accounts, and that the use of formal financial services is espe-
cially concentrated among the richest 20 percent of the population.
These aggregate survey data give us a reasonably good picture of the use of for-
mal financial services. There is ample evidence, however, that there is widespread 
use of informal financial services, ranging from moneylenders and deposit collec-
Table 3.1    The Use of Formal Banking Services across 18 African Countries, 
2009
percent of the respondents to the question “Do you have a bank account?”
 Country Yes No Demographic profile Yes No
South Africa 49 50 Residence
Kenya 29 70   Urban 28 71
Zimbabwe 28 72   Rural 15 84
Nigeria 23 75 Quintile
Uganda 21 79   Poorest 11 89
Ghana 19 81   Second 11 88
Rwanda 16 84   Middle 15 85
Tanzania 16 84   Fourth 21 78
Malawi 11 89   Richest 38 62
Zambia  9 91 Gender
Cameroon  8 92   Men 23 76
Chad  7 93   Women 16 83
Côte d’Ivoire  6 94 Age-group
Senegal  6 94   15–24 years 15 85
Burundi  4 96   25–39 years 23 76
Mali  2 98   40–54 years 21 78
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1 97   55+ years 20 79
Niger  1 99
Source: Gallup survey data.
Note: The surveys were conducted in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries in 2009. The data are weighted using adult 
population estimates for 2008 developed by the World Bank.
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tors over savings clubs to informal financial arrangements among families, friends, 
and neighbors (Aryeetey et al. 1997). In their financial diaries on a series of devel-
oping countries, including South Africa, Collins et al. (2009) document that the 
poor rely on an array of financial services and financial partners and that the total 
amount of financial transactions over the course of a year add up to a multiple of 
incomes over the same period. The financial diary analysis also makes clear that 
informal financial arrangements are an imperfect substitute for formal financial 
services, which are out of reach for most of the poor and even parts of the middle 
class in many African countries. Meanwhile, informal financial services are often 
unreliable and costly and violate the privacy of customers.
The FinScope and FinAccess surveys in southern and eastern Africa confirm the 
evidence presented in the financial diaries and elsewhere on the widespread use of 
semiformal (microfinance providers and cooperatives) and informal financial ser-
vices. By surveying individuals about a large set of formal and informal financial 
services and service providers, they give us a good picture of the household use of 
financial services and the individual characteristics that predict whether someone 
uses financial services.
Figure 3.1 presents FinScope and FinAccess data on access strands for 12 coun-
tries in southern and eastern Africa, that is, the shares of a population that (1) use 
formal banking services; (2) use formal nonbanking services, but not formal bank-
Source: FinScope (database), FinMark Trust, Johannesburg, http://www.finscope.co.za/new/pages/default.aspx 
(accessed in 2010).
Note: The FinScope and FinAccess survey years are indicated next to the names of the countries.
Figure 3.1    Access to Financial Services across Southern, Eastern,  
and Western Africa
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ing services; (3) use informal services, but not formal services; and (4) are com-
pletely excluded from any formal or informal financial service. As we can see, there 
is  wide  variation  across  countries. While,  in  South Africa,  62.5  percent  of  the   
surveyed population uses formal banking services, only 12 percent do so in Mo-
zambique and Tanzania. However, the segments of the population lacking access to   
formal banking services often use informal or semiformal services. The second 
strand of financial access—users of formal nonbank services, such as microfinance 
institutions (MFIs)—accounts for 18 percent in Botswana, but only 1 percent in 
Mozambique. Finally, the segment of the population with access to informal ser-
vices, but not formal services (the third strand) ranges from 1 percent in Namibia to 
42 percent in Uganda. A large segment of populations are considered excluded from 
both formal and informal services, though the extent varies significantly across 
countries, ranging from 23.5 percent in South Africa to 78 percent in Mozambique.
Household survey data do not only allow us to focus on the aggregate numbers, 
but they do provide a picture of the composition of the banked population (Hono-
han and King 2009). Univariate comparisons between the banked and unbanked 
segments of the population according to characteristics and multivariate regres-
sion analysis offer insights into the composition of the banked population. One of 
the most robust predictors of formal financial service use is income (often mea-
sured by expenditures): more well off individuals are significantly more likely to 
use formal services.
1 Education is another strong predictor: the use of formal ser-
vices increases linearly with educational attainment. Geography measured by rural 
or urban residence is not as strongly associated with the use of formal services once 
we control for other household and individual characteristics. Employment status 
is another important correlate of the use of formal services, while financial literacy, 
numeracy, and risk aversion are less consistently correlated with the use of formal 
services. We also find a positive correlation with the ownership of a mobile phone, 
suggesting that participation in the market economy is related to higher demand 
for financial services.
One important dimension is gender: across countries, women are less likely to 
have bank accounts. This is confirmed by the FinScope and Gallup surveys. Is this 
gender gap caused by discrimination, lower demand by women for financial ser-
vices, or disadvantages along some other dimensions, for example, education or 
formal employment? Using FinScope and FinAccess data and controlling for other 
individual  characteristics  such  as  income,  education,  and  formal  employment, 
Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone (2011) find that women are as likely as men to use 
formal services. This suggests that the narrower coverage of women by banks in 
southern and eastern Africa is not necessarily caused by lower demand or by dis-
crimination within the financial system, but, rather, by the fact that women are less 
likely to use formal banking services because they have lower incomes and lower 
levels of educational attainment and are less likely to hold formal jobs. There may 
also be a demand dimension given that many women already have indirect access 
to formal banking services through bank accounts in the names of their husbands. 
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This is not to downplay the problem of intrafamily resource conflicts, a phenome-
non widely documented in the literature (for example, see Goetz and Gupta 1996) 
or the problem that women in Africa are discriminated against along other dimen-
sions (Hallward-Driemeier 2011). The only country in which there seems to be 
somewhat of a bias toward women is South Africa, the richest among the nine 
countries in the Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone (2011) study. Across the nine coun-
tries, women are significantly more likely to use informal services, especially in the 
eastern African  countries.  In  comparing  the  excluded  population  of  men  and 
women, the authors find that, overall, women are less likely to be excluded from 
any financial service. It is important to note that these results are for southern and 
eastern Africa; so, they may not hold for other parts of the continent. However, 
they point to an important caveat in the exploration of the characteristics of the 
banked population, that is, one must look beyond univariate correlations to search 
for the truly restricting household and individual characteristics preventing people 
from accessing formal financial services.
An analysis of enterprise data leads to similar conclusions. Firms with female 
ownership participation are no less likely to have loans, and they rely on external 
finance to fund the same share of working capital or fixed asset investment (Aterido, 
Beck, and Iacovone 2011). This finding can be explained through a selection bias: 
women are less likely than men to run sole proprietorships, and firms with female 
ownership participation are smaller, but more likely to innovate. This conclusion is 
in line with findings reported in a study on women and entrepreneurship in the 
North African subregion (CAWTAR and IFC 2007). The study shows that access to 
finance is not among the three most important barriers facing women entrepre-
neurs in Tunisia, mainly because of the high level of education of the women entre-
preneurs interviewed.
There are undoubtedly a host of legal, social, cultural, historical, and economic 
traditions, concepts, and practices that account for the varying gender-based dif-
ferences in access to finance, and this book cannot possibly explore them ade-
quately.  In  any  case,  the  developmental  implications  are  significant  for Africa. 
Through varying degrees of commitment for policy action, women’s contributions 
to economic development have long been recognized in households, food produc-
tion systems, and national economies. Increasing women’s access to finance is cen-
tral to expanding their economic and social opportunities and advancing women’s 
rights and, in turn, Africa’s broader development prospects.
Household surveys also allow us to track outreach and access to financial services 
over time, even though the surveys are repeated cross-sectional surveys and not true 
panels. For example, household data were collected in 2006 and 2009 through the 
FinAccess surveys in Kenya. A comparison of the two surveys shows an increase in 
the use of formal financial services, but not at the expense of the use of informal 
services. It also shows changes in the use of certain financial service providers; in 
this case, this involved less use of savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and 
more prominent use of MFIs.
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Household surveys have also confirmed the findings of previous country-level 
studies indicating that informal financial service provision is important across 
  Africa. While only 23 percent of the population uses formal financial services in 
Kenya, more than 50 percent use informal services. Digging deeper, as in the finan-
cial diaries, one notices that most individuals use a variety of financial products 
and providers. Informal financial services are important for large shares of the en-
terprise and household population, and this will continue to be true. The carica-
ture of the moneylender demanding usury interest rates as representative of infor-
mal financial services has to be qualified. Informal financial service providers range 
from bus drivers who accept remittance payments to rotating savings and credit 
associations and accumulating savings and credit associations in urban and rural 
areas. Figure 3.2 shows that there is an overlap among the users of formal and in-
formal financial services in Kenya. The FinAccess survey in 2009 found that over 50 
percent of users of formal banking services also used informal financial services.
Formal institutions have also made inroads in areas in which informal providers 
once dominated. The best example is the domestic remittance market in Kenya, 
where the introduction of M-Pesa has crowded out informal and other formal de-
livery channels for domestic remittances (FinAccess 2009). In the FinAccess survey 
of 2006, a relative (weighted) majority of the people surveyed named specialist 
Source: FinAccess (2009).
Note: The figure shows the relative shares of surveyed individuals that use formal or informal financial services or 
some combination thereof.
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money transfer operators as the least risky and most rapid channel for sending re-
mittances, and friends and family as the least expensive and most easily accessed. In 
2009, M-Pesa was rated the least risky, the most rapid, and the most easily accessed, 
but the second least expensive. M-Pesa has not only had an impact on perceptions, 
but also on remittance flows. The market entry of M-Pesa may explain the increase 
in remittance flows within Kenya. In 2006, 16.5 percent of the people surveyed re-
ported that they had received a domestic remittance, but, in 2009, the share was 
51.8 percent. Similarly, in 2006, 16.9 percent of the people surveyed reported that 
they had sent a domestic remittance, while, in 2009, the share was 35.3 percent. 
One can certainly not attribute this increase in remittances exclusively to M-Pesa, 
but these numbers suggest that M-Pesa has had a positive impact on people’s lives 
and livelihoods.
Broadening Finance: A Reality Check
How realistic is it to expect the formal financial system to reach 100 percent of the 
population? What are realistic benchmarks and targets in the effort to expand ac-
cess to financial services? Measuring access to financial services is an important 
first step. However, to develop policies and targets, benchmarks are needed, and the 
bottlenecks inhibiting the expansion of access have to be identified.
Access to finance is limited. If African policy makers wish to double the share of 
populations with access to some type of formal financial service, what has to be 
done? In the following, we present a framework and identify four areas for discus-
sion and policy reform: the institutions and products that allow African financial 
systems to expand outreach, the demand-side constraints and solutions, the role of 
technology, and the role of governments and donors.
To provide an analytical framework for our discussion throughout the remain-
der of the chapter, we build on the discussion in chapter 1 and introduce the con-
cept of the access possibilities frontier. This frontier is the point of the maximum 
possible commercially viable outreach of the formal financial system given the 
technology and the macroeconomic and institutional framework (Beck and de la 
Torre 2007). This concept allows us to distinguish among the banked, bankable, 
and unbankable population and provides us with a framework to discuss the bot-
tlenecks impeding efforts to reach the frontier (turning the bankable population 
into the banked population) and push the frontier outward (turning the unbank-
able population into the bankable population) (figure 3.3). This concept can also 
serve as a reality check on the ambition to expand the access to financial services. 
Finally, it provides a framework to distinguish exogenous trends and develop-
ments—such as technology, globalization, and regional integration—and govern-
ment policies, including regulation.
To understand the limitations to outreach, we first return to the discussion in 
chapter 1 on the two main barriers that financial institutions face in reaching out to 
previously unbanked segments of the population: (1) transaction costs and the re-
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sulting scale economies of financial services at the level of the user, the institution, 
and the market and (2) systemic and idiosyncratic risks. To complement these 
  supply-side constraints, we differentiate between economic and noneconomic fac-
tors on the demand side that may lead to self-exclusion.
2
Fixed transaction costs in financial service provision result in decreasing unit 
costs as the number or the size of transactions increases. Screening and monitoring 
a borrower entails costs that are, at least in part, independent of the value of the 
deposit or loan. At the level of a financial institution, fixed costs are crucial; they 
span a wide range—from the brick-and-mortar branch network to computer sys-
tems, legal services, accounting systems, and security arrangements—and are rather 
independent of the number of accounts or clients. Fixed costs also arise at the level 
of the financial system, including regulatory costs and the costs of payment clear-
ing and settlement infrastructure, which are, up to a point, independent of the 
number of institutions regulated. Profitable and sustainable financial institutions 
have to exploit the resulting scale economies by either sufficiently high-volume 
transactions or sufficiently high-value transactions. In terms of outreach, this im-
plies a focus on high-volume transactions, thus spreading the fixed transaction 
costs across a group of customers that is as large as possible. Alternatively, one can 
look for technologies and products that are not traditional bank products and de-
livery channels, but that represent a significantly lower fixed cost element.
In addition to costs, the outreach in the supply of financial services, especially 
credit services, is constrained by risks, especially the default risk (discussed else-
where above). While financial institutions can influence their costs and risks to a 
certain degree, they are constrained by state variables, that is, factors that do not 
change in the short run and affect financial sector activity across the board. These 
factors might include market size, macroeconomic fundamentals, the available 
Source: Author compilation.
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technology, the average level and distribution of per capita income, and the system-
wide costs of doing business that are related, for instance, to the quality of the 
transportation and communications infrastructure, the effectiveness of the con-
tractual and informational framework, and the degree of general insecurity associ-
ated with crime, violence, terrorism, and so on.
Using the concept of state variables allows us to define the access possibilities 
frontier as a rationed equilibrium, that is, the maximum share of potential clients 
that can be served by financial institutions prudently. This frontier is a different 
one for savings/payment services, where the transaction costs are the decisive mar-
ket friction, and for credit services, where the risk dimension is an additional im-
portant friction. Figure 3.4 illustrates the demand and supply for a standardized 
payment service for which the fee is assumed to be flat, that is, independent of the 
amount to be transferred. The horizontal axis represents the share of the popula-
tion (households and firms) engaging in payment and savings transactions, rather 
than the quantity of service transactions. The population is ordered along the axis 
starting with agents engaging in transactions that are large in value and number 
and moving toward agents engaging in transactions of increasingly lower value and 
number. The downward sloping demand curve D* reflects the willingness to pay 
and the assumption that customers with a demand for large-value, high-volume 
transactions have a higher marginal willingness to pay than customers relying on 
transactions that are few and small. The upward sloping supply curve S* reflects 
Source: Beck and de la Torre (2007).
Note: See the text for an explanation of the figure.
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the potential of efficient financial institutions to reach out to a larger share of the 
population as the fee increases.
3 The intersection of the supply and demand curves 
(point I) constitutes the access possibilities frontier.
We can use the access possibilities frontier to identify several types of problems 
in access to financial services and policies to address these problems (see figure 
3.4). We denote the maximum commercially viable demand and supply curves by 
D* and S*, respectively. The intersection of the two, point I, can therefore be seen as 
the maximum commercially viable share of the population with access to formal 
payment and savings services. A first type of access problem may arise because of 
supply suboptimization, whereby financial institutions and markets settle at a point 
below the access possibilities frontier (curve S, point III). This might reflect, for 
instance, regulatory distortions or insufficient contestability that lead financial in-
stitutions to avoid exploiting all the outreach opportunities fully because of the 
state variables. We discuss hereafter the need for a diversified landscape of financial 
service providers so that competition can be increased and the system can be 
pushed toward the frontier.
A second type of access problem originates in demand. It consists of a number 
of loan applicants that is too low simply because of the self-exclusion resulting 
from cultural barriers or financial illiteracy (curve D, point II).
4 Similarly, there 
might be a lack of demand for payment and savings services because these prod-
ucts may be accessed indirectly through family and friends or avoided for cultural 
or religious reasons. However, there may also be a lack of knowledge about the ad-
vantages of certain financial products or a general aversion to formal institutions. 
We therefore discuss financial literacy hereafter as an important, though not well-
tested policy to address demand-side constraints. A different access problem that 
can arise mainly in credit markets is associated with excess access, that is, an equi-
librium above the access possibilities frontier, whereby loans are granted to a larger 
share of loan applicants than is prudent based on the lending interest rate and the 
state variables (covered in chapter 5).
A final access problem involves a prudent access possibilities frontier that is too 
narrow and thus reaches out to a bankable population that is too small because of 
deficiencies in state variables relative to countries at similar levels of economic de-
velopment. We are able to distinguish here between the role of technology in ex-
panding the frontier outward and the role of government policies.
The remainder of this chapter will use this framework to discuss the possibilities 
for addressing these challenges.
Landscaping the Providers: How to Get to the Frontier
Household surveys have documented a large array of providers of formal financial 
services. Banks still play a prominent role, but, increasingly, other institutions are 
emerging, including nonfinancial companies, such as telecommunications compa-
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nies. As we discuss above, this has been complemented by a large set of different 
informal financial service providers.
Which institutions can help push the financial system to the frontier? Are spe-
cific institutions better than others in serving underbanked segments of the popu-
lation and helping overcome the market frictions of transaction costs and risk? In 
the following, we argue that different institutions target different groups and that 
no single type of institution is the silver bullet. This may change over time as new 
technologies emerge and market structures change.
Banks
The dominant providers of formal financial services in Africa are still banks, but the 
universe of banks in Africa today is a diverse one, ranging from large multi  national 
banks with European parents to small domestically owned niche banks. There are 
also several commercial banks supported by public or private donors, such as OPM 
in  Malawi  and  the  Development  Finance  Company  of  Uganda.  Rabobank  has 
  expanded recently into several African markets based on the cooperative banking 
  experience it acquired in the Netherlands.
One contentious item on the agenda has been the role of foreign-owned banks. 
Africa’s banking systems were dominated by foreign-owned banks before indepen-
dence. Subsequent nationalizations and indigenization reduced the share of foreign 
ownership significantly. During financial liberalization in the 1990s, many foreign 
banks returned, and new foreign banks, especially from South Africa and western 
Africa, expanded throughout the region. By the early 2000s, almost half of Africa’s 
financial systems were dominated by foreign-owned financial institutions, with the 
notable exception of North Africa, where banking is still dominated in several 
countries by government-owned banks. Foreign banks are often accused of cherry-
picking the high-end wealthy customers, but their role in outreach has to be quali-
fied: the population of foreign banks is more diverse now than it was 20 years ago. 
Regional banks from West Africa, especially Nigeria, and from South Africa have 
often brought competition and new products into domestic markets. The Bank of 
Africa, a West African bank partly owned by BCME Bank of Morocco, has expanded 
throughout the continent. In South Africa, Absa (now majority owned by Barclays 
Bank, but still managed from Johannesburg) and Standard Bank have introduced 
new technologies and products in the host countries of their subsidiaries.
Banks have grown beyond the concept that microfinance is mainly only a cor-
porate social responsibility and have discovered the bottom of the pyramid as a 
potential client base. Many commercial banks have therefore progressed past tradi-
tional products and delivery channels and recently adopted new products and de-
livery channels. In The Gambia, Oceanic Bank offers deposit collection services, 
providing traders and other small-scale businesses with a condaneh (or box, in the 
local parlance) in which they store their daily revenue and which is picked up in   
the evening by a bank employee. In Ghana, Barclays Bank has piloted an initiative 
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to make microloans to susu collectors (a local term of unclear origin that now re-
fers to accumulated money) for onlending to the clients of the collectors. The bank 
uses the susu collectors as an intermediary to extend loans and mobilize savings to 
productive rural communities. The susu collectors intermediate on behalf of the 
bank, conduct appraisals for prospective borrowers, and advise the bank on risky 
ventures within the communities. Barclays also provides susu lenders with deposit 
accounts  and  training  sessions.  Indeed,  Barclays  has  expanded  the  program— 
promoting access through partnerships—to other intermediaries, that is, credit 
unions and trade associations. Building on this experience, Pesewa Power Trust 
(PPT), a technology-based susu system, will soon be introduced onto the Ghana-
ian market. All PPT susu contributors will be issued personal smart cards that reg-
ister all their micropayments. PPT susu collectors will also wear PPT uniforms and 
have a smart card collection device for easy identification.
Commercial banks have also initiated cooperative efforts with MFIs or directly 
started them. One successful example is the partnership between Ecobank and 
  ACCION International in Cameroon that was formed in April 2010. Both partners 
have launched EB-Accion Microfinance to provide microcredit and savings prod-
ucts to currently unbanked Cameroonians (Ecobank 2010). Ecobank also supports 
200 MFIs on the continent in wholesale loans and other products (ACCION 2011). 
Absa has moved into South Africa’s microfinance market and, in partnership with 
CompuScan, built Microfinance Enterprise Service Centers, which are freight con-
tainers functioning as rural mobile lending outlets. To reach rural and remote areas, 
the centers are fitted with third-generation mobile telecommunications, general 
packet radio service, and satellite connectivity that are linked to CompuScan’s 
South African credit bureau database. Prior to the rollout, Absa, together with Fin-
Mark Trust, invested a lot of effort in understanding the market for microfinancial 
products in general by learning from ICICI Bank, in India, and the scope of South 
Africa’s market potential in particular. In Morocco, Banque Populaire du Maroc 
has, since 1999, operated a microcredit subsidiary, Fondation Banque Populaire 
pour le Micro-Crédit, which acquired, in 2009, the Fondation Zakoura, one of the 
leading players in the market. In the Arab Republic of Egypt, service companies, a 
new category of microfinance providers, are acting as agents for banks in the provi-
sion of microfinance services.
The importance of government-owned commercial banks has declined in re-
cent years mostly because of the privatization process. The initial fears that the 
privatizations in favor of large multinational banks would lead to a decrease in 
outreach have not been confirmed across the board, but neither have the hopes 
that the privatizations would lead to a wide-scale increase in outreach and compe-
tition. Experiences in Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia have shown that careful priva-
tization of these institutions can increase efficiency and stability, while not reduc-
ing outreach. In Uganda, the largest government-owned bank, Uganda Commercial 
Bank, which was also the largest bank in the system, was successfully privatized 
(after an initial failure at privatization) to the Standard Bank of South Africa. Al-
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though an agreement not to close any branches was in place for only two years 
following the sale of Uganda Commercial Bank, Standard Bank kept all branches in 
place and even opened new ones. It also introduced new products and increased 
agricultural lending (Clarke, Cull, and Fuchs 2009). Similarly, the privatization of 
the Tunisia-based Banque du Sud in favor of Attijari Wafa Bank and the rebranding 
of Banque du Sud as Attijari Bank led to a 78 percent expansion of the bank’s net-
work and the development of a range of new products within five years of the 
privatization. The case of Zambia National Commercial Bank, which was priva-
tized in 2007 in favor of Rabobank, based in the Netherlands, shows how a for-
merly wholly state-owned financial institution can branch out, establish agency 
arrangements with local partners (gas stations, post offices), and introduce mobile 
phone technology to facilitate low-cost transactions in an effort that holds promise 
to increase the bank’s deposit base substantially and convey a healthy demonstra-
tion effect among private banks.
The example of Uganda, however, also shows that privatization and foreign 
bank entry is not a panacea for increasing efficiency and competition in a banking 
system. Beck and Hesse (2009) find that there was no significant impact of privati-
zation and of increased foreign bank participation on interest rate spreads, and 
Cull and Trandafir (2010b) show that the Ugandan banking system is segmented 
(see the discussion in chapter 2).
If privatization is not feasible, the turnaround of such institutions by external 
management teams can also be successful under the proper conditions. Such a 
turnaround would rely on the franchise value of the large network and customer 
base, while leveraging private expertise. The example of the National Microfinance 
Bank of Tanzania has been heralded as a success story (Dressen, Dyer, and Northrip 
2002). Government-owned banks that focus completely on deposit services, such 
as postal savings banks, have a safer record in terms of fragility than government-
owned  commercial  banks,  though  they  often  suffer  from  poor  service  quality. 
Nonetheless, some of these institutions have been at the forefront in expanding ac-
cess, such as in Morocco, where the transformation of postal savings banks has 
helped increase the access to financial services.
Development finance institutions (DFIs) are more important in financial terms 
than government-owned commercial banks. While it is more difficult to obtain 
hard data because DFIs are not subject to central bank supervision, country reports 
suggest that there is a substantial number of such institutions in many countries of 
the continent. The evidence on the success of these institutions is mixed, however. 
We return to this topic in chapter 4 and in our discussion of rural finance below.
Microfinance and cooperative institutions
Over the past decade, MFIs have become an important segment of the financial 
system in terms of outreach if not also in volume. One of the advantages of micro-
finance is nimbleness, responsiveness, and its ability to adapt to environments, in-
cluding in conflict-affected areas. MFIs have traditionally targeted women, who 
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make up a significant proportion of the poor and suffer disproportionately from 
poverty. As discussed elsewhere above, women face an array of barriers to access in 
the formal banking system.
Until 2008, the sector experienced impressive growth in outreach and opera-
tional self-sufficiency. However, the crisis affected the attempt of microfinance to 
expand. Food and fuel price increases and a severe financial and global economic 
contraction exerted severe strain on MFIs across Africa in 2008 so that growth was 
slowed significantly. Since the onset of the crisis, MFIs have generally not expanded 
their client base, instead concentrating on trusted, known borrowers. Despite the 
crisis, however, there has been less volatility in returns, and fewer MFIs are incur-
ring significant losses than was the case in 2007 (MIX and CGAP 2010). MFIs have 
been also facing more difficulties in raising funding as credit spreads widened and 
the resources from donors became more scarce (MIX and CGAP 2010). In interna-
tional comparison, however, Africa has fared better than other regions and was al-
ready showing signs of recovery in 2009, while the East Asia and Pacific region and 
the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region experienced negative growth rates dur-
ing that year.
The sector’s resilience in the face of the crisis is laudable. Nonetheless, Africa is 
still relatively underserved by MFIs compared with other parts of the developing 
world, and most of the institutions are focused on urban rather than rural areas. At 
the end of 2008, MFIs in Africa reported that they were reaching 9.2 million bor-
rowers and a significantly larger number of depositors, 17.3 million.
5 Both num-
bers, however, are below the 20 million microfinance clients in Bangladesh. With 
considerably more borrowers than the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region and 
the Middle East region, these numbers still bring Africa’s penetration rate among 
borrowers (relative to the population living below the national poverty line; see 
table 3.2) to only 2.2 percent, which is significantly lower than all other regions 













Population below  
national poverty line 420,758,767 30,637,572 87,304,988 70,162,168 63,983,852 168,670,188
Total borrowers 9,250,759 2,205,769 3,750,164 1,089,481 285,394 1,919,951
Penetration rate,  
borrowers 2.2% 7.2% 4.3% 1.6% 0.4% 1.1%
Total depositors 17,324,291 41,961 8,799,457 2,131,460 736,994 5,614,419
Penetration rate,  
depositors 4.1% 0.1% 10.1% 3.0% 1.2% 3.3%
Sources: Author calculations based on Mix Market (database), Microfinance Information Exchange, Washington, 
DC, http://www.mixmarket.org/data-center; World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/; World Factbook (database), Central Intel-
ligence Agency, Washington, DC, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/#.
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aside from Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
6 The depositor penetration rate is 
somewhat higher, at 4.1 percent.
The penetration rates vary greatly across the continent. While borrower pene-
tration rates are 7.2 and 4.3 percent, respectively, among North and East African 
MFIs, Southern, Central, and West African MFIs deliver loans to only 1.6, 0.4, and 
1.1 percent, respectively, of the population living below the national poverty line. 
Among depositors, East African MFIs have a penetration rate of 10 percent, while 
MFIs in West and Central Africa reach only 1.2 and 3.3 percent of the poor, respec-
tively. Southern and North African MFIs reach even fewer poor depositors: only 3.0 
and 0.1 percent, respectively. This variation is remarkable given that all subregions 
started out at a similar level in 2000 in terms of the numbers of both borrowers and 
depositors (figure 3.5). For example, East African MFIs did not experience deposi-
tor growth spurts until 2002, but then grew significantly through the crisis and 
beyond (figure 3.5, chart b). Meanwhile, North African MFIs have seen little growth 
in depositor penetration over the past 10 years, which is a result of restrictions they 
face on deposit collection. The differing penetration rates between the credit side 
and the deposit side reflect the contrast in the models for MFIs across the subre-
gions. Thus, North African MFIs focus on credit provision, while MFIs in other 
subregions focus on deposits (table 3.2 and figure 3.5).
Source: Mix Market (database), Microfinance Information Exchange, Washington, DC, http://www.mixmarket.org/
data-center.
Note: All figures provided by Mix Market represent trends because not all MFIs in a country report to the database.
Figure 3.5   Total Borrowers and Depositors across African Subregions, 
2000–09
5.0 







































































Central Africa  West Africa 
North Africa  East Africa  Southern Africa 
03--chapter 3--77-140.indd   93 8/18/11   9:38:41 AM94  Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond
This underlines another interesting development on the African continent: while 
borrower growth rates slowed for the five years to 2009, depositor growth rates ac-
celerated, except for 2009 (figure 3.6). A comparison across regions shows that, in 
2008, the depositor growth in Africa was only paralleled by the Middle East, leaving 
all other regions far behind; some, such as East Asia and the Pacific, experienced 
negative growth rates. In 2009, the declining growth rates were in line with other 
regions, apart from East Asia and the Pacific, which had recovered slightly from the 
negative growth rate in the previous year. Depositor growth rates within the region 
have been persistent in recent years, and, with the notable exception of North Af-
rica, all subregions increased their depositor base from 2007 to 2008. While deposi-
tor growth accelerated in the five years to 2009, the average deposit decreased con-
sistently, falling another 1 percent from 2008 to 2009. While borrower growth rates 
decreased, average loan balances increased. This rise and fall was consistent in Af-
rica over the period. One assumption is that, because MFIs were not expanding 
their client base, they were able to grant higher loan balances to their current cli-
ents. Simultaneously, existing clients may have been more in need of larger loans 
because of the higher food and fuel prices and other effects of the crisis.
Among borrowers, women make up the majority, consistent with the original 
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a.  Borrowers b.  Depositors
Source: Mix Market (database), Microfinance Information Exchange, Washington, DC, http://www.mixmarket.org/
data-center.
Note: All figures provided by Mix Market represent trends because not all MFIs in a country report to the database.
Figure 3.6    Borrower and Depositor Growth Rates and Average Loan and 
Deposit Balance, 2005–09
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women borrowers account for around twice as many borrowers as men on the 
continent. Looking at the median MFI, however, we see a different picture: in 2009, 
only 52 percent of the borrowers were women.
Early on, African MFIs shifted toward an individual lending model and away 
from the microcredit model implemented by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh 
that initially focused on group lending. Indeed, MFIs in West Africa never used the 
latter model in the first place.
There is a large variety of institutions offering different products and targeting 
different clients. One may observe throughout the continent different ownership 
and organizational models, including the cooperative model, the model based on 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the microbank model. There are 
also different sources of funding for MFIs, ranging from donor funding to com-
mercial funding, funding through the savings of members (in the case of coopera-
tives), and government funding, in Ethiopia for example. While most of these insti-
tutions were originally set up to provide credit only, some of them have started 
offering other financial services, including deposit services. Notably, MFIs in West 
Africa offered both savings and credit services from the beginning, though this was 
limited to members. Several countries have introduced a regulatory framework to 
support deposit-taking MFIs, a topic to which we return in chapter 5.
The increasing focus on deposit services is also reflected in the funding struc-
ture of MFIs. Even though the funding sources for microfinance around the world 
have become increasingly diverse, including an array of crossborder flows, local 
funding remains the key source for growth in the African context (MIX and CGAP 
2010). In international comparisons, African MFIs have been generally successful 
in mobilizing deposits: deposits reached 57.3 percent of overall funding in 2009 
(figure 3.7). During the financial crisis, the institutions that relied more on deposits 
as their main funding source fared better. A large share of the deposits across differ-
ent MFIs are voluntary deposit accounts rather than compulsory savings. Accord-
ing to the Microfinance Information Exchange and the Consultative Group to As-
sist the Poor, the structural composition of funding varies strongly by type of 
organization (MIX and CGAP 2010). Deposits are an important funding base for 
credit unions and bank MFIs, while NGOs are substantially more dependent on 
grants and wholesale borrowings as a source of funding. Across all regions, Africa 
has the lowest rate of borrowings as a source of funding, at 23.4 percent in 2009. In 
recent years, private financiers, including banks, have come to play a more impor-
tant role in funding compared with donors, especially in North Africa. Donor 
funding is, not surprisingly, also unevenly distributed, with a heavier focus on low-
income countries (MIX and CGAP 2010).
The discussion on the merits of the commercialization of microfinance—which 
has become personalized in the debate between Muhammad Yunus and the Mexi-
can microlender Compartamos—centers on the interest rates that microfinance 
borrowers should be charged. Should they be commercially viable or subsidized? 
The discussion can be easily politicized, as the recent experience in Andra Pradash 
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in India shows. While the debate has not yet touched Africa on a wide scale, com-
mercial microlenders—nonbank financial institutions that mainly provide con-
sumer loans at high interest rates—have been shunned by the microfinance com-
munity in South Africa.
The mantra upon which microfinance is built—reaching out to the poor—has 
also been the main challenge of microfinance. A consensus has developed that the 
poorest of the poor do not really benefit from microfinance services, but need other 
support. Over time, the challenge has therefore become to reach the poor with 
products that will yield the best possible outcome. Much research has been con-
ducted to determine the products that might be most beneficial to the poor. The 
initial focus on credit services has been questioned in the literature and by practi-
tioners. The analysis of financial diaries carried out by Collins et al. (2009) has 
shown that the poor lack appropriate savings instruments and credit facilities. The 
experiences reported by the authors suggest that savings and credit may be inter-
changeable in the minds of the poor, the only difference being that large expendi-
tures—such as weddings, funerals, or emergencies—are possible at the end of the 
contract period in the case of savings, while, with credit, they are possible at the 
beginning; meanwhile, both equally involve regular payments over time. Recent 
evidence from Kenya shows that enterprise development can, indeed, be fostered 
through the provision of credit, but also through the provision of more effective 
Source: Mix Market (database), Microfinance Information Exchange, Washington, DC, http://www.mixmarket.org/
data-center.
Note: All figures provided by Mix Market represent trends because not all MFIs in a country report to the database.
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savings instruments. Through a field experiment in rural Kenya, Dupas and Robin-
son (2009) show that access to savings accounts had a substantial, positive impact 
on the levels of productive investments among market women and, within six 
months, led to higher incomes. Their findings imply that a significant fraction of 
women entrepreneurs have difficulty saving and investing as much as they would 
like and therefore represent a potential clientele for formal savings products even if 
these offer negative interest rates. Intrahousehold conflicts and time-inconsistency 
problems—short-run impatience (high-discount factors in the near future) and 
long-run patience (low-discount factors in the far future)—prevent many poor 
households from saving despite the inherent demand for savings products. Learn-
ing from informal arrangements such as rotating savings and credit associations, 
MFIs have therefore developed deposit collector services and savings commitment 
products for their clients, including limited access to savings until a target amount 
has been reached (Ashraf et al. 2003).
A major challenge facing MFIs in Africa is the need to move beyond urban areas 
toward rural areas. Data on a few selected countries clearly suggest that, in most 
countries, MFIs still operate mainly in urban areas. In Tanzania, for example, only 
1 percent of the rural population saves with MFIs, while 7 percent of the urban 
population fits this category (Napier 2011). In Nigeria, 208 of the country’s 901 
microfinance banks are in Abuja and Lagos, while two of the northern states,     
Jigawa and Katsina, have only 12 microbanks between them despite a combined 
population of 10 million (Napier 2011). In this respect, MFIs face the same chal-
lenges as other financial institutions, including banks: especially physical infra-
structure deficiencies make outreach costly. MFIs in Africa face higher cost barriers 
than MFIs elsewhere. The average ratio of overhead costs to assets is 22.5 percent, 
compared  with  17.4  percent  in  non-African  developing  countries.
7  High  staff 
  salaries have been one of the main costs. The ratio of the average salary to gross 
national income per capita is nearly three times higher in Africa than in other re-
gions. Significant competition among MFIs and from banks, as well as the lack of 
an ample qualified labor force, may be one of the reasons for the high operating 
costs and staff salaries (MIX and CGAP 2010). Moreover, the ratio of borrowers 
per staff member has not increased in recent years. The high operating costs are 
also driven by the high costs of processing, monitoring, and collecting payments, 
which reflects not only infrastructure deficiencies, but also demand constraints 
and the substantial level of information asymmetry.
In overcoming these cost constraints, MFIs have made gains by using technol-
ogy, especially cell phone–based technology. Particularly in countries where mobile 
banking (or m-banking) is already available, examples abound. Tujijenge Tanzania, 
an MFI in Tanzania, has made the repayment of individual loans via M-Pesa 
  mandatory below the threshold of US$1,800. In Kenya, various MFIs offer the pos-
sibility of loan repayments through M-Pesa for individual loans, but also group 
loans. Deposit-taking MFIs such as Faulu Kenya allow their customers to deposit 
through M-Pesa. In Malawi, MFIs have used biometric technology, based on a 
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physiological characteristic (fingerprint, face, eye iris, or retina) or behavioral char-
acteristic (speech or signature) to identify customers. Preliminary evidence has 
shown that this can help increase repayment rates, especially among borrowers 
with ex ante high risk profiles (Giné, Goldberg, and Yang 2010).
It is rather difficult to jump-start a microfinance industry through a licensing 
window or some other special regulatory process. A regulatory framework helps 
mainly at a later stage. In Uganda, for example, the push for a regulatory frame-
work to support deposit-taking microfinance banks arose from within the MFI 
industry, which realized that the industry could not grow and become viable with-
out proper regulation. The need for a special regulatory framework for MFIs so as 
to encourage market entry has to be balanced with the concern about regulatory 
arbitrage, that is, institutions choosing to adopt this form to avoid more burden-
some bank regulations. Forcing MFIs to focus on specific sectors or regions can 
backfire. Meanwhile, donor support facilitated the establishment of a significant 
microfinance industry in Madagascar, though the sustainability of this industry 
will have to be managed carefully through a gradual withdrawal of the support.
MFIs can suffer from excessive ambition that translates into significant, but 
poorly managed growth. For instance, several MFIs in Morocco recently imple-
mented extensive growth strategies to increase their market shares, but they did   
not accompany this growth by assembling appropriate human and information 
technology resources. This led to significant pressure on the microfinance industry.   
In attempts to jump-start microfinance, donors sometimes provide too many re-
sources to MFIs without also providing the necessary capacity to absorb these   
resources. The example of Crédit Mutuel of Guinea shows how this can backfire. 
This was the largest MFI in the country until it had to be shut down in the early 
2000s because it had lent excessively without proper screening or monitoring sys-
tems after it had received substantial resources from donors, including the French 
Development Agency and the World Bank.
SACCOs, which are member-based financial institutions that lend and take de-
posits, are an important player in many African countries. In many countries, 
these institutions function in the semiformal arena: they are registered by an au-
thority (such as the ministry of cooperatives), but are not formally supervised as 
banks are. The cooperative model is based on the cooperative movement in Cen-
tral and Western Europe (Austria, France, and Germany) that has often been cred-
ited with the almost universal access to financial services in these countries, in-
cluding access to credit among farmers, thus helping rural areas develop. Donors 
have tried to implement this concept in developing countries, including in Africa. 
Local circumstances, however, have to be taken into account. Countries with com-
munities having deep roots and little migration offer themselves to this kind of 
initiative, while countries or regions with large migration flows and less tightly 
knit community links may be less appropriate. A similar argument can be made to 
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defend the idea that group lending as a lending model is less attractive in Africa 
than elsewhere.
In most countries, these institutions suffer from a limited skill base and a lack of 
capacity. Apex institutions, supported by donors through technical assistance, can 
help overcome these barriers. The Co-operative Bank of Kenya was, for a long time, 
considered a success story, but it has recently experienced problems in governance. 
In  Rwanda,  the  cooperative  network  of  the  Union  des  Banques  Populaires  du 
Rwanda was initially established with technical support from the Swiss government, 
but suffered from financial and operational deterioration in the wake of the conflict 
in Rwanda, and its management has recently been taken over by Rabobank.
Looking beyond existing institutions
The variety of institutions in a financial system is often a function of the overall size 
of the system, but also the overall degree of competitiveness and contestability of 
the system. Even small financial systems such as the system in Uganda can support 
a variety of financial institutions. Often, the push to expand the frontier comes 
from unexpected directions. In Kenya, Equity Bank transformed itself from an   
underperforming building society into an innovative bank and is now the largest 
bank in the country in terms of clientele. It did this by offering new delivery chan-
nels, such as mobile branches, by targeting a new clientele, and by focusing on the 
quality of service delivery. More recently, it launched M-Kesho, which is an ad-
vanced mobile financial product offered by M-Pesa (Safaricom, a leading mobile 
operator) and Equity Bank. In Rwanda, one bank is offering payment services to 
SACCOs through mobile branches on trucks.
Regional integration has become an important driver of new providers and 
products around the continent. As documented in chapter 2, the share of regional 
banks has increased significantly in recent years. One example is the expansion of 
Kenyan banks into Uganda following the lifting of a moratorium on new bank li-
censes in Uganda and in expectation of the establishment of a free trade area in 
East Africa.
Increasingly,  new  delivery  channels  beyond  brick-and-mortar  branches  are 
being tested. The transaction accounts mentioned elsewhere above are often linked 
to a preference for the use of less costly ATMs rather than branches. Mobile branches 
located on trucks that deliver financial services to remote areas have become a pop-
ular delivery channel. Another promising example includes agency agreements, a 
model favored in several Latin American countries. Through these agreements, 
banks offer financial services through third-party agents, such as stores or post of-
fices. Agency agreements offset several supply- and demand-side constraints simul-
taneously. First, they address the scale diseconomies involved in the provision of 
financial services to small communities of customers with a need for small-scale 
transactions because they allow financial services to be bundled with other prod-
ucts and services and reduce the fixed costs of a full-fledged branch. Second, they 
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reduce cultural and social barriers to the access to branches by large population 
segments. Kenya has recently put in place the necessary regulatory framework. 
Most countries in Africa, however, do not yet allow such arrangements.
New products have been tested to facilitate the inclusion of the unbanked popu-
lation in the banked population. On the deposit side, simple transaction accounts 
have been offered. In South Africa, following moral suasion, if not outright pres-
sure by the government, the Mzansi basic account initiative was launched by banks 
in 2004 to provide affordable banking services to the unbanked, but bankable pop-
ulation. Although the pricing structure differs from bank to bank, the Mzansi bas-
ket includes a bundle of basic services on a monthly basis at no monthly fee and 
with no switch fees, such as free electronic deposits, two ATM withdrawals, two 
cash deposits, one balance enquiry, one debit order, one rejected debit order, and 
one money transfer. By the end of 2007, there was a substantial shift in the geo-
graphical distribution of the footprint of the Mzansi account: major geographical 
regions had experienced decreases, while significant gains were being achieved in 
more remote provinces. Almost 52 percent of all the new accounts were previously 
unbanked customers. It thus appears that the Mzansi account is gaining acceptance 
especially among black women between the ages of 25 and 54. However, the results 
have not all been positive. A staggering 44 percent of all accounts remained inac-
tive. The jury is therefore still out on the sustainability of the account as originally 
designed. Although highly praised for bringing the unbanked into the financial 
sector, its ability to keep them is less clear, perhaps because of brand consciousness 
or cost-related issues. Likewise, in 2008, Banque Centrale Populaire put in place a 
similar low-income banking program in Morocco that was called Al Hissab Chaabi 
(popular account). For DH 9 (approximately US$1) per month, clients are offered 
a bank account, a debit and payment card, a mobile service, a monthly bank state-
ment, and free counter operations. As of April 2010, Al Hissab Chaabi had helped 
193,000 formerly unbanked individuals gain access to banking services.
On the lending side, salary loans have become a popular form of consumer 
lending. This model builds on a formal agreement between a company and a lender 
to deduct repayments for a loan directly from the salary of the borrower. It seems a 
good technology to avoid the key problem of contractual deficiencies and reduce 
the transaction costs for lenders. There is a critical downside, however: the over-
indebtedness to which such agreements can lead. We return to the topic in chapter 
5 under the heading of consumer protection.
Islamic finance
Islamic finance is a relatively new addition to the set of financial providers and 
products in most African countries, even though the first African Islamic Bank was 
created in the 1960s in Egypt. There are five principles that differentiate Islamic fi-
nance from conventional finance. Three of these are negative principles: the prohi-
bition on riba (usury, which is generally defined as interest or excessive interest), 
the prohibition on gharar (risk or uncertainty, which is generally defined as specu-
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lation), and the prohibition on financing for illicit sectors in Sharia (such as weap-
ons, drugs, alcohol, and pork). The other two principles are positive: the profit- and 
loss-sharing principle and the principle that all transactions have to be backed by a 
real economic transaction that involves a tangible asset. Despite the implication of 
the term, Islamic finance is not restricted to Muslim customers. Islamic financial 
products can be offered by Islamic banks and conventional banks through special-
ized windows.
8 It has been popular in the Middle East and some Asian countries 
for many years and has expanded to Africa in recent years.
Currently, 20 of the 53 African countries have Islamic institutions, including a 
total of 42 Islamic banks, plus numerous conventional institutions offering Sharia-
compliant products through Islamic windows. There are 32 insurance companies 
offering Sharia-compliant insurance (takaful). In contrast, only three countries 
(Egypt, The Gambia, and Sudan) have issued Sharia-compliant government bonds 
known as Sukuk (legal instrument, deed, check, which is generally defined as finan-
cial certificate). Islamic finance is mainly found in countries with a significant 
Muslim population, such as The Gambia, Kenya, and Sudan (which has a com-
pletely Islamic financial system in the north), and North Africa generally. Some of 
the related institutions have been supported by the Islamic Development Bank, 
based in Saudi Arabia, through resources and technical assistance. Providing re-
sources can be important not necessarily because of a lack of funds, but because of 
the constraint that both sides of a balance sheet at an Islamic bank (or Islamic win-
dow) have to be Sharia-compliant.
Despite the presence of a large Muslim population, the development of Islamic 
finance in North African countries has not been as rapid as one might have ex-
pected. There are several factors behind this outcome. First, for the most part, North 
African countries, along with a large part of Muslim Asia, follow a less conservative 
interpretation of Sharia relative to Gulf countries. In Egypt, for example, Al Azhar 
University has stated that riba should be defined as excessive interest and not inter-
est per se. Second, for a long time, banking customers in North Africa have pre-
ferred conventional banks for their transparency on interest rates and the cost of 
transactions. The openness of North African countries toward the rest of the world 
meant that banks preferred to align with the practices of Western banks. Further-
more, given their structure, the average cost of a similar banking service has gener-
ally been higher for Sharia-compliant instruments than for conventional instru-
ments. While this additional markup has been easily accepted among the wealthy 
Gulf population, it has been more difficult to accept among less well off North Afri-
can clients. A final factor behind the slow emergence of Islamic finance may be 
found in the political will to avoid religious tensions or risk the perception that 
conventional banks are unlawful because an Islamic bank has been authorized.
The emergence of Islamic finance will certainly pose regulatory challenges (Sole 
2007). Regulators have to become familiar with and stay current on the Sharia 
compliance of the Islamic financial products offered in their jurisdictions and on 
the accounting and auditing standards of Islamic institutions. The equity-like na-
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ture of some Islamic finance instruments increases the risk-taking incentives for 
Islamic banks, which might require more intensive monitoring by supervisors. Is-
lamic finance also poses problems of financial literacy in terms of transparency. In 
Islamic finance, the interest rate structures of conventional banking are often re-
placed by fee structures. While, at first glance, this may be easier for clients to un-
derstand, it raises the challenge of disclosure.
An important issue that is beyond the scope of this chapter and this book is the 
effective difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks. Recent analysis 
by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche (2010) finds few significant differences 
in business models across Islamic and conventional banks. This is based, though, 
on rather crude indicators derived from financial statements. Consistent with this 
finding is the observation that Islamic finance in northern Sudan is rigorous in 
complying with the no-interest rule, while Islamic finance in Malaysia, a sophisti-
cated financial system, resembles conventional banking.
In the long term, a large-scale expansion of Islamic finance would involve the 
creation of parallel structures for bond markets, discount windows, and so on. 
Given the current resource and skill constraints in many African countries, it seems 
unlikely that this can occur outside the largest markets, such as Kenya, Nigeria, or 
South Africa, and it is questionable that this should be a priority among policy 
makers and donors.
The ultimate question—the extent to which the provision of Sharia-compliant 
products can expand the banked population—is still open. On the one hand, such 
products might overcome the reluctance of religious households and entrepreneurs 
to use formal financial services. This population segment, however, is probably 
small in most African countries. On the other hand, the main barriers laid out 
above—cost and risk—are also present in Islamic finance, so that Islamic banking 
is unlikely to help push the frontier outward. Islamic finance seems to offer the 
chance to attract additional resources from the oil-exporting countries of the Mid-
dle East. However, most African countries face an intermediation constraint, but 
not a resource constraint.
The jury is still out, but the experience of the past few years suggests that the 
share of Islamic finance in overall intermediation will continue to increase across 
the continent; however, it will help deepen and broaden the financial system only at 
the margin and will not be a game changer.
Demand-Side Constraints
We have discussed supply constraints extensively, but there are also important 
  demand-side constraints, that is, characteristics that can prevent households and 
individuals from accessing formal financial services.
One way to explore demand-side constraints is to consider the information pro-
vided by household surveys. FinScope and FinAccess survey users about their expe-
riences with banks and nonusers about the reasons why they do not use financial 
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services (FinAccess 2009). These questions are typically open ended; so, the sur-
veyed have to state the reasons without being offered formulated responses. Figure 
3.8 reports the reasons reported by interviewees in Kenya to explain why they do 
not use formal banking services. At the top of the list is the lack of stable, regular 
income. Inadequate products (for example, products that are too costly) and the 
lack of the necessary documentation are often cited as important, while the lack of 
demand is rarely the most important reason. Reasons related to literacy and the 
lack of knowledge about products account for another important factor (see else-
where below). Overall, this points to three of the main barriers we discuss in this 
chapter: the large segment of the population that is currently unbankable, the sup-
ply constraints related to the significant documentation requirements and product 
and geographical barriers, and the demand-side constraints.
The lack of formal income sources is an important constraint to participation in 
the formal economy, including conventional banking. Conversely, the lack of for-
mality and the small size of transactions pose important barriers to banks in reach-
ing out to such customers. Semiformal and informal providers seem much more 
appropriate. Nonetheless, mobile payment providers are much more likely to be 
able to reach out to this segment because they have much lower fixed costs and do 
not rely on a threshold transaction volume for each customer, but, rather, the over-
all volume; they thus follow a high-volume strategy. The barriers related to the lack 
of the necessary documentation are harder to overcome, especially in light of the 
recent trend to formally register subscriber identification module (SIM) cards. 
Overall, however, the profile of the unbanked population points to transaction ser-
Source: FinAccess (2009).
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vices as a more promising entry point for financial institutions and to technology 
as a promising delivery channel.
A simple lack of awareness about the availability of financial services may also 
be an important barrier. A recent Gallup poll across 18 African countries showed 
that, on average, only 36 percent of the surveyed are aware of the existence of MFIs 
in their communities: 18 percent had never heard of MFIs, and the remainder 
claimed to have heard of them, but said that MFIs were not available in their com-
munities (table 3.3). Obviously, this also points to the lack of availability. Perhaps 
more worrisome is the fact that the awareness increases with income and is greater 
among men than among women, though the latter are often targeted by MFIs. This 
suggests that MFIs are not reaching their target clientele or may not be able to reach 
as far down-market as they would like.
There is a general trust issue. Overcoming the mistrust of financial institutions 
might be easier in the case of transaction services, where the intertemporal nature 
of financial services is reduced to a few minutes, especially in m-banking, than in 
Table 3.3  The Awareness of Microfinance across African Countries, 2009
percent of the respondents to the question “Are you aware of any institution/company in 
your community helping people with microfinancing, that is, helping people like you to obtain 
small loans, with interest, for a business?”
 Country Yes No, not available in my community No, never heard of it
Malawi 65 29 7
Uganda 63 30 7
Kenya 57 29 14
Senegal 56 29 13
Tanzania 47 40 13
Rwanda 46 40 13
Chad 38 51 10
South Africa 38 34 28
Ghana 37 43 18
Mali 36 51 13
Cameroon 36 36 28
Niger 33 59 8
Nigeria 31 43 17
Zambia 30 53 14
Burundi 25 59 15
Côte d’Ivoire 18 65 18
Congo, Dem. Rep. 16 61 22
Zimbabwe 15 46 39
Source: Gallup survey data.
Note: The surveys were conducted in 18 Sub-Saharan African countries in 2009. The data are weighted using adult 
population estimates for 2008 developed by the World Bank.
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the case of savings or credit services, where the result can only be seen after months 
or even years.
Financial literacy has been an increasingly important topic among policy mak-
ers and donors in recent years. It is important to distinguish between financial lit-
eracy (or knowledge), that is, awareness and knowledge about the existence and 
functioning of specific services and products, and financial capability, that is, good 
financial decision making. Financial capability includes managing resources well, 
knowing how to evaluate and compare different financial products and services, 
and demanding one’s rights if necessary. Box 3.2, on the next page, describes some 
of the related efforts across the region.
Do financial literacy programs help? It is hard to establish causality, but ran-
domized  evaluations  have  provided  some  evidence.  A  recent  financial  literacy 
training program in Indonesia targeted selected unbanked households. It sent half 
of them invitations to a free financial literacy seminar two to three hours in length 
(Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2010). While the program had no effect on the general 
population, there seems to have been a significant impact on the likelihood of un-
schooled and financially illiterate households to open bank accounts as a result of 
the  program.  Additionally,  a  financial  literacy  program  delivered  over  several 
weekly sessions seems to be more successful than a single session of a few hours. 
Monetary incentives offered for opening accounts seemed more successful than 
education programs, at least in the short run. In Uganda, women microentre-
preneurs were offered business development and literacy training (McKenzie and 
Weber 2009). The training led many entrepreneurs to keep separate business and 
personal accounts, specify the salaries they would draw each month, and draft bud-
gets they would monitor. However, this effect was concentrated among women 
with some university training. The lesson from these two experiments seems to be 
that targeted literacy programs are more promising than general programs and 
that programs have to be adjusted according to feedback from participants. It is 
important to stress that these are preliminary findings. Significantly more research 
and analysis are needed to explore the sorts of programs and the targeted popula-
tion groups that may be appropriate. It is certainly easier to improve the basic 
awareness of financial concepts and financial attitudes. Measuring the long-term 
impact of financial literacy programs on behavior requires longer-term analysis.
There is a more general demand-side issue: Which financial service does the 
currently unbanked population segment in Africa need most? As we discuss above, 
the poor use a large portfolio of informal financial services, including credit (mon-
eylenders), savings (susu collections or rotating savings and credit associations), 
and payment services.
Technology: The New Silver Bullet?
Africa has been at the forefront of mobile financial services.
9 In 2002, Celpay, a 
specialized provider linked to mobile network provider Celtel, started a business-
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to-business payment service in Zambia, and, in 2005, First National Bank started a 
similar service in South Africa, though limited to existing customers. In 2007, 
Safari  com started M-Pesa in Kenya, which had more than 10 million registered 
customers, or 40 percent of Kenya’s population, by June 2010 and a business vol-
ume of US$400 million per month, or 15 percent of Kenya’s GDP. Most countries 
in Africa have a mobile payment service provider by now, although the penetration 
has not reached the same level in other countries as in Kenya. These service provid-
There are many types of financial literacy programs, ranging from widely distributed to tar-
geted efforts and efforts using different media and different channels. The following are a 
few examples from across Africa.
Drama, music, and dance. Drama and role plays, accompanied, sometimes, by music and 
dance, can help bring to life issues of personal finance. In Uganda, the Association of Micro-
finance Institutions of Uganda has used music, dance, and drama to reinforce other means 
of communications in finance. This channel was chosen because it is the most highly appre-
ciated means of communication within communities and because it reflects local culture: 
knowledge is traditionally passed from one generation to another through storytelling.
Exhibitions, road shows, and gathering points. In South Africa, where many people use local 
transportation to go to work, brief education messages on personal finance are transmitted 
via radio, television, and compact discs at some of the main taxi (minibus) stands and train 
stations and in   vehicles. These infomercials typically contain music, as well as education 
messages on personal finance. In addition, roving trailers and stages, with live sessions by 
trained facilitators, are used at taxi stands and train stations. In South Africa, the national 
credit regulator runs the Borrow Wisely Campaign after Christmas. The campaign includes 
broadcasts from shopping malls at which prizes are given to shoppers who answer personal 
finance questions correctly.
Mass  media.  In  Africa,  mass  media  has  long  been  used  to  communicate  health-related 
  messages and educational content. Now, these tools are being used for financial capability 
outreach. In Kenya, for example, a popular soap opera, Makutano Junction, has received 
funding to include financial literacy messages in the story lines. They are using content de-
veloped by the United States–based NGO, Microfinance Opportunities. The content was cre-
ated for classroom-type instruction, but is now being modified for mass media. In Uganda, 
rural radio, including call-in shows during which local experts respond to the questions of 
callers, has been found to be a cost-effective means of reaching large numbers of rural 
people, particularly because, taken together, these shows are presented in a range of local 
languages. Listeners can identify with callers who have similar profiles and may be facing 
similar issues. In Tunisia, radio commercials have been used to educate people on the bene-
fits of holding and using payment cards instead of cash.
Source: Miller (2011).
Box 3.2  Financial Capability Programs
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ers are building on the wide success of mobile network providers across the conti-
nent that are leapfrogging more conventional technologies because of the poor 
state of landline telephony in Africa. According to Aker and Mbiti (2010), the total 
number of mobile phone subscribers in Africa rose from 16 million in 2000 to 488 
million in 2010, covering effectively two-thirds of the population. These payment 
networks are also referred to as second-generation models of mobile financial ser-
vices.
10 Rather than building on the existing payment infrastructure, these provid-
ers had to build their own infrastructure, including a large agent network where 
customers  could  exchange  electronic  money  for  cash.  The  second-generation 
model of mobile financial services has also introduced new players into the finan-
cial system, at least in some countries.
Mobile phone banking offers two critical advantages over other delivery chan-
nels. First, it relies to a greater extent on variable rather than fixed costs, which im-
plies that even customers who undertake small and few transactions are viable or 
bankable relative to banking through conventional channels. Second, trust can be 
built much more easily by reducing the risk from the customer’s and the provider’s 
viewpoint. By overcoming these two major barriers, mobile phone banking can 
help push out the access possibilities frontier to cover a large share of the adult 
population. By overcoming these barriers, mobile phone banking can change the 
economics of retail banking (Mas and Radcliffe 2010).
There has been a lot of speculation about the factors behind the success of   
M-Pesa in Kenya and whether it can be replicated elsewhere. Conditions were con-
ducive for Safaricom to reach the necessary scale as rapidly as it did; these condi-
tions may not be available for replication in other countries. First, Safaricom had a 
high market share in mobile telephony (75 percent), which gave it the necessary 
network advantage in allowing its customers to reach friends and family with pay-
ment transfers. This strong market position also allowed it to attract customers and 
cash-in/cash-out merchants rapidly, as the usefulness of the system was obvious. In 
Tanzania, for example, where Vodacom has a 40 percent market share, M-Pesa 
managed to attract only 280,000 customers in the first 14 months, compared with 
2.7 million in Kenya during a corresponding time period (Napier 2011). Second, 
the demographic structure of Kenya has helped because of the migration flows to-
ward Nairobi and the necessity to transfer money on a regular basis. Third, Safari-
com managed to overcome the challenges of scale and network effects through a 
massive start-up marketing and investment effort, thus avoiding the subscale trap. 
A final positive factor was the open regulatory environment that allowed a non-
bank company to offer financial services.
Beyond the question of how easy it is to replicate the success of M-Pesa else-
where on the continent, there seem to be two important lessons of this success for 
the ongoing discussion on how to expand the outreach of formal financial systems. 
First, the success of M-Pesa and the spread of similar products and services around 
the continent might indicate a shift away from a credit-led inclusion approach, the 
hallmark of the original microfinance movement—which saw credit as the only 
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barrier between the poor and entrepreneurship—toward a payment-led inclusion 
approach (Mas and Radcliffe 2010). Such an approach can have several advantages 
over the credit-led approach. It addresses people’s most immediate needs, that is, 
the need for safe, rapid payments. There is also a potential for scaling that is not 
necessarily available for credit because there is no need for large resources within 
such an approach. Finally, focusing on transaction services rather than credit ser-
vices also seems consistent with the overall level of financial development, which is 
more highly focused on transactions. It therefore fits well with the Finance for 
Market approach. This transaction-led rather than credit- or savings-led approach 
toward inclusion does not downplay the importance of other financial services; 
rather, the issue is: Which service should one start with and which delivery channel 
should one use?
The second important lesson revolves around the fact that innovation can come 
from an unexpected quarter, a conclusion we discuss in the previous section. Given 
the limited competition in banking in Africa because of the small size of banking 
systems in most African countries and given the limited development of nonbank 
financial institutions in Africa, it is important to find alternative financial service 
providers. This does not mean that there should be an open-door regulatory envi-
ronment to permit all and sundry to offer deposit-taking services. Rather, it means 
that there should be an open regulatory environment with regard to new providers 
Table 3.4    The Regulatory Framework for Branchless Banking in Selected 
Countries
 Indicator Angola Malawi Mozambique South Africa Zambia
Domestic branchless banking regulatory framework
Nonbank-based branchless 
banking model permissible?
Restrictive Unclear Permissive Transition
a Permissive
Outsourcing to retail agents 
permissible?
Restrictive Transition
a Permissive Permissive Permissive
Regulator and policy maker 
perspectives on outsourcing
Restrictive Transition
a Permissive Permissive Permissive
Electronic money services Transition
a Unclear Permissive Transition
a Permissive




Regulatory framework for crossborder transactions
Who can offer them? Restrictive Restrictive Restrictive Transition
a Permissive
Transaction limits?
c Restrictive Restrictive Permissive Transition
a Permissive
Identification requirements Restrictive Restrictive Permissive Restrictive Permissive
Source: Data of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and the World Bank.
a.   Transition = in between or in transition.
b.   AML = anti–money laundering. CFT = combating the financing of terrorism. Information on the effects of AML and 
CFT for Angola is incomplete.
c.   The transaction limits in South Africa are restrictive for Postbank, but not so restrictive for banks.
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and new products that might increase outreach and competition within the finan-
cial system.
The state of development of the information and communication technology 
infrastructure and the legal framework in countries has a lot to do with the regula-
tory attitude and approach toward mobile technologies, especially among nonbank 
sources, as a recent study of southern African countries shows (table 3.4). Coun-
tries not only have different regulatory regimes in relation to the potential for m-
banking, they are also at different stages in the development of m-banking facili-
ties; thus, m-banking is widespread only in South Africa, though its use is also 
expanding for commercial users in Zambia.
The challenge will be to use the network created by mobile financial services to 
make the transition from payment services to other services. The recent introduc-
tion of M-Kesho in Kenya is a first step in this direction. M-Kesho is a savings ac-
count offered by Equity Bank that provides only electronic transaction functional-
ity, that is, money can be transferred in and out either via the customer’s M-Pesa 
account or an account with Equity Bank. Eventually, Equity Bank hopes to offer 
both credit and insurance services via this delivery channel. In Ghana, MTN, a 
mobile network operator, is planning to offer life insurance products for the low-
income market.
More recently, there has also been a push to integrate mobile payment systems 
across borders. Celtel’s network project in East Africa is the world’s first borderless 
(or unified) phone network. It offers subscribers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda 
free roaming facilities across borders with airtime charged in local currencies.
While the dominance of Safaricom in the cell phone market has facilitated the 
success of M-Pesa, concerns have arisen about this dominant market position.   
Exclusivity agreements with agents can become effective entry barriers for new 
suppliers. Eventually, the shift to an interconnectivity model might be required, 
whereby (as in railway services) the infrastructure and the transfer services are 
  separated. Another challenge is the decision whether to allow stand-alone mobile 
payment service providers or bank-based solutions. Kenya has selected the stand-
alone solution, while many other countries have preferred a bank-based solution or 
a solution that centers on a telecommunications company that acts in cooperation 
with a bank (box 3.3). One size certainly does not fit all. The Kenyan solution was 
possible because of the market dominance of Safaricom and the desire to induce 
more competition from outside the banking system. Banking systems that face sig-
nificant competition from within the sector may prefer the bank-based solution. In 
middle-income countries that are already reasonably well banked and have the re-
lated infrastructure, the bank-based model may also be more appropriate.
As an alternative to an activist regulatory approach to sharing infrastructure, 
such as agents, a shift to third-generation mobile financial services can help over-
come problems of scale and competition. The third-generation model implies the 
existence of access to Internet via mobile phones. Two technical aspects would 
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Bank-based models
Wizzit is a joint venture between an independent provider and the South African Bank of 
Athens. Its services are based on the use of mobile phones to access bank accounts and 
conduct transactions, in addition to a Maestro debit card that is issued to all customers 
upon registration. Wizzit has partnered with the South African bank Absa and the South Afri-
can Post Office, which act as banking agents and allow Wizzit customers to deposit funds at 
any Absa or Post Office branch.
MTN Banking is a joint venture between mobile network operator MTN and Standard Bank 
that allows customers to obtain immediate access to their bank accounts at anytime they 
wish  using  cell  phones,  MobileMoney  MasterCard,  and  the  Internet.  They  can  withdraw 
cash from any ATM in South Africa and also make balance and statement inquiries using 
cell phones. MobileMoney account holders can make person-to-person payments.
Hello Money is now offered in Botswana by Barclays Bank, in partnership with Orange and 
Mascom. It supports a full range of retail and business banking services that are already of-
fered to its customers and allows customers to make transactions such as account inquiries, 
fund transfers, bill payments, mobile recharges, and checkbook and statement requests.
Nonbank-based models
Zap was launched in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in February 2009 by Zain Mobile, in part-
nership with leading international banks, enabling Zain and bank customers to use mobile 
phones to withdraw cash or pay for goods and services, school fees, and utility bills, includ-
ing electricity and water; receive money from or send money to friends and family; send 
money from and receive money to their bank accounts; top up their or someone else’s air-
time; and manage bank accounts. More than 10 million people are using the service, and 
Zain expanded Zap to Niger and Sierra Leone and, in the context of a full commercial pilot, 
also expanded to Malawi.
Mikemusa mobile is a pilot mobile, wallet-based money transfer service that aims to cater to 
Zimbabweans in diaspora. Customers can access the service online and open m-cash ac-
counts. They can load funds onto their m-cash accounts through direct bank-to-bank online 
payments (suitable for customers with online banking facilities) or direct bank cash deposits; 
this is most suitable for customers without bank accounts or online banking facilities.
Mobicash Payment Solutions (Pty) Ltd, trading as MobiPay, is Namibia’s first mobile payment 
solution. It was licensed and authorized by the Bank of Namibia in August 2010. Customers 
must first register free of charge before depositing money with Mobicash Payment Solu-
tions. The actual cash is either deposited with the company’s bank account or with the com-
pany’s agents across the country. Customers would then use their cell phones to access the 
money for transactions, which may include the purchase of airtime, electricity payments, the 
transfer of money to other persons, and payment for goods at shops.
Note: In nonbank-based models, unlike in bank-based models, it is not mandatory to have a bank 
account.
Box 3.3  Examples of Transformative Technology-Based Products
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make this a promising route. First, this can lead to a reduction in costs. Second, the 
Internet can serve as a shared platform for different providers of payment services, 
such as PayPal. The initial applications have enjoyed high take-up rates, for exam-
ple, MXit in South Africa. However, there are also risks involved with this next 
generation of mobile payment service, most prominently the risk of viruses. This 
might also have implications for supervision and even monetary policy.
In summary, electronic banking can change the economics of retail banking. It 
can help push out the possibilities frontier substantially because it reduces the fixed 
cost component of financial service provision. Pushing out toward the new fron-
tier, however, requires that one also overcome other constraints, such as the lack of 
financial literacy and awareness, and might require a new regulatory approach. 
There are two major challenges. One involves shifting from transaction services to 
other financial services, that is, to use the initial mobile payment services as entry 
points rather than as end points in the effort to extend the outreach of the financial 
system. The other challenge is to minimize the problems associated with scalability, 
which might require a large market share and competition. Contestability—that is, 
openness to competition from new providers and new products—can go a long 
way in this direction.
Pushing Out the Frontier: The Role of  
Governments and Donors
The right mix of institutions, competition, and generally open systems can allow a 
financial system to push toward the frontier. However, for most African countries, 
this frontier is still narrow. How can the frontier—the share of the bankable popu-
lation—be pushed out at the level of households and enterprises? This brings us 
back to a long-term agenda item: institution building.
Contractual institutions—laws, the courts, collateral registries, and so on—have 
long been at the top of the agendas of policy makers. The modernist approach fo-
cuses on the ability of borrowers to use fixed assets, such as land or machinery and 
vehicles, as collateral and on the existence of the infrastructure necessary to estab-
lish sound lending practices. The creation of a sound and effective contract en-
forcement mechanism is an important part of the long-term institution building 
agenda; we return to this in chapter 4. Are there more short- to medium-term solu-
tions that can help push out the frontier and address the challenges of competition 
and the demand-side constraints?
Credit registries have been heralded as a major policy tool to push financial 
systems toward the frontier by providing more competition and allowing more 
entrepreneurs and households to become part of the bankable population. Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) assert that credit registries are better than the reform 
of the contractual framework as a tool for deepening financial systems, and Hono-
han and Beck (2007) highlight credit registries as a useful tool. What can we expect 
from the introduction of credit registries?
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Credit registries that provide easy, reliable access to client credit history and both 
negative and positive information can dramatically reduce the time and costs nec-
essary to obtain such information from individual sources and thereby reduce the 
total costs of financial intermediation. Through credit reporting, borrower quality 
becomes much more transparent, which benefits good borrowers and increases the 
cost of defaulting on obligations, thus providing a disciplining tool. It helps bor-
rowers build up credit histories—reputation collateral—and thus eases the access 
to credit. Credit registries are especially important for SMEs because the credit-
worthi  ness of SMEs is generally more difficult to evaluate, and SMEs typically are 
less visible and transparent relative to large enterprises. Many cross-country studies 
have found that countries with effective credit registries possess deeper and broader 
financial systems (see, for example, Jappelli and Pagano 2002). Does this also hold 
over time, that is, comparing individual countries before and after the introduction 
of credit registries? There is, indeed, evidence of a useful effect on the stability of 
banks and on the access to credit by enterprises, though little of this evidence is on 
African countries.
11 There is specific evidence for countries that have introduced 
credit registries and have seen improvements in the access of enterprises to credit 
(Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 2009).
While credit registries have often been praised as an important policy tool, one 
has to be realistic about what can be achieved and about the related time frame. 
Negative information sharing will lead to the more effective screening of borrowers 
by lenders through access to information, which, in the first instance, may generate 
a reduction in access rather than an expansion. However, only through the inclu-
sion of positive information can one achieve a buildup in the reputation capital of 
existing borrowers that might have an effect on competition, though this will only 
be felt over time rather than immediately. At the outset, this positive impact will 
affect the existing borrower population and cause an expansion of the frontier to 
the previously unbanked population only by fostering stronger competition among 
the participants in the credit registry, thus forcing some of the participants down-
market. Here, the type of information on which the registry can draw is critical. In 
general, the broader the sources the registry can draw on (utility companies, trade 
registries, and so on), the larger the share of enterprises that will be captured and 
that can potentially benefit from such a registry by proving their good borrower 
status. In this context, the connection to information from MFIs seems crucial. 
While the borrowers targeted by such institutions are often different from those 
targeted by banks, growing microenterprises that formalize into small enterprises 
will, at some point, want to access bank credit as they become too large for MFIs. It 
is at this stage that a credit registry can help them. All these possible effects, how-
ever, should not be expected immediately, but over the medium term, that is, in 
three or more years.
There has been an important debate about the private versus the public model 
in credit registries. While the private model has the advantage of being able to draw 
on data from many different sources, it is typically a voluntary arrangement. More-
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over, it can be exclusive to certain groups of financial institutions, thereby under-
mining competition within the banking system and fostering segmentation in the 
financial system. Meanwhile, the public model, which is usually hosted at the cen-
tral bank, has the advantage of being compulsory. In many cases, however, it is 
limited to credit information from banks themselves and refers to loans above a 
certain threshold, while focusing on negative information only.
As in the case of many items on the policy agenda, the space for action by policy 
makers varies significantly across Africa. Larger countries, such as Egypt, Kenya, 
and Nigeria, can afford several competing credit registries, while small countries 
cannot. Even where there are competing credit registries, however, it is important 
that they truly compete with each other, rather than representing separate segments 
of a financial system, as in the case of Nigeria. This entrenches the segmentation of 
the banking system rather than fostering competition.
Egypt offers an interesting example. In Egypt, the central bank recognized its 
capacity constraints and encouraged the banking sector to set up its own credit 
registry, I-Score, which could then also draw on data from the central bank’s credit 
registry. Expansion toward the MFI segment is now being considered. Similarly, in 
Morocco, through a private-public partnership, private banks are building a data 
platform that is ultimately controlled by the central bank, but which may be ac-
cessed by any private credit registry. Some of these experiences would certainly be 
useful for other countries farther south as long as they always take into account the 
capacity constraints of small markets.
There are also potential benefits associated with regional arrangements in credit 
registries. Sharing the fixed costs of setting up and running such a registry can 
thereby be spread across more users, which, if passed on to the end users of the 
registry, makes the registry more cost-effective. Furthermore, as the economies in 
subregions, such as East Africa, become better integrated and as more, even smaller 
enterprises expand across national borders, a broader supranational information 
base becomes important. However, in this case, a consistent legal foundation must 
be created as a basis for information sharing across borders and to ensure the com-
patibility of different models.
The lack of proper identification cards in some African countries is a challenge. 
Biometric identification can help solve this problem, though there are cost con-
cerns. Given the absence of a national identification system, Uganda has introduced 
biometric identification in the context of the establishment of a new privately man-
aged credit registry.
The Role of Government: Looking beyond  
Institution Building
While governments continue to play a major role in pushing financial institutions 
toward the frontier and pushing the frontier outward, the role of governments in 
access to finance has changed significantly in recent decades.
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Government entities acting as financial service providers, especially in the retail 
trade and in credit services, have failed almost everywhere in the developed and 
developing world. In contrast, the role of government in the policy arena has in-
creased and is no longer limited to macroeconomic stability and long-term institu-
tion building. In this context, it is important to discuss the role of DFIs. While they 
have failed in providing retail credit, they can have a key role in alleviating supply-
side and demand-side constraints.
Another area of possible policy intervention is affirmative action to push finan-
cial systems toward the frontier through moral suasion or the legislative and regu-
latory process. The example of South Africa and its financial charter is insightful in 
this context, although the dictum “one size fits all” certainly does not apply here 
because similar policies may not be feasible in poorer and smaller countries in Af-
rica, as Honohan and Beck (2007) point out. Furthermore, there is a fine line be-
tween moral suasion and political interference, as the recent example of Uganda 
has shown. In early 2006, frustrated by the insufficiency of earlier attempts to raise 
access to financial services, the Ugandan government announced that each district 
should be serviced by at least one financial institution. In those districts where no 
financial service provider was in operation, the government mandated the estab-
lishment of SACCOs to be supported through payment services and other services 
supplied by the poorly managed government-owned Postal Savings Bank. Simi-
larly, in Nigeria, the government put in place the Small and Medium Enterprises 
Equity Investment Scheme, which obliges banks to set aside 10 percent of their 
profits for equity investment in SMEs. The experience was not successful. As of 
September 2005, only about 27.5 percent of the resources set aside by 82 banks had 
been utilized (Abereijo and Fayomi 2007).
Beyond institution building, governments have a critical role in ensuring com-
petition and in designing regulation in a manner compatible with the goal of out-
reach. We discuss these in the following.
Encouraging competition
Competition is an important area for government action. However, this entails a 
sophisticated approach that has to balance (1) the need for innovation, (2) the need 
to avoid market dominance by new players who rapidly gain market share in new 
products, and (3) the need to reduce the risks of fragility. To illustrate, we return to 
the topic of mobile financial service providers.
Its monopolistic position in the cell phone market and its anticipation of mo-
nopolistic rents encouraged Safaricom to launch M-Pesa.
12 The possibility of en-
tering the market without regulatory restriction certainly helped. However, the 
dominating market position represents a concern in terms of market development 
going forward, and mobile payment services might raise previously unknown risks. 
A dynamic approach is therefore called for, whereby regulatory authorities—in this 
case, banking and telecommunications regulators—have to follow market develop-
ment closely and react flexibly.
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As Porteous (2010) clarifies, the pricing and access conditions imposed by tele-
communications companies in regard to third parties such as banks can affect the 
willingness of the latter to offer such services. Meanwhile, by charging high rates, 
banks can impede the access to payment systems by companies offering mobile pay-
ment services. The banks thereby similarly erect barriers to competition. These is-
sues call for close coordination between bank and telecommunications regulators.
Allowing the entry of sound and reputable service providers into financial sys-
tems is critical for innovation and for the objective of broadening access to finance 
in Africa. Data on license applications and approvals across Africa’s banking sys-
tems are worrisome given that more than a third have been rejected for numerous 
reasons in recent years. While this might simply be a symptom of a lack of reputa-
ble and experienced financial service operators in Africa, it does raise concerns 
about competitive barriers.
Another  lever  to  increase  competition  is  more  transparency,  which  can  be 
  created by, for example, forcing financial institutions to publish their service fees   
in major newspapers. Currently, only 18 countries in Africa have such a require-
ment.
13 It is important to stress that publishing by itself is not sufficient to ensure 
transparency; the publication of fees on comparable products and the distribution 
of the information properly are paramount.
In certain instances, the authorities might have to force financial service pro-
viders to cooperate rather than compete with each other, especially in financial 
sector infrastructure, such as payment systems. One striking feature of African fi-
nancial systems is the lack of interconnection among ATM and point-of-sale net-
works across banks. More than half the countries on which data are available have 
more than one payment card switch, which is highly cost-inefficient given the 
small scale of most African financial systems. Similarly, relative to other countries, 
African countries show, on average, lower interoperability scores for ATM systems 
and point-of-sale systems (World Bank 2008b). Even where there is interoperabil-
ity, participants face high fees. Central banks, in carrying out their payment sys-
tem oversight responsibilities, have to ensure that the balance between competi-
tion and cooperation is a healthy one. As a public good, key payment system 
infrastructure such as this should meet public policy concerns by, for example, 
allowing fair and competitive access to retail payment infrastructure. This would 
also entail ensuring that different types of institutions, be they banks or nonbank 
entities, provide payment services and promote fair access, thereby establishing a 
level playing field in the market. In most African countries, access to payment 
services is limited to banks, which gives banks a competitive advantage over other 
financial service providers.
Governments have to act with caution, however. Thus, in 2008, for example, 
Bank of Ghana introduced a national retail switch (eZwich) to which all banks had 
to connect. While banks obliged, few cards were issued, mainly because of the high 
cost of the technology and because the switch is not interoperable with other bank-
level networks. Box 3.4 presents another example, in Malawi. The lesson from these 
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experiences is that the authorities have a critical role in ensuring cooperation in 
infrastructure, but the private sector has to be closely involved in technical design. 
Another important dimension is the increasing trend toward SIM registration, that 
is, implementing the documentation requirements for acquiring a SIM card. This 
increases the costs for customers and mobile telephony companies, with poten-
tially  negative  repercussions  on  efforts  to  broaden  access  to  cell  phones  and   
mobile payment services. However, it also seems to offer an opportunity if the doc-
umentation requirements for opening bank accounts and registering SIM cards 
can be harmonized and linked, thus lowering the documentation requirements for 
bank accounts, at least at the regulatory level.
Fostering innovation
Providing the necessary environment for innovation is essential, but nurturing it is 
much  more  difficult.  Innovation  funds  and  innovation  challenges,  possibly  fi-
Malawi has made great progress in the modernization of its payment system, but its decision 
to invest in a proprietary smart card payment system technology has been costly and has in-
hibited its ability to achieve an interoperable platform with a broad base of participation by 
issuers and acquirers. Keen to establish a shared retail payment system platform, the Re-
serve Bank of Malawi (RBM) invested, in 1999, in a nationwide payment service provider 
called Malswitch. (The provider is owned by RBM and the government. The respective own-
ership shares are 99 and 1 percent.) Malswitch operates the real time gross settlement sys-
tem on behalf of RBM, while the Electronic Check Clearing House participates on behalf of 
other banks. The smart card system has off-line capabilities, as well as biometric identifica-
tion facilities. It was thus intended that the system should reach a wider customer base than 
traditional payment instruments, including in unbanked rural areas.
RBM hoped that the commercial banks would subsequently subscribe to the Malswitch 
smart card technology and compete on products rather than infrastructure. After 11 years, 
this aspiration has not materialized. Banks found the selected technology expensive and in-
vested in alternate open platforms, which are governed by open standards that allow inter-
connection and interoperability with existing payment system platforms. Today, the Malswitch 
smart card is still not interoperable and is inconsistent with best practice and user needs. 
Furthermore, the advances in technology since Malswitch was introduced and the proprie-
tary nature of the technology have made Malswitch additionally unattractive to the private 
banking sector.
While RBM was right in seeking to champion a public good for the banking sector so as 
to attract the significant transaction volume required to lower average transaction process-
ing costs, good practice today requires private sector ownership and management of such 
shared retail payment system infrastructure. In this way, banks could collectively make all 
key decisions affecting the infrastructure, thereby demonstrating a good balance between 
cooperation and competition.
Box 3.4  Malswitch
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nanced and sponsored by donors, might help. M-Pesa was partly financed by a 
challenge fund sponsored by the U.K. Department for International Development. 
The recent G20 SME Finance Challenge included several winners who focused   
on Africa.
Another important step in pushing the financial sector toward the frontier is the 
reduction of information hurdles. Throughout this chapter, we refer to and use 
household-level data produced through the FinScope and FinAccess databases. 
These databases are useful not only for analysts and researchers, but also for finan-
cial institutions that are considering expanding their outreach. Identifying the geo-
graphical and sectoral gaps in financial service provision can be helpful for finan-
cial institutions that want to expand. Identifying gaps in the outreach of financial 
institutions can also have a demonstration and incentive effect. In South Africa, the 
private banking sector has supported such studies, while governments and donors 
have financed such studies in other countries given the limited buy-in so far by 
private financial institutions, though these institutions should have a strong incen-
tive as well.
Avoiding a regulatory bias against outreach
Regulations are important in safeguarding finance and ultimately protecting the 
beneficiaries and users of financial services. Burdensome regulations, however, re-
strict the outreach of financial institutions (box 3.5). Regulatory constraints prevent 
New providers and new products represent opportunities to push the financial system toward 
the frontier and push out the frontier. The discussion in this chapter shows the powerful ef-
fect that competition and the ensuing innovation can produce. Partisans of the modernist ap-
proach have the tendency to focus on new laws and regulations to enable new providers and 
products. Partisans of the activist approach would like the government to take a more active 
role in introducing new products. Both sides seem too eager in their respective drives. First, 
M-Pesa was introduced in Kenya well before any regulations on m-banking. Islamic banking 
works in South Africa without the accompanying regulations because regulators apply the 
same  rules  in  spirit  to  Islamic  banks  and  to  conventional  banks.  Second,  innovations  are 
mostly introduced by private players; perhaps these are not always commercially oriented, 
but they have a clear vision of long-term sustainability. An open policy approach is therefore 
called for that adopts an initial caveat emptor attitude toward financial innovation.
This should not imply that regulatory authorities stand by silently as the financial system 
is changed through innovation. On the contrary, the success of M-Pesa and the possible 
dominance of the mobile payment market by Safaricom show the need for an active regula-
tory approach to prevent the potential entrenchment of a monopolist, while excesses in pay-
roll lending show the need for an active approach to consumer protection to avoid overin-
debtedness on the household side and financial fragility on the supplier side.
Box 3.5    Financial Innovation: The Opportunities and Risks in Expanding 
Outreach
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microfinance from exerting the maximum effect. In Morocco, for example, MFIs 
are treated as nonprofit organizations, a rule that prevents them from diversifying 
services and funding sources beyond the original donors. Similarly, maximum lend-
ing thresholds limit the business of MFIs. As they are implemented in many African 
countries, interest rate ceilings have an even worse effect because they price micro-
credit providers out of the market (see the discussion in chapter 5).
At a more individual level, regulations on anti–money laundering and on com-
bating the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) are important, but they can also re-
strict access to financial services, thereby constraining outreach. The need to make 
AML-CFT regulations as access-friendly as possible is recognized by specialists 
(Hernández-Coss et al. 2005). To accomplish this, one must ensure that the re-
quirements are based on risks and that they therefore do not impose excessive rules 
on documentation and verification on low-income customers who access services 
that have limited scope for abuse. Regulatory authorities should engage with finan-
cial service providers to design the services needed by the poor, such as basic bank 
accounts, in such a way that they can be safely offered without triggering concerns 
about AML-CFT. Thus, for example, South Africa lowered the documentation bar-
riers on basic financial products subject to monetary limits and certain other con-
ditions, including that clients be natural persons, South African nationals, or resi-
dents and that the transactions be domestic. Such documentation requirements are 
also relevant in agency agreements so that they guarantee the right of nonbank 
staff to open accounts and verify identities, as well as receive and make cash pay-
ments even under the AML-CFT regime. Otherwise, the outreach of this important 
delivery channel will not be effective.
Even more important than focusing on the supply-side constraints of regula-
tion is to formulate regulations so as to address demand-side constraints. South 
Africa  has  taken  an  active  approach  to  curbing  excesses  in  consumer  lending 
through the National Credit Act in 2007 by requiring lenders to undertake afford-
ability tests before granting credit. By curbing consumer credit, this law (which also 
covered the establishment of a national credit regulator) may well have prevented 
the buildup of a consumer credit bubble, as we have seen in several industrialized 
countries. We return to this topic in chapter 5.
Facilitating regional solutions
Beyond developing national markets, African policy makers also need to look at 
regional solutions. Developments on the continent are such that there are tremen-
dous incentives for expanding access to finance through the rapid, but safe launch 
of  domestic  and  crossborder  branchless  banking,  accompanied  by  appropriate 
protections for customers and the financial system. The immediate motivations 
include current migration patterns, regional remittance flows, and trade patterns 
(Stone et al. 2009).
In Africa, there is a complex mix of skilled and unskilled migrants. While most 
migrants in the region are men, there is an increasing pattern of the feminization of 
migration in the region. Migrants typically use cash as they cross borders and have 
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to go through numerous hurdles to obtain the relevant documentation to access 
banking services in their new places of residence. Internal migration is also wide-
spread and is linked to rapid urbanization. Internal migrations have greatly con-
tributed to the enlargement of the informal sector within countries. Rural-urban 
migration has also resulted in many geographically split households, with impor-
tant implications for the demand for m-banking.
The infrastructure for transferring remittances among African countries re-
mains rudimentary. The means of sending remittances relied on by crossborder 
and internal migrants include banks and other formal financial intermediaries, post 
offices, money transfer operators (for example, Western Union and Moneygram), 
and the hand transport of cash (personally or through an agent such as a friend, a 
relative, or a taxi driver). The informal channels are inextricably linked with the 
informal nature of migration in the region, with important consequences for the 
relative ease and security of money transfers. The relatively high costs of sending 
remittances through the formal financial sector are also an important factor in de-
termining patterns of demand (Maimbo et al. 2010; Maimbo and Ratha 2005).
Informal crossborder trade is the main potential source of demand for cross-
border m-banking services. Individuals cross borders to sell small amounts of 
goods—informal street traders, for example. While these informal traders are not 
strictly migrants, some studies describe them as among the most entrepreneurial 
and energetic of contemporary migrants. One study noted that informal traders 
who cross borders are mostly women (70 percent). Thus, informal crossborder 
trade may be closely linked to the feminization of migration.
Despite the importance of crossborder migration, remittances, and trade pat-
terns, the financial architecture for facilitating these processes remains hindered 
by regulatory constraints. Financial sector development policies and products 
have focused on facilitating large-value payments within national borders and pay 
little attention to innovations in small-value payment systems whether domestic 
or crossborder.
From a regional regulatory perspective, in addition to the recommendations 
above regarding the development of national markets, it is important that policy 
makers recognize and address the fact that countries still have (1) different regula-
tory regimes in relation to the potential for m-banking in general and for cross-
border m-banking in particular and (2) are at different stages in the development 
of m-banking facilities. Countries need to accelerate the process of harmonizing 
the licensing and supervisory framework for mobile money to facilitate private 
sector–led technological solutions, many of which will benefit national markets.
From Agricultural Credit to Rural Finance
Throughout the developing world, rural finance, especially agricultural credit, has 
always been the troubled child in the financial family. Considered costly and risky, 
it is often avoided by commercial lenders, who leave the field to cooperatives, 
  donor-supported MFIs, and government-owned DFIs.
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The conditions in Africa exacerbate the difficulties that agricultural and rural 
finance faces. The four characteristics of African economies described in chapter 1 
that make financial service provision more challenging in Africa apply even more 
so to the rural sector in Africa.
•    Scale: Dispersed populations and deteriorated road infrastructure make finan-
cial service provision through normal delivery channels prohibitively expensive. 
Deficient energy supply and, thus, the need for generators, as well as the lack of a 
reliable landline phone system, increase the costs of providing banking services 
through traditional delivery channels. In some countries, the difficult security 
situation drives costs up additionally.
•    Informality: Informality is typically more prominent in rural areas, where there 
are few formal residential addresses or land titles and little formal employment 
except government jobs. Competing systems governing land rights, that is, the 
overlap  between  modern  land  law  and  traditional  land  assignment  systems, 
make the use of land as collateral difficult for traditional lenders.
•    Volatility: Agricultural products face high operational and price risks, and, given 
the monoculture of many farms and regions, risk diversification is not possible 
for lenders. There is also significant price volatility both seasonally, but, even 
more, also over multiyear cycles.
•    Governance: The provision of subsidized credit through government-owned fi-
nancial  institutions  has  undermined  the  culture  of  credit,  and  commercial 
lenders are often reluctant to enter the market. Repeated debt forgiveness by 
government-owned institutions causes borrowers to confuse loans with grants. 
In addition, the agricultural sector in most countries is subject to substantial 
government intervention. Unlike in most developed countries, however, such 
intervention does not always favor agriculture. This makes agricultural finance 
more challenging.
These four characteristics of rural areas in Africa mean that the challenge of 
overcoming scale diseconomies and managing risk is more difficult for financial 
service providers. As we discuss below, technology can be as powerful a game 
changer in rural finance as elsewhere. Critically, competition is important to attract 
new providers, new products, and new delivery channels to rural areas. Demand 
constraints, including the lack of financial literacy and business development, but 
also nonfinancial supply constraints, such as lack of access to markets, loom large 
in agriculture and in rural areas more generally.
In discussions of agricultural and rural finance and in seeking to attain the gen-
eral objective of expanding access to financial services to previously unbanked seg-
ments of the rural population, one should distinguish among target groups, which 
partly overlap in terms of the concepts of Finance for All, Finance for Markets, and 
Finance for Growth introduced elsewhere above. Specifically, one should make the 
important distinction between cash crop producers, who sell their produce on 
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markets and thus need a large array of financial services, including transaction, 
savings, and credit services, and staple crop producers, who, in many cases, are 
subsistence farmers with limited resources and little scope for becoming customers 
of formal financial institutions. Furthermore, the focus long ago shifted from agri-
cultural credit to a much broader set of financial needs, including the link with 
nonfinancial corporations, such as input providers and produce purchasers, as well 
as links with informal financial services providers (see World Bank 2005; Coates 
and Hofmeister 2010). This reflects the fact that agriculture is, for large parts of the 
rural population, only one of many income sources.
The market gaps in agricultural credit—documented in chapter 2—led most 
African countries in the 1960s and 1970s to establish development banks and DFIs 
that focused on agricultural credit, including, in many cases, extension services. 
These entities were often supported by donor institutions, including international 
financial institutions. The performance of these entities has generally not been ef-
fective, which reflects an overreach in activism in light of governance deficiencies. 
Nonperforming loans and little, if any, additionality effect—that is, loans accruing 
to borrowers that have access to commercial bank credit—undermined the finan-
cial performance and economic impact of these entities. Governance challenges, 
including political interference in the credit allocation process, politically moti-
vated debt forgiveness, corruption, and even incompetence, further damaged the 
sustainability and efficiency of these entities.
In response to the negative experience with government-managed or government- 
sponsored agricultural banks, donors and governments have moved away from 
retail lending in agriculture. The challenge of financial service provision to agri-
culture and to rural areas continues to exist, however, and it is here that the prom-
ise of modernism has not been realized. The good news is that, in recent decades, 
new products and delivery channels have been developed, new players have en-
tered the market, and new partnerships have emerged. As in the general effort to 
expand access, there is no silver bullet for the problem of access to finance in rural 
areas; there will be many small solutions that help push rural finance to the fron-
tier and move the frontier outward. In the following, we discuss some of these in-
novations and link them to the general theme of this chapter.
Value chains: utilizing existing relationships to expand formal finance
One promising way to overcome the limitations imposed by information asym-
metries and the lack of collateral is to use value chains as entry points for financial 
institutions.  Value  chain  finance,  or  buyer  and  supplier  finance,  is  important 
throughout the economy, but especially in agricultural finance, given the predeter-
mined time periods between sowing and harvesting (box 3.6). Financial relation-
ships related to the value chain are most effective if the value chain is clearly de-
fined, such as the value chain between input providers and farmers or between 
farmers and wholesalers. Well-structured value chains allow an opening for value 
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chain financing, whereby smallholders can leverage the reputation and collateral of 
large input providers or large clients for their products.
By using their balance sheets to strengthen existing value chain finance arrange-
ments or to help arrange new ones and contribute their expertise and resources, 
the financing of a value chain can constitute an important entry point for banks 
into agricultural finance (box 3.6). DFIs can play a key role by providing platforms 
for the value chains and bringing together other actors.
Perhaps one of the best examples of short-term trade credit for agricultural producers is the 
cocoa value chain in Ghana. Cocoa is a huge industry in Ghana, and the purchase of the 
output from producers is dominated by a market of private sector companies (licensed buy-
ing companies or LBCs) with licenses to sell to the state-owned marketing monopoly.
LBCs routinely provide significant amounts of short-term credit to producers for the pur-
chase of the required inputs (for example, fertilizer and pesticides) before the growing sea-
son. In return, the cocoa growers commit to selling the resultant cocoa harvest to the LBCs 
at an agreed price. The capital and interest are repaid to the LBCs through the proceeds of 
the sale, and the balance goes to the farmer.
Similarly,  credit  can  also  be  provided  by  the  input  supplier.  In  another  example  from 
Ghana, one of the country’s largest suppliers of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs fur-
nishes supplies on credit to members of a major cocoa growers association, with repayment 
due following the harvest.
A bank in Ghana had a large local supermarket as a customer. The supermarket was 
keen to expand its sales of horticultural produce from local producer groups, but the supply 
of the produce was unreliable and limited. It wanted to improve the supply chain by making 
formal arrangements with producer associations to provide an agreed quantity and quality 
of produce for an agreed price in return for helping to prefinance the horticultural produc-
tion. Rather than relying on its own balance sheet, it approached the bank with a view to 
helping with a credit line of its own.
In Mozambique, small farmers have established self-managed outgrower schemes with 
the assistance of the international program of the Cooperative League of the United States 
of America. The program established a two-tier structure of producer organizations and their 
regional associations. The producer organizations serve as the intermediary between the in-
dividual farmer and the agribusinesses and other processors that provide short-term pro-
duction credit and purchase the output. The producer organizations provide extension ser-
vices to help the farmers improve their methods and the quality of the produce; they also 
provide storage and transport facilities. While outgrower schemes are well established, par-
ticularly in the cotton and tobacco sectors, more loosely organized marketing arrangements 
are prevalent in the cashew, groundnut, sesame, sunflower, and maize sectors. At the end of 
2002, the program had established over 840 producer organizations involving approximately 
26,000 farmers. Repayment had reached 96 percent. The program has since been handed 
over to OLIPA, a local NGO.
Source: GIZ (2010).
Box 3.6  Examples of Value Chain Finance
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Value chain finance can have important benefits for a bank. First, the interme-
diary firm—be it the buyer of the produce or the seller of the input—has close 
links with producers at the grassroots, which allows the bank to overcome the con-
straints of scale and asymmetric information. Second, the intermediary firms are 
more well placed to make sure that the finance is spent by the borrowers on pro-
ductive inputs rather than diverted to activities that may not guarantee repayment. 
The buyer and supplier financing arrangements rely on stable and professional 
relationships between producers and intermediary firms. To some extent, it is ben-
eficial if the intermediary firms are in a position of power on the market relative to 
the producer, and the implications of a breach of loan covenants by the producer 
in terms of subsequent difficulty in sourcing alternative suppliers or buyers, such 
as side-selling, are therefore clear. This sort of sanction is usually more obvious to 
producers than the more ambiguous threats of legal actions by banks in costly and 
ineffective legal systems.
The challenge for the financial institution is to agree on an appropriate credit 
line and terms and conditions in line with the market risk profile and competitive 
conditions. It needs to develop a simple and streamlined credit process for the in-
termediary firm, ideally with a basic application form that the intermediary can 
use to score the proposed customer in keeping with the agreed credit policy. One of 
the simplest mechanisms is to mandate that producers receive the payments for 
their produce in a dedicated account held with the bank (which is particularly easy 
in the case of supplier finance) from which repayments can be automatically de-
ducted. This also represents a cross-sell opportunity for the bank and a way of in-
creasing the formality of producer financial activity. However, it might also be use-
ful to link a rural-based cooperative or a microbank into the relationship. A major 
factor of differentiation among value chains is the presence of a strong agribusiness 
player at some point in the value chain. This increases the overall credit standing of 
the chain and its participants from the viewpoint of the financial institution. Credit 
enhancement can also take place through credit guarantees, a topic that is treated 
more generally in chapter 4.
Looking for collateral
One major problem facing lenders in rural areas is the lack of collateralizable as-
sets. Land can often not be used as collateral, given the dominance of traditional 
land law or the impossibility of reselling land in a tight-knit community. In several 
countries, land cannot be owned by foreigners, which makes the use of land as col-
lateral problematic for foreign-owned banks. Secure property rights, however, are 
also important for other transactions such as the rental or sale of land. Reforms in 
this area encompass a large number of actions, ranging from legal, sometimes con-
stitutional changes to the establishment of land registries and enforcement mecha-
nisms. One has to be realistic about the outcomes of such actions, however. Tradi-
tional land customs and cultural trends will make the application of modern land 
law infeasible in many rural areas of Africa. This is one of the best examples of 
modernism reaching its limits.
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An alternative used with increasing success is warehouse receipts for crops. 
Under this arrangement, commoditized produce (for example, wheat, coffee, cocoa, 
or maize) is deposited in a warehouse by the owner, and a receipt is issued that 
stipulates the quantity, quality, and type of produce deposited. The warehouse re-
ceipt would generally be negotiable, meaning ownership is transferable, which 
makes it quite suitable for collateral purposes. Financial institutions have therefore 
been willing to extend loans against this security in the appropriate environment. 
From a financial perspective, the product is a simple one, but it does require some 
fundamentals to be established. It is essential that good physical warehousing fa-
cilities are available so that all parties to the transaction can be confident that the 
produce is well protected and secure. There must also be high levels of trust among 
the players, particularly the assurance that the warehouse operator will not release 
the produce to any party other than the owner (that is, against the presentation of 
the warehouse receipt). The inspection and grading services must also be reliable to 
ensure that the produce is of the precise type, quantity, and quality stipulated. The 
legal environment must be supportive of the bank’s right to realize security quickly 
and unilaterally in the event of default, usually by selling the warehouse receipt to a 
third party, and, thus, there must also be a vibrant secondary market for warehouse 
receipts. There is nothing particularly complex about these components, but they 
must all work together in a fairly flawless way.
Warehouse receipts tend to be a slightly awkward product for small producers. 
They rarely have the volume of produce that makes such an operation cost-  effective. 
However, they are suitable for higher levels of aggregation, such as agricultural co-
operatives. They are also only suitable for certain types of produce, that is, produce 
that is highly commoditized and can therefore be reliably and consistently graded, 
for which there is a clear and open market price, and that is not highly perishable. 
Warehouse receipts are especially useful for short-term finance. For similar reasons 
of market volatility, banks will typically only extend a relatively modest proportion 
of the market value of a warehouse receipt.
Assets such as equipment and machinery can also be financed through leasing, 
which can help free up working capital over the medium term. These arrangements 
usually work best when a bank acts closely with a supplier of agricultural machin-
ery and equipment. They usually also work best with assets that enjoy a vibrant 
secondary sales market. The legal environment has to be appropriate because the 
bank must be able to seize and realize collateral easily and quickly in the event of 
default. One of the reasons for the popularity of leases in developed markets has 
usually been the favorable tax treatment and the potential to treat them as off–
balance sheet items for accounting purposes. Leasing and other asset finance solu-
tions have huge potential for African agribusiness and for other parts of the econ-
omy, as we discuss elsewhere below under the heading of SME finance. It remains 
to be seen how much value these solutions will offer directly to the smallest pro-
ducers, but, given the right circumstances, they certainly have potential.
03--chapter 3--77-140.indd   124 8/18/11   9:38:52 AMExpanding Financial Systems  125
Looking beyond smallholders and credit
Our focus so far has been on the extension of credit to agricultural and other ac-
tivities in rural areas, mostly short term. As in other sectors, however, there is also a 
lack of equity finance in rural areas. Few agribusinesses are sufficiently large to list 
on a stock exchange or issue debt instruments; private equity thus seems more 
promising. We return to the theme of private equity providers in the next chapter 
in discussing the challenge of more long-term finance for African economies, but 
private equity seems even more difficult in agribusiness than in other sectors. First, 
agriculture is much more heterogeneous than other sectors in terms of products 
and markets, meaning that it is more costly for private equity funds to undertake 
market  research  and  specialize.  Second,  information  asymmetries  are  typically 
larger in agriculture, and monitoring is made more difficult because of the dis-
tances. Third, as much as in other sectors, there is often a lack of exit options for 
private equity financiers.
Looking to other financial services and beyond finance
While the emphasis of policy makers was for a long time on agricultural credit, the 
debate has more recently broadened from agriculture to rural areas generally, given 
that the incomes of a large share of the population in rural areas does not depend 
exclusively on agriculture. The debate has also broadened from credit to financial 
services more generally, given the financial needs of the rural population (and the 
urban population); one has to consider the entire array of products, from short-
term trade credit to long-term investment credit, but also beyond credit to savings 
and payment products, as well as insurance services.
Technology can be especially useful in rural areas. However, one has to be realis-
tic in terms of which technology is the most cost-effective, given the higher costs   
of financial service provision mentioned above. One case in point is the Dowa 
Emergency Cash Transfer Program (2006–07) of Opportunity International Bank 
of Malawi. The bank set out with the objective of helping the poor in remote, 
drought-stricken parts of the Dowa District to purchase food. To enable the related 
cash transfers, the bank employed off-line smart cards developed by Net1 Aplitec. 
The system was supposed to match funds deposited at the bank with the identity of 
each approved recipient established by the smart card at enrolment. To deliver the 
cash payments, 11 paypoints were introduced that were serviced by a van equipped 
with ATMs to read smart cards and with fingerprint readers to authenticate each 
recipient biometrically before payment. The project increased the outreach of fi-
nancial services in Dowa: 45 percent of the recipients were still using their bank 
accounts in 2009 (Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman 2009). And yet, during the proj-
ect, 80 percent of the funds were used to purchase food, indicating that the poorest 
had a rather low need for transactions outside the government-to-person pay-
ments.
14 Despite being effective, the smart card technology was expensive, taking 
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up 23 percent of the overall cash that was put into the project, but that was sup-
posed to reach the poor. Furthermore, because the technology was expensive and 
proprietary, the project could not be scaled up. Pearson and Kilfoil (2007) conclude 
that the smart card could have been replaced by a substantially cheaper technology: 
magnetic stripe cards.
Index-based weather insurance is a relatively new product that allows small-
holder farmers to hedge against risks stemming from natural disasters, such as 
drought or flood. The policy pays out only if a publicly observable index, such as 
rainfall, passes a certain threshold. Such an instrument allows insurance to be pro-
vided against one of the most important sources of volatility and risk for agricul-
tural producers. The principal advantage relative to traditional insurance policies is 
that individual insurance cases do not have to be followed up by the insurance 
company. The challenge, meanwhile, is to identify an index that is closely related to 
the actual variation for the individual producer and to have sufficient time series 
available to compute appropriate thresholds for insurance payout and actuarially 
fair premiums.
Recent experience with the introduction of such a product in Malawi offers 
valuable insights (Giné and Yang 2009). First, the marketing of index insurance is 
critical for the take-up of such a product. Teaching smallholder farmers the advan-
tages of such a product and the payout structure is important; designing the prod-
uct in a way that pays out relatively often in the first few years can increase accep-
tance. Linking such a product to credit provision can constitute a win-win proposal 
for borrowers and lenders, though borrowers might be reluctant to pay extra given 
the limited liability of many agricultural loans.
Another useful innovation is the application of radio frequency identification 
technology to monitor the movement of livestock so as to ensure there are no 
fraudulent insurance claims. This reduces the premium cost and also increases ac-
cess to finance by the livestock owners.
It is important to look beyond the financing constraints for agricultural pro-
ducers. While the observation of a lack of finance has often led to the conclusion 
that limited access to finance is the binding constraint on agriculture, this may not 
be the case. First, there may be serious demand-side constraints in the form of 
missing bankable projects. Second, agriculture faces an array of constraints, in-
cluding the transportation problems associated with bringing produce to market. 
As much as in other sectors, business development services are important in 
  agriculture.
Institutions for rural finance
There is an increasing variety of players in rural finance in Africa. While micro-
finance has been traditionally limited to urban areas, more and more donor- 
financed and donor-supported institutions are pushing out toward rural areas, 
partly because the urban MFI market is maturing. One challenge faced by MFIs 
catering to clients with income streams dominated by agriculture is the high risk 
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and seasonal volatility of revenues. The solution requires lending based on antici-
pated crop production rather than current cash flows. It also involves longer loan 
periods and bullet payments rather than regular, frequent repayments. Risks re-
lated to price volatility and natural disasters have to be taken into account by the 
lender and priced appropriately. One important set of institutions in rural finance 
are community-based institutions, especially in connection with banks.
With the new approach to rural finance, the role of government has changed 
from direct lending through DFIs or agricultural loan quotas imposed on commer-
cial banks to a more policy-oriented wholesale function. By the 1990s, it had be-
come clear that most of the activist market-replacing approaches, such as interest 
rate caps, direct lending by government-owned institutions, lending quotas for pri-
vate institutions, and credit forgiveness, were not working. However, reliance on 
market forces alone has not proven successful either. Some governments responded 
by establishing dedicated institutions with different mandates combining agricul-
tural extension services and financial services. In Malawi, the government went fur-
ther and established a plethora of government institutions and programs (box 3.7, 
on the next page).
In summary, the analysis of financial service provision in rural and agricultural 
finance is consistent with other themes and messages in this book. As in the case of 
SMEs in other sectors, there is a dearth of equity and new institutional forms to fill 
this gap. Rural finance in general and agricultural finance more specifically need a 
variety of different institutions for different services. The analysis of rural finance 
also underlines that we need an increased focus on services and users that looks 
beyond institutions providing credit, as well as on the needs of users in rural areas, 
whose livelihoods may not be linked to agriculture, but who, in any case, require an 
array of financial services.
Our analysis of agricultural finance emphasizes that one size does not fit all. Dif-
ferent countries specialize in different crops, mostly because of climate factors, and, 
for historical reasons or because of the crops, have different organizational struc-
tures in agriculture (that is, microfarms, smallholders, and agribusinesses) and in 
rural financial institutions. Different forms of financing and innovations in finance 
are therefore appropriate for different countries.
SME Finance: Continuing Challenges
It is by providing financial services to firms with good growth opportunities that 
the financial sector has its main impact on African economies, helping them to 
grow and converge to the high-income levels of advanced economies. However, it is 
not so much the overall level of credit, but, rather, the allocation of credit to the 
most creditworthy that matters. Firms look toward banks and other financial insti-
tutions for an array of financial services, including payment, deposit, and insur-
ance services. However, it is through the external financing function that financial 
institutions and markets play their most important role.
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The size gap
One striking characteristic of financial underdevelopment is the limited access of 
firms to external funding, be it debt or equity. While most firms—even in Africa 
and even the small ones—have access to deposit services and thus payment services 
through banks, the picture on the credit side is different. Moreover, alternatives to 
banking credit are few and far between. Few firms are listed, and, among those that 
are, even fewer have used the possibility to issue corporate bonds. This reduces the 
The Malawi Rural Finance Corporation (MRFC) was established in 1993 following the collapse 
of  the  Small  Holder  Agriculture  Credit  Administration.  MRFC  began  operations  in  October 
1994 using the former rural extension service offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irriga-
tion that had belonged to the Small Holder Agriculture Credit Administration. The Malawi 
Savings Bank was incorporated in 1994 as a successor to the financial services arm of the 
Malawi Post Corporation, then known as the Malawi Post Office Savings Bank, which was 
established in 1911 to mobilize rural savings. Other government programs include the Malawi 
Rural Development Fund, which was established in January 2005 to increase access to fi-
nance among low-income groups in rural communities; the Small Enterprise Development 
Organization of Malawi, which has been focusing on a crop marketing loan scheme and a 
group lending facility; and the Development of Malawi Enterprises Trust, which was estab-
lished in 1979 and focuses on business advisory services but also provides limited loan ser-
vices for small enterprises.
Some programs achieved a modest measure of success. For a long time, government 
ownership  of  the  Malawi  Postal  Services  savings  accounts  increased  public  trust  in  the 
banking  system,  leading  to  more  savings  and  a  deeper  rural  financial  market.  MRFC  had 
200,000 loan customers in 2002 and an estimated 293,600 in 2003, making it one of the largest 
lenders to smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Today, it has 120 field offices, 20 su-
pervisory offices, 6 branches, and the head office. Malawi Savings Bank currently has a net-
work of five branches and 35 agencies. All its branches have dial-up internet connectivity, an 
improvement over their previous manual processes. Its deposit base grew from MK 1.8 billion 
in 2005 to MK 3.8 billion in 2007. With a minimum account opening requirement of only MK 
500, it is able to attract deposits at the lower end of the market.
Overall, however, the performance of government-owned financial institutions and pro-
grams has not been stellar. By 2004, the loan portfolio of Malawi Savings Bank (around US$1 
million) was heavily concentrated in a few companies (42 percent was lent to one borrower). 
Although performance has improved more recently, the bank is not maximizing its full poten-
tial. At the MRFC, collection on loans fell from 90 percent in 2004 to 80 percent in 2005 and 
74 percent in 2006. MRFC’s income has also been impacted by the fall in Treasury bill rates 
and competition in the SME lending market from the National Bank and the National Building 
Society. Furthermore, because MRFC does not have a banking license and is not part of the 
payments system, its operations are restricted, and it cannot engage in regular revenue gen-
erating financial intermediation activities. MRFC also has problems in managing information 
flows within its network.
Box 3.7  Malawi: Development Finance Institutions
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financing choices of firms to retained earnings, funds from family and friends, and 
supplier credit. Cross-country comparisons have, in addition, shown that there is a 
size gap in corporate finance: small firms have more difficulty accessing external 
finance than medium-size firms, which, in turn, have a more difficult time access-
ing external finance than large firms. This size gap in corporate finance is greater in 
financially less well developed countries. Not surprisingly, therefore, this size gap is 
larger in African countries than in other developing countries, while the size gap in 
deposit services is about the same in Africa as in non-African developing countries 
(figure 3.9). The other striking observation is that, across all firm size groups, the 
average use of deposit services is as great or even greater in Africa, while access to 
credit is significantly less in Africa. We find a similar variation across firms of dif-
ferent ages: firms that have been established more recently receive significantly less 
external finance than older firms (also reflecting a survivor bias). Across all firm 
age-groups, however, African firms are less likely to have a loan or credit.
The financing of SMEs continues to pose significant challenges not only for Af-
rican financial systems. It is important, however, to distinguish among the small 
enterprises that have different financing needs and different profiles. A large share 
of the enterprises in Africa consists of informal microenterprises that have been 
established because of a lack of alternative economic opportunities. Because these 
firms are not able to produce formal financial accounts or formal guarantees, it is 
hard to see this segment of the enterprise population becoming bankable over the 
medium to long term, at least not for credit services. They seem a natural target 
Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC,  
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed in 2010).
Note: Sample size: 90 countries.
Figure 3.9  The Size Gap in Corporate Finance and in Deposit Services
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group for microcredit institutions and rely more heavily than other enterprises on 
informal finance providers. A second segment consists of medium-size enterprises 
that are well established and, often, export oriented. In most cases, they have access 
to bank finance, but struggle to gain access to equity finance, including through fi-
nancial markets. Finally, there are small formal enterprises, some of which may 
possess significant growth potential. These firms—often referred to as the missing 
middle—are usually too big to use MFIs, but not sufficiently formal or well estab-
lished to use banks.
The International Finance Corporation–World Bank Enterprise Surveys (used 
also in chapter 2) provide additional insights into the financing structure of enter-
prises of various sizes and the constraints enterprises face.
15 Small firms consistently 
report greater financing obstacles relative to medium and large enterprises, as do 
younger firms throughout the developing world. The limited access of firms to ex-
ternal finance can be explained by constraints on both the supply side and the de-
mand side. Banks typically impose high collateral and documentation requirements, 
citing information barriers and deficiencies in the contractual framework, as well   
as poor applicant capacity in preparing clear business plans. There is a tendency to-
ward cash and personal guarantees because land and machinery are more costly to 
use as collateral given the deficiencies in the legal system, collateral registries, and 
the court system. Audited financial statements are a sine qua non for most banks, 
though they are not a sufficient condition for banks to grant credit. Finally, there is 
a tendency toward short-term credit for working capital rather than medium- to 
long-term credit for fixed asset purchases, as documented in chapter 2.
Most small firms and even many medium-size firms face significant hurdles in 
complying with bank requirements in collateral and documentation. Moreover, the 
related opportunity costs may be substantial given the high cost of finance and the 
other costs of formality that the business environment imposes. Accordingly, it is 
not surprising that banks often explain their high liquidity with reference to the 
lack of bankable projects, while firms complain about the lack of financing for in-
vestment projects. Policy has to address the market frictions that drive this spread 
between supply and demand.
An important area in this context is accounting and auditing standards. Most 
African countries have weak accountancy professions, partly because of the weak 
education and training programs in accountancy and auditing practices and partly 
because of the weak oversight institutions. This calls for capacity building and de-
velopment, but also for assistance with institution building. Beyond these impor-
tant issues, however, is the question of whether standard accounting rules are too 
much of a burden or even necessary for SMEs. There seems to be a need for the 
development and implementation of simplified accounting standards for microen-
terprises and for SMEs. This still leaves open the issue of the acceptance of proper 
financial reporting and the costs this involves among enterprises. Only if enter-
prises see the benefit of increased access and the lower cost of external finance will 
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they be willing to incur these costs. Financial literacy and business development 
services can help to a certain extent in this area.
Bank finance: relationship versus transaction lending
In the absence of a functioning contractual and informational framework, banks 
have found alternative mechanisms to manage credit risk and ensure repayment. 
Where no credit registries exist, information about existing borrowers is exchanged 
informally among bank executives, which is only feasible in small and concentrated 
banking systems based on old boy networks that, in turn, strengthen the oligopolis-
tic nature of the systems. Especially in the case of smaller enterprises, there is a 
tendency toward relationship lending (Berger and Udell 1996). Long relationships 
between a financial institution or even a specific loan officer and the borrower allow 
problems of information asymmetry and, thus, risk to be overcome. Relationship-
based lending, however, might be more costly, moving the equilibrium away from 
the access possibilities frontier discussed above. Recently, the more nuanced view 
has been put forward that large banks and foreign banks, relative to other institu-
tions, can have a comparative advantage at financing SMEs through arm’s-length 
lending technologies, such as asset-based lending, factoring, leasing, credit scoring, 
and centralized organizational structures (see Berger and Udell 2006; de la Torre, 
Martínez Pería, and Schmukler 2010).
The debate on relationship-based versus transaction-based lending techniques 
also has implications that affect whether institutions can cater cost effectively to 
SMEs. Relationship lending might be more readily done by small, community-
based financial institutions, while transaction-based lending is more cost effectively 
done by large financial institutions that can exploit the necessary scale economies 
implied by investment in technology. In many developing countries, this debate has 
an additional dimension because smaller banks are often owned by domestic share-
holders, while large financial institutions are often foreign owned. Using data for 91 
banks across 45 countries, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería (2011) find 
that foreign banks are more likely to use transaction-based lending techniques and 
more centralized business models relative to domestic banks. However, they also 
show that foreign banks do not tend to lend less to SMEs relative to other banks. It 
thus seems that both relationship-based and transaction-based lending techniques 
are appropriate for SME lending and that domestic and foreign-owned banks can 
cater to SMEs.
16
Expanding into the SME segment often requires a new approach and attitude as 
a bank in Nigeria demonstrates (World Bank 2010b). After bringing in interna-
tional expertise, the bank launched new products targeted specifically at SMEs. It 
scrapped its Commission on Turnover, which effectively penalized customers for 
growing their deposit accounts. It began charging its SME customers a tiered fixed 
rate for banking (capped at N =   6,000 per month), which quickly resulted in the 
rapid growth of the bank’s SME loans. The bank then introduced a peripatetic 
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system of quarterly seminars where SMEs gathered to hear various success stories 
and gain valuable information and expertise from SME bankers and other business 
leaders. The bank introduced an entrepreneur’s guidebook and launched a busi-
ness club where SMEs could network and develop valuable business relationships. 
In Egypt, meanwhile, Banque Misr has targeted the SME segment by allowing lend-
ing to SMEs to be conducted in a completely different way relative to corporate 
lending. This included hiring young graduates as loan officers without the precon-
ceptions of experienced loan officers in terms of risk assessment. Taking a page from 
microfinance, Banque Misr introduced step-up loans, allowing SMEs to take out 
increasingly larger loans upon the full repayment of previous loans (Napier 2011).
Beyond an increasing focus on transaction lending as opposed to relationship 
lending, there have been other innovations in SME financing. Several regional 
banks, including Absa and Standard Bank, have started using psychometric assess-
ments as a viable low-cost, automated screening tool to identify high-potential en-
trepreneurs and evaluate risk and future potential; these have proven successful in 
initial pilot tests.
Looking beyond bank finance
Leasing can be a prominent instrument for SME financing. Leasing is a contractual 
arrangement whereby one party (the lessee) can use, for a defined period of time, 
an asset owned by a second party (the lessor) in exchange for periodic payments. 
Several arguments may be put forward to explain why supporting the leasing   
industry is important for Africa. First, collateral requirements have been well docu-
mented as one of the main impediments that prevent African SMEs from accessing 
the traditional forms of financing needed to acquire machinery and equipment. 
Leasing is backed by cash flows from assets, and its applications are often assessed 
based on a project’s capacity to service lease payments. Accordingly, businesses and 
entrepreneurs that are denied traditional banking and commercial credit because 
of their lack of credit histories and inability to provide sufficient guarantees can 
find a new financing alternative in the leasing market. This could also bring more 
businesses into the formal sector (IFC 2009). Second, leasing allows businesses to 
avoid tying down resources, which should reduce pressure on their financials and 
free resources for other purposes. It also translates into lower barriers against start-
ing a business or upgrading existing facilities, which should promote entrepreneur-
ship and the acquisition of new technologies. New equipment is likely to reduce 
maintenance costs and increase productivity. Additionally, unlike bank credit, leas-
ing directly provides the asset, instead of the financial resources needed to acquire 
the asset, which reduces the possibility of diverting funds from the intended pur-
pose. Leasing contracts involve less paperwork and more relaxed credit require-
ments as well, which lead to shorter waiting periods relative to bank loans. Accord-
ing to a review of the leasing sector in Tunisia, funding could be offered in periods 
as short as 24 hours (MAC SA 2010). Reduced waiting times allow companies to 
respond quickly to business needs without having to lose important transactions.
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Despite these advantages, the African leasing market is still in its infancy, repre-
senting a tiny 1 percent share of the world leasing volume (White 2009). Where 
they exist, most leasing markets in Africa are small and underdeveloped; annual 
leasing volumes do not exceed US$500 million. Even in larger African markets, 
such as Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia, which exceed this 
threshold, penetration rates—measured as the ratio of the annual leasing volume 
to GDP—are below 2 percent, compared with ratios above 3 percent in many mar-
kets in Central and Eastern Europe (White 2009).
Most leases are finance leases, reflecting the limited development of the leasing 
market in Africa, given that operating leases usually develop at a later stage relative 
to finance leases. Another feature of African leasing markets is the dominance of 
banks and bank-related operators. In Ghana, bank lessors sourced more than 75 
percent of the new leases in 2007 and held 65 percent of the market share, while 
five of the six leasing companies operating in Morocco are backed by banks (Na-
ouar 2009; APSF 2010). In Tunisia, of the 10 leasing companies, the major share-
holders of 8 are banks (MAC SA 2010). Such ownership structures could poten-
tially threaten the potential of leasing to service SMEs; experience shows that banks 
offering leasing through internal units tend to target large-ticket, low-risk clients 
(IFC 2009). The African leasing market also continues to be centered on the provi-
sion of financing for vehicles. In Rwanda, vehicle financing represented 65 percent 
of total leasing activity (IFC 2007). Similarly, in 2009, vehicle financing accounted 
for 46 percent of lease financing in Morocco (APSF 2010), while the Equipment 
Leasing Association of Nigeria recently disclosed that commercial vehicle leasing 
represents the bulk of leasing business in Nigeria. This is driven to a large extent by 
the availability of a thriving secondary market for such products. The sectoral dis-
tribution of leasing activities also reflects the structure of local economies. For in-
stance, in 2009, oil and gas captured more than 45 percent of the lease transactions 
in Nigeria, while construction and transformative industries received 48 percent of 
the lease financing in Morocco.
Leasing thus has large potential, but there are important regulatory impedi-
ments. There are taxation issues concerning sales or value added taxes and the de-
ductibility of asset-related depreciation costs. Inefficient repossession systems also 
limit the leasing activities in a number of countries. This includes lengthy court 
procedures for asset repossession, the absence of implementation bodies, and a 
lack of capacity in the juridical system. The average length of time taken by the 
courts to issue repossession orders in Egypt in 2005 has been estimated at around 
one month (Nasr 2008). As noted by Al-Sugheyer and Sultanov (2010), the re-
quirement to register the leasing contract, not the leased asset, in countries such as 
Egypt adds no benefit and may prevent leasing companies from entering the mar-
ket if the incurred cost is prohibitively high. The lack of capacity in the juridical 
system to handle commercial cases was also identified as a challenge for the leasing 
sector in Rwanda (IFC 2007). Similarly, in Kenya, once two-thirds of the price has 
been paid by the lessee, the lessor has no right of repossession (Kapchanga 2010). 
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The scarcity of funding is an additional challenge that leasing companies need to 
address in Africa. Leasing companies depend on external funding from donors and 
wholesale borrowing to fund their operations. Funding availability and cost could 
prevent them from competing with banks and threaten their financial viability. 
This may explain why the leasing market is still dominated by banks.
Similarly, factoring—the discounting of sales receivable—is attractive for small 
suppliers of large creditworthy buyers because it does not rely on information 
about the borrower, but rather on the obligor (Klapper 2006). Under a factoring 
contract, the factor purchases the seller’s accounts receivable, with or without re-
course, and assumes the responsibility to collect repayments. Originally limited to 
domestic contracts, international factoring has become popular because it eases 
the credit and collection burden of international sales on exporters. Several African 
middle-income countries have factoring industries, though these are focused on 
domestic rather than international factoring. Like leasing companies, factoring 
companies can only function within a legal framework governing these transac-
tions, but rely to a lesser extent on the contractual framework of a country so that 
they can help push a financial system toward the frontier of SME lending, even if 
this frontier is too low. Development finance institutions can have an important 
role in jump-starting this industry, as shown by an example from Mexico, described 
in Box 3.8. 
A key constraint on bank finance is the lack of equity in enterprises. Significant 
leverage can prevent enterprises from pursuing more debt so that a lack of equity 
rather than a lack of debt is the binding constraint. At a more general level, equity 
can be a potentially beneficial financing source for enterprises in their early years 
and for enterprises with a profile of high risk. Yet, there are few, if any, instruments 
and vehicles for equity finance available in most African countries, as we discuss in 
more depth in chapter 4.
Increasingly, equity funds that specialize in SMEs are appearing across Africa. 
Business Partners International Kenya SME Fund is a private fixed-life fund estab-
lished in 2006 that invests in the equity, quasi-equity, and debt of Kenyan SMEs 
and has been successful in ultimately attracting external financing from donors 
and private sources. Several Aureos Capital Funds focusing on East, West, and 
South Africa have also been set up with support from donors.
Demand-side constraints
While  supply  constraints  are  important  in  the  access  of  SMEs  to  finance,  the 
  demand-side constraints should not be underestimated. Table 3.5 presents data 
from the Enterprise Surveys to explore the various categories of banked and un-
banked enterprises in Africa and in non-African developing countries. A first re-
markable result is the small number of African enterprises that have taken out 
loans. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that only 23 percent of the African en-
terprises without loans have applied for a loan, compared with 40 percent in non-
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Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) is a Mexican development bank created in 1934 to provide com-
mercial financing. NAFIN is mostly a second-tier bank, lending 90 percent of its portfolio to 
banks. In 2001, NAFIN launched an online system, cadenas productivas (productive chains), 
to provide reverse factoring services to SMEs. NAFIN’s online system is important because 
small businesses, lacking access to bank credit, frequently face difficulty financing the pro-
duction cycle, and most buyers usually take between 30 and 90 days to pay their accounts 
payable. NAFIN’s online system helped breach the 60-day liquidity gap. NAFIN’s factoring 
program has been successful, extending over US$9 billion in financing since its inception in 
September 2001 and brokering more than 1.2 million transactions, 98 percent by SMEs.
Once a supplier delivers goods to the buyer and issues an invoice, the buyer posts an on-
line negotiable document equal to the amount that will be factored on its NAFIN Web page. 
Participant financial institutions that are willing to factor this particular receivable post their 
interest rate quotes for the transaction. The supplier can then access this information and 
choose the best quote. Once the factor is chosen, the discounted amount is transferred to 
the supplier’s bank account. The factor is paid directly by the buyer when the invoice is due.
NAFIN developed, produced, and marketed the electronic platform. To participate, all fi-
nancial institutions must use NAFIN’s second-tier funding to provide credit through the sys-
tem. For this service, NAFIN does not charge a fee; instead, it covers its costs using the inter-
est it charges on its loans.
To reduce information problems, in the NAFIN case, it is the buyer who posts the ac-
counts payable on the online system (reverse factoring), thus reducing risk. The financial in-
stitutions (factor) only need to assess the creditworthiness of the buyer, which is frequently 
a large firm. Hence, it is the buyers who invite suppliers to join their chains and the online 
system. This reduces principal-agent problems by effectively outsourcing screening to the 
buyers, who have an informational advantage relative to financial intermediaries. All trans-
actions are carried out on the electronic platform, reducing transaction costs, increasing 
speed, and improving security. The online system also increases transparency because all 
banks can access historical information on the performance of suppliers, which helps them 
establish a credit history.
NAFIN’s experience suggests that, to foster competition through this type of intervention, 
it is necessary to facilitate the participation of all financial intermediaries and avoid giving 
preferential access or other advantages to larger banks or public institutions. Furthermore, a 
significant advantage of factoring, especially in developing countries, is that it does not re-
quire good collateral laws, but only the legal ability to sell or assign accounts receivable.
NAFIN’s initial participation has been important as it helped foster innovation. If a private 
financial institution would have invested in a like online system, it would have had little in-
centive to let other financial institutions participate and thus compete. The initial investment 
in the development of a large retail sales staff and promotional resources to reach firms and 
establish the productive chains has been central.
Source: de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2008).
Box 3.8  NAFIN’s Productive Chains
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African developing countries. The reasons given for not applying also show inter-
esting differences. The share of enterprises that cite the lack of demand is significantly 
lower in Africa (41 percent) than in non-African developing countries (64 percent), 
suggesting that lack of demand is less of a problem in Africa than elsewhere. There 
are two interpretations of the high interest rates (17 percent in Africa versus 12 
percent in non-African developing countries) as a reason for not applying. On the 
one hand, the return on investment in projects may be too low. On the other hand 
and more in line with the high interest rate spreads noted in chapter 2, the cost of 
credit may impede the use of bank finance. Even more striking as a reason for not 
applying is the difference in application procedures. Among nonapplicant enter-
prises, 18 percent in Africa cite this as a reason for not applying, compared with 6.5 
percent in non-African developing countries. Collateral requirements also seem 
more of an impediment in Africa than in other regions of the developing world (9.5 
versus 5 percent), as does the need for bribes (5.7 versus 1.8 percent).
It is important to stress that financing is only one of the many obstacles that 
African enterprises face in their operation and growth. As indicated in figure 3.10, 
Table 3.5   Enterprise Credit Demand: Comparing Africa with Non-African  
Developing Countries
Do you have a loan?
Area Yes No
Africa 22.44 77.56
Rest of the world 47.59 52.41
⇓
Did you apply for a loan?
Area Yes No
Africa 22.82 77.18
Rest of the world 40.01 59.99
⇓
Why didn’t you apply?
Reason Africa Rest of the world
No need for a loan 40.80 64.44
Application procedures are complex 17.96 6.51
Interest rates are not favorable 16.74 12.48
Collateral requirements are too high 9.55 5.18
Size of loan or maturity are insufficient 2.25 1.68
Informal payments needed to obtain bank loan 5.69 1.75
Did not think loan would be approved 6.92 6.42
Other 0.10 1.54
Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://
www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed in 2010).
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African firms report greater obstacles than firms outside Africa in financing, but 
also in access to land, customs and trade regulations, transport, and, most strik-
ingly, electricity. This points to the deteriorated physical infrastructure that African 
enterprises have to deal with, as well as the deficiencies in the broader regulatory 
environment.
Conclusions
The access landscape and the agenda are diverse in Africa. Relative to a few years 
ago, we have a much better picture about the demand and supply of formal and 
informal financial services across Africa. Having better data also allows us to bench-
mark countries and to formulate targets for policy. The framework of the access 
possibilities frontier allows us to disentangle the challenges in the expansion of 
outreach. Specifically, we have distinguished among (1) constraints that prevent 
Source: Enterprise Surveys (database), International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC,  
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ (accessed in 2010).
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the financial system from reaching the maximum commercially viable outreach 
and (2) demand-side constraints that depress the effective demand for financial 
services and the possibilities for pushing out the frontier, which is too low, through 
(3) technology and (4) government policies.
The analysis of these challenges and the possible solutions leads us directly to the 
three main messages of the book. First, allowing competition within banking sys-
tems and from outside banking systems will foster the necessary financial innova-
tion to push the financial system toward the frontier and exploit the opportunities 
that new methodologies, products, and technologies offer. An increased focus on 
competition, however, has critical repercussions on regulation and government 
policy in general. Fostering competition implies a more open regulatory mind-set. 
This might require reversing the usual timeline of legislation-regulation-innovation 
among new players and products and adapting a more try-and-see or test-and-see 
approach, as applied by regulators in Kenya with respect to M-Pesa. It also means 
expanding traditional infrastructure, such as credit registries and payment systems, 
beyond banks. However, it might also imply a more activist, hands-on government 
approach to force financial institutions to share infrastructure, such as payment 
systems and credit registries.
Fostering competition and openness toward new services and products is di-
rectly related to the second main message: focusing on services rather than existing 
institutions and markets. A focus on expanding the provision of payment, savings, 
and other financial services to previously unbanked segments of the population 
might mean looking beyond existing institutions, products, and delivery channels, 
such as banks, traditional checking accounts, and brick-and-mortar branches. It 
might also mean a new approach to inclusion by moving away from the credit-led 
approach toward a savings- or transaction-led approach.
Our third message—focusing as much on demand constraints as on supply 
constraints—refers mainly to financial literacy programs for households and en-
terprises and the need to address nonfinancial constraints, especially among small 
enterprises and in rural areas.
The options for expanding the access to financial services and the opportunities 
for  governments  to  implement  policies  to  enhance  access  vary  across  country 
groups, as we see throughout the chapter. Competition is more difficult to achieve 
in small financial systems, be they small because of low-income status or because of 
small country size. Yet, dominance of the mobile phone market is more likely in 
small economies, so that it might be easier for a new provider to achieve the neces-
sary scale. In small financial systems, it is more important to allow for competition 
from all possible providers. There is a premium in these economies on increasing 
competition through crossborder providers. In countries with high shares of gov-
ernment ownership in financial systems, such as in North Africa, a stronger role for 
the private sector can be helpful. There seems to be little relationship between coun-
try size and the extent to which governments and donors can address demand-side 
constraints. However, sophistication might vary. In middle-income countries such 
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as South Africa or the countries in North Africa, the focus is on the various options, 
while, in low-income countries across most of Sub-Saharan Africa, the focus is on 
the use of financial services in general. This is certainly an area where one size does 
not fit all.
Technology can be a game changer throughout the continent, but its impact is 
larger in some countries than in others. It is especially important in countries with 
disperse populations so that traditional delivery channels are more costly than else-
where. It can also be more important in countries at lower levels of financial and 
economic development so that it can help financial systems leapfrog.
Notes
1.  Typically, individuals are likely to give more accurate responses on their expenditure 
patterns than on their incomes.
2.  For the following, see Beck and de la Torre (2007) for a more in-depth discussion.
3.  We can derive a similar curve for credit services, though with the complication that the 
price, that is, the interest rate, is endogenous. Rather than focusing on the overall population 
of potential borrowers, we therefore have to focus on the universe of loan applicants, that is, 
the supply constraints. See Beck and de la Torre (2007) for a more detailed discussion.
4.  Note that a key problem in emerging markets may be a lack of investment projects 
that deserve financing based on the expected return. While this is a relevant problem, it is 
not a problem of access to finance.
5.  The data used in the analysis are taken from the latest surveys and reports of the Con-
sultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Microfinance Information Exchange 
(MIX) (for example, see Pickens, Porteous, and Rotman 2009; CGAP and World Bank 2010; 
Kumar, McKay, and Rotman 2010; MIX and CGAP 2010). While this is the most compre-
hensive data set available on MFIs, there is a caveat related to the fact that only MFIs who 
reported to MIX and CGAP are taken into consideration in the surveys, meaning that data 
may not be as comprehensive as one might expect. Yet, MFIs that report to MIX and CGAP 
are often market leaders and control a large share of the microfinance market. The statistics 
are therefore an acceptable reflection of the development of the microfinance market.
6.  The lending penetration rate represents active borrowers as a percent of the popula-
tion living below the national poverty line. The savings penetration rate represents deposi-
tors as a percent of the population living below the national poverty line.
7.  It is important to note that these averages are based on data of the Microfinance Infor-
mation Exchange, which represents a (supposedly higher-quality) subset of MFIs through-
out the developing world.
8.  Islamic products have to be offered through specialized windows that must, in theory, 
rely on resources that are ring-fenced because the source of the resources and the use of the 
resources have to be Sharia-compliant, that is, assets and liabilities must match.
9.  For the discussion in this section, see Porteous (2010).
10.  First-generation models of m-banking were launched in the late 1990s mostly in 
European countries as additional delivery channels for financial services for existing cus-
tomers. This approach is referred to by Porteous (2010) as an additive approach rather than 
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the transformative approach of second-generation models of m-banking that target the pre-
viously unbanked in Africa.
11.  For the positive effect of credit information sharing on stability, see Houston et al. 
(2010); for the effect on the financing constraints on firms, see Galindo and Miller (2001).
12.  Even stronger may have been the incentive of the expectation of cross-selling be-
cause mobile payment revenues appear to constitute a miniscule share of Safaricom’s overall 
revenue stream.
13.  Making Finance Work for Africa (database), Partnership Secretariat, African Devel-
opment Bank, Tunis, http://www.mfw4a.org/.
14.  See Pearson and Kilfoil (2007). The results of this study have also been published in 
Bankable Frontier Associates (2008).
15.  Enterprise  Surveys  (database),  International  Finance  Corporation,  World  Bank, 
Washington, DC, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
16.  This is consistent with evidence from the transition economies, where foreign banks 
quickly went down-market after their entry (De Haas and Naaborg 2005).
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Introduction
Chapter 3 documents the scale of the problem of limited and costly access to fi-
nance. This chapter focuses on an area of finance in Africa that is particularly chal-
lenging in many countries across the continent: long-term finance. Long-term fi-
nance is crucial for Africa’s economic development. The ability of financial systems 
to transform short-term claims into long-term assets is a key ingredient of Finance 
for Growth. It is this aspect of finance that transforms African economies: by sup-
porting the expansion of the productive capacity of established firms, by financing 
productive investments such as equipment leases especially for farmers, and by fi-
nancing infrastructure such as power, roads, and housing, financial deepening im-
proves Africa’s investment and business environment.
Despite recent encouraging innovations in banks, contractual savings institu-
tions, and the capital market, the lengthening of financial contracts remains a chal-
lenge for financial systems across Africa. In areas where progress has been made, 
the progress is not yet at a rate at which it can significantly affect the scale of the 
financing deficit on the continent. The challenge for policy makers thus consists of 
scaling up current initiatives that are succeeding or showing promise; tapping new 
long-term funding sources, especially domestic sources; and working on long well 
understood constraints to long-term finance, namely, macroeconomic instability 
and weak institutions.
This chapter provides examples of long-term funding gaps in infrastructure, 
housing, and firms. It describes the current landscape of providers of long-term 
resources and offers policy options for expanding long-term finance. In discussing 
policies, we take a similar approach as in the previous chapter on expanding access: 
we distinguish between policies that help Africa optimize the current possibilities 
to expand long-term finance and policies that expand the frontier of long-term   
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finance. It is important to keep in mind that, as in expanding access, there is no 
silver bullet for enhancing long-term finance in Africa. The legislative and institu-
tion building agenda, including the establishment of reliable commercial courts, 
efficient property registries, and procedures for facilitating public-private partner-
ships (PPPs), is substantial and will take a long time to realize. It is therefore im-
portant to address this challenge through multiple initiatives and to pursue them 
consistently over time. Only with significant confidence in the financial system 
will investors and households seek longer-term savings instruments and financial 
institutions for longer periods. In this regard, this chapter is demonstrative and 
not exhaustive of the challenges and potential solutions for long-term finance in 
Africa.
1
Africa’s Long-Term Financing Gap
There are various ways in which we could demonstrate the scale of Africa’s long-
term financing gap, but, for illustrative purposes, this chapter focuses only on three 
areas: infrastructure, housing, and firm finance.
The infrastructure finance gap
The deficit in the availability of long-term financing is most evident in the state of 
infrastructure across the continent. Even if we take into account Africa’s income 
level, the continent still lags behind other developing regions of the world and this 
holds back per capita GDP growth by 2 percentage points each year (see table 4.1). 
Electricity outages, deteriorating roads, and the poor provision of water and sani-
tation networks are too common in many countries. Africa’s total installed power 
generating capacity is estimated at the equivalent of the capacity of Spain. Infra-
structure services are twice as expensive in Africa as in other parts of the world be-
cause  of  diseconomies  of  scale  and  the  lack  of  competition  among  providers. 
Transportation costs in Africa are more than twice the corresponding costs of the 
BRIC countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China) in part because 
the relatively sparse road networks are poorly maintained (World Bank 2010a).





Road density, kilometers per 100 square kilometers of arable land 7.22 127.11
Electricity production, megawatts per million population 398.00 2,475.00
Share of population with access to water, % 66.95 85.33
Share of population with access to improved sanitation facilities, % 34.67 70.14
Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, Washington, DC, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
data-catalog/world-development-indicators/.
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The cost of addressing Africa’s physical infrastructure needs is estimated at 
US$93 billion per year, some 15 percent of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP).
2 
About two-thirds of this amount is needed for greenfield and rehabilitation invest-
ments, and the other one-third is needed for the maintenance of existing infra-
structure (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010). This infrastructure gap, however, 
varies greatly by country type: it is greater in landlocked and sparsely populated 
countries. While there are substantial needs across sectors, more than 40 percent of 
the estimated spending is for power infrastructure. This reflects the particularly 
large physical deficits in this sector relative to other sectors such as transportation, 
telecommunications, and water. However, there remains a paucity of long-term 
resources available for investment in Africa’s infrastructure to facilitate private in-
vestment in these key sectors.
Current spending on infrastructure is around US$45 billion per year; two-thirds 
is sourced domestically, while one-third is financed externally through private, 
public-private, multilateral, or bilateral development partners, such as China and 
India (see elsewhere below). Because of the recent financial crisis, which resulted in 
limited fiscal space in Africa, but, even more so, in the developed world, the fund-
ing base for infrastructure has been reduced. There is thus a greater focus on find-
ing new funding sources.
How can the sizable infrastructure gaps in Africa be filled? As this chapter shows, 
there is an increasing array of financing options for infrastructure. Most infrastruc-
ture financing has traditionally come from the public sector, either from national 
governments or multilateral or bilateral development partners. However, address-
ing Africa’s chronic infrastructure shortfall is as much about improving efficiency 
as about raising more finance. Fiscal pressures have mounted because of the global 
financial crisis, and redressing the region’s infrastructure shortfall has become 
more challenging than ever.
The main difficulty for many countries is often not the lack of financing,   
but rather the limited capacity to absorb infrastructure-related development aid 
and private investment. With a few exceptions, there is a serious lack of capacity 
to generate credible long-term strategies, policies, and programs for infrastruc-
ture finance. The lack of transparency and efficiency in bidding processes, the 
shortage of qualified financial skills for drafting and negotiating long-term finan-
cial contracts, and the absence of mechanisms for holding governments account-
able for investment decisions limit the scale and pace of financing transactions   
for infrastructure. When public-private transactions have occurred, political con-
straints have often been an issue, especially for utilities such as water, where the 
sociopolitical resistance to staff reductions and to raising tariffs to cost-covering 
levels has often been underestimated. Not surprisingly, the overall balance of pri-
vate participation in infrastructure finance has therefore fallen short of expecta-
tions (Jerome 2008). Overall, private participation in infrastructure finance has 
occurred mostly in transportation and telecommunications, while energy is a dis-
tant second.
3
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The housing finance gap
Demand for housing, especially in urban areas, continues to rise across the conti-
nent as Africa rapidly urbanizes.
4 Yet, the ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to 
GDP remains low, averaging around 10 percent, which compares with 50 percent 
for Europe and 70 percent for the United States (see figure 4.1). Excluding South 
Africa, the ratio for Africa falls to 8 percent. Excluding the North African countries 
reduces the ratio to only 1 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa. In those Sub-Saharan 
African countries in which formal mortgage markets exist, such as Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, the number of loans is rarely more than a 
few thousand, and these loans are often limited to the wealthiest segment of the 
population. External financing for housing thus eludes the vast majority of the 
  African population.
Rapid urbanization and the lack of financing for private housing and public 
infrastructure impede any long-term planning processes, which, in turn, explains 
the lack of urban planning, the poor utility connections, and the poor transport 
links that can be observed across the continent. These factors also explain, in large 
measure, why over 50 percent of the urban population in Africa lives in slums.
The need for additional housing, however, varies significantly across Africa. 
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Figure 4.1  The Size of Mortgage Markets in Africa
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important variations in additional housing needs over the next 40 years. For ex-
ample, in Nigeria, which is rapidly urbanizing, 550,000 new houses are required in 
cities, but only 144,000 in villages. Contrast this with Kenya, which requires, on an 
annual basis, only 65,000 new urban dwellings versus 136,000 new rural dwellings. 
Across the continent, almost the entire housing need will be urban by 2050. Even 
within the context of the current macroeconomic constraints and the demand and 
supply barriers, a growing, though still small segment of the African population 
could afford mortgage finance, as we discuss in box 4.1, in which we calculate an 
access possibilities frontier for housing finance.
Because of the low level of development of many housing finance markets in 
Africa, the direct impact of the financial crisis was limited. However, the conserva-
tive nature of much of the lending that resulted from the crisis meant that the 
longer-term development prospects of housing finance were negatively affected. 
Prior to the crisis, some banks had ambitious plans for expansion across Africa, as 
well as plans for raising the ratio of capital to debt. Subsequently, banks with a 
strong presence across the continent scaled back their expansion plans, although 
they still have a positive long-term outlook on Africa.
5 Alongside the expansion 
plans, there had been tentative signs that some banks would look to international 
capital markets such as the Eurobond market to fund some of their balance sheet 
growth. These plans, which would have provided banks with the longer-term fund-
ing required for products such as housing finance, were put on hold in the wake of 
the crisis (Walley 2010).
Firms’ long-term finance gap
For firms, term finance is equally acute, especially for local small and medium en-
terprises (SMEs). Large multinational firms in Africa have access to finance from 
outside the continent, from parent companies, from domestic banks in local mar-
kets keen to keep large corporate entities on their books, or from foreign banks, 
often with mandates to accompany multinational firms outside their home coun-
tries. Local firms do not have these options, and, if funds become available, tenure 
is limited. In a survey of tenures in Cameroun, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nige-
ria, and Senegal, Shendy, Kaplan, and Mousely (2011) find that, in most countries, 
95 percent of loans are for five years or less. Similarly, available data suggest that, 
although firms in North African countries have made progress accessing longer fi-
nancing contracts, mainly at the level of medium-term maturities, long-term fi-
nancing remains limited in the region. Data from bank loans across five selected 
countries show that long-term credit is scarce (figure 4.2).
Optimizing the Current Possibilities for Expanding  
Long-Term Finance
More recently, there has been an increase in the entry of new institutions, instru-
ments, and products, which allows one to hope that Africa may be turning the 
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Calculations can be made on future housing needs that can be supported by commercial fi-
nance  for  housing.  There  are  two  principal  determinants  over  the  long  term  that  dictate 
housing need. These are the net population growth rate and the level of internal migration, 
which is, essentially, the urbanization process whereby villagers leave their homes in rural 
areas and move to the cities. This is a simplified model, but it also must take account of the 
average household size in rural and urban areas. The household size is used where data are 
available, and, where data are not available, the African average is used, which is 4.79 peo-
ple per household in urban areas and 5.28 people per household in rural areas. This changes 
depending on cultures and relative levels of wealth and is also likely to change over time, 
but these factors are not accounted for in the model. This methodology can be put to use 
with United Nations population data to predict housing requirements over the next 50 years. 
The results for Africa as a whole are shown in figure a.
Figure a.  Annual Housing Needs in Africa, 1955–2050
On the supply side, one has to take into account several factors. Based on the average 
interest rate, one can compute the most cost-effective maturity of a mortgage. Using the 
  average price of a house, mortgage conditionality (based on interest and maturity), and a 
self-financing ratio of 20 percent, one can compute the average monthly mortgage costs. 
Assuming a maximum ratio of mortgage payment to income of 40 percent and using income 
distribution data, one may compute the share of the population that can afford commercially 
viable mortgages from formal financial institutions. On average, this provides one with a cut-
off point for mortgage affordability among the richest 2.9 percent of the population across 
Africa  (with  large  variations  across  countries).  This  translates  into  six  million  mortgage 
loans. Assuming an average loan of US$50,000—half the average loan amount in South Af-
rica—yields a total mortgage market across Africa of US$300 billion, or 18 percent of GDP, 
almost twice the size of the current mortgage market. Behind these aggregate numbers are 
large variations across countries in the housing finance frontier.
Sources: Walley (2010) based on author calculations; STATcompiler (database), Measure DHS, ICF Macro, 
Calverton, MD, http://www.statcompiler.com/; World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision Population 
Database, UN Population Division, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, http://esa.un 
.org/wup2009/unup/index.asp.
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corner on this challenge. In commercial banking, innovations in the use of special-
ized products and instruments are enabling banks and specialized lenders to ex-
tend the maturity of their long-term financing instruments. Also, the recent re-
newed interest in development banks has highlighted the need for appropriate 
governance structures that shield these banks from political interference. In the 
  following, we offer a summary discussion of these trends.
Commercial banks
Although commercial banks dominate the financial system in Africa, their partici-
pation in long-term finance remains limited. A number of reasons account for the 
limited tenor that banks are willing to provide. First, banks are plagued with a 
structural asset-liability mismatch. Although banks are highly liquid, their liquidity 
is largely financed by short-term deposits (discussed in chapter 2). Underdevel-
oped corporate bond markets are one factor inhibiting the ability of banks to cover 
their asset-liability mismatch. Second, an underdeveloped government bond mar-
ket inhibits the development of the yield curve benchmarks necessary for commer-
cial banks to price long-term debt in local currency.
Despite these constraints, Shendy, Kaplan, and Mousely (2011) find that there 
are some exceptions: some local commercial banks find ways to overcome these 
challenges and provide long-term finance. For example, in Nigeria, the Lekki-Epe 
Express Toll Road, which reached financial close in 2008, was able to mobilize a   
15-year loan from Stanbic’s IBTC-Nigeria in local currency for N =   2 billion (US$13.4 
million) at a fixed interest rate of 13.9 percent and with a moratorium on principal 
Source: Data of Bankscope.
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Figure 4.2  Bank Loan Maturities in Selected Countries, 2008
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repayments  for  four  years.  The  deal  was  also  supported  by  other  local  banks, 
namely, Diamond Bank, Fidelity Bank, First Bank, United Bank for Africa, and 
  Zenith Bank, which provided a total loan value of N =   9.4 billion (almost US$63 mil-
lion) for a tenor of 12 years.
6 In Senegal, the Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Road reached 
financial close in November 2010. The concessionaire Eiffage was able to tap into a 
local credit line at a Senegalese bank that provided approximately US$10 million, 
with a 13.5-year tenor and a fixed interest rate of about 10 percent. This amounts 
to 10 percent of the total debt of the project. Similarly, the Kenyan Equity Bank has 
been the single largest financier in a syndicated loan to Rift Valley Railways.
Development banks and specialized lenders
State-owned financial institutions, particularly development banks, have returned 
to the spotlight of public debate. Concerned because of the lack of notable progress 
in increasing access to long-term finance, policy makers are discussing the efficacy 
of the role of development banks. African countries have had differing relation-
ships with state financial institutions over the last couple of decades. In some, such 
as Malawi, there has been an active state-led interventionist approach to financial 
sector development until recently. In others, such as Mozambique and Zambia, 
there has been a more liberalized private sector–led model. In yet others, such as 
Ethiopia, the government continues to dominate the sector.
For decades, the debate on the rationale for state intervention in the financial 
sector has centered on market failures, such as lack of information, which are 
more prominent in some sectors, as discussed in chapter 3. In this case, direct   
state participation would be warranted to compensate for market imperfections 
that leave socially profitable (but sometimes financially unattractive) investments 
underfinanced.
Take the example of housing finance. Where commercial banks have feared to go 
in the past, state housing banks have often sought to bridge the gap. Many African 
countries have such banks, including Cameroon (Crédit Foncier du Cameroun), 
Gabon  (Compte  de  Refinancement  de  l’Habitat  du  Gabon),  Mali  (Banque  de 
l’Habitat), Rwanda (Caisse Hypothécaire du Rwanda), and Tanzania (Tanzania 
Housing Bank). Almost without exception, these institutions have failed in their 
mission to expand access to housing finance. Many have also required large bailouts 
from the government when they became insolvent. The reasons for the failures are 
repeated  across  the  institutions  and  include  poor  management,  political  inter-
ference, and a perception by borrowers that they are receiving grants rather than 
loans, with little consequence if they do not repay. The concern related to state 
housing banks is the displacement effect they have on the private sector. There are 
certainly exceptions, as the case of the Banque de l’Habitat in Tunisia shows (box 
4.2). There, the major difference with Sub-Saharan housing banks relates to the 
Tunisian bank’s access to retail savings.
Some African countries have opted to establish specialized single-purpose non-
bank mortgage lenders, or monoline lenders, most notably, the Arab Republic of 
04--chapter 4--141-192.indd   148 8/18/11   9:36:54 AMLengthening Financial Contracts  149
Egypt, which has mortgage finance companies; Kenya, which has housing finance 
companies; Nigeria, which has primary mortgage institutions; and South Africa, 
which has financial service providers specializing in mortgage lending. Typically, 
these institutions have a narrow banking license limiting their activities and, in 
particular, restricting deposit collection. This means that they are usually reliant on 
wholesale funding on the liability side of their balance sheets. This type of institu-
In its social and economic policies, the Tunisian government has assigned a top priority to 
access to housing and has taken an activist stance. Banque de l’Habitat (BH) was estab-
lished in 1989 as successor to a failed savings bank (Caisse Nationale d’Epargne Logement) 
to provide financial solutions in the housing sector. BH’s mandate includes savings mobiliza-
tion, prefinancing for real estate developers, and the provision of diversified mortgage loans 
to individuals through savings-based loans and direct loans. Unlike many housing banks in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is thus primarily a savings bank. In 1992, BH was authorized to extend 
its loans to all economic sectors and was listed on the Bourse de Tunis, though the govern-
ment kept a majority shareholding of 58 percent. During the early 1990s, BH was the only 
bank authorized to offer mortgage loans in Tunisia, but, after the liberalization in 1998, pri-
vate banks were allowed to enter, and, over time, BH’s market share dropped significantly, 
to only 22 percent in 2008. Today, the bank is the major player in low-end housing finance, 
given that it is the only bank authorized to offer the classic housing savings plan, which pays 
the highest savings deposit rate, benefits from an exemption from the withholding tax on 
savings-for-housing accounts, and allows clients to enjoy subsidized interest rates on loans. 
In 2003, the   financing of social housing projects represented almost 80 percent of BH inter-
ventions. This contrasts with private commercial banks, which mainly serve the upper part 
of the market. One of the success factors of BH is thus the more numerous subsidies and 
privileges it has received relative to private institutions in the housing segment.
Despite the success of BH and the overall situation on the mortgage market in Tunisia, 
serious constraints remain. There is a large disparity in the quality of the housing stock be-
tween urban areas and rural areas, mainly in the northwest and center-west regions. While 
official statistics suggest that supply meets demand and significant progress has been made 
on the financing side, affordability remains an issue, mainly among low-income households. 
There  seems  to  be  an  oversupply  among  upper-income  and  upper-middle-income  groups 
and a shortage among lower-income groups. This is corroborated by the global property 
guide, which shows that demand for houses in Tunisia is mainly driven by the middle class 
and that house prices range from TD 450 (US$320) to TD 1,700 (US$1,215) per square meter. 
These  prices  are  high  relative  to  the  minimum  wage,  which  does  not  exceed  TD  251 
(US$180). Relying mostly on retail saving accounts, BH faces funding constraints. Its loan-
deposit ratio is above 1, plus it has maturity risks: deposit rates are fixed, while lending rates 
are tied to the interbank market rate. The current levels of interest rate risk exposure and 
maturity mismatch remain manageable, but the latter will need careful follow-up, especially 
in light of the political unrest that the country experienced recently and the potential nega-
tive effects of this on the real economy.
Box 4.2  The Role of the Housing Bank in Mortgage Finance in Tunisia
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tion was especially vulnerable during the crisis because its funding costs rose to a 
much greater extent relative to lenders with a deposit base. One response has been 
a consolidation in the financial sector as banks acquired specialist mortgage busi-
nesses or started up their own. This is the case in Egypt (where a number of mort-
gage finance companies have been acquired by banks), Kenya (where Savings and 
Loan was acquired by Kenya Commercial Bank), and Nigeria (where banks have 
been setting up Project Management Institute subsidiaries to carry out their mort-
gage lending business). This bank-subsidiary model allows specialization in mort-
gage lending and may attract some regulatory benefits, but it avoids the funding 
downside because banks can rely on a stable retail depositor base.
Meanwhile, for private and government financial institutions, the constraints   
to the development of mortgage markets are not restricted to problems within the 
financial sector. A major constraint for housing finance is the contractual frame-
work, because high fees and difficult registration processes—that might involve 
additional informal fees—constitute a large hurdle to the formal recognition of 
property ownership (figure 4.3). Land laws in many countries still put restrictions 
on private ownership, and the infrastructure for property transfer is cumbersome, 
which makes the use of land as collateral difficult. Registries are often in a dismal 
state and are frequently based on handwritten records, which means the systems 
are open to abuse and corruption. Furthermore, government approval is often nec-
essary before land can be transferred; this is the case, for example, in Malawi. Stamp 
duties and fees are another major hurdle. In Nigeria, for instance, the consent fee 
Source: World Bank and IFC (2008).
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Figure 4.3  The Cost to Register a Mortgage or Transfer a Title
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(the governor has to agree to a land transfer) amounts to at least 15 percent of the 
land valuation, and total stamp duties, registration fees, and other levies can add 
another 30 percent. Yet, there are many exceptions; thus, Rwanda and Zambia have 
continued to strengthen their already well-functioning property transfer systems.
Development finance institutions: continuing challenges  
and unclear mandates
While many development finance institutions (DFIs) have been established and 
have good objectives, the activities of DFIs have often resulted in unintended con-
sequences in terms of the credit culture of beneficiaries and the interest of the 
private sector in investment in the financial sector. Experience worldwide suggests 
that, despite the apparent advantages of government intervention in the effort to 
broaden access to credit, the public provision of banking services has generally not 
been successful in developing countries. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2002) find a close association between government ownership and lower levels   
of financial development, less credit for the private sector, wider intermediation 
spreads, greater credit concentration, slower economic growth, and recurrent fis-
cal drains.
Even today, as governments revisit the role of development banks, the perfor-
mance  of  these  banks  remains  suboptimal. African  DFIs,  on  average,  perform 
poorly. They show low levels of profitability, with a 2.4 percent return on average 
assets, and high levels of loan impairment, with a 15.8 percent ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans (figure 4.4). These are only some of the indicators of poor per-
formance. For many of these banks, the problems of yesteryear persist, including 
political interference, the lack of capacity, and the lack of economies of scale.
This is not to say there are no success stories, but they are few and far between. 
In a survey by the International Monetary Fund covering 100 institutions in 25 
countries, a third of these institutions reported losses over three years, and a third 
reported nonperforming loans greater than 10 percent, while capital injections 
were common as banking crises led to fiscal crises (Brooks 2006). Despite the lim-
ited number of success stories, DFIs, even poorly performing ones, have been te-
nacious survivors. There are more than 60 in Africa. Meanwhile, in Mali, Tanza-
nia,  Zambia,  and  many  other  countries,  specialized  state-owned  banks  have 
remained stagnant; they are largely illiquid and deliver few services, and their sol-
vency is precarious and conditional on support from governments (Honohan and 
Beck 2007). Looking specifically at specialized DFIs that focus on the provision of 
housing, Hassler and Renaud (2009) distinguish among three types. Most of the 
funds for the first type are deposits, as in Algeria (Caisse Nationale d’Epargne et de 
Prévoyance) and Tunisia (Banque de l’Habitat). These banks, which are typically 
savings banks, have a strong funding foundation and the ability to offer a wide 
range of banking products. The second type typically consists of specialized banks 
without a large deposit-collection capacity that raise funds on bond markets, as in 
the case of Morocco (Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier). The third type consists of 
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Source: Author calculations.
Note: The data are valid as of December 31, 2009.
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banks that are largely funded by public finance sources, such as mandatory sav-
ings or wage taxes, central bank facilities, or government grants and loans. This 
model is rare, but it has been used, for instance, in Cameroon (Crédit Foncier du 
Cameroun).
The limited success of DFIs—except where they can rely on a large retail savings 
base—calls into question the current business model of these entities. Rather than 
their current focus, policy-oriented and wholesale financing tasks seem more ap-
propriate (see below). Such tasks could range from managing partial credit guaran-
tee funds, discussed below in this chapter, to facilitating value chain finance arrange-
ments in agriculture, managing investment funds that are provided by donors, and 
serving as conduits to private commercial banks acting as ultimate lenders. Caisse 
de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG), in Morocco, is an example of a para-governmental 
entity that helps deepen the financial system. It collects funds from pension and 
provident funds, as well as insurance companies, and invests in listed and nonlisted 
companies. The CDG Group is the largest institutional investor in Morocco and a 
major player in funding development and social programs. It participates in private 
sector enterprises and investment on international stock markets (mainly France). 
CDG has also been supporting the private equity industry, including through its 
investment in Averroes Fund I, a €30 million (around US$42 million) fund of funds 
targeting the Mediterranean region.
Many refer to the success of the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), 
which is one of the four state-owned development banks in the country. Its main 
objective is to facilitate financing and technical assistance among companies and 
municipalities, principally for infrastructure funding. It also provides financing to 
large infrastructure projects in neighboring countries. DBSA’s taxable profits go   
to DBSA Development Fund, a subsidiary of DBSA, of which the main objective is 
to provide support to low-income municipalities through grants, the deployment 
of technical expertise, training, and the identification of projects. Rudolph (2009) 
concludes that DBSA’s success can be primarily attributed to the bank’s sound cor-
porate governance structure. The presence of an independent and qualified board 
of directors, professional management, and the South African Treasury as an ac-
tive shareholder have contributed to the bank’s strong corporate governance prac-
tices. Furthermore, the lack of financial dependence on government funding has 
strengthened the asset-liability management functions of the bank.
Rudolph (2009) observes, however, that DBSA has faced challenges. Because its 
taxable profits go to DBSA Development Fund, DBSA has two conflicting objec-
tives: financing infrastructure projects in middle-income municipalities and gener-
ating revenues to fund the operations of DBSA Development Fund. Although re-
quiring a minimum return is a desirable objective, the goal of maximizing profits 
(with the purpose of funding DBSA Development Fund) may intensify the invest-
ments of the bank in commercially oriented projects that are not necessarily con-
sistent with social objectives.
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To help avoid a repetition of the disappointing performance of development 
banks in the 1970s and 1980s, Thorne and du Toit (2009) identify six dimensions 
of success, namely: an enabling environment; a mandate; regulation and supervi-
sion; governance and management; financial sustainability; and performance as-
sessment. Development banks need a climate of macroeconomic stability without 
too many microeconomic distortions. They must be integrated into the financial 
system and operate along commercial lines, with a flexible mandate. They should 
do this without competing with the private sector, but, rather, they should aim to 
develop the private sector. They should also operate autonomously, while ensuring 
that they adhere to their mandate. Sound governance and management may be the 
single factor most likely to determine the success of a development bank. To align 
incentives, it might also be advisable for governments to capitalize new (or restruc-
tured) development banks adequately and then limit additional fiscal support to 
ring-fenced noncommercial activities undertaken on behalf of the state. Govern-
ments should also put in place arrangements for development banks to be assessed 
on a regular basis against an agreed set of financial and social or developmental 
objectives.
Guided by the principle that government intervention should support rather 
than distort incentives for the private sector provision of financial services, how-
ever, our preference remains for a reorientation and possible restructuring of exist-
ing state-owned financial institutions toward more wholesale long-term financing 
activities. Given the limited success of the direct provision of financial services by 
government-owned financial institutions and the promise that the use of technol-
ogy and agent agreements holds for the expansion of access, government-owned 
financial institutions will be able to maximize more effectively their impact on fi-
nancial sector broadening by providing assistance as second-tier rather than first-
tier financial institutions.
For many countries, policy makers would be better served by refocusing the 
primary engagement of governments in the financial sector on policy formulation 
and wholesale lending activities, while leveraging the private sector to lead in the 
retail delivery of financial services, including long-term financial services. A holis-
tic review and restructuring of current government institutions and programs 
could yield substantial economies of scale and reduce the current contamination of 
private sector–led efforts to increase access to financial services. Rather than estab-
lishing a new program each time a government prioritizes a particular sector, re-
gion, or activity, policy makers ought to consider focusing on using a single agency 
or institution to prepare and draft the eligibility criteria for the program and then 
tender the retail implementation of the program to interested institutions. All bank 
and nonbank financial institutions would be eligible to bid for the tender. By level-
ing the retail financial sector landscape in this manner, the government would in-
crease the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of commercially sus-
tainable long-term financing programs in the country.
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Contractual savings: pensions and insurance funds
To the same extent that there is a renewed interest in development banks, there is 
also a persistent interest in unlocking the funds held by pensions and insurance 
firms and using them for long-term investments. Because of its long-run liabilities, 
this segment of the financial sector has the potential to play an important role. 
However, as discussed in chapter 2, the contractual savings sector in Africa is   
even more underdeveloped than the banking systems. Insurance sectors across the 
continent are mostly focused on non–life insurance business lines, with the notable 
exception of several southern African countries, where life insurance products   
are popular for, among other reasons, tax motives. Few countries on the continent 
have private pension funds; the majority rely almost exclusively on public funds in 
the form of pay-as-you-go funds or social security funds. An important feature of 
African pension funds is the limited coverage of the working population, though 
important variations exist across countries. While the coverage rate used to exceed   
80 percent in Libya and Tunisia, it is 3 percent in Niger. We discuss below the insur-
ance and pension industry in turn.
As shown in chapter 2, insurance sectors across Africa are small in depth and 
breadth, and most insurance sectors are dominated by the shorter-term non–life 
insurance business lines, while life insurance products such as mortality or savings 
products are less popular. In addition to the country factors discussed in chapter 2 
that explain the limited financial sector development, demographic characteristics 
also play an important role. High mortality reduces the incentive to save through 
life insurance policies, but also makes the pricing of such products more difficult 
and less attractive for consumers. The small populations in most countries mean 
that the pooling and diversification of risks are more difficult. There are other im-
portant demand-side constraints, including low savings rates, the lack of awareness 
and financial literacy, and the lack of trust in insurance companies because of 
fraudulent practices and the shortage of consumer protections.
Many insurance sectors on the continent are characterized by a large number of 
small, locally owned, often undercapitalized companies with low levels of expertise 
and insufficient economies of scale that are unable to offer attractively priced prod-
ucts or professional levels of service. Consistent with the short-term nature of 
non–life insurance lines of business, insurance companies are mostly purchasers of 
short-term financial instruments. However, limited supply, lack of skills, and gov-
ernance deficiencies would prevent the life insurance segment from maximizing its 
positive role even if there were demand for more long-term financial instruments.
The lack of long-term assets is particularly problematic for life insurance com-
panies, which offer products with a payout many years after policy commencement, 
such as whole life or universal life contracts and long-term savings plans. Long-
term investment assets offering attractive rates of return are seldom available, par-
ticularly because there are generally severe restrictions on investing assets outside a 
country. As a result, the returns from life insurance products are frequently unat-
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tractive. Because of the short-term nature of their insurance contracts, such as 
auto  mobile insurance and fire insurance, non–life property and casualty insurance 
companies are not as affected by the unavailability of long-term asset classes. Non–
life insurers need to keep most of their funds, such as cash and fixed interest, in 
liquid form. However, even non–life insurers are not immune and are affected by 
the general lack of liquidity in government bonds, for which there is rarely a sec-
ondary market, and, hence, bonds need to be held to maturity. In addition, stock 
markets are frequently underdeveloped; stocks are thinly traded; and stockholdings 
are therefore generally illiquid. Thus, it is not uncommon for a smaller insurance 
company to advise its clients that valid insurance claims will not be paid for some 
months, until such time as the company sells a longer-term investment asset, after 
which it will have sufficient liquidity to pay the claim. This problem arises when an 
insurer invests in virtually any investment asset class other than cash, given that the 
illiquidity of stock markets, real estate investments, and even bond markets does 
not allow insurance companies to convert investment assets into cash in a timely 
fashion to pay insurance claims and policyholder benefits.
Similarly to the life insurance sector, the private pension industry in most Afri-
can countries is small. With the exception of larger or middle-income common law 
countries, such as Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa, but also Kenya, such 
funds are rare for the same reasons life insurance business is limited. In Kenya, over 
1,000 occupational pension schemes are licensed and are required to outsource 
asset management to independent, registered fund managers and hire independent 
custodians to ensure the full segregation and safe custody of the assets of sponsors. 
Most of these schemes, however, are underfunded and suffer from risk concentra-
tion on both sides of the balance sheet. Botswana has seen impressive growth in 
occupational pension schemes only over the past 10 years or so, and the schemes 
now reach 40 percent of the formally employed population.
The pension sector in many African countries is still dominated by obligatory, 
state-owned pension schemes administered by national social security parastatals. 
Among pension funds, 7 percent are privately managed in Africa, compared with 
16 percent worldwide.
7 Coverage is, however, mostly limited to the formally em-
ployed. There is a large variation in funding structures. In Uganda, the pension 
fund for civil servants is financed through the general budget, while, in Botswana, 
after the reforms around 2000, there is a fully funded, defined contribution scheme. 
Prefunding can have critical advantages, including an increase in the national sav-
ings rate and opportunities for international risk diversification.
Overall, the pension funds in Africa suffer from absent or weak investment 
guidelines, as well as limited capacity to implement investment strategies. Large 
parts of pension fund investments, whether private or public, are in real estate, 
short-term bank deposits, or government securities, while a limited, though in-
creasing percentage is invested in equity (table 4.2). An even smaller share is held in 
corporate bonds. However, even if one wished to invest pension funds in corporate 
bonds, there might not be enough available in the domestic market, an issue to 
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which we return below. The participation of some pension funds in African bond 
markets is also limited because of restrictions on the exposure of funds to this asset 
class or to investments outside the country; this is the case, for instance, in Egypt. 
In Nigeria, savings are managed by separately licensed private investment manag-
ers, who are also severely restricted in investment across asset classes and generally 
cannot invest outside the country. There may be macroeconomic reasons for re-
stricting investments to the country of origin; however, this approach also restricts 
potential investment returns. The need to diversify away from government securi-
ties and real estate alone is reflected in the investment guidelines of the Interna-
tional Social Security Association (ISSA 2004).
8
Recently, several countries have undertaken comprehensive pension reforms. 
These reforms might eventually result in a more important role for this sector in 
providing funding for long-term investment and growth. There is a significant 
trend toward greater autonomy among social security organizations, notably in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. In 
many countries, the challenge lies in being able to tame the role of the government, 
even in the presence of a technically sound pension sector regulator. Autonomy is 
not the sole requirement for good governance. Moreover, it is sometimes associated 
with high administrative costs and excessive staffing levels. However, it helps in 
creating an environment for more accountability and a framework that can ensure 
proper governance.
In June 2008, the Social Security Regulatory Act was passed in Tanzania. It de-
fines a framework to distribute the supervision of schemes between the Bank of 
Tanzania and a new social security regulatory authority. Ghana has also moved 
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Kenya (2009) 13.00 50.00   1.00 29.00 5.00 2.00
Fixed income Equity Real estate
Uganda (2009) 70.00 10.00 20.00
Sources: For Egypt, South Africa, and Zambia: data of the International Organization of Pension Supervisors;  
for Ghana: data of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust; for Kenya: data of the Retirement Benefits 
Authority; for Uganda: World Bank (2009b).
a. TPS = Tenant Purchase Scheme.
04--chapter 4--141-192.indd   157 8/18/11   9:36:58 AM158  Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond
forward by creating the National Pensions Regulatory Authority following passage 
of the National Pensions Authority Act in January 2010. For both agencies, it re-
mains to be seen whether they will follow the widely accepted principles that su-
pervision must be independent, money managers must be professional, and audits 
must be external, thereby enhancing their investment activities, but the potential   
is there.
In Kenya, the pension sector has experienced a significant improvement in per-
formance since the establishment of the Retirement Benefits Authority, which re-
sulted in the introduction of investment guidelines and a shift to private portfolio 
managers. The returns from privately managed pension funds have been strong 
since these reforms. In contrast, the government-controlled National Social Secu-
rity Fund remains unreformed and has a long history of low returns. Moreover, it 
operates outside the Retirement Benefits Authority Act. (For example, it is not sub-
ject to the related investment guidelines, and it relies on internal portfolio manage-
ment  rather  than  outside  professional  money  managers.)  An  argument  could 
therefore be mounted that government-controlled pension managers, like all other 
managers, ought to be subject to the same enforcement measures associated with 
the stringent guidelines.
The lack of alternative domestic investment opportunities for insurance and 
pension funds raises the issue of how necessary it is that a portion of the funds be 
invested abroad. Many countries on which data are available show a bias toward 
domestic funds; Botswana is one notable exception. Yet, investing a proportion of 
their assets abroad allows pension funds to reap the benefits of diversification and 
offers greater investment opportunities, given the dearth of such instruments in 
most African markets. In addition, investment quality would be significantly im-
proved. Few African assets are investment grade as defined by Standard & Poor’s 
and Moody’s; even the sovereign risk of many Sub-Saharan countries does not 
qualify as investment grade. This is particularly important for insurance compa-
nies: international requirements call for the use of more than 90 percent of avail-
able funds in investment grade assets. Investing a portion of funds outside the 
home country would thus present the management of insurance companies with 
an opportunity to upgrade investment quality, improve returns, and acquire the 
ability to match long-term liabilities with commensurate long-term assets.
However,  permitting  the  management  of  insurance  companies  and  pension 
funds to invest outside the home country has drawbacks. First, insurance company 
and pension fund management may not have sufficient expertise to make appropri-
ate international investment decisions. Second, foreign investment could become a 
mechanism whereby funds are transferred outside the reach of policyholders.
Investing outside the country therefore requires safeguards. Rigorous checks 
and balances would need to be introduced through significantly stepped-up corpo-
rate  governance  requirements,  supported  by  improved  regulation.  This  would 
likely include criminal penalties for directors and managers who abuse their au-
thority. Regulators would need to build their expertise in investment matters, im-
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prove their market surveillance, act upon alerts from early warning systems, and 
rigorously enforce compliance with regulations. Investing abroad also introduces 
an additional element of volatility related to exchange rate movement and other 
possible sources of risk. Regional integration could help in this case, especially 
across countries with similar economic structures and stable, if not fixed exchange 
rates, such as in the currency unions of Central Africa and West Africa.
For pensions and insurance, there is an urgent need to undertake reforms in 
such areas as risk diversification, solvency, consumer protection, and taxation. Ca-
pacity building among regulators and financial literacy programs for policyholders 
are essential. Insurers are short on training and experience, and gaps in regulatory 
coverage persist. To ensure effective corporate governance, it is vital that insurance 
companies and pension funds have appropriate risk management processes in 
place. Insurance and pension regulators need to deploy risk-based supervision 
methodologies and thereby make use of sound oversight and supervision. In the 
case of the pensions industry, a separate implementation body and external evalu-
ators for the overall process need to be considered (box 4.3).
Capital markets: a limited role
Long touted as essential to unlocking the long-term potential of finance by provid-
ing a trading platform for equities, stock exchanges have been the must-have insti-
tution of a modern national financial system. Yet, for decades, stock market capital-
ization has remained low in Africa and represents, as of 2009, only 2 percent of 
world market capitalization. As we discuss in chapter 2, markets in Africa have low 
levels of liquidity, with the exception of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. As stated 
by a market practitioner, “an entire year’s worth of trading in the frontier African 
stock markets is done before lunch on the New York Stock Exchange.”
9
To revitalize, many stock markets in the region have undertaken regulatory and 
institutional reforms, such as a relaxation of the restrictions on foreign investors. 
All African stock exchanges now allow foreign participation (Allen, Otchere, and 
Senbet 2010). Governments have also tried to use tax incentives. In Tanzania, for 
example, equity-issuing companies face a reduced corporate tax rate for a period of 
three years if at least 35 percent of the equity is issued. Efforts have been made to 
reduce the transaction costs as well, including the taxation of capital gains. While 
tax incentives can increase the number of listed firms, it will not necessarily trans-
late into enhanced liquidity in the market, as indicated by the example of Egypt, 
which recently abolished some tax subsidies.
However, the capital markets in the region still face severe challenges. Some cap-
ital markets are constrained by outdated practices and inefficient listing procedures 
and trading mechanisms, such as manual systems, the lack of a regulatory frame-
work, and an inefficient market information dissemination process, though most 
African stock exchanges have now shifted to an electronic rather than manual trad-
ing system. Governments continue to try to make their markets more cost-effective 
by working with development partners on (1) market development strategies to 
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An investment committee should be established concentrating on investment policy, strat-
egy, monitoring, and evaluation (see figure a). Because the board needs to monitor invest-
ment policy and strategy on an ongoing basis, it is important that board members receive 
training to be able to evaluate and pass judgment on the investment committee’s reports.
Figure a.    Administrative Bodies of a Social Security Scheme and Their Control 
Mechanisms
Investment committees are different from investing institutions. The investing institution 
may be the administering body or a separate institution dealing only with investment man-
agement. It can be separate, but in-house, or it might be completely outsourced to profes-
sional money managers. Three more entities are necessary to contribute to achieving the 
best results from pension fund investments: a custodian, an external auditor, and an external 
actuarial assessment body. A custodian should be appointed for the assets, including to hold 
the documents and prove the ownership of the assets. This can be an independent firm, the 
central  bank,  or  the  ministry  of  finance.  The  renewal  of  an  independent  firm’s  contract 
should be based on performance. An external auditor who is free from political interference 
and independent of all internal bodies should be appointed by the board to carry out annual 
audits of the scheme. The same should be true of the actuarial assessment body. Its task 
will be to report findings to the board. In the extreme case that the future expenditures of a 
scheme are not covered by reserves and no remedial action is taken by the board, the actu-
ary body should also make a report directly to parliament.
To improve performance, control mechanisms need to be employed on a regular basis as 
well, that is, performance assessment, compensation mechanisms, information systems and 
processes, risk management procedures, and regular reviews of expert advisers and any 
contractual arrangements. To help ensure accountability and good performance, a sugges-
tion of the International Labour Organization is to publicize the relevant information on in-
vestments—such as the associated objectives, policies, and strategies and the performance 
of investments—in the annual report, but also throughout the year in press releases on the 
organization’s website.
Source: ILO (2010).
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increase listings, especially listings of upcoming medium-size enterprises; (2) ca-
pacity building among staff in the industry as a whole, including brokers and regu-
lators; (3) education campaigns for relevant stakeholders and the general public 
that are aimed at informing the general public on long-term investment opportu-
nities and risks and at informing firms about the benefits of listing on stock mar-
kets; and (4) reform in investor protection laws and corporate governance codes. 
The evidence of sustained success is still mixed at best, however.
Another option is secondary trading boards, such as exist in Botswana (intro-
duced in 2001 as the Venture Capital Board and dedicated to helping firms that are 
looking for start-up capital), as well as in Egypt and South Africa. These make 
lower demands on issuers in terms of listing fees, track record, size, reporting re-
quirements, and float, or the minimum number of shareholders. They thereby try 
to attract medium-size companies, for which the regular conditions are too bur-
densome. While these markets have facilitated the access of firms to stock markets, 
their limited success suggests they can only partly solve the problem of the access to 
finance. Box 4.4 describes the experience with a secondary board in Egypt. In 
Kenya, the introduction of a secondary trading board led to a switchover among 
companies from the main board to the secondary board to avoid the more onerous 
Nilex is a second-tier market initiated by the government in 2007 to offer funding to SMEs. 
By offering relaxed listing rules, Nilex is meant to attract promising companies that cannot 
comply with the listing rules of the regular market. Nilex is currently functioning as a market 
segment of the Egyptian Exchange, but will be spun off once it reaches a critical size. So far, 
companies listing on Nilex cannot thereby benefit from any tax exemption.
While trading on Nilex started fairly recently (in June 2010), 16 companies were already 
listed on the market as of September 2010, and 4 are close to initial public offerings. On av-
erage, the listing process takes two months, but can be fast-tracked to two weeks if a com-
pany has a complete application. Candidates for listing operate in various sectors, including 
real estate, agribusiness, and manufacturing.
So far, companies have not been keen to list on Nilex for the following reasons: (1) fear 
of losing control by complying with enhanced disclosure requirements, (2) limited resources 
to pay listing fees, and (3) lack of understanding of the benefits of listing and of the need to 
pay listing fees. Nilex listing fees are set at LE 0.5 for every LE 1 million of paid capital, with 
a maximum of LE 25,000 per year. To tackle the listing fee problem, exchange authorities are 
working closely with several governmental and professional bodies to subsidize part of the 
listing costs. For example, the Industry Modernization Center bears at least 90 percent of the 
listing costs for industrial companies. Candidates must select a nominated advisor from a list 
prepared by the exchange. Nominated advisors are expected to help the company restruc-
ture its operations, comply with Nilex requirements, and assist in the listing process by play-
ing the underwriter role.
Source: Feyen (2010).
Box 4.4  The Experience with a Secondary Board in Egypt: Nilex
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listing and disclosure requirements on the main board. The switch therefore had 
only a limited overall effect on trading.
But even more cost-effective domestic stock exchanges will be constrained by 
the limited firm and investor universe of their respective host economies. Most 
small economies in Africa are too small to sustain a liquid stock exchange. Moving 
toward regional models or cross-listing arrangements are viable alternatives in this 
context. One route is toward regional stock exchanges, as in the case of the Abidjan 
Stock Exchange, which was expanded to become the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs 
Mobilières to allow enterprises from throughout francophone West Africa to list, or 
the Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de l’Afrique Centrale, on which companies and 
states of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa are encour-
aged to list. However, as of December 2010, of the 39 companies listed on the 
Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, only six are not Ivorian and, of these, only 
Niger has more than one listed company. Similarly, with the exception of the Inter-
national Finance Corporation bond issue, all issues on the Bourse des Valeurs Mo-
bilières de l’Afrique Centrale were made by the government of Gabon or Gabonese 
firms (Banque de France 2009). The harmonization of regulations, trading sys-
tems, and tax regimes can be an important first step toward the regionalization of 
stock exchanges, but also in facilitating cross-listings.
10 The three stock exchanges 
in West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria) are in talks to establish uniform 
rules, regulations, and operational procedures. An alternative to regional stock ex-
changes is to allow cross-  listing, which permits enterprises to tap additional inves-
tor communities and encourages more liquid trading of the shares of enterprises, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of the price-finding process (Pagano et al. 2001).
Yet, even under the best-case scenario, with the implementation of all the neces-
sary regulatory reforms and all the cost problems solved, one has to be realistic 
about what to expect in terms of stock market development. The experience in 
Latin America, but even in Western Europe has shown that it is difficult to sustain 
liquid stock exchanges in smaller economies (box 4.5).
Given experiences in other regions, it is unrealistic to expect stock exchanges 
across Africa to flourish. The modernist approach would hold that financial ser-
vices per se matter, not where or by whom they are delivered; this would mean that 
listing on foreign exchanges would be a good solution, for example, on the Johan-
nesburg Stock Exchange. However, this would only help the largest enterprises in 
each country and might even increase the listing threshold, given the potential ad-
ditional listing and transaction costs of listing abroad rather than at home. It might 
also pull liquidity away from small stock exchanges, exacerbating the small ex-
change curse (Levine and Schmukler 2006).
Corporate bond markets across Africa are also small and illiquid. They are lim-
ited in many countries by cumbersome regulatory structures. Rather than focusing 
on disclosure, most African countries impose a complex approval process. Rather 
than allowing the market to assess the financial viability of bond issuers and the 
risk of the securities, regulators feel compelled to undertake this assessment on 
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behalf of market participants, which leads to inefficiency (because incentives are 
not aligned), but also opens the door to arbitrary decisions and corruption. Fur-
thermore, some regulators require credit guarantees before issuing bonds, and this 
has also led enterprises to consider bonds unaffordable. For instance, the supervi-
sory authority of the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, the West African 
In Latin America at the beginning of the 1990s, high hopes for capital market development in 
emerging markets had catalyzed the debate about reform and action to address financial 
liberalization, the establishment of stock exchanges and bond markets, and the development 
of a regulatory and supervisory framework. The associated expectations that were thus built 
up were not met: Latin American countries, despite their reform efforts, greatly underper-
formed relative to East Asia and the G7 countries.
A couple of explanations can help shed light on what went wrong in the Latin American 
experience. One explanation ascribes the failure to a combination of impatience and the in-
sufficient implementation of reform. Because reform efforts materialize only long after the 
initial steps, policy makers have to be patient in harvesting the fruits that they have planted. 
Instead, the claim has been put forth that some key reforms were not initiated, while other 
reforms were often implemented in an incomplete or inconsistent fashion. Appropriate laws 
and regulations were approved, but not duly implemented or adequately enforced. The policy 
advice that follows from this is to forge ahead persistently with reform and be patient. The 
reform efforts should seek to improve the enabling environment for capital markets, enhance 
market discipline through greater competition, upgrade the regulatory and supervisory frame-
work for securities markets, and address problems in key areas, such as accounting and dis-
closure standards, corporate governance practices, and securities trading, custody, clearing, 
and settlement systems.
The second explanation ascribes the underperformance to mistakes in sequencing the 
reform. This view contends that, before the application of capital market reforms, other re-
forms  are  necessary,  such  as  the  achievement  of  a  minimum  threshold  of  institutional 
strength in the legal and regulatory framework, supervisory capacity, accounting and disclo-
sure standards, and so forth. Hence, whether the Latin American countries will be success-
ful in building capital markets will depend on their clarification of the sequencing issues.
A recent paper by de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007) finds that stock market devel-
opment in the region is below what could be expected, given the economic and institutional 
fundamentals. There is a particular shortfall in market capitalization, trading, and capital rais-
ing. The authors believe the two explanations offered above are complementary to their gap 
analysis. A forward-looking reform agenda has to take into account the intrinsic characteris-
tics of developing countries, in particular their small size, lack of diversification opportunities, 
weak currencies, and prevalence of systemic risk. The first point that should be considered 
is whether a given country can sustain an active domestic market for private sector securi-
ties. Furthermore, any reform agenda on capital markets should be part of a broader reform 
agenda that is embedded in an all-encompassing financial development agenda.
Source: Based on de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007).
Box 4.5  Capital Markets in Latin America
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regional market, requires private companies to offer a guarantee equal to 100 per-
cent of the issue value (interest, plus capital). This approach has been adopted to 
ensure that only companies with high-quality credit (or a guarantor) can issue 
debt. However, the result has been a de facto requirement for expensive guarantees, 
which add as much as 100–200 basis points to the cost for the issuer. The complex 
approval process for bond issuances also implies a long process of up to six months 
(in Kenya and in Senegal), which constitutes another hurdle for enterprises access-
ing corporate bond markets. In all these cases, there is a clear misalignment of ob-
jectives. The regulatory philosophy represented by the rules is appropriate in deal-
ing with equities to protect small investors, but it is misplaced in dealing with 
institutions given that these can be expected to have access to professional invest-
ment advice and services.
High issuance costs are another impediment. In Kenya, issuance fees for corpo-
rate bonds have historically ranged from 3–4 percent compared with 1–2 percent 
for bank loans (World Bank 2003). In Nigeria, issuance fees in 2004 were over 6.0 
percent, of which 1.8 percent went to regulatory authorities and the exchange, 
around 2.5 percent went to financial intermediaries, and another 1.5 percent went 
to fees for professionals and marketing. This turns a corporate bond issue into a 
financing tool of last resort. Costs are also high on the secondary market. Thus, in 
Nigeria, secondary market trading of corporate bonds involves fees of 3.75 percent, 
including 2.75 percent as a broker fee and 1.00 percent as a fee for the regulator and 
the exchange (World Bank 2007b).
In general, fixed income instruments are geared toward institutional investors, 
who have the capacity to operate in a disclosure-based framework. The require-
ment that corporate bonds need to be traded on exchanges shuts down a channel 
for introducing liquidity into the market. The one-off nature of the issuance of 
corporate bonds, combined with the small average size of issues, introduces a major 
liquidity constraint on this type of instrument. In this situation, the negotiation of 
the instrument by dealers and institutional investors in the over-the-counter mar-
ket is the predominant practice around the world. Private placements can reduce 
the overall costs of a bond issuance because it shortens the time it takes companies 
to access the market.
The rather restrictive supervisory approach to issuers of stocks and bonds has 
been detrimental to the development of these markets in Africa. This observation 
is consistent with broader cross-country evidence that public enforcement con-
tracts do not foster stock market development, but that laws mandating disclosure 
and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock market li-
quidity (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006).
Tapping International Markets
As a source of finance, global investors have an important role to play in Africa. By 
investing through banks, contractual savings institutions, and capital markets in 
Africa, they not only provide finance for investment projects, but they also have 
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the potential to increase and improve the intermediation capacity of financial sys-
tems. In this section, we discuss the sources of long-term finance in Africa associ-
ated with international financial markets. One is private equity funds, and the 
other is sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Both of these include African funds, as 
well as non-African funds that invest in Africa. Affecting both, but especially the 
latter, is the changing global environment and the increasing role of Brazil, China, 
India, and other emerging markets in Africa. A final opportunity is diaspora bonds, 
which we discuss in box 4.8 elsewhere below. While we see the possibilities for rais-
ing funds with such an instrument, we remain rather skeptical in the case of coun-
tries in Africa.
Private equity funds
Where organized exchanges are too expensive, more private structures might be 
helpful. While equity funds have acquired a somewhat bad reputation in Europe, 
especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, equity funds could be an 
important part of the corporate finance solution in Africa (box 4.6).
In Africa, private equity is becoming a growing part of the financial sector, espe-
cially for long-term finance. In the boom years of 2006 to 2008, private equity funds 
raised in Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to approximately US$6.4 billion, while 
those invested reached US$7.6 billion. Similarly, a survey shows that North African 
countries  raised  at  least  US$1.6  billion  in  2008  (ANIMA  Investment  Network 
2008). Nonetheless, Africa still attracts only a small fraction of global equity funds, 
although there are promising trends (EMPEA and Coller Capital 2010). There is 
a growing number of seasoned and regionally experienced fund managers, an 
  increasing number of investment opportunities (because of the improving macro-
environment, sustained growth, and significant regulatory reforms), and, critically, 
improving exit opportunities.
Although the financial crisis dented the market, there are clear signs of recovery. 
Fund-raising in Sub-Saharan Africa through 2010 reached US$1.5 billion, surpass-
ing by far the 2009 total of US$964 million (figure 4.5). Following the financial 
crisis, the recovery of fund-raising momentum was stronger in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than in many other emerging markets, including China, India, and Russia, and was 
comparable with the robust performance in Latin America. In contrast, private 
  equity investment activity tells a modest tale: investments with known transaction 
values accounted for US$631 million in 2010, the lowest level in emerging markets 
(EMPEA and Coller Capital 2010). This suggests that bullish fund-raising efforts 
are not being met with an equally bullish pipeline of transactions.
South Africa continues to be the main fund-raising hub and investment desti-
nation. Most funds operating in Sub-Saharan Africa have a panregional focus; 
these represent approximately 75 percent of the funds raised in both value and 
number from the beginning of 2009 through mid-2010 (figure 4.6). However, the 
market is slowly shifting away from generalist pan-African funds because fund 
managers are increasingly looking to specialize and develop a comparative advan-
tage within an extremely diverse region. In terms of single-country focused funds, 
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The  benefits  of  private  equity  funds  can  be  assessed  from  different  perspectives.  At  the 
macrolevel, private equity can catalyze structural changes through support for new eco-
nomic sectors and by fostering industrial innovation (Kortum and Lerner 2000). It can help 
reduce  unemployment  rates,  mainly  among  skilled  workers,  and  spur  overall  employment 
growth (Fehn and Fuchs 2003; Belke, Fehn, and Foster 2003). Bernstein et al. (2009) show that 
industries with private equity investments grow more quickly in production, value added, and 
employment, while exhibiting more resilience to industry shocks. Conversely, opponents of 
private equity argue that these funds are return driven and that they reflect no hesitation to 
destroy jobs, ultimately jeopardizing global economic welfare in exchange for higher returns. 
According to this view, private equity funds are, at best, not value destroying, but certainly 
not value creating. In support of this view, Davis et al. (2008) report no differences in em-
ployment growth between their control group and manufacturing companies that are backed 
by private equity, and they report a higher level of job losses in businesses that are backed 
by private equity and that are operating in the services and finance sectors. Similarly, Lerner, 
Sørensen, and Strömberg (2008) find no significant difference in the quantity of patenting in 
the  years  following  private  equity  investment.  Most  of  this  research,  however,  refers  to 
cross-country samples or samples outside Africa, thus allowing few inferences on the ex-
pected effects of an increased role of private equity in Africa.
The employment and sales growth rates reported on random samples of exited deals in 
Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia support the perception that businesses backed by pri-
vate equity funds grow more rapidly and create more jobs than those without private equity 
fund support. South African businesses that were backed by private equity funds grew their 
sales by 20 percent, outperforming companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
and companies included in the all share index by 2 and 6 percent, respectively (SAVCA and 
DBSA 2009). Similarly, these companies backed by private equity funds reported employment 
growth rates significantly superior to the regional rates, which were estimated at almost   
3 percent for North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The involvement of private equity funds 
in African businesses seems to foster innovation as well. For instance, SAVCA and DBSA 
(2009) show that 69 percent of companies backed by private equity funds have introduced 
new products and services. According to the same report, the annual growth rate of re-
search and development in these businesses was 7 percent, sevenfold the rate reported 
among companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange over the same period.
The value added of private equity funds can include more than the financing. A randomly 
selected sample of deals shows that private equity funds provided targeted businesses with 
valuable  guidance  that  catalyzed  improvements  in  their  corporate  governance  structures 
and reporting standards. They also managed to strengthen management teams by leading to 
the replacement of entrenched managers, investment in training, or assistance in the re-
cruitment of missing skills in the management team. This is consistent with the findings of 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) that businesses backed by private equity have supe-
rior  management  practices  relative  to  family,  private  sector,  and  government  ownership 
structures. The randomly selected sample also shows that private equity funds often intro-
duce investee companies to strategic partners, including suppliers, clients, and acquisition 
targets which facilitate their expansion. Obviously, these simple comparisons cannot be in-
terpreted  in  a  causal  sense  because  private  equity  funds  will  most  likely  invest  in  more 
promising industries and businesses, but the comparisons supply suggestive evidence that 
there is space for private equity in Africa to improve resource allocation and foster growth.
Box 4.6  Private Equity Funds: The Benefits and Experience in Africa
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South Africa is the market leader, accounting for 17 percent of funds by value, fol-
lowed closely by Nigeria, at 10 percent. In North Africa, Egypt and Morocco are 
leading the markets. Most private equity markets in North Africa outside of these 
countries remain modest, but new funds are emerging. Over the last decade, the 
average size of deals among private equity funds in Africa increased significantly. 
For instance, the sale by Citadel of its ownership in Egypt Fertilizers Company was 
the first subregional private equity deal to break the billion-dollar mark.
Private equity can generate benefits to the enterprises in which they invest, but this is 
also a profitable business proposal. As the head of one major global equity fund recently 
said, “the highest returns are in Africa.” Data on the realized returns from deals made by 
private equity funds are difficult to collect because funds are reluctant to disclose informa-
tion  about  their  gains.  Nonetheless,  the  limited  data  available  suggest  that  African  busi-
nesses deliver attractive returns to private equity funds. For instance, a recent survey pub-
lished  by  the  Moroccan  Private  Equity  and  Venture  Capital  Association  reports  average 
internal rates of return of 26.9 percent for 26 deals of private equity investors in Morocco 
(AMIC and Grant Thorton 2010). The highest rate is reported for deals involving development 
capital investments (33.3 percent). Several reports by the Emerging Markets Private Equity 
Association include data about internal rates of return for 62 deals and the realized multi-
plier for 25 deals (EMPEA 2011; EMPEA and Coller Capital 2009, 2010). This information is 
schematized in figure a. The average internal rate of return for deals exited between 2005 
and 2010 was 55.4 percent if the 972 percent internal return on resources is included that is 
reported by Citadel Capital on its investment in ASCOM Geology & Mining in Egypt, which 
appears as an outlier, and 40.16 percent if this return is excluded.
Figure a.  Average Internal Rate of Return and Multiplier by Exit Strategy
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The  private  equity  model  in Africa  seems  to  target  mainly  well-established   
medium-size enterprises at the top end of the market. This is corroborated by sur-
vey data of ANIMA Investment Network (2008), which finds that there is a lack of 
seed and venture capital money compared with the equity investments in leveraged 
Source: EMPEA and Coller Capital (2010).




























Figure 4.5    Sub-Saharan Africa: Private Equity Fund-Raising and Investment, 
2006–10
Source: EMPEA and Coller Capital (2010).
Note: The data for 2010 are year to date. Values are US$, millions.
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Figure 4.6  Private Equity Investment Activity, Sub-Saharan Africa, 2009–10
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buyouts and the expansion of investee companies in North Africa. Similar conclu-
sions can be drawn from a study on Kenya (FSD Kenya 2008). The study found 
that, in 2008, US$40 million of the US$200 million of venture capital available in 
the country targeted early-stage SMEs. In addition, larger countries with a rising 
middle class, such as Egypt, Nigeria, and Tunisia, are more attractive to private 
  equity funds given the potential for consumer goods industries.
Notwithstanding these positive trends, the main obstacles continue to be the 
limited interest of financiers in investment in private equity funds targeting Africa 
and the excessive risk aversion of investors toward Africa (table 4.3). Investors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa north of the Limpopo River demand some of the highest risk 
premiums, and risk premiums in the North African countries are only slightly 
lower. Investor behavior reflects the lack of an institutional track record because 
most of these funds are first-generation funds, as well as the perception that politi-
cal risk remains high in Africa relative to other regions of the world (figure 4.7). For 
instance, well-publicized cases such as the tensions over the Jubilee oil field that 
pitted the government of Ghana against private equity–backed Komsos Energy are 
likely to damage the frail confidence of private equity investors in African markets. 
Furthermore, poor governance structures and inadequate research coverage make 
the identification and assessment of potential investment targets a challenge for 
private equity funds. Another key challenge for equity funds is the limited local ac-
cess to debt coinvestment.
In addition to the perceptions of high risk, the industry suffers several specific 
challenges in Africa, most of them related to the institutional environment in which 
the industry operates.
Table 4.3  Risk Premiums for Private Equity Funds Worldwide
percent
 Emerging market country, region 2008 2009
Increase in  
risk premium
Brazil 6.9 6.4 −0.5
China 6.3 6.4 0.1
India 6.1 6.4 0.3
South Africa 6.4 7.0 0.6
Latin America, excluding Brazil 6.7 7.5 0.8
Middle East 6.5 7.3 0.8
North Africa 6.7 8.0 1.3
Central and Eastern Europe, including Turkey 5.0 6.4 1.4
Russian Federation, Commonwealth of Independent States 6.9 8.4 1.5
Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa 6.7 8.4 1.7
Other emerging Asia — 7.3 —
Source: EMPEA and Coller Capital (2009).
Note: The figure reflects the perceptions of limited partners (investors in private equity funds) of the risk premiums 
required for emerging market private equity funds relative to developed-market buyout funds.
 — = not available.
04--chapter 4--141-192.indd   169 8/18/11   9:37:04 AM170  Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond
Source: EMPEA and Coller Capital (2010).
Note: Limited partners are investors in private equity funds. General partners are private equity fund managers.
limited number of established 
general partners 
political risk 
weak exit environment 
challenging regulatory/
tax environments
scale of opportunity to 
invest is too small 
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Figure 4.7    Factors Deterring Limited Partners from Investing in Africa and 
Latin America
First, the lack of scale affects private equity in three ways. Most private equity 
funds  in  Africa  are  small,  which,  by  construction,  excludes  investments  from 
 
several institutional investors, including SWFs. These funds usually have large in-
vestment  tickets  and  strict  exposure  limits  dictated  by  their  risk  management 
guidelines. For instance, if an SWF has an average investment ticket amounting to 
US$80 million and an exposure limit to a single investment of 20 percent, only 
private equity funds larger than US$400 million will be eligible. The size of invest-
ment opportunities also limits private participation. On any number of measures, 
the size of many firms is small; many are family owned and reluctant to bring in 
third-party management participation, which is essential for private equity. Finally, 
many of the markets make exit challenging. The highly illiquid stock exchanges 
and the limited availability of domestic funds severely limit the range of exit op-
tions for most private equity firms.
Second, there are many domestic regulatory constraints. For instance, current 
regulations in Morocco preclude insurance companies from using their regulated 
reserves instead of their equity to invest in risk capital entities that are not struc-
tured as organismes de placement en capital risque (OPCRs, venture capital invest-
ment funds). Insurance companies are also required to report their investments at 
accounting value rather than market value, which reduces their appetite to invest in 
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private equity structures.
11 Furthermore, Law 41–05 offers tax incentives to OPCRs, 
but requires such institutions to hold at least 50 percent of their resources in SMEs 
with annual turnover inferior to DH 75 million. The SME definition is being re-
viewed to reflect current market practices, and the 2011 Finance Act eliminated 
this minimum allocation rule, but the rule remains a problem because OPCR sta-
tus is still conditional on compliance with it.
12 Additionally, current regulations on 
foreign exchange preclude private equity funds domiciled in Morocco with less 
than three years of operation from investing outside the country.
13 Similarly, Tuni-
sia requires local private equity providers to invest at least 50 percent of their re-
sources in priority sectors or regional development zones and upgrade programs, 
while investors in such vehicles are required to lock their investments for at least 
five years to benefit from tax exemptions.
14
Third, there remains only a limited participation of contractual savings institu-
tions. In Tunisia, domestic private equity markets are dominated by bank-  controlled 
providers. These operators tend to favor applications made by the existing clients 
of banks and often adopt prudent investment strategies that are not always con-
sistent with the purposes of banking. Financial institutions control 75 percent of 
the capital of fund managers in Morocco as well and slightly over 31 percent of the 
funds under management in South Africa (AMIC and Grant Thorton 2010; KPMG 
and SAVCA 2010). One of the investors in an equity fund may be contractual sav-
ings institutions, which have only a limited choice on organized capital markets. 
Yet, the contribution of pension funds and insurance companies seems to be small. 
For instance, they contribute less than 10 percent of the total venture capital fund-
ing in Kenya (FSD Kenya 2008). Most African countries restrain pension funds’ 
and insurance companies’ investment share in equity, which significantly reduces 
the potential resources available to African private equity funds. However, as noted 
elsewhere above, there is a trend toward the revision of investment guidelines. In 
September, Nigeria’s National Pension Plan released draft regulations that would 
allow pensions to invest up to 5 percent of their portfolios in private equity funds 
targeting Nigeria.
Fourth, there are also ownership and foreign exchange barriers to foreign pri-
vate equity funds. Some countries still restrict foreign ownership. Algeria imposes a 
49 percent limit on foreign ownership, with the exception of importing companies, 
which must have a minimum of 30 percent of local participation (Deloitte 2011). 
The borrowing levels of foreign-controlled companies are restricted in South Af-
rica (Bowman Gilfillan 2009). In Ethiopia, foreign investment is prohibited in the 
telecommunications, financial, transportation, and retail sectors. Even where there 
are no ownership restrictions, few African countries have fully convertible curren-
cies, and a large number of them do not allow free profit repatriation for private 
equity and venture capital providers. In addition, several African countries have 
volatile currencies that cannot be properly hedged given the lack of instruments or 
the poor liquidity of the available instruments. Local currency volatility could re-
sult in a dramatic decline in a fund’s performance.
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Fifth, there are also taxation-related barriers across the continent. First, there is 
a double-taxation issue because investment revenue is taxed both at the fund and 
the ultimate investor level. Even if this may be addressed in individual countries, 
there is a lack of double-taxation treaties among African countries. Another issue 
related to some African tax regimes is the application of the value added tax on 
management fees or carried interest. Fund managers are subject to a 20 percent 
value added tax on management fees in Morocco. These taxes increase the cost of 
doing business significantly. Often, disparities in tax treatment make other asset 
classes more attractive. Today, most international private equity funds are based in 
Mauritius for tax purposes. Moreover, they also benefit from the fact that Mauri-
tius offers both a common law framework and a civil law framework, a stable busi-
ness environment, and a well-developed financial services industry.
Lastly, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Europe and the United States are 
enacting new rules aimed at regulating nonbank financial institutions and enhanc-
ing the stability of their financial systems. These rules are expected to make fund-
raising for private equity funds targeting Africa more challenging and expensive. 
For  instance,  the  European  Union’s  Directive  on Alternative  Investment  Fund 
Managers will make it more costly for non-European Union–based private equity 
funds to market their funds to European investors. Similarly, new registration re-
quirements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission will increase the 
cost of doing business for non-U.S. funds that have more than 15 United States–
based investors, U.S. resources in excess of US$25 million, and at least one office in 
the United States (PEI 2010). Thus, the Volcker Rule, which is expected to become 
effective in July 2012, precludes banking entities—both U.S. and non-U.S. banks 
with a U.S. branch or agency—from investing in or sponsoring private equity and 
hedge funds (Clifford Chance 2010). The increased burden resulting from this reg-
ulation will reduce the amount of resources available for investments in private 
equity in Africa and raise the cost of managing private equity funds targeting Af-
rica, ultimately translating into lower returns to investors and new limits on their 
appetite to invest in Africa.
Despite these challenges, private equity funds in Africa are growing and are ex-
pected to play a more significant role in the future. Multilateral and regional DFIs 
are increasingly using them as a complementary way for more cost-effective invest-
ment and support for private sector firms in Africa. In 2009–10, the African Devel-
opment Bank invested in 13 private equity funds targeting Africa; as of September 
30, 2010, its investments in private equity funds represented 10 percent of its pri-
vate  sector  active  portfolio.  Similarly,  the  International  Finance  Corporation 
launched the SME Ventures Program, which aims at establishing venture capital 
funds in several International Development Association countries, including the 
Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone. The Development Bank of Namibia has established a private equity fund 
focused on SMEs.
The performance of the public-led versus private-led model has not yet been 
explored in Africa. Nonetheless, recent evidence reported in Brander, Du, and Hell-
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man (2010) based on a sample of 126 countries suggests that a PPP model, whereby 
the government invests in independently managed funds that also rely on private 
investors, leads to better results in terms of value creation and innovation com-
pared with either a public-led model or a private-led model.
Sovereign wealth funds
Another potentially significant source of long-term funding is SWFs with strate-
gic interests in Africa. These include funds in China, India, and the Middle East 
that have become important players in African infrastructure projects. The appe-
tite of SWFs in Africa is growing for minerals and raw materials, as seen in China’s 
successful efforts to lock up deals in the oil and gas sector, but they also provide 
substantial funding for transport infrastructure. SWFs from the Middle East are 
active in the physical and social infrastructure sectors. One can expect these trends 
to continue in the near future, though they may slow as some of the SWFs restruc-
ture portfolios and investment strategies damaged by the global financial crisis. 
SWFs experienced considerable losses as a result of the crisis, but remain active in 
the exploration of infrastructure opportunities in Africa. For instance, the 2008 
annual report published by the Central Bank of Libya shows that revenues from 
the Libyan Investment Authority’s long-term investment portfolio dropped from 
US$687.3 million in 2007 to US$63.5 million in 2008, mainly because of the fi-
nancial crisis.
As of December 2009, African SWFs had US$114.3 billion in assets under man-
agement.  This  was  much  less  than  their  Middle  East  peers,  which  held  assets 
amounting to US$1.4 trillion (figure 4.8). The regional distribution of SWFs dis-
Source: Data of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
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plays a predominance of the Middle East (43 percent), followed by Asia (36 per-
cent) and Europe (18 percent).
Africa counts 15 SWFs. More can be expected, especially in countries with re-
cently discovered oil (box 4.7).
15 Meanwhile, in 2006, Chad canceled its Fund for 
Future Generations. Among the five largest African SWFs, four are sourced from 
oil and gas revenues, and one from diamonds, minerals, and other natural re-
sources. It must be noted, however, that the collection of data on the existence, 
holdings, and institutional arrangements of SWFs in Africa remains a challenge. 
This explains why there is also a limited literature on the activities of these funds.
In the case of Africa’s development process, one has to make the important dis-
tinction between the role of domestic wealth funds—the task of which is mainly to 
manage a nation’s natural wealth and stabilize the income stream from this wealth, 
thereby avoiding the well-documented Dutch Disease phenomenon—and the role 
of non-African SWFs.
Let us first discuss the role of domestic SWFs in managing Africa’s natural 
wealth. Domestic SWFs can have a critical role in avoiding the Dutch Disease phe-
nomenon that result from an appreciation of the real exchange rate, thus crowding 
out non–resource-related economic activities. They can prove to be efficient fiscal 
stabilization instruments by facilitating intergenerational transfers and creating 
higher risk-adjusted returns that allow savings in fiscal resources. For most African 
countries, such stabilization needs are twofold. In the short term, African countries 
need to smooth their expenditures in a context of volatile commodity prices to 
avoid the challenges in macroeconomic management resulting from revenue insta-
bility. In the long term, African countries need to protect themselves against the 
declines in revenues resulting from the depletion of nonrenewable commodities. 
This means that SWFs might still invest in financial markets and systems to pursue 
long-term stabilization objectives. They can also help avoid problematic privatiza-
tions and the looting of national wealth, as has happened so often already on the 
continent. Unlike the management of reserves by central banks, which is usually 
limited to investments in European and U.S. sovereign fixed income securities, 
SWF holdings are expected to be more diversified and could be structured to max-
imize the risk-adjusted investment returns that are not necessarily pegged to the 
dollar. Stabilization funds help insulate African economies from bullish and bear-
ish cycles driven by commodity price swings and ensure fiscal stabilization. A final, 
less discussed, purpose of domestic SWFs can be to enhance overall transparency 
and governance throughout the economy.
However, the available data suggest that African countries have been regularly 
using their SWFs to close budget deficits rather than keeping resources to imple-
ment countercyclical macroeconomic policies or future long-term and intergener-
ational stabilization. For instance, Nigeria paid US$6.8 billion out of the Excess 
Crude Account to state governors in 2008, while Sudan has almost wiped out its Oil 
Revenue Stabilization Fund to meet increased expenditure commitments (Ahmed 
2010). Additional drawdowns of US$12 billion in 2009 and US$7 billion in 2010 
almost entirely depleted the fund. Algeria has also been using its stabilization fund 
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SWFs are government-owned investment vehicles managed by a government entity or exter-
nal managers on behalf of a sovereign state primarily to serve medium- to long-term eco-
nomic and financial objectives. They have emerged as a potential solution for the active 
management of the large stocks of foreign reserves that several countries have accumu-
lated by exporting commodities and other goods and services. There is considerable contro-
versy about the relative merits of SWFs and their value added. Often citing the experience of 
Norway, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are increasingly advocating 
the creation of SWFs in resource-endowed economies, arguing that they can help foster 
economic growth and prosperity for current and future generations. Proponents of SWFs 
also point out that these vehicles can help stabilize the global financial system by providing 
crossborder liquidity in times of financial turmoil. Other observers, meanwhile, are express-
ing serious concerns that SWFs would endow governments with too much power, which 
could edge the global economy away from liberalism and impede market forces and compe-
tition.  This  argument  is  strengthened  by  empirical  evidence  suggesting  that  state-owned 
companies often operate less efficiently than private firms.
The first African SWFs were established in 1993 in Botswana (the Pula Fund) and Ghana 
(the Minerals Development Fund). Currently, Africa counts 15 active SWFs, which are, for the 
most part, relatively small compared with their peers in other regions of the world (such as 
Asia and the Middle East) in terms of the size of assets. The two exceptions are the Libyan 
Investment Authority (LIA) and the Algerian Revenue Regulation Fund, which rank among the 
largest 15 SWFs worldwide in size.
The LIA is the largest and most active Africa-based SWF, although the political unrest in 
Libya has created uncertainty about its future. It was created in December 2006 by a decree 
of the Comité Populaire Général and started its activity on June 2007 with US$50 billion in 
assets under management. The aim of the LIA, which currently manages about US$70 billion 
in assets, is to create a durable source of revenue and reduce Libya’s dependence on oil 
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Figure a.   The Geographical Distribution of Libyan Investment Authority  
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to repay public debt and reduce fiscal deficits. Similarly, between November 2008 
and March 2009, Mauritania withdrew US$45 million from its Fond National des 
Revenus des Hydrocarbures, leaving a balance of US$34 million as of March 2009. 
São Tomé and Príncipe withdrew US$11.9 million in 2006, US$1.7 million in 2008, 
and US$1.2 million in 2009, leaving its fund with US$9.9 million at the end of 
2009. This represented 12 percent of the US$77.8 million received by the country 
as an oil signature bonus. Such statistics suggest that African governments kept 
exports. It invests both domestically and internationally either directly or via its subsidiaries. 
The bulk of LIA’s investment in Africa, however, is undertaken by the Libyan African Invest-
ment Portfolio, which was created in February 2006 and has around US$8 billion in assets 
under management. Its subsidiary, the Libyan African Investment Company, is present in 30 
African countries, where it invests mainly in real estate and hotels (it owns 22 hotels in 15 
African countries). The Libya Oil Holding Company (formerly Tamoil), another subsidiary of 
the LIA, runs gas stations in 16 African countries.
In terms of the regional allocation of LIA’s investments in Africa, a sample of 98 deals 
shows that West Africa stands out as the largest beneficiary, with a share of 47 percent (fig-
ure a). East Africa and Central Africa each attract 18 percent of total investments. In terms 
of the sector allocation of these investments, the largest fraction is allocated to restaurants, 
hotels, and motels, followed by real estate and infrastructure (figure b).
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Figure b.   The Sectoral Distribution of Libyan Investment Authority  
Investments in Africa
Source: Author compilation.
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spending, while also accumulating resources in their stabilization funds, which 
may potentially result in zero net savings. This raises concerns about intergenera-
tional equity and long-term fiscal and macroeconomic sustainability, especially in 
a context of external shocks. The implication of such behavior is that African SWFs 
will have limited resources for long-term stabilization purposes and even less for 
savings for future generations. Accordingly, the role of SWFs as long-term investors 
in Africa can only be marginal if current practices are maintained.
Additionally, data suggest that most African SWFs are investing their resources 
mostly outside Africa. For instance, Asfaha (2007) reports that Chad invests the 
proceeds from its natural resources abroad, while article 6.6 of the Oil Revenue 
Management Law in São Tomé and Príncipe prohibits the use of the National Oil 
Account for investments in São Tomé and Príncipe or in companies controlled by 
São Tomé and Príncipe nationals (Albin-Lackey et al. 2004). According to the São 
Tomé and Príncipe oil revenue law, the National Oil Account is to be held at the 
U.S. Federal Reserve. Similarly, Belaicha, Bouzidi, and Labaronne (2009) argue that 
half of Algeria’s foreign currency reserves have been invested in U.S. sovereign 
bonds and deposits and tier-one banks. Botswana invests only in rated securities, 
which excludes all Sub-Saharan African countries except South Africa.
Over the past decade or so, Africa has also become the target of investment by 
non-African SWFs. Some governments are creating development funds (the China-
Africa Development Fund established by the China Development Bank) or invest-
ment companies (Dubai World Africa) entirely dedicated to Africa.
16 Nonetheless, 
Africa’s  share  in  foreign  SWF  investments  remains  relatively  negligible.  Many 
SWFs, including African funds, are discouraged by the high risk of investment in 
Africa. According to recent research published by TheCityUK (2010), an indepen-
dent membership body that promotes the financial and professional services in-
dustry based in the United Kingdom, Africa receives less than 5 percent of world-
wide SWF investment flows. Similarly, as of December 2009, of 8,300 companies in 
which the Norway SWF held equity investments, only 144 (corresponding to 1.74 
percent) were African, and these companies were concentrated in only three coun-
tries, namely, Egypt (32 companies), Morocco (8 companies), and South Africa 
(104 companies).
Such investment strategies are justified by the weak governance and significant 
volatility of African economies. Unfortunately, investment risk in Africa is still per-
ceived as high, which hinders the continent’s attractiveness as a target for African 
SWF money. This brings us back to the sequencing issue. African countries would 
have to reform governance structures and communicate more about the returns 
and risk profile of financial markets and institutions in Africa before SWF money 
would follow.
Foreign SWFs could have a striking effect on the amount of investment received 
by Africa.  Statistics  published  by  TheCityUK  show  that  SWFs  were  managing 
US$3.8 trillion in assets globally as of December 2009. The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development expects assets under SWF management to 
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reach US$5 trillion in 2010 and US$10 trillion by 2015. Investing 1 percent of cur-
rent SWF resources in Africa would channel up to US$29.7 billion in foreign in-
vestment to the continent.
As with all foreign direct investment (FDI), however, there are also risks for re-
ceiving countries. First, high and volatile capital inflows, albeit with less volatility 
for SWFs, can lead to asset boom-and-bust cycles, especially in small countries 
with small and illiquid capital markets. Second, destabilization can result from 
SWF involvement in the banking sector, where these funds can distort the credit 
allocation process to favor home country businesses (Heyward 2008). Third, large 
reverses in SWF flows resulting from profit repatriation or asset reallocations also 
involve currency transactions that might affect the exchange rates of African coun-
tries, as was observed during the early stages of the financial crisis.
The Changing Global Environment: Tales of Dragons  
and Elephants
Among the options available for tapping international finance, none is more no-
ticeable than the BRIC countries, particularly China. China, India, and several Gulf 
states have been increasingly investing in Africa. This investment has come after a 
decade-long trend toward increased trade between middle-income emerging mar-
kets and Africa (map 4.1). This must also be seen in light of the increased demand 
for natural resources by emerging markets, notably the BRIC countries. There are 
other complementarities between these large emerging markets and Africa that 
likewise explain the increasing cooperation. China and India, for example, bring 
expertise from the construction sector and from their recent experience in building 
large infrastructure. Chinese construction firms are globally competitive, and they 
have won a large number of civil works contracts financed by the African Develop-
ment Bank and the World Bank (Foster et al. 2008). Furthermore, both countries 
have a growing need for natural resources for their rapidly expanding manufactur-
ing sectors and want to diversify their large financial resources away from U.S. 
Treasury Bonds. They have increasing food needs as well because of growing popu-
lations and increasingly scarce arable land. Chinese finance is often invested in 
large-scale infrastructure projects, with a particular focus on hydropower genera-
tion and railways. Currently, more than 35 African countries are engaging with 
China on infrastructure finance deals. The biggest recipients are Angola, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, and Sudan.
The China-Africa economic ties experienced a great leap forward after the first 
triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, held in Beijing in October 2000. 
Bilateral trade and Chinese FDI in Africa grew about fourfold between 2001 and 
2005. This was accompanied by a major influx of Chinese enterprises and workers 
in the region. The natural resource exports of Sub-Saharan Africa to China grew 
exponentially, from slightly more than US$3 billion in 2001 to US$22 billion in 
2006. Foster et al. (2008) estimate that Chinese financial commitments to African 
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infrastructure projects rose from less than US$1 billion per year in 2001–03 to 
around US$1.5 billion per year in 2004–05 and reached at least US$7 billion in 
2006, China’s official “Year of Africa,” before trailing back to US$4.5 billion in 2007. 
Chinese infrastructure finance has been widespread across sectors, from oil to hy-
dropower and transportation. However, in the period through 2007, there was a 
geographical concentration. Over 70 percent of the finance went to only four coun-
tries: Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan.
A typical arrangement is for the Chinese investment entity, whether private or 
state-owned, to form a joint venture with the local African state-owned enter-
prise. This has been the pattern set, for example, in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Zambia. Chinese FDI flows typically 
involve investments by Chinese contractors that are funded through bilateral 
loans from the Export-Import Bank of China to the government of the benefi-
ciary country. This accounted for 92 percent of recorded Chinese investment 
projects from 2001 to 2007. This leaves little room for African banks to become 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (database), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://elibrary-data.
imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170921 (assessed in 2010).
Note: The figure shows the ratio of the total BRIC trade with Africa to African trade with the world.
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involved in the funding of the projects. Increasingly, the China-Africa Develop-
ment  Fund  has  gained  importance.  While,  previously,  China  Eximbank  lent 
mostly to state-owned Chinese enterprises, it has recently also opened up its   
coffers to private Chinese enterprises. This has resulted in the Angola mode, or 
resources for infrastructure, whereby repayment of the loan for infrastructure   
development is made using natural resources.
What drives China’s interest in Africa? According to Cheung et al. (2011), the 
determinants of China’s engagement in Africa are similar to the determinants of 
traditional FDI: the search for new markets and follow-up on trade links, as well as 
natural resources, especially oil. Unlike Western countries, Chinese FDI is less in-
fluenced by concerns about the risk of political instability or corruption and there-
fore flows to countries where Western investors often do not dare to invest. China 
has also started creating special economic zones, such as in Mauritius and in the 
Chambishi copper belt region in Zambia. India has followed suit, using the Export-
Import Bank of India. Similarly, several Arab countries have invested in African 
infrastructure projects. The finance from Arab donors is channeled through special 
funds or development agencies, such as the Islamic Development Bank, the Arab 
Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development, the OPEC Fund, and the Saudi Fund.
Another possible option for raising international finance for the benefit of Af-
rica is represented by diaspora bonds, which we analyze in box 4.8.
Pushing toward the Frontier and Beyond: A Long-Term 
Agenda with Tricky Shortcuts
Lengthening financial contracts in Africa requires that policy makers address the 
structural bottlenecks that inhibit the issuance of longer-term contracts. To this 
end, there is a need to (1) increase the diversity of domestic sources of long-term 
finance and (2) promote an appropriately diverse range of long-term financial 
products and services. As in the case of expanding access, we can distinguish among 
several layers of policies for lengthening contracts. On the first level are market-
developing policies, that is, policies that help create the necessary conditions for 
long-term funding flowing to and staying in Africa, as well for long-term financing 
tools and products to emerge. While far from sufficient, these policies are neces-
sary. Most prominently among them are policies aimed at the contractual frame-
work and macroeconomic conditions, including price stability and the develop-
ment of long-term sovereign bond markets.
These policy reforms seek to unlock substantial additional sources of long-term 
finance through currently existing, but underdeveloped segments of financial sys-
tems, including pensions, insurance, and capital markets. While a boom in con-
tractual savings cannot be expected in the short term (because of demographic and 
income factors), a stronger role for insurance companies, pension funds, and mu-
tual funds should be fostered. Such reforms should also seek to encourage new 
04--chapter 4--141-192.indd   180 8/18/11   9:37:15 AMLengthening Financial Contracts  181
providers and more competition, for example through equity funds. More urgent, 
however, is the need to explore alternative methods for intermediating pension re-
courses transparently.
On a second level are market-enabling policies that take the current environ-
ment as a given and try to maximize the absorption and intermediation of existing 
resources in the financial system. These policies should be focused on competi-
A diaspora bond is a debt instrument issued by a country or, potentially, by a subsovereign 
entity or by a private corporation to raise financing from its overseas diaspora. India and Is-
rael have raised US$11 billion and US$25 billion, respectively, from their diaspora abroad 
(Ketkar and Ratha 2010). The people of the diaspora usually have more information about 
their country of origin than other foreign investors. These bonds are issued often in times of 
crisis and frequently at a “patriotic” discount. Unlike international investors, the people of 
the diaspora tend to be less averse to convertibility risk because they are likely to have cur-
rent  and  contingent  liabilities  in  their  home  countries.  Furthermore,  they  usually  have  a 
strong desire to contribute to the development of their home countries and are therefore 
more likely to purchase diaspora bonds.
The stock of the Sub-Saharan African diaspora is estimated at about 16 million, with 5 
million  in  high-income  countries.  Assuming  that  members  of  the  Sub-Saharan  African 
diaspora earn the average income of their host countries and save a fifth of their incomes, 
their annual savings would be more than US$28 billion. Most of these savings would come 
from African migrants in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, where a third of the Sub-Saharan African diaspora is located, because of the 
larger income differentials. In an alternative scenario, if the Sub-Saharan African diaspora 
were assumed to earn only half the average per capita income in the host countries and 
save a fifth of their incomes, the annual savings of the African diaspora would still be over 
US$10 billion. Presently, the bulk of this savings is invested outside Africa. African govern-
ments and private corporations can potentially tap into these resources by issuing diaspora 
bonds. Diaspora bonds can also provide an instrument for the repatriation of Africa’s flight 
capital, estimated at more than US$170 billion (see chapter 2). Diaspora bonds could poten-
tially raise US$5 billion to US$10 billion annually by tapping into this wealth.
While the size of the potential market for diaspora bonds is impressive, it may be difficult 
for most unrated Sub-Saharan African countries that are characterized by high risk to issue 
such bonds. Some of the constraints that Sub-Saharan African countries may face in issuing 
these bonds include weak and nontransparent legal systems for contract enforcement; a 
lack of national banks and other institutions in migrant destination countries, which can fa-
cilitate the marketing of these bonds; and a lack of clarity on regulations in the host coun-
tries that allow or constrain people in the diaspora in the investment in such bonds (Chander 
2001; Ketkar and Ratha 2010). Finally, the diaspora of African countries is typically dispersed 
across  various  host  countries,  constituting  small  communities,  which  makes  fund-raising 
more costly and more difficult.
Source: Based on Ratha, Mohapatra, and Plaza (2008).
Box 4.8  Diaspora Bonds
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tion—encouraging the entry of new providers—and the removal of regulatory re-
strictions, as discussed in the case of equity funds above. However, they may also 
imply the application of market-friendly activist approaches that try to crowd in 
private providers. Most prominently among these have been partial credit guaran-
tee funds as risk mitigation instruments.
Macroeconomic stability
Most African countries have made enormous progress in macroeconomic stability 
over the past 20 years. Chart a in figure 4.9 shows the median inflation rate across 
African countries, while chart b in figure 4.9, shows the standard deviation of infla-
tion, computed over five-year rolling averages. Behind these medians, however, are 
some rather large outliers, such as Zimbabwe.
External debt has been reduced substantially across Africa, often because of the 
heavily indebted poor countries initiative. In the case of commodity exporters, the 
reduction has also been caused by commodity price increases. The privatization of 
loss-making state-owned enterprises can also contribute to an easing of fiscal pres-
sure and thus reduce the crowding out effect. However, many countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa still depend heavily on donor flows. Although Mozambique, for 
example, benefited from debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries ini-
tiative in 2001 and the multilateral debt relief initiative in 2006, the budget for 2008 
Source: International Financial Statistics (database), International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, http://elibrary-
data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=169393 (accessed in 2010).
Note: Sample size: chart a: 35 countries; chart b: 32 countries. The number of countries indicated represents the 
situation following the balancing of the data set.
Figure 4.9  Inflation and Inflation Volatility, 1990–2009
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projected external funding of 55 percent from various bilateral and multilateral 
donors. In large part because of Mozambique’s success in implementing public fi-
nancial management reforms, a substantial proportion of external assistance takes 
the form of direct budget support.
Despite the sustained macroeconomic stability in many African countries, the 
yield curve is still steep in most countries, if it exists at all. This can be explained by 
the high risk premium on long-term resources, which, in turn, is caused by politi-
cal uncertainty and uncertainty about the willingness of governments to meet   
longer-term commitments, and which is also reflected in the illiquidity of long-
term capital markets. The effective management of government debt—often seen 
as a purely technical area, but extensively discussed by Honohan and Beck (2007)—
can make an important contribution to the creation of a yield curve and also help 
flatten it. As confidence in markets improves and issuing costs fall, the issuance of 
longer-term bonds, for example for infrastructure, can also help establish a yield 
curve. Interest rates might have to be adjustable, however, until confidence is cre-
ated in long-term, stable macroeconomic management. A yield curve is a neces-
sary,  though  far  from  sufficient  condition  for  private  market  participants  to 
lengthen their financial contracts. Having a benchmark curve allows easier pricing 
so that banks and other financial institutions may establish prices. Benchmark 
curves can also help reduce the risks in refinancing.
An important aspect of the management of macrostability is the challenge of 
tending to the Dutch Disease phenomena that arise from large inflows of capital 
through aid money, revenues related to commodity exports, or—least likely in the 
case of most African countries—portfolio inflows. If such inflows are mostly spent 
on import goods, a more relaxed approach can be considered, while an increase in 
the demand for domestic goods and services can easily result in inflationary pres-
sures. For natural resources, there are SWFs, as we discuss above. Similar problems, 
however, can arise from aid surges if they are not absorbed properly in the domes-
tic economy. Here, the domestic financial system has a critical role in terms of ab-
sorbing such funds.
Institution building
As discussed above, financial institutions in Africa, as in other parts of the develop-
ing world, face significant hurdles in the screening and monitoring of borrowers, 
that is, in choosing creditworthy borrowers and projects and in ensuring repay-
ment, especially for long-term transactions. This points to the critical role of the 
contractual and informational framework, as well as appropriate corporate gover-
nance structures.
The informational framework, most importantly accounting and auditing stan-
dards, are critical to long-term transactions. This might enable banks to undertake 
what Berger and Udell (2006) refer to as financial statement lending, at least for 
medium-size and larger firms. The reliability of cash flows for a long-term invest-
ment can be a viable form of collateral if there is confidence in the financial state-
ments that have been produced.
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While many countries in Africa have taken the first step in advocating for the 
use of international financial reporting standards, at least for enterprises above a 
certain size, as well as for financial institutions, more work remains to be done. The 
emergence of a number of strong national accounting associations and professions 
on the continent is a welcome development for the industry.
Reforms in the contractual framework and corporate governance are another 
important item on the long-term agendas of policy makers throughout the region. 
There have been advances, though much slower than hoped by the modernists. 
These agendas comprise a large number of elements, ranging from changes in legal 
codes to changes in the court systems and building and reforming property and 
collateral registries. Recent reforms have been promising. In 2010, Ghana created a 
unified registry for movable property and now requires any secured credit agree-
ment covering an amount of about US$350 or above to be registered in the collat-
eral registry. In recent years, Rwanda has significantly upgraded company law and 
related legislation, strengthening minority shareholder rights and disclosure re-
quirements for companies. The 16 member countries of the Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa have started reviewing the Uniform 
Commercial Act (see World Bank and IFC, various).
Regulatory and legal reforms
Beyond the ongoing challenges of macroeconomic stability and the proper man-
agement of international capital flows, as well as the long-term tasks of building a 
contractual and informational framework, there is also an array of more immedi-
ate, short-term steps that governments can take to push financial systems toward 
the frontier of long-term finance.
One area is the regulatory framework for various segments of financial systems. 
As we discuss above, there are many regulations that, for the sake of stability, re-
strict the engagement of banks in long-term finance, but that, for the sake of use-
fulness for financial stability, might also be questioned. Loan concentration ra-
tios—typically defined relative to capital—can be restrictive in terms of the scale of 
lending. In Africa, concentration ratios are defined at relatively high levels, at 20 
percent or more in most countries. Exceptions are Ghana, where it is only 10 per-
cent in the case of unsecured lending, and Tanzania, where it is only 5 percent for 
unsecured loans. Having to lend 60 percent of a portfolio to borrowers who are 
eligible for refinancing by central banks, as is still formally the case in West Africa, 
can also increase the cost of lending for banks and limit the borrower universe.
The legal and regulatory framework, including adjustments in tax codes, might 
be necessary if the leasing industry is to take off. Similarly, stamp duties and restric-
tions contained in legal codes concerning the sale of claims to third parties can 
limit the extent to which factoring is used as a financing instrument. Likewise, reg-
ulatory restrictions on the operations of domestic and international equity funds, 
as well as concerns about taxation, can limit the extent to which equity funds enter 
markets, as we discuss above.
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An important and often overlooked challenge is the demand side. In chapter 3, 
we discuss the extent to which demand-side constraints can limit the expansion of 
the banked population; such constraints can also hold back the access to and use of 
credit services by enterprises, especially small and medium-size firms. Turning in-
vestment into bankable projects requires business planning and development skills 
that many entrepreneurs lack, but can be taught. Furthermore, even if the financ-
ing constraints are eliminated, enterprises across Africa face a plethora of con-
straints related to market and government failures that have to be addressed in the 
context of a broader reform of the business environment. African enterprises feel 
more constrained about various dimensions of the business environment relative 
to enterprises in other regions of the developing world. One should not downplay 
the importance of finance, but it is not necessarily always the binding constraint.
Beyond easing regulatory restrictions, addressing demand-side constraints, and 
fostering competition, governments across the continent have tended to favor more 
activist instruments in seeking to foster lending to underserved segments of the 
enterprise universe. Directed lending through commercial or development banks 
has not helped in most instances. A more indirect method is partial credit guaran-
tees. Because these have become the intervention tool of choice among many 
  donors and governments, we discuss the experience a bit more in depth below.
Public-private partnerships
We discuss the benefits, elsewhere above, that PPPs can create by closing infrastruc-
ture gaps. In most countries, however, the legislation on such partnerships remains 
confusing. How and with whom should one start negotiations? With the line minis-
try or the ministry of finance? Do the competitive clauses of national procurement 
laws apply to all PPP transactions? There is weak capacity in the public and private 
sectors in the management of such partnerships, and there is an opaque bidding 
process. PPPs in infrastructure have therefore not been used in Africa to their full 
potential or even to the same extent as they are used in other developing regions.
The donor community has initiated and invested in a number of funds aimed at 
attracting private financing for infrastructure projects in the form of PPPs. For 
their part, governments across Africa are making a concerted effort to harness this 
source of long-term finance by strengthening the legal and regulatory framework 
for PPP transactions. In Zambia, for example, the government has recognized that 
it has limited resources to embark on all the infrastructure development projects 
on its wish list and is actively working to improve the PPP environment. In Decem-
ber 2008, the government approved a policy framework for the implementation of 
PPPs. A central unit has been established at the Ministry of Finance and subunits in 
line ministries, including the Zambia Development Agency. The legal and regula-
tory framework has been approved by Parliament.
For countries such as Zambia to strengthen their pipelines for PPPs substan-
tially, more work is required to ensure that the PPP legislation enacted by parlia-
ments and the accompanying regulations issued by ministerial statutory instru-
04--chapter 4--141-192.indd   185 8/18/11   9:37:17 AM186  Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond
ments are conducive to a wide variety of PPP transactions, support national PPP 
agencies in acquiring the relevant technical skills and financial resources to act as 
effective PPP transaction facilitators on behalf of the government, and ensure that 
all relevant public and private stakeholders in PPP transactions have a clear, estab-
lished process for facilitating such transactions in a coordinated and complimen-
tary manner.
An important mechanism for increasing the appetite for PPPs for longer-term 
infrastructure projects is represented by risk mitigation instruments, to which we 
turn next.
Risk mitigation instruments
Over the years, some specialized instruments have been developed to mitigate the 
effects of specific risks. In housing, for example, mortgage liquidity facilities help 
lenders obtain long-term funds to finance their retail mortgage portfolios. This is a 
popular model that many francophone African countries have adopted in the form 
of caisses de refinancement hypothécaire, which is based on a similar institution in 
France. Such institutions exist, have existed, or are planned in Egypt, Gabon, Nige-
ria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and the countries of the West African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. The basic concept is simple: mortgage lenders are al-
lowed to use their mortgage assets as collateral for loans from a centralized bond 
issuer. The bond issuer or liquidity facility is typically owned by the banks that use 
it for refinance purposes and is therefore a sort of mutual organization providing a 
service to members. The institution gains its strength from a strong capital base 
and careful lending, which is secured by mortgage assets as collateral.
Lenders can use a mortgage liquidity facility in two ways. First, it can be used as 
a direct source of long-term funds to help overcome the maturity mismatch, or, 
second, it can be used as a backup in the case of liquidity problems. Because the 
facility acts as a safety net, a lender is able to make better use of short-term deposits 
in the knowledge that any liquidity imbalances can quickly be overcome by pre-
senting mortgage assets to the liquidity facility in exchange for long-term funds. 
Essentially, this allows banks to refinance their mortgage loans if they are in trou-
ble. During the crisis, this was a function undertaken by a number of central banks 
to support mortgage markets in the absence of a mortgage liquidity facility.
Requiring borrowers to save for a period as part of the qualification for a mort-
gage as an alternative risk mitigation instrument is not a widely developed hous-
ing financing scheme in Africa. Such a scheme represents a significant opportu-
nity, especially in markets where lenders are unable to obtain the credit histories 
of borrowers. The requirement allows lenders to verify the capacity of borrowers 
to save regularly and meet mortgage payments, and it helps borrowers build up a 
mortgage deposit and equity in the property. In Nigeria, the national housing 
fund mechanism requires a potential borrower to save for six months before be-
coming eligible to access a loan. This is a closed savings scheme, that is, the savings 
determine the eligibility of borrowers for loan disbursement. The six-month sav-
ings period qualifies many more potential borrowers than can be serviced by the 
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fund, which is therefore fundamentally unsustainable. In Kenya, meanwhile, in-
vestment in housing bonds allows borrowers to build up the necessary equity for 
home purchases. The government actively encourages this scheme by providing 
tax concessions to savers. A similar scheme exists in Uganda, although without the 
tax break.
One way to foster long-term financing is credit-enhancement through guaran-
tees, such as an infrastructure guarantee facility (figure 4.10). Mitigating risk means 
protecting projects against arbitrary interference by regulatory agencies, including 
preventing tariff adjustments commensurate with cost increases caused by exchange 
rate movements. The partial risk guarantee against regulatory default that the World 
Bank granted for the concession of Uganda’s electricity distribution company, for 
example, played a key part in attracting private investors (see Mazhar 2005; Nyirin-
kinda 2005). In the case of guarantee facilities, these are managed most effectively by 
independent private managers selected through a competitive process. DFIs can 
also use specific structures to mitigate the risks of commercial loans. This is the case, 
for instance, of the A/B loan structure that is offered by the African Development 
Bank and that extends the bank’s privileges to commercial investors.
17
African Trade Insurance (ATI), an initiative established by the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa in 2001 with financial support from the World 
Bank, is an example of a regional African institution that offers risk mitigation in-
struments.
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Figure 4.10  The Effects of Guarantees on Loan Maturity
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ing ATI-member countries. Participating states are liable for any loss triggered by 
violations of their commitments toward the ATI. Such violations would also trigger 
default with respect to the World Bank, thereby enhancing the deterrence effect of 
the ATI insurance. Given ATI’s regional shareholding, ATI products have a stronger 
deterrent effect than the guarantees offered by national export credit agencies. The 
ATI has been providing political and credit insurance to facilitate the financing of 
several infrastructure projects. These projects have included mainly power plants 
and information and communication technology infrastructure. As of December 
2009, only 10 percent of ATI exposure to political risk was represented by infra-
structure projects.
An important policy tool to foster lending to the enterprise sector in general 
and, notably, to SMEs and other disadvantaged groups has been partial guarantee 
schemes. These schemes exist on a private basis, but governments and donors have 
been aggressively pushing to establish partial credit guarantees to overcome the 
limited access of SMEs to bank credit. Partial guarantees can help overcome the 
lack of collateral of most SMEs, but issues of appropriate pricing, funding, and in-
stitutional structure are important. Although such schemes could be run on a self-
sustainable basis, they often involve significant subsidies and contingent fiscal lia-
bilities to cover losses. While it is difficult to compute such costs ex ante, it is even 
more difficult to measure the benefits, which would be partially captured by addi-
tionality, that is, the share of borrowers that would not have gained access to fi-
nance if the partial credit guarantees had not been available. There are only a few 
rigorous impact assessments of such schemes, and evaluations are urgently needed 
given the popularity of this policy tool.
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As discussed by Honohan (2010), private credit guarantee schemes can emerge 
for three main reasons. First, if the guarantor has informational advantages over 
the lender, this can help overcome information asymmetries and improve access to 
borrowing or reduce the related costs of financing for certain borrower groups. 
Requiring guarantors for new borrowers was one of the pillars of the success of the 
cooperative banking movement in Germany and other European countries in the 
19th century (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). Second, guarantee schemes can help 
diversify risk across lenders with different sectoral or geographical specializations. 
As created in several European countries, cooperative central banks serve to insure 
individual  cooperatives  that  are  heavily  invested  in  specific  regions  or  sectors. 
Third, guarantee schemes can emerge to exploit regulatory arbitrage if the guaran-
tor is not subject to the same regulatory requirements as the lender. The recent 
growth in guarantee schemes in China might derive from such regulatory arbitrage 
(Honohan 2010).
Coordination failure among private parties and first-mover disadvantage could 
prevent private providers from entering the market for credit guarantees or prevent 
lenders from pooling resources for such a scheme and thus justify government in-
tervention (de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler 2008). This can be seen as one major 
reason why most guarantee funds in Africa are, today, publicly financed and often 
even operated publicly. Another reason for the popularity of the schemes is the 
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limited resources that are needed up front, leaving potential liabilities to a much 
later stage.
The important assessment criteria are additionality and sustainability. How 
many creditworthy borrowers who previously did not have loans have been in-
cluded because of the scheme? This requires not only an assessment of the addi-
tionality effect in itself, but also an assessment of the creditworthiness of the addi-
tional borrowers. The other important criterion is financial sustainability. The 
design of the scheme can be critical in reaching these two goals. While there has not 
been a rigorous research effort on the optimal design of such schemes, there has 
been quite a lot of discussion.
A first important design element is eligibility. Targeting the scheme on specific 
sectors, specific geographical areas, or firms of a specific size can help maximize the 
additionality effect. Targeting that is too specific, meanwhile, may increase the bu-
reaucratic costs of running such a fund (for example, verification costs) thus limit-
ing take-up. It might also limit the overall economic effect.
The coverage ratio is a second important design feature that can impact both 
additionality and sustainability. Retaining part of the risk with lenders can increase 
their incentives to assess and monitor borrowers properly and thus reduce loan 
losses. Too low a coverage ratio might reduce the value of the guarantee and dampen 
take-up. Too high a coverage ratio could incentivize lenders to excessive risk taking. 
Important to note is that the impact of the coverage ratio on lender incentives 
might vary with the informational advantage of the lenders. If guarantors have an 
informational advantage over lenders, then the coverage ratio that is sustainable 
might be higher than the coverage rate that would be sustainable under a scenario 
in which the informational advantage lies with the lenders. One interesting exam-
ple in this context is the Small Businesses Credit Guarantee Fund of Chile, known 
as Fogape, which was launched to auction available guarantee amounts. In this case, 
lenders bid on the loan shares that are to be guaranteed. Bankers who bid for cover-
age of lower shares than the maximum allowable have their requests filled; others 
are rationed. In practice, the auctions have meant that primary lenders retain be-
tween 20 and 30 percent of the risk (Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza 2006; 
Bennett, Doran, and Billington 2005).
The pricing structure is another important feature, especially for the sustain-
ability of the fund both under the revenue aspect, that is, recovering the costs of the 
fund, but also in terms of providing proper incentives for lenders. If fees are too 
high, lenders might be reluctant to use the fund, and it can also cause good custom-
ers not to be included in the guarantee scheme that would have received funding 
otherwise. If fees are too low to maximize the additionality effect, the fund might 
not be sustainable. Critically, the fee structure should influence the incentives of 
lenders to screen and monitor properly.
The payment structure is a fourth important design feature. Prompt payments 
can increase trust in the system and, thus, the use by lenders. However, delays in 
payments until after a threshold of recovery efforts by the banks has been reached 
can be important in enticing lenders to monitor borrowers properly. Delaying pay-
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ments until all legal recourse has been exhausted, however, might be too extreme, 
especially in countries with weak legal recovery processes. A staggered reimburse-
ment schedule might be more appropriate, such as in Morocco and Tunisia, where 
50 percent is paid once the claim is presented, followed by the remainder once the 
legal process has been exhausted.
Another item is the approach to operational management. Individual loan-level 
guarantees involve guarantee agencies in the screening stage to review eligibility 
(that is, whether potential borrowers are within the target group of the private 
credit guarantee), but also risk profiles (that is, whether the level of credit risk as-
sociated with specific borrowers is within adequate limits). In this approach, lend-
ers will usually first approve the loans and then seek a guarantee approval on behalf 
of the borrowers. Alternatively, the portfolio model allows lenders, at their discre-
tion, to assign guarantees to higher risk loans or targeted borrowers (that is, SMEs) 
and inform the guarantors after loans are approved or the loans default. While the 
loan-level approach might allow for more careful screening and risk management, 
it is also more costly for the credit guarantee fund. A hybrid approach would allow 
the guarantees to be extended to portfolios of loans up to a limit, after which ad-
ditional loans would be screened by the guarantee fund.
Beyond the details of the design features, there is the more general issue of the 
relative roles of the private sector, the government, and donors. The assignment of 
responsibilities among government, the private sector, and donors might be im-
portant in creating the incentives so that lenders screen borrowers properly. Fund-
ing of the scheme through the proper pricing of the guarantees and by limiting 
government funding to setup costs might be important in giving lenders the proper 
incentives to monitor borrowers, avoid excessive risk taking, and, thus, minimize 
loan losses. Credit risk assessment by private parties rather than government bu-
reaucrats can help improve the quality of the risk decisions and, again, minimize 
loan losses. Similarly, loan recovery by lenders rather than the government can 
maximize recovery because lenders typically have more information about the bor-
rowers and potentially stronger incentives to recover loan resources.
Conclusions
This chapter documents the enormous long-term resource needs of Africa, but also 
the increasing number of sources for long-term finance. Beyond commercial banks, 
development banks, capital markets, and other traditional sources, there is an in-
creasing variety of nonbank financial sources that are gaining ground in Africa, 
including private equity funds and SWFs, and various financial instruments such 
as corporate bonds and partial risk guarantees. This chapter briefly touches on 
some of the central themes important in efforts to achieve improved long-term fi-
nance. It also demonstrates that Africa can find new and more well managed pro-
viders and new products and delivery channels of long-term finance. This will 
mean, however, that governments must play a facilitating rather than a market- 
replacing role. We advocate an appropriate regulatory touch in organized capital 
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markets that also fosters regional integration and cross-listing arrangements. We 
argue for a stronger role for more private arrangements wherever organized mar-
kets are too costly and cumbersome, including a stronger role for private equity 
funds. Ultimately, this will help (1) attract more long-term resources to Africa and 
(2) intermediate these resources more effectively.
The main messages in the analysis offered in this chapter are consistent with the 
overall messages of the book. Competition among different providers can prove 
critical in the provision of the resources and products necessary for long-term 
  finance in Africa. As in chapter 3, looking beyond banking is important for firm 
finance, but also for other areas of long-term finance, including infrastructure and 
housing finance. Looking at the necessary services and, thus, beyond existing in-
stitutions and markets is critical in expanding long-term finance: looking beyond 
national capital markets to regional solutions and looking beyond organized ex-
changes to private solutions. Consideration of the demand-side constraints implies 
looking at nonfinancial constraints, as well as business development services. The 
ultimate  goal  is  to  turn  investment  into  bankable  projects,  where  bankable  is 
broadly defined.
As in the case of the effort to expand access, policy recommendations have to be 
tailored to country circumstances. Larger or middle-income countries will have an 
easier time attracting international funding and can support a larger number of 
institutions,  including  capital  markets.  In  the  case  of  smaller  and  low-income 
countries, more emphasis has to be placed on linking to international markets and 
pushing for regional integration. Postconflict countries and countries with tradi-
tionally heavy government intervention in financial systems should have gover-
nance reform at the top of the policy agenda.
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T
he global financial crisis has put financial stability back onto government 
agendas around the world. The crisis has exposed weaknesses in the way 
national and international financial markets and national and crossborder 
banks  are  regulated  and  supervised,  and  the  international  community  has  re-
sponded through concerted efforts to strengthen international supervisory and 
regulatory standards. Many of these efforts have repercussions in Africa. Their 
adoption across the continent should be guided by the different needs of individual 
African financial systems relative to systems in industrialized and advanced emerg-
ing markets.
The themes of this chapter are closely linked to the main messages in chapters 3 
and 4. We stress the importance of competition in the banking system and the fi-
nancial system at large. However, this also poses additional challenges for regula-
tors and supervisors. The recent Nigerian experience of widespread and systemic 
fragility linked to (though not necessarily caused by) rapid changes in market 
structure and the capital structure of banks shows that regulators and supervisors 
have to develop the capacity to follow such changes carefully. It also shows that in-
creased competition has to be accompanied by improvements in governance. Simi-
larly, expanding financial service provision beyond banking poses additional chal-
lenges to regulators and supervisors. This means not only the challenges in the 
supervision of insurance companies and pension funds, but also the coordination 
between bank and telecommunications regulators, a topic we touch upon in chap-
ter 3. It also requires an open and flexible regulatory and supervisory approach that 
balances the need for financial innovation with the need to be alert to the emer-
gence of fragility in new forms. Finally, to the same extent that addressing demand-
side constraints is important in expanding outreach toward the access possibilities 
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frontier, demand-side constraints have to be dealt with to keep the financial system 
from moving beyond the sustainable frontier and to avoid overindebtedness and 
abuse on the individual level and financial fragility on the aggregate level.
This chapter takes a fresh look at the challenges represented by the need to safe-
guard finance in Africa and is informed by the recent crisis experience, but also Af-
rica’s own experience with fragility and by solutions adopted across the continent 
and in other developing and emerging markets. Overall, our approach is guided by 
the principle that finance should be safeguarded for the ultimate users. Thus, our 
goal is not to resolve the problems of banks for the sake of banks and not to foster 
the regulation of exchanges to prevent the failure of brokers and dealers. Rather, our 
goal is to protect the ultimate beneficiaries, that is, investors and customers. In the 
case of sophisticated investors, we follow the recommendation by Honohan and 
Beck (2007), who adopt a caveat emptor approach. For the bottom-of-the-pyramid 
users of financial services, we stress the need for more effective consumer protec-
tion. As the objectives of deeper and broader financial systems are being realized, 
appropriate regulation and supervision are becoming more important.
This chapter is organized to reflect the three main messages of the book. After 
discussing the stability of the financial system, we turn to the challenges in bank 
regulation and supervision in a rapidly changing environment of increased compe-
tition and a continuing trend toward globalization, but also toward crossborder 
banking within the region and the reform discussion in the context of the G20 
process. We then discuss the expansion of the regulatory perimeter beyond bank-
ing in light of our discussion on expanding the financial system beyond banking. 
The regulation of insurance companies, pension funds, and capital markets has 
traditionally been weak, while the regulation and supervision of microfinance in-
stitutions (MFIs) have undergone significant changes in large parts of the conti-
nent in recent years. We argue for a risk-based approach that focuses on more rig-
orous regulation of those segments that manage the savings of unsophisticated 
savers. Finally, we turn to the users of financial services, especially small savers, and 
advocate an increased focus on consumer protection.
Stability: We Have Come a Long Way
African financial systems have come a long way in terms of financial stability. The 
1980s and 1990s saw a series of costly banking crises, both systemic and nonsys-
temic.
1 In 1994, at the height of widespread bank fragility, countries in Africa, from 
the Arab Republic of Egypt to South Africa and from Cameroon to Kenya, were 
suffering systemic or nonsystemic banking crises. Beginning in 2000, this fragility 
subsided across the continent. Between 2000 and 2007, Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
report no single systemic crisis in Africa (figure 5.1). As Honohan and Beck (2007) 
discuss, African banking crises of the late 20th century were distinct from banking 
crises outside Africa because they were mostly caused by governance problems at 
the bank level and at the regulatory level or simply by bad banking practices. This 
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is true of countries in which the banking systems were dominated by government-
owned banks, but also of countries with predominantly private banking systems, 
no matter if these were local banks or foreign banks (for example, Meridien BIAO 
and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International).
Governance continues to be a major challenge in banks and regulatory entities 
in some countries, though important steps have been taken in most. In some in-
stances, privatization has helped by reducing the conflicts of interest that public 
authorities face because they are owners and supervisors of the same institutions, 
though, in other instances, the process was not smooth and, at first, exacerbated 
misgovernance and fragility and, subsequently, had to be renegotiated. The privati-
zation process in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda in the 1990s, for example, 
was undermined by governance challenges leading to insider lending and looting, 
often by politically connected insiders, which forced the respective governments to 
renationalize the institutions before a successful second round of privatization 
could be undertaken. In Nigeria, internal bank governance deficiencies were at the 
core of the recent crisis, as we discuss in chapter 2.
Improving asset quality and capitalization are the two dimensions in which Af-
rican banking systems have made the greatest progress over the past two decades. It 
is partly because of this progress that Africa has weathered the recent crisis. The 
traumatic experience with bank fragility in the 1980s and 1990s explains the rather 
conservative bias of bank regulators and supervisors across the continent toward 
stability. Today, most African banking systems are stable and well capitalized. They 
also have a good level of liquidity. (Indeed, sometimes, the liquidity is excessive to a 
degree that undermines the ability of the systems to intermediate efficiently.)
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Figure 5.1  Systemic Banking Crises in Africa, 1980–2009
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Nonetheless, there is still hidden or silent fragility in several Central and West 
African countries. Among the smaller financial systems, Togo has several banks 
with a high level of nonperforming loans and insufficient capital-asset ratios, and 
50 percent of the banking system is effectively in distress, a result of governance 
deficiencies and political and economic turmoil over the past two decades. The 
banking crisis in Togo illustrates how banking systems may suffer from a deteriora-
tion in public finance. Similarly, there are undercapitalized banks in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, a consequence of political and economic turmoil. In 
Côte d’Ivoire, a large number of banks, mostly local or regional, faced difficulty in 
2008, generally related to the accumulation of public sector arrears, loans to risky 
sectors, and governance problems. The government took control of three banks 
and recapitalized them. In Ghana, systemic distress is concentrated in state-owned 
banks and a number of small, locally owned banks that face liquidity problems 
because of their dependence on the public sector and wholesale funding. Similarly, 
in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), many banks do 
not comply with prudential norms and are subject to potential shocks stemming 
from the heavy involvement of the governments in economies throughout West 
Africa. In addition to governance weaknesses, the lack of an appropriate bank reso-
lution framework prolongs the distress and exacerbates the overall costs, a point to 
which we return below.
Figure 5.2 shows the significant capitalization of African banks. Even in their 
unweighted version, capital-asset ratios are well above 8 percent. The ratio of regu-
latory capital to risk-weighted assets is more than double the 8 percent given by the 
Basel capital adequacy ratio and has even increased during the recent crisis. Raw 
capitalization ratios and risk-weighted capitalization ratios are thus highly conser-
vative. Given the characteristics of African banks and their host economies that we 
discuss in previous chapters, especially the high volatility African lenders face, it 
might be argued that a conservative bias in capitalization is appropriate.
A comparison of the liquidity of African banks over time shows similar trends, 
as we discuss in chapter 2. In general, African finance is liquid, with limited matu-
rity risk. There has been limited exposure to derivative products and securities with 
high price volatility on bank balance sheets, partly because of the lack of well- 
developed financial markets and partly because of the conservative approach of 
African regulators. The simplicity and conservative bias of bank balance sheets 
minimized contagion during the crisis. This is symptomatic of the low level of fi-
nancial development, which also, however, prevents the financial system from ful-
filling a growth-enhancing role.
The stability focus is on banking because of the vulnerability of banking based 
on the maturity mismatch and because of the dominant role of banking within the 
financial systems of Africa. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to discuss other segments 
of finance as well. The insurance sector is characterized across the continent by 
undercapitalized institutions, poor governance structures, poor payout records, 
and a weak regulatory framework. In countries where they exist, pension funds are 
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often underfunded, have poor governance structures, and are poorly regulated, as 
we discuss in chapter 4. While this is a different kind of fragility given that, with a 
pension fund, there is no implication of the risk of a run, the fragility of pension 
funds has a direct impact on long-term growth because the resources of the pen-
sion funds are not being allocated to the most effective use, as we discuss in chapter 
4. While there is no immediate risk for the overall financial system and the econ-
omy at large, the misallocation creates long-term, contingent fiscal liabilities.
Bank Regulation and Supervision: New Challenges in a 
Changing Environment
Although we advocate the expansion of the financial system beyond banking, this 
sector is and will continue to be the most important part of financial systems across 
Africa for many years to come. In addition, the regulatory and supervisory focus is 
on banking rather than on other segments of the financial system. This is so be-
cause of the sector’s vulnerability to runs given the maturity mismatch between 
assets and liabilities, because of the close interconnection through the interbank 
market and payment system and the consequent risk that a single bank failure 
could spark systemic distress, and because of the role of banks as the creators of 
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Figure 5.2    The Capitalization of Banks: Delevering during the Crisis,  
2005–10
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tem and the real economy, these externalities make bank failures much more dam-
aging than fragility in other parts of the financial system.
However, the environment in which banks are operating is changing, even in 
Africa. First, there is increased competition from within and from outside the 
banking sector. As we discuss above, increased competition has many advantages; 
however, it also implies greater uncertainty and risks, which have to be properly 
managed. This puts a premium on improved governance in the banking system (as 
in the financial system at large; see below), as well as on supervisory upgrades. 
  Second, in an increasingly global financial system and given the prominent and still 
increasing presence of multinational banks, but, recently, also regional banks, Af-
rica’s financial systems and economies will become more interconnected and sub-
ject to more external shocks that have to be properly managed. Third, the interna-
tional regulatory reforms put forth by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
Committee have direct and indirect repercussions for Africa. Africa needs to be 
careful to manage the process of adopting similar standards for its own markets, a 
subject to which we return in chapter 6.
From a regulatory to a supervisory upgrade
Over the past decade or so, there has been a significant strengthening of the regula-
tory framework in various African jurisdictions. Reviews and subsequent reforms 
of banking sector legislation have been undertaken in a number of countries. Many 
countries have complemented legislative reforms with an overhaul of the corre-
sponding regulations. However, there are still deficiencies in the regulatory frame-
work, especially as regards the independence of supervisors, risk management, and 
the resolution capacity of supervisors, as we discuss below.
2
One way to measure the adequacy of the regulatory and supervisory framework 
is the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs). These cover 
30 areas of bank regulation and supervision on which countries are being assessed 
by their peers in other countries, often in the context of joint International Mone-
tary Fund–World Bank financial sector assessment missions. One should bear in 
mind that different assessors apply different grading principles; nonetheless, it has 
been reported that, on average, the 16 African countries for which the BCPs have 
been assessed were largely or fully compliant with only 20 of the 30 principles. 
Among the important principles that pose a challenge in the effort at compliance 
are BCP 1.2 (the independence, accountability, and transparency of bank supervi-
sors), BCP 7 (the risk management process in bank supervision), BCP 18 (the abuse 
of financial services), and BCP 23 (the corrective and remedial powers of supervi-
sors) (BCBS 2006). The median ratings for these were materially noncompliant 
(figure 5.3). Looking beyond banking to other segments of the financial sector, we 
see that there is still a striking lack of a sound, best practice regulatory framework in 
the insurance and pension fund industries in most African countries.
Focusing on compliance with international best practices is an important part 
of the modernist agenda for building financial markets. How important is the 
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adoption of these principles in explaining the stability of the financial systems in 
the region? Cross-country comparisons have shed doubt on the usefulness of the 
BCPs in predicting stability across countries. Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and 
Tressel (2008) find no significant relationship between most of these principles and 
banking system stability, with the notable exception of BCP 21, which measures the 
quality of supervisory reporting. Countries in which banks have to report their fi-
nancial data regularly and accurately to regulators and market participants have 
banks showing greater financial strength. None of the other BCPs is significantly 
associated with bank stability. This does not mean that peer review of the regula-
tory and supervisory framework is not important. Rather, it means that one has to 
look beyond adherence to the principles to the actual implementation and func-
tioning of bank supervision. One also has to consider the root causes of widespread 
financial fragility in the 1980s and 1990s, which, as pointed out by Honohan and 
Beck (2007), lie mostly in governance failures in the public sector and in the private 
sector. These failures led to credit boom-and-bust cycles. The most recent example, 
Nigeria, also points to weak governance within financial institutions and markets 
as a core cause of fragility.
Weak supervisory capacity and the lack of regulatory independence
Pervasively weak supervisory capacity and the lack of regulatory independence are 
at least as important as gaps in the regulatory framework in explaining fragility. In 
many countries, licensing and closure decisions are still vested with ministries of 
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Figure 5.3  The Median Basel Core Principle Assessment across Africa
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finance rather than bank regulators, which gives rise to a risk of political inter-
ference in these critical decisions, as well as delays in early intervention in the case   
of fragile and weak banks. In most African countries, supervisory resources are 
limited, including qualified staff and the availability of analytical tools and skills. 
Supervisory processes focus on compliance with regulatory standards, but are not 
set up to identify and manage the changing risks in banking systems. In addition, 
the ability to monitor risk at the institutional and systemic level is hampered by 
insufficient quality in data and reporting processes. These deficiencies weigh even 
more heavily in an increasingly globalized world, in which most African countries 
host banks from developed countries, but also from other African countries.
The UEMOA Banking Commission, for example, lacks sufficient power to en-
force corrective measures in cases of noncompliance with regulations, a situation 
that political authorities have only recently started to address. Ill-suited regulations, 
such as the regulation on preapproval of loan applications, are often ignored, which 
undermines supervisory discipline. To ensure certainty and supervisory discipline, 
one would prefer that such outdated regulations be dropped and the focus be 
shifted to the consistent enforcement of meaningful regulations.
While most supervisory authorities still use the Basel I capital regime (with no-
table exceptions, such as Mauritius and South Africa), the large majority plans on 
implementing the Basel II capital requirements. In the recent Making Finance 
Work for Africa survey, all responding countries across Africa, except Angola, Eri-
trea, and Lesotho, indicated their intention to implement, though many have not 
yet set a date.
3 Given the complexity of Basel II, it is surprising that its adoption is 
so high on the agenda of regulators in Africa. African regulators offer a variety of 
reasons why they want to adopt Basel II, although adoption is not mandatory out-
side the member states of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Specifi-
cally, they are concerned that Basel I is beginning to be perceived as an inferior 
standard by international investors and that African markets may be penalized by 
international market participants or that African banks will eventually be denied 
access to foreign markets if they do not comply with the latest Basel standards. Ac-
cording to a Financial Stability Institute study (FSI 2004), the main driver among 
nonmember countries of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to move 
toward Basel II is the fact that foreign-controlled banks or local subsidiaries of for-
eign banks operating under Basel II expect regulators in low-income countries to 
adopt the framework as well. Whether or not these concerns are justified, they have 
accelerated the diffusion of the Basel accords not only in Africa, but across the de-
veloping world.
South Africa was one of the first countries on the continent to introduce the 
full-fledged version of Basel II, pillar 1, in 2008, leaving it up to banks to decide 
which approach to use for capital calculation, though their choice is subject to ap-
proval by the supervisor. Even so, most domestic banks opted for the standardized 
approach, in addition to the minimum Tier 1 capital ratio of 7.0 percent and the 
minimum total capital ratio of 9.5 percent. The latter includes a 1.5 percent sys-
temic requirement on top of the internationally agreed minimum capital ratio of 
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8.0 percent that was imposed to adjust international capital standards to an emerg-
ing market environment.
Implementing the full-fledged version of Basel II beyond the simplified stan-
dardized approach carries significant costs for banks and regulators alike. However, 
even choosing the standardized approach can be problematic because of the low 
penetration of credit ratings across the continent and the disadvantages unrated 
companies (typically small or informal sector companies) would face in accessing 
credit at affordable terms. Building up supervisory capacity (including staff train-
ing), new processes, and the substantial investments in information technology 
  infrastructure is beyond the budgetary scope of many regulators in low-income 
African countries. The development of their own internal rating systems might be 
easy for subsidiaries of larger international banks, but it is a steep hurdle for smaller 
domestic banks, thus creating an additional competitive barrier. Importantly, as 
long as supervisory capacity remains low, Basel II does not provide an adequate 
framework for enhancing financial stability in African countries. Because of the 
lack of preparedness among authorities to supervise the use by banks of highly so-
phisticated risk models effectively, moving beyond the simplified standardized ap-
proach could result in a de facto loss of supervisory power and would therefore be 
counterproductive.
The crisis and new international reform proposals offer a valuable opportunity 
to revisit the regulatory and supervisory landscape in Africa and to look at the pri-
orities for the continent. Caution is called for, however. In defining the regulatory 
and supervisory reform agenda in Africa, policy makers need to assess carefully the 
costs and benefits of implementing international standards. Rather than applying 
the standards wholesale, a more successful alternative might be appropriate se-
quencing and cherry-picking among the building blocks that correspond to the 
regional implementation environment and risks.
4
The new Basel III standards developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision are meant to incorporate lessons learned from the financial crisis. Most 
of the proposed measures are of limited immediate relevance to African banking 
sectors because the weaknesses they address are largely a result of regulatory phi-
losophies and market practice in developed markets. This does not signify that they 
are irrelevant in the effort to enhance the regulatory framework in the future, but it 
does signify that they are of limited practical application today. First, Basel III out-
lines various measures to raise the quality, consistency, and transparency of the 
regulatory capital base and focuses largely on the definition of Tier 1 capital. In 
most African countries, bank capital structures are a relatively straightforward 
composition of common shares and retained earnings and, thus, already fulfill 
Basel III quality requirements. Second, measures to improve the risk coverage of 
the capital framework for counterparty credit risk will have little immediate impact 
because African bank activity in derivatives, repurchase agreements, and securities 
financing is limited. However, they should be included in the regulatory approach 
of African jurisdictions going forward because they might become relevant as fi-
nancial markets deepen. Third, given the high levels of liquidity in most African 
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markets, global minimum liquidity standards imply little change for African banks. 
However, given the lack of data quality and the system constraints in Africa, more 
basic approaches, such as the simple ratio of customer loans to deposits seen in 
some low-income countries, appear more appropriate and easier to implement. 
Care would need to be exercised to balance prudent liquidity controls with the risk 
of excessively constraining loan growth and the consequent economic develop-
ment. Finally, a leverage ratio, currently under supervisory monitoring, may offer 
an important safeguard for all low-income jurisdictions, especially those that are in 
the process of introducing Basel II. However, in practice, the leverage of African 
banks is significantly less than the suggested standards.
Finally, the addition of a layer of macroprudential regulation, as proposed in the 
Basel III framework, is viewed by most regulators in Africa as a key challenge. 
Macroprudential oversight is meant to address systemic risk as opposed to bank-
level idiosyncratic risk, the focus of microprudential regulation. Perhaps the most 
prominent example is the cyclical provisioning for loans. As attractive as these cy-
clical requirements are from a theoretical viewpoint, they seem much more diffi-
cult to implement in low-income or even most middle-income countries than in 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. They 
are technically challenging, and, if regulators get them wrong, capital adequacy lev-
els become out of tune with risk. With the exception of a few countries, the devel-
opment of macroprudential supervisory capacity is in its infancy. Most central 
banks do not have dedicated financial stability units. The additional resource de-
mands are considerable, particularly in skills, training, modeling, technology, and 
data. In addition, macroprudential supervision requires a cultural shift from a pas-
sive rules-based supervisory approach to active risk management. Regulators may 
lack the legal authority for intervening on the basis of macroprudential factors 
(rather than institution-specific factors). Regulators need to work with govern-
ments to determine how far they are prepared to intervene in the event of a buildup 
of systemic risk.
Despite these difficulties and independent of the need to adhere to new interna-
tional standards, the development of a macroprudential supervisory capacity is 
crucial to most African supervisors. It is generally agreed that macroprudential su-
pervision is a function that all regulators must address, but it imposes a range of 
new demands that many regulators are unable to meet. It requires new cross- 
cutting skills combining macroeconomic analysis and regulation, new modeling 
techniques, data collection and analysis, and practical criteria for triggers and inter-
ventions. The development of international standards on tools and measures to 
monitor macroprudential risks could inform similar exercises by African regula-
tors that are adjusted to the existing resource and data constraints.
Minimum capital requirements
Throughout the book, we discuss the diseconomies of scale arising among small 
banks in terms of expanding outreach and lengthening contracts. An additional 
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dimension is whether concentrated banking systems with larger banks can also be 
considered more stable. Box 5.1 discusses the evidence. Nigeria dramatically in-
creased minimum capital requirements a few years ago to create larger banks (see 
chapter 2, box 2.3) and other countries are following this trend. The evidence dis-
cussed in box 5.1 and in previous chapters points to potential gains in the efficiency 
and stability of the financial system from such a consolidation. However, consolida-
In chapters 3 and 4, we emphasize the positive impact that competition can have on deep-
ening and broadening. However, more competition can certainly also bring about more fra-
gility. What have the academic literature and recent examples taught us about the relation-
ship between competition and stability?
Theoretical  models  have  made  contrasting  predictions  about  the  relationship  among 
bank concentration, competition, and stability. On the one hand, bank concentration may en-
hance  market  power  and  result  in  high  profits,  which  provide  a  buffer  against  adverse 
shocks and increase the franchise value of a bank, thus reducing the incentives for bankers 
to take excessive risk (Marcus 1984; Keeley 1990). On the other hand, proponents of the 
  concentration-fragility  view  argue  that  market  power  might  result  in  higher  interest  rates, 
which, in turn, provide incentives to borrowers to take higher risks (Boyd and de Nicoló 2005).
Closely linked to the market structure and fragility debate is the issue of bank size. On 
the one hand, larger banks can diversify more readily so that banking systems characterized 
by a few large banks tend to be less fragile than banking systems with many small banks 
(Allen and Gale 2004). Furthermore, a few large banks might be easier to monitor than many 
small banks. On the other hand, policy makers are more concerned about bank failures if 
there are only a few large banks. Larger banks in a concentrated banking system could also 
increase the risk of contagion, thus creating a positive link between concentration and sys-
temic fragility.
Cross-country evidence shows that more concentrated banking systems are less likely 
to suffer systemic fragility; at the same time, competition also contributes to greater stability 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2006; Schaeck, C ˇ     ihák, and Wolfe 2009). Bank-level evi-
dence provides conflicting evidence on the impact of competition and concentration on sta-
bility. This emphasizes that market structure is not the same as competition and that idiosyn-
cratic bank fragility and systemic distress are far from perfectly correlated. However, there 
also seems to be significant cross-country variation in the relationship between competition 
and  stability;  the  effect  of  competition  depends  on  the  regulatory  framework,  the  market 
structure,  and  the  potential  herding  behavior  by  banks  (Beck,  De  Jonghe,  and  Schepens 
2011). This puts the emphasis back on the regulatory and supervisory framework.
In summary, competition is not detrimental per se for bank stability, nor does a more con-
centrated banking system necessarily imply less competition and more stability. It is critical, 
however, to adjust the regulatory and supervisory framework to changing market structures. 
The governance of financial institutions is as important, including ownership structures and 
cash-flow rights, as well as the accountability of senior management for risk decisions and 
the financial statements to which they agree (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine 2007; Schaeck et al., 
forthcoming; Beltratti and Stulz 2009).
Box 5.1  Competition and Stability
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tion can result in more aggressive risk taking by the banks that have now become 
larger and are seeking to exploit their too-big-to-fail status; in any case, their failure 
will exert more stress than the failure of small banks on the resolution framework. 
In addition, the consolidation process might have a negative impact on access, espe-
cially for customers of small niche banks. Meanwhile, the impact of consolidation 
on efficiency, stability, and access will depend on the implications for competition 
of a more concentrated banking system. At higher concentration, it is even more 
important to have an open, contestable financial system that allows for competition 
from outside the banking system, including from nonbank financial institutions 
such as leasing companies, equity funds, and also mobile phone companies.
Thus, consolidation can create important scale economies in African financial 
systems. However, the consolidation process has to be accompanied by the neces-
sary changes in the regulatory and supervisory framework, and greater contestabil-
ity through the nonbank provision of financial services has to be assured.
Bank resolution: the missing component
The weakest point in the financial safety net in most countries across the develop-
ing and developed world continues to be the lack of effective resolution systems, 
crisis management tools, and implementation, where this is present at all. Effective 
resolution systems rely on the capacity to intervene in a failing bank in time to 
prevent economic damage and contagion. Effective crisis management tools rely 
on the capacity to coordinate a response to a crisis when it occurs. The recent crisis 
and the often bungled attempts of the countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development to deal with their failing banks have put this issue 
high on the agenda. There are two main dimensions to the problem: one on the 
domestic level and one on the regional or international level.
Few countries in Africa have a separate bank resolution framework, and, in most 
countries, either supervisors or courts can intervene in banks. Even in South Africa, 
supervisors have to obtain approval from the minister of finance to intervene in a 
bank. Immediate intervention is not possible: there is a delay of 30 days, during 
which time the bank can argue against intervention. This hinders supervisors in 
intervening decisively, expediently, and effectively. In Tanzania, meanwhile, regula-
tors can intervene in a failing or noncompliant bank without the involvement of 
the policy sphere or courts. The resolution framework includes a prompt corrective 
action procedure and provides for a large number of options, including private 
solutions and the possibility of mergers and acquisitions supported by the regula-
tor. In Ghana and Kenya, the central bank has the power of intervention, but the 
legislation does not include provisions for specific resolution techniques. The lack 
of legal clarity in terms of the power of intervention and, more critically, the lack of 
a clear framework for resolving weak banks undermine not only market discipline, 
but also supervisory independence with respect to banks.
The banking crisis in Togo illustrates this point. The slow resolution of the crisis 
points to the ineffectiveness of the mechanism for managing banking crises within 
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UEMOA. The UEMOA Banking Commission does not have the necessary powers 
to intervene in failing banks and shares many of its responsibilities with national 
ministries of finance, which is of special concern given the increasing dominance 
of regional banks. Specifically, the banking law authorizes the chairman of the 
commission to call for market solidarity or to request shareholder assistance in the 
event of a banking crisis. The provisions of the law, however, are not binding on 
shareholders, and any action is thus based on the chairman’s power of persuasion. 
The national ministries of finance have the power to appoint a temporary admin-
istrator and to lodge an appeal with the UEMOA Council of Ministers against any 
license revocation decision. The appeal suspends action until the council reaches   
a decision.
The main challenges in the domestic agenda thus include the lack of an appro-
priate legal framework to deal with failing banks. Dealing with failing banks can 
often only be accomplished under the provisions of the general bankruptcy law, 
which, as discussed in box 5.2 in more depth, is not sufficient. A common feature 
of the special resolution regimes is that, provided certain trigger conditions are 
met, they allow the supervisor to overrule shareholders during the preinsolvency 
stage. In turn, this allows for good-bank–bad-bank solutions, whereby a set of lia-
bilities and a corresponding set of high-quality assets are transferred to an acquir-
ing bank (a purchase of assets and an assumption of liabilities if this occurs di-
rectly; otherwise, a bridge bank is used). This permits a transfer of the systemically 
relevant parts of the bank, while the remainder can be liquidated. It also allows for 
continuity. The advantage relative to a scenario in which no special bank resolution 
regime is in place is that the decision for the authorities to intervene is no longer a 
binary one (that is, save the entire institution, or do not intervene). It thereby serves 
the public interest of financial stability at minimum overall cost to taxpayers.
Related to the more general point on supervisory capacity above, many African 
countries also lack the capacity to deal with failing banks. This concerns not only 
supervisory skills, but also the financial resources that might be needed to fill po-
tential capital shortfalls. This has often led to regulatory forbearance, which deep-
ens fragility. As we discuss below, this problem can be exacerbated by the presence 
of subsidiaries of large multinational banks and the fact that many regulators are 
not independent of ministers of finance or other government institutions in their 
decision making. Moreover, the legal framework often limits regulatory discretion 
in two important regulatory decisions: licensing and the corrective and remedial 
powers of supervisors to intervene in failing banks.
The recent Nigerian experience in responding to bank failures and several self-
assessments by other African countries have highlighted the need to establish and 
rehearse effective crisis response mechanisms and bank resolution procedures be-
fore such events occur. Several countries in the region have undertaken holistic re-
views of the crisis management and bank resolution framework, such as Malawi, 
Mozambique,  and  Zambia.  They  have  strengthened  the  resolution  framework 
through the adoption of prompt corrective action mechanisms, the development 
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The three basic functions of banks in any market economy are to (1) provide payment ser-
vices; (2) pool society’s savings, thereby transforming short-term liquidity into long-term in-
vestment; and (3) screen and monitor borrowers and investment projects. These three func-
tions result in (1) the need to belong to a network of financial institutions, (2) the risk of a 
maturity mismatch and liquidity shortages in the case of shocks such as bank runs, and (3) 
the creation of private information. The failure of a financial institution results in negative 
externalities beyond the private costs of the failure to shareholders, management, employ-
ees, depositors, and borrowers. It also imposes external costs on other financial institutions 
and the economy at large. This gap between the private and the social cost of bank insol-
vency by itself justifies the establishment of a special insolvency regime for banks. Specifi-
cally, the three characteristics discussed above can be mapped to three problems that lead 
to the external social costs arising from bank failure, as follows: (1) the domino problem that 
is created because banks belong to a network: the failure of one institution can easily result 
in the failure of other institutions despite the sound fundamentals of these other banks; (2) 
the hostage problem that results from the maturity mismatch and the incapacity of banks to 
satisfy the liquidity needs of all its customers in the case of a bank run, which, in turn, might 
lead to contagion effects throughout the financial system; and (3) the refrigeration problem 
that results from the deterioration in lender-borrower relationships occurring because of the 
loss of information after the institution fails. These problems require swift attention, which 
cannot be provided through the regular insolvency regimes for corporate insolvencies. Such 
a special framework with clearly defined rules is also necessary to avoid a classical time in-
consistency problem among regulators: while it is optimal ex ante to deny the possibility of a 
bailout so as to instill market discipline, it is optimal ex post to focus on reducing the social 
costs of bank failure.
In the absence of a proper bank resolution framework, authorities are often left with two 
ways to deal with failing banks: make them undergo regular bankruptcy procedures or bail 
them out. Implementation of the first option exacerbates the problems described above be-
cause it can lead to bank runs, contagion, and the destruction of private information. Imple-
mentation of the second option creates perverse incentives for banks to take aggressive 
risks. Any gains realized from this risk taking accrue to the banks, and any losses are social-
ized through the bailouts. The objective of a bank resolution framework is to create options 
so that bank regulators can minimize the costs imposed by bank failures on the rest of the 
system, while reducing moral hazard because bankers are encouraged to be too aggressive 
in the face of risks. Such options may include a supervisory-driven merger of a weak bank 
with a strong bank or a purchase-and-assumption technique, where the good part of a fail-
ing bank’s assets (the purchase portion), together with some of the liabilities (the assumption 
portion), is transferred to another bank, while the remainder of the assets, together with re-
sidual liabilities, is sent through the liquidation process. If such options are not available be-
cause of the absence of purchasers or because the failing bank is too large, a bridge-bank 
option may be considered. This involves establishing a temporary bank to administer the de-
posits and liabilities of the failed bank.
However, bank regulators do not operate in a vacuum. They are part of an overall institu-
tional and political framework. Their objectives might not coincide with those of taxpayers, 
Box 5.2  Bank Resolution
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of crisis management plans for large, systemically important banks, and the intro-
duction of coordination mechanisms within central banks and ministries of fi-
nance. Proper procedures need to be established by African authorities to define 
efficient information-sharing, analysis, decision-making, and internal and external 
communications processes, as well as appropriate mechanisms to fund bank reso-
lution. The various responsibilities can be described in detail in interagency mem-
orandums of understanding (MOUs) on crisis management, which should con-
tribute to preventing coordination failures, facilitating timely exchanges of key 
information, ensuring coordinated communications among institutions, markets, 
and the public, and, in general, strengthening overall contingency planning for fi-
nancial crises. Acute time pressures and severe shortages of information are com-
mon during banking crises.
One size does not fit all. In some financial systems, for instance in West Africa,   
a current task is the restructuring and possible privatization of weak or failing   
government-owned banks, while other countries should focus on implementing a 
structure to deal effectively with potential failures of private banks.
A dimension in which quick progress could be made is fire drills, simulation 
exercises, and contingency plans. Fire drills can hone the necessary capacities of 
supervisory staff. They can also help expose shortcomings in the current legal bank 
insolvency framework and thus influence reform in the bank resolution system. 
Fire drills can also highlight the need to prepare contingency plans for major bank 
failures or a systemic banking crisis. A contingency plan should include previsions 
for the necessary human resources; the legal background; the lines of communica-
tion with other institutions, government authorities, and foreign supervisors; and 
action plans for the response to major bank failures or a systemic crisis. Contin-
gency planning should include all relevant national authorities, including the su-
pervisor, deposit insurance authorities, and finance ministries, as well as other rel-
evant agencies (such as international agencies, foreign supervisory authorities, and 
so on). Scenarios such as a takeover by competitors inside or outside the domestic 
banking system should also be part of contingency planning. Well-prepared and 
realistic contingency plans allow regulatory authorities to be proactive rather than 
reactive in a crisis. Simulation exercises can be used to test the adequacy of contin-
gency plans.
who ultimately have to pay the bill for bank failures. Imposing certain rules on supervisors in 
terms of when and how to intervene (in the form of a framework for prompt corrective ac-
tion) and certain rules on which resolution option to choose (for example, the least cost rule 
in the United States) can help structure the bank resolution framework in a way that the in-
centives of supervisors become better aligned with the incentives of taxpayers and the ob-
jectives of an effective and sound financial system.
Box 5.2  Bank Resolution (continued)
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Contingency planning is especially important in countries with a history of ex-
ercising forbearance, whether because the owners of distressed banks have been 
politically influential or because governments have shown fear that bank closures 
and the attendant job losses and disruptions among bank customers would be po-
litically and economically unpopular. In addition to economic forbearance and po-
litical forbearance, Maimbo (2001) argues that, in some cases, a third kind of 
  forbearance—bureaucratically institutionalized regulatory forbearance—may be 
more prevalent. In a study of the regulatory and supervisory process in Zambia, he 
finds that this type of forbearance was not only embedded in the formal and infor-
mal administrative policies and procedures for effecting legislative and supervisory 
sanctions, but also appeared to be part of the organizational culture of decision 
making within the regulatory agency.
The efficient resolution of failing subsidiaries of foreign banks is often both 
more challenging and more critical, especially in many smaller economies in Af-
rica, where such banks often have a dominating position.
5 It is more challenging 
because bank supervisors in host countries often lack the necessary information to 
be sufficiently prepared for a failure event. In addition, given the nature of bank 
balance sheets, the asset-liability composition and, thus, the liquidity and equity 
positions of banks can be changed within hours in favor of the parent and at the 
expense of the subsidiary. While the idea of stand-alone subsidiaries has been of-
fered as an option against these risks, such firewalling would also take away the 
advantages of multinational banks in terms of scale economies and the use of joint 
platforms. Bank of Africa, Ecobank, First Rand, and Standard Bank, four impor-
tant regional banks throughout the continent, have centralized their group func-
tions for treasury and liquidity management, group audit, large credit authoriza-
tion, and electronic data processing (Lukonga 2010). Contingency plans can thus 
be especially useful in the context of subsidiaries of multinational banks. Such 
plans would also entail making the corporate structures of these banks more trans-
parent. In an additional phase, it might even be worthwhile to require subsidiaries 
of multinational banks to undertake their own contingency plans, that is, plans on 
resolving the subsidiaries on a stand-alone basis if the need arises. This is similar to 
the idea of instituting living wills that has been floated in Europe and North Amer-
ica for large, systemically important financial institutions.
6
A role for deposit insurance?
A critical issue in a bank resolution framework is access to the necessary resources 
to resolve failing banks. Recent reforms in the bank resolution framework in Latin 
America have put deposit insurance at the center of the resolution of weak banks 
to align incentives across the financial safety net and provide resolution authorities 
with appropriate resources. Can the Latin American experience be transplanted to 
Africa? Most countries in Africa currently have no deposit insurance scheme, and, 
over the past decade or so, more and more empirical evidence has pointed to the 
pitfalls of moral hazard associated with deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
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Kane 2002). Thus, by reducing the incentives for bank depositors and creditors to 
monitor and discipline banks (although one has to remain skeptical of the ability 
of small-scale depositors to assess the risk profile of banks in the first place) and by 
institutionalizing the liability of governments, banks are more likely to follow their 
natural instinct of taking an aggressive stance toward risk (given that they only 
participate in the upside but not the downside of this risk), especially in the pres-
ence of a weak supervisory framework. The argument that an explicit deposit in-
surance is better than an implicit guarantee because it limits this guarantee does 
not necessarily hold in reality, as the case of Bolivia has shown. Bolivia’s financial 
system is small and not well developed, somewhat similar to many African finan-
cial systems, and the introduction of explicit deposit insurance led to increased 
risk taking by banks (Ioannidou and Penas 2010). However, there is much anec-
dotal and practitioner evidence that the existence of a deposit insurance scheme 
can help in the reform or establishment of a proper and incentive-compatible bank 
resolution scheme; Bolivia is, again, the example (see Bolzico, Mascaro, and Gra-
nata 2007). There thus seems to be a trade-off between ex ante and ex post effi-
ciency in the use of deposit insurance as part of the financial safety net: it raises the 
incentives for aggressive risk taking, but serves as an effective instrument in resolv-
ing failing banks. There also seems to be path dependence in the sense that, where 
certain institutions and structures already exist, it is best to maximize their useful-
ness, while, in countries in which they do not exist, it is easier to start afresh with 
optimal structures.
Would the introduction of deposit insurance to improve the efficiency of bank 
resolution be practical in the context of small, low-income African countries? Given 
the limited number of banks and the often limited human resources, it seems   
that the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme with the primary purpose of 
establishing  an  incentive-compatible  bank  resolution  scheme  would  be  costly.   
Also, bank runs are much less common in Africa than elsewhere. The failure of a 
single bank, not even the largest, would exhaust the fund, and diverting staff to the 
establishment and administration of a deposit insurance scheme might draw nec-
essary resources from bank supervision. However, where deposit insurance already 
exists, transforming it from a pay-box scheme into an integral part of failure reso-
lution, as is happening in Kenya and Uganda, might enhance efficiency and crisis 
preparedness. This might include assigning regulatory powers to the deposit in-
surer, along with access to supervisory information, the right to require additional 
and intensive on-site and off-site supervision, and participation in the intervention 
decision. It would help align incentives because deposit insurers would then have 
the incentives, but also the tools to minimize the losses of the insurance fund. As 
with so many other discussions throughout the book, we see that one size does not 
fit all: the structure of the ideal financial safety net is a function of the develop-
ment, structure, and size of the relevant banking system.
Alternatives to deposit insurance are available. Given the significant liquidity of 
most banks in Africa, the investment of liquidity in the central bank or government 
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papers, earmarked to reimburse small depositors in the case of failure, could be 
useful. Most banking systems in Africa impose high liquidity requirements on 
banks, plus high reserve requirements; so, such an arrangement would be easy to 
implement.
Another lesson from the European crisis is that crossborder issues of deposit 
insurance must be addressed. This is especially the case with respect to branches 
because these are supervised by the respective home countries and may or may not 
be covered by the deposit insurance schemes of these countries. Such arrangements 
have led to problems within Europe, as the case of Iceland has shown. Almost half 
the countries in Africa that responded to the recent Making Finance Work for Af-
rica survey on the regulatory framework (see elsewhere above) allow foreign banks 
to enter through branches. In reality, however, foreign bank entry through branches 
is rare in Africa because most multinational or regional banks establish subsidiar-
ies. Even where the regional integration of bank supervision might facilitate a re-
gional resolution framework, such as in West Africa and Central Africa, bank regu-
lators insist that foreign banks must enter each country through subsidiaries rather 
than branches.
Regional crossborder supervisory cooperation
Another important dimension in bank resolution is the crossborder dimension, an 
area where the recent European experience can be insightful. Crossborder supervi-
sory issues are increasingly important among African regulators, especially in light 
of the fact that, by the end of 2009, there were at least 20 banks of African origin 
with crossborder operations in four or more countries (Lukonga 2010). The home 
countries ranged from Morocco to Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa. The effec-
tive supervision of crossborder financial institutions requires close cooperation 
between the respective supervisors in the home countries of the institutions and in 
the host countries of the subsidiaries. This is also a key issue in advancing consoli-
dated supervision.
Recent reforms in the international supervisory architecture have focused on 
the constitution of colleges of supervisors for all banks with international opera-
tions. The representation of African supervisors in these supervisory colleges re-
mains a weak point given the current asymmetry of the size of operations of large 
international banks in developed markets and in most African markets. For exam-
ple, the activities of an international banking group in Africa may make up only a 
small part of the total balance sheet of the group, but they may be of dispropor-
tionate systemic importance in African countries. This asymmetry introduces an 
inherent complication in the design of college arrangements, namely, that African 
supervisors have a great interest in being included in the supervisory college, but 
may be overlooked by the home supervisors under a biased view of efficiency and 
effectiveness. To these issues may be added the substantial money and time costs 
required for relatively scarce qualified senior personnel in low-income countries to 
travel to and attend meetings in distant locations.
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Closer to home, the emergence of regional banks headquartered in African ju-
risdictions requires close cooperation among banking supervisors across the re-
gion. African home supervisors have begun championing regional college agree-
ments and bilateral MOUs to facilitate the cooperation process. Restrictions on the 
sharing of banking information to protect confidentiality need to be loosened to 
enable proper communication among regulators.
The recent European experience suggests, however, that colleges of supervisors 
and MOUs are necessary, but not sufficient tools for coordination in cases of idio-
syncratic or systemic fragility. MOUs are legally nonbinding documents, and, even 
within a college of supervisors, it is the home country supervisor who makes the 
final decision. MOUs are therefore not as crisis proof as is commonly assumed 
prior to a crisis. Moreover, given the asymmetries in information and capacity, the 
position of African supervisors will be weak with respect to home country supervi-
sors in Asia or Europe. Closer to home in the case of regional banks, there might be 
more room for cooperation given the relative size of host and home country opera-
tions, and there might be more balance in capacity and skills. More political will 
might be necessary, however, in pursuing regional financial integration in the regu-
latory framework and in achieving supervisory cooperation so as to avoid the mis-
takes of Europe.
How can the limitations of the traditional crossborder bank resolution frame-
work be overcome? As discussed above, the major challenge is the gap between the 
ex ante and ex post objectives of the resolution framework, the objectives of reduc-
ing aggressive risk taking ex ante and of avoiding the negative repercussions of 
bank failure ex post. A complicating factor in crossborder bank resolution is that 
costs have to be distributed in an incentive-compatible way, which is almost impos-
sible ex post because decisions have to be made quickly (Goodhart and Schoen-
maker 2009). Ultimately, this points to living wills, an idea that is being increasingly 
adopted across developed financial markets. Living wills are drawn up by the banks 
themselves and lay out how to wind down large crossborder banks. Combined with 
international contingency plans and ex ante binding resolution cost-sharing plans, 
living wills can create, ex ante, adequate incentives against excessive bank risk tak-
ing, but also provide a blueprint for dealing with large failing crossborder banks in 
the region.
And market discipline?
Allow us one quick remark on the debate on market discipline versus supervisory 
discipline. The obvious failure of market discipline during the recent crisis can be 
attributed to the moral hazard generated by the Bernanke-Greenspan put, although 
other explanations such as mood swings or externalities have also been put forward 
(de la Torre and Ize 2009). In addition, the absence of markets in many low-income 
countries leads observers to the conclusion that there is no room for market disci-
pline in the financial systems of these countries. As Caprio and Honohan (2004) 
do, we argue that there is sufficient room for market discipline because of the pres-
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ence of large depositors (often expatriate or donor accounts) and the limited re-
sources of governments to bail out large banks (even if the latter may be small in 
global comparisons). In addition, the relatively small business community and the 
less-sophisticated banking business in Africa make monitoring and information 
collection and dissemination easier. While strengthening supervisory capacity and 
discipline seems important, fostering market discipline, where possible, can be 
critical. One option would be a greater role for equity markets where they exist. 
Encouraging large and listed banks to float a greater share of their equity can lead 
to share prices that reflect the risk taking of management more accurately. Another 
instrument is the strengthening of auditing standards so that auditors are liable for 
the financial statements they have agreed to and ensure accountability with regard 
to shareholders and supervisors.
Market discipline is essential in addressing the challenges of governance. The 
discussions throughout the book, but especially in the context of recent banking 
crises across Africa, point out the severe governance challenges at the core of fragil-
ity. Corporate governance in banks is especially important, given that many pre-
vious crises in Africa have been caused by governance challenges. Moreover, the 
expansion of Africa’s financial systems can only be achieved if the governance 
  challenges in nonbank financial institutions, including MFIs and cooperative insti-
tutions, are also addressed.
Governance is as much an issue of legal rules as it is an issue of enforcement. 
Most of the bank regulators that responded to the Making Finance Work for Africa 
survey reported that they have regulations on related party lending and disclosure 
requirements of directors and controlling shareholders about their business inter-
ests involving related party relationships or potential conflicts of interest with 
banks. This begs the question about the enforceability and enforcement of these 
rules. Similarly, as discussed in chapter 3, many cooperative institutions suffer from 
weak governance structures.
Entrenched political elites tend to use financial systems for their own financing 
purposes. However, the problem in governance goes beyond direct government 
ownership. It involves cross-ownership between the financial and the nonfinancial 
corporate sector and, most importantly, connections among politicians, regulators, 
and financial institutions that result in noncommercial lending decisions associ-
ated with high risks and, thus, contingent and, often, realized losses. Privatization is 
not a panacea in this context, but only a first step, as the experience in several coun-
tries in East Africa and southern Africa mentioned above has shown.
One method is to induce more competition into the system. Certainly, one size 
does not fit all. Advances in governance through competition and the media is 
more easily achieved in larger and middle-income countries than in smaller or 
low-income countries. Encouraging openness and competition is widely seen as 
effective in dealing with this type of governance challenge. Foreign bank entry and 
strategic private foreign management can be effective in tackling problems associ-
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ated  with  the  political  capture  of  the  financial  sector,  while  contributing  to  a 
buildup in technical expertise.
Equally important is ensuring that there is a measure of effective self-discipline 
within institutions. Self-regulation, whereby a bank voluntarily monitors its own 
adherence to legal and ethical standards, is far preferable to enforcement of these 
standards by outside regulators. To this end, there has been a lot of governance 
work aimed at making boards of directors more effective. The reports of the King 
Committee on corporate governance in South Africa, led by former High Court 
Judge Mervyn King, have been influential in setting the direction of codes of cor-
porate practice and conduct in Africa. The latest report, King III, builds on the 
spirit of the December 1992 Cadbury Report, which was published in the United 
Kingdom and which was the first in-depth statement on corporate governance and 
a model for sound practice worldwide for dealing with the division of responsibili-
ties among top management to ensure that the decision-making power is not del-
egated to one person alone (IODSA 2009). On governance, King III is based on 
principles and accepts that there is no one size fits all in the solutions to corporate 
governance issues. Instead, it encourages firms to tailor standard corporate gover-
nance principles as appropriate to the size, nature, and complexity of their organi-
zations. For banks in Africa, this message is especially relevant given the diversity of 
strategies for overcoming Africa’s unique challenges.
Looking beyond Banks: How to Regulate Which Segments 
of the Financial System
Contractual savings institutions and capital markets
The regulation of insurance companies and pension funds has often been ne-
glected, especially when financial sector supervision has been housed in ministries 
of finance with small staffs, a weak regulatory framework, and no supervisory pow-
ers. As we argue in chapter 4, the lack of proper regulation and supervision is an 
important, though not necessarily the decisive factor in explaining the underdevel-
opment of these segments of financial systems across most of Africa. Similarly, 
  severe governance challenges plague these segments. As important as capital and 
governance regulations are, consumer protection regulations seem especially con-
ducive to increasing the public’s trust in these institutions. Fortunately, this has re-
cently started to improve. Regulatory and supervisory functions have been moved 
to central banks or to dedicated nonbank regulatory agencies, as in the case of   
Botswana and Zambia.
The lack of proper regulation and supervision can be a drain on the develop-
ment of capital markets. As we discuss in chapter 4, however, in the case of Africa, 
it is, overly burdensome licensing and issuing requirements that seem to be hold-
ing back the development of the market. As shown in a broad cross-country   
sample of countries, transparency and disclosure standards are more important 
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than the   existence of strong supervisory entities (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and   
Shleifer 2006).
Another reform suggestion in the recent postcrisis debate has been the idea of 
extending the regulatory boundary, that is, extending financial sector regulation 
and supervision to nonbank financial corporations such as private equity funds. 
This reform push has been influenced by the recent crisis experience that brought 
to light the large shadow-banking sectors outside regulatory oversight in many de-
veloped financial markets. This has led to recommendations that capital funds be 
supervised and that market oversight be more stringent, including requiring stan-
dard products to be traded over the counter on organized exchanges. The purpose 
of such a step would be to supply supervisors with better information and early-
warning signals, as well as to throw sand into the gears of rapidly moving global 
financial markets by increasing trading costs. Would the implementation of such 
recommendations fit the African reality?
The trend toward the extension of the regulatory perimeter conflicts with the 
lack of the necessary human and financial resources in many low-income coun-
tries, but also with the transaction costs that the expansion of regulation would 
generate in the emerging components of the financial system, such as certain over-
the-counter markets and capital funds. More generally, the decision to regulate and 
supervise a segment of the financial system has to take promissory intensity into 
account. This is determined by (1) the likelihood that a financial contract cannot 
be honored, (2) the problems faced by consumers in assessing the creditworthiness 
of a financial service provider, and (3) the impact of the breach of a contract (Quin-
tyn and Taylor 2007). This promissory intensity, in turn, has to be balanced with 
the costs of regulation for users, providers, and the economy at large, and the sys-
temic risks must be weighed against the long-term benefits of the development of 
these segments of the financial system (Honohan and Beck 2007). A caveat emptor 
approach, whereby the weight of the responsibility for monitoring lies on sophisti-
cated investors rather than supervisors, might therefore be more adequate for seg-
ments of the financial system that are being used by such investors.
This caveat against expanding the regulatory boundary indiscriminately cer-
tainly does not exclude strengthening the regulation and supervision of the insur-
ance and pension fund sectors, which are still rudimentary in many countries of 
Africa, or the risk-based expansion of regulation and supervision to MFIs or sav-
ings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs). In a nutshell, expanding the regulatory net 
to include nonbank financial institutions that serve households with less financial 
exposure might be more important than expanding it toward products and mar-
kets mostly used by more educated and sophisticated segments of the population.
7
The bottom of the pyramid: prudential regulation where appropriate
One of the areas experiencing the most rapid changes over the past decade or so 
has been the regulation of institutions that serve the bottom of the pyramid. Many 
African countries have introduced some kind of special regulatory framework for 
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MFIs or are in the process of doing so. In a third of the countries in Africa, mean-
while, MFIs still either fall implicitly or explicitly under the banking or nonbank 
financial institution regulatory framework or are left out completely.
One important issue is the failure of nonregulated or poorly regulated bottom-
of-the-pyramid institutions, such as SACCOs. As we have seen across the world 
(for example, in Albania and Colombia), the failure of such institutions can lead to 
bank runs and the loss of trust in all financial institutions among large parts of the 
population, but also to social and political unrest. On a more general level, the fail-
ure of an MFI has potentially an even bigger impact on people’s lives than a bank 
failure. While concerns about a domino effect are usually unjustified because MFIs 
and SACCOs feature only limited interconnectedness and size, the number of sav-
ers affected by a failure can be considerable.
A question many countries across the continent have been struggling with is 
whether microfinance or cooperative institutions should be regulated and super-
vised to the same extent as banks. A global consensus has developed around the idea 
of extending prudential regulation and supervision only to deposit-taking institu-
tions, while avoiding “burdensome prudential regulation for nonprudential pur-
poses, that is, purposes other than protecting depositors’ safety and the soundness 
of the financial sector as whole” (Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg 2003, 3). While, 
for a long time, deposit taking was limited to banks, more and more countries have 
loosened this restriction and created a regulatory framework for deposit-taking 
MFIs or community banks. In some cases, regulation has followed reality because 
many SACCOs in East Africa are already taking deposits not only from their mem-
bers (as they are allowed to do), but also the broader public through front-office 
facilities. This creates serious concerns if the broader public does not understand 
the difference between banks and such bank-like financial institutions, expecting 
the  same  regulatory  oversight  and  protection.  Introducing  a  formal  regulatory 
framework for such institutions, however, without complementing this by the nec-
essary supervisory structure can backfire. This can be exacerbated if a deposit insur-
ance scheme for such institutions is introduced before their financial situation and 
viability have been assessed, resulting in potentially high fiscal liability and, even 
worse, a loss of trust in bank supervision if the authorities do not follow up on their 
commitments.
Deposit-taking MFIs can certainly benefit from reporting requirements and ab-
solute minimum capital standards that are less strict than those applying to banks; 
however, they may need more stringent requirements in terms of capital and li-
quidity ratios. An argument can be made that higher capital-adequacy ratios should 
be required among MFIs because their loan portfolios are typically more geo-
graphically and sectorally concentrated and, for this reason, tend to be more vola-
tile. Rules, such as limits on unsecured lending as a ratio of equity, should not be 
imposed on MFIs because most, if not all microlending is uncollateralized. It is 
important not to impose overburdening activity or geographical restrictions on 
such institutions because this might undermine their viability. Similarly, the regu-
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lation of MFIs is expensive for supervisory agencies, given the fixed costs. There is 
thus a trade-off between the goal of inclusion and the goal of stability. However, 
there are ways to alleviate this trade-off. Unnecessary regulatory burdens, such as 
excessive loan documentation or excessive branching requirements, should give 
way to simpler reporting requirements and ownership diversification rules that do 
not represent barriers to investment in MFIs by nongovernmental organizations. 
Member-based financial institutions, such as cooperatives, might also benefit from 
reduced supervision, especially if the supervisory authorities can rely on well-run, 
well-governed, and appropriately regulated and supervised apex institutions. A 
separate question is whether a special regime is needed for deposit-taking MFIs. 
The example of Uganda, which introduced a regulatory framework for deposit-
taking MFIs a few years ago, might be rather depressing because there are currently 
only two institutions under this regime. However, such an assessment does not take 
into account the contestability aspect of this option with regard to a growing MFI 
or a new entrant.
The transition process from credit-only to deposit-taking institution is a tricky 
one. Allowing credit institutions to start collecting deposits requires that the new 
institutions first submit to a careful process of vetting and screening. Are they suf-
ficiently viable and profitable? Do they have the proper management information 
systems? Can they bear the regulatory burden? Does a license to take deposits entail 
a certain promise from regulators? It is therefore important to be open toward the 
public about the implications of such a license in terms of security and guarantees.
MFI regulation can be both restraining and enabling and can help low-end fi-
nancial institutions push toward the access possibilities frontier. Yet, regulation that 
is too lax can also provide perverse incentives to move beyond the frontier by al-
lowing too many unqualified providers into the market or by giving support to 
disreputable providers.
The supervisory structure: two is a party; three is a crowd?
An important discussion in recent years has revolved around the organizational 
structure of financial sector supervision.
8 Across the world, the advantages and 
shortcomings of various models—separate supervisors for each segment, unified 
supervisory agencies, or a functional approach involving separate prudential su-
pervision and supervision of business conduct—have been discussed. Tradition-
ally, bank supervision has been carried out by central banks, with the exception of 
UEMOA, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, and other 
francophone countries in which bank supervision is housed in a separate entity. 
The supervision of other financial institutions and markets, including capital 
market supervision and insurance and pension fund supervision, has often been 
carried out through ministries of finance. Even today, countries as diverse as Alge-
ria, Madagascar, and Mauritania supervise insurance companies through the min-
istries of finance. The latter arrangement, however, has often been plagued by the 
limited skill base and the lack of independence. Several countries have therefore 
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undertaken the establishment of specialized insurance and capital market super-
visors in recent years. Specifically, Egypt, Mauritius, and South Africa have intro-
duced financial service boards for nonbank financial service providers to stream-
line  rules  regulating  these  industries  and  supervise  institutions  with  multiple 
financial nonbanking activities, while Ghana and Kenya have separate insurance 
supervisors.  Another  discussion  concerns  the  issue  of  who  should  supervise 
  deposit-taking microfinance and cooperative institutions. The majority of coun-
tries rely on supervision by the same institutions that supervise banks, though not 
necessarily under the same regulatory framework. In Kenya, deposit-taking MFIs 
are supervised by the Central Bank, which also supervises banks, while SACCOs 
are supervised by a separate entity.
In each of these cases (insurance companies and capital markets, as well as 
MFIs), there are arguments in favor and arguments against using the same entity to 
supervise nonbank financial institutions and banks. On the one hand, bank super-
visors have accumulated the necessary supervisory expertise and skills, as well as 
the necessary reputation, which might be especially critical in the early stages of the 
supervision of a new segment of the financial system. This might be particularly 
important in countries with a limited skill base. On the other hand, the supervision 
of nonbank financial institutions and markets often requires a separate skill set. 
This also applies to MFIs. Moreover, there are concerns about competition because 
bank supervisors might dominate other types of supervisors and favor the banking 
segment of the financial system over other segments.
While the concerns about the separate skills needed and about competition 
might be valid in the case of insurance and capital market supervision, they appear 
less valid in the case of the supervision of deposit-taking microfinance and coop-
erative institutions because the required technical skills are similar. Furthermore, 
given the often vague boundary between traditional banks and deposit-taking MFIs 
or cooperatives in the eye of the general public, it might be helpful to have one set 
of regulators for such deposit-taking institutions so as to avoid regulatory arbi-
trage. It is certainly important that financial cooperatives not be supervised by the 
general cooperative authority, but by specialized supervisors. There are also politi-
cal considerations, as well as concerns about the power of bank supervisors and 
about whether bank supervisors might focus too much attention on stability and 
not sufficient attention on outreach. A compromise might involve the secondment 
of staff to a new authority that supervises nonbank deposit-taking institutions.
Another important question revolves around the location of the authority re-
sponsible for market development and expansion. While currently often housed in 
central banks, this raises the issue of a conflict of interest with the prudential task 
of bank regulators. Yet, the central bank is, in most countries across the region, still 
the institution with the highest concentration of skills outside financial institutions 
and often the entity with the best reputation and greatest autonomy.
There has been a recent trend toward a regional regulatory framework. The 
francophone countries of West and Central Africa are farther ahead in this context, 
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having joint bank regulatory authorities for the two currency unions and one joint 
insurance regulator and supervisor (the Inter-African Conference on Insurance 
Markets), though these entities exist more in form than in substance. The authority 
to license banks is housed with the ministries of finance in these countries, and 
there is no consolidated supervision, at least not in the UEMOA region. Such re-
gional arrangements can have critical advantages over national supervisors because 
they are able to address the scale challenge and the governance challenge. By join-
ing forces regionally, bank regulators can create scale economies and build the nec-
essary skills and capacities, while gaining independence from the political sphere 
and the regulated entities by functioning on the regional level rather than the na-
tional level. Attempts to harmonize regulations and supervisory practices, as cur-
rently undertaken in other parts of the continent, such as the Southern African 
Development Community, is an important first step toward the establishment of 
such regional structures.
From the supply side to the demand side
On a more local level, the risk of overindebtedness among households has been 
raising concerns since before the microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh, India. Ini-
tiatives that focus on responsible finance, such as those encouraged by the Consul-
tative Group to Assist the Poor and the International Finance Corporation, commit 
MFIs to certain minimum standards of individual consumer protection against 
overindebtedness, including disclosure and transparency standards, but also incen-
tive structures that do not create a bias in favor of lending too much to one client. 
This refers especially to salary loans, which are considered troublesome especially 
because of the ease with which creditors can gain access to the salary payments of 
borrowers.
If voluntary initiatives are not sufficient, more formal structures of consumer 
protection must be examined. We discuss these in the following.
Focusing on Users: Consumer Protection
Throughout the book, we stress the importance of extending the focus from supply- 
side constraints to demand-side constraints. This is as important in the area of fi-
nancial stability as in the areas of expanding access and lengthening contracts. Par-
allel to financial literacy in the attempt to include a larger part of the population in 
the financial system, we have to focus on consumer protection to protect current 
and newly banked segments of the population.
Unlike in the case of capital markets and equity funds, where we advocate a ca-
veat emptor approach to avoid suppressing these nascent segments of the financial 
system,  a  caveat  venditor  approach  is  called  for  in  the  case  of  bottom-of-the- 
pyramid financial services.
9 Consumer protection has gained increasing importance 
throughout the world. Across industrialized countries, the aftermath of the global 
crisis has seen a reemphasis on protecting the unsophisticated consumers of finan-
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cial services from buying products they do not need or that expose their livelihoods 
to extreme risk. This focus on consumer protection relates to savings and invest-
ment and to credit products, as well as to payment services, such as remittances. It is 
closely related to the theme of financial literacy discussed elsewhere above, but fo-
cuses more on the market-harnessing role of regulation and imposes restrictions on 
financial service suppliers rather than focusing on (potential) consumers.
Consumer protection can help competition and, thus ultimately, outreach.
10 
Better informed customers are able and more likely to shop around, thus incentiv-
izing financial service providers to compete on price and product features. By the 
same token, marketing tools, including deceptive advertising, can have a major im-
pact on consumer decisions, as a recent study in South Africa shows (Bertrand et al. 
2010). Loan offers were mailed to some 50,000 customers. The loans were asso-
ciated with randomized interest rates and advertising material containing numer-
ous variants on common advertising devices. The researchers found that loan de-
mand was sensitive to the quoted interest rates, but also to several features of the 
advertising. For example, including a photograph of a woman in the accompanying 
literature (as opposed to a man) was, in terms of the influence on loan take-up, 
equivalent to lowering the rate of interest by over 4 percentage points per month.
Effective consumer protection in financial services focuses on four key areas:   
(1) consumer disclosure that is clear, simple, easy to understand, and comparable; 
(2) prohibitions on business practices that are unfair, abusive, or deceptive; (3) ef-
ficient and easy-to-use recourse mechanisms; and (4) financial education that gives 
consumers the knowledge, skills, and confidence to understand and evaluate the 
financial information they receive (Rutledge 2010). Consumer protection sets clear 
rules of engagement between financial firms and retail customers. It helps narrow 
the knowledge gap between consumers and their financial institutions and in-
creases the ability of consumers to make informed decisions about financial prod-
ucts. Thus, effective financial consumer protection is delivered through regulation 
(government regulation and self-regulation) and programs of financial education.
No internationally agreed methodology has been developed to assess the quality 
of a financial consumer protection framework.
11 Nonetheless, the legal, regulatory, 
and institutional framework is generally stronger in high-income countries than   
in Africa.
What are the instruments of consumer protection? In line with the motto that 
transparency is the best disinfectant, disclosure requirements are one of the most 
basic and important tools. Advising consumers about the returns and the risks of 
investment products should be the foundation of any sales process in financial ser-
vices. Providing customers with a clear indication of the monthly costs of credit, 
including interest, principal, and fee payments, over the complete lifetime of the 
credit should be a minimum requirement. According to the Making Finance Work 
for Africa survey (see elsewhere above), most countries require banks, by law, to 
inform customers about the fees for products before account opening and, subse-
quently, about any changes to these fees. This is the hallmark of any decent busi-
05--chapter 5--193-226.indd   219 8/18/11   9:51:17 AM220  Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond
ness conduct, and these are rules that can be easily put in place. Consumer protec-
tion should also be an integral part of any credit reference bureau, including 
mechanisms for data disclosure and an appeal process, as in the case of South   
Africa (box 5.3).
12
A step up from minimum consumer disclosure rules (which can be enforced by 
bank supervisors or on a self-regulatory industry-wide basis by the banking asso-
ciation) are government regulations that prohibit financial institutions from sell-
ing specific products to all but sophisticated clients (such as corporate clients or 
high-wealth individuals) and government regulations that impose affordability 
A distinct feature of the South African financial system is the presence of the National Credit 
Act, credit bureaus, the national credit regulator, the Office of the Credit Information Ombud, 
and the National Consumer Tribunal, which became operational on June 1, 2006.
•    National Credit Act 34 of 2005: The purpose of the act is to promote and advance the 
social and economic welfare of South Africans; promote a fair, transparent, competi-
tive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, and accessible credit market and industry; and 
protect consumers. Specifically, this includes (1) promoting black empowerment and 
ownership within the consumer credit industry; (2) prohibiting unfair credit and credit-
marketing practices; (3) promoting responsible credit granting and use and, for that 
purpose, to prohibit reckless credit granting; to regulate credit information; to provide 
for the registration of credit bureaus, credit providers, and debt counseling services; 
(4) establishing norms and standards relating to consumer credit; and (5) promoting a 
consistent enforcement framework.
•    National credit regulator: The national credit regulator is responsible for the regulation 
of the South African credit industry and has the responsibility to (1) implement educa-
tion campaigns, (2) conduct research and develop policies, (3) investigate complaints, 
and (4) ensure compliance with the act. It also has the responsibility to register and 
regulate credit providers, credit bureaus, and debt counselors.
•    Credit bureaus: The National Credit Act (1) stipulates that credit bureaus are required 
to register with the national credit regulator to conduct business legally, (2) sets out 
the purposes for which consumer credit information may be used and the companies 
to which the credit bureaus may provide the information, (3) sets out the standards for 
data accuracy, and (4) ensures that consumers have the right to check their records.
•    Office  of  the  National  Credit  Ombud:  To  resolve  disputes  between  consumers  and 
credit bureau providers, the Office of the Credit Information Ombud was established 
and is operating.
•    National Consumer Tribunal: The tribunal hears cases on noncompliance with the act, 
issues fines, and provides redress to consumers. Consumers and credit providers may 
appeal any decision of the national credit regulator to the tribunal.
Collectively, the South African consumer protection framework is designed to ensure that, 
among other protections, (1) the language in credit agreements is simple and understandable; 
Box 5.3  The Consumer Protection Framework in South Africa
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(2) quotes are given on all credit agreements and are binding for five days; (3) advertising and 
marketing contains prescribed information on the cost of credit; (4) credit sales at a person’s 
home and workplace are strictly limited; (5) reasons are provided if credit is declined; (6) au-
tomatic increases in credit limits are regulated; (7) reckless lending is prohibited; (8) interest 
and fees are regulated on agreements, including microloans; (9) credit bureaus are regulated, 
and consumers have the right to free credit bureau records; and (10) overly indebted con-
sumers have access to debt counseling to enable the restructuring of debt.
Although largely applauded for their restrictions on abusive lending practices, the debt 
restructuring processes embedded in the National Credit Act have attracted criticism from 
the financial sector. The court-enshrined process has been criticized as too slow. Banks cite 
the 9,000 cases being submitted to the courts monthly and the resultant backlog as a source 
of major concern for the industry. Their efforts to establish a national debt mediation associ-
ation to increase the flow of negotiated interventions for overly indebted consumers is seen 
as a positive, yet insufficient initiative. It is argued that as few as 5 percent of the estimated 
150,000 applications made by consumers since July 2003 have been finalized by the courts.
To create an effective consumer protection framework, the effort must be complemented 
by an equally effective financial literacy program. The government is determined to raise the 
level of financial awareness and improve the financial behavior of consumers so that they 
can make informed financial decisions according to their specific economic and social cir-
cumstances. Only a financially literate population will use consumer protection systems. Im-
proving  financial  literacy  strengthens  the  knowledge,  understanding,  skills,  attitudes,  and, 
especially, behavior that people need to make sound personal finance decisions and that 
allow people to become more attractive as potential borrowers. The government has to use 
multiple channels to deliver financial literacy programs, including financial institutions, the 
education system (financial education in school curricula), the media (newspapers, radio, 
television, Internet), social marketing (road shows, street theater, targeted entrainment pro-
grams), institutional services (debt counseling, mentoring), and other methods.
In South Africa, the Banking Association of South Africa has made representations to the 
parliamentary portfolio committee on basic education on reforms to the national curriculum 
on matters of economic management science, including an individual’s economic cycle, sus-
tainable growth and development, and managerial, consumer, financial, and entrepreneurial 
knowledge and skills. Financial literacy programs in the early formative years are accepted 
as an essential aspect of efforts to improve South Africa’s low savings rate of only 15 per-
cent, but also as an essential element of the national empowerment for citizens. The pro-
posed reforms are intended to build on the ongoing Teach Children to Save South Africa 
Program launched in July 2008, which enables financial sector professionals to share their 
work-based knowledge and expertise by giving one-hour lessons on savings to grades 4 to 7 
learners nationwide. Supported by the Department of Basic Education and integrated in the 
economic science learning area of the school curriculum, the program has thus far attracted 
participation from 13 banks and 27 financial sector institutions.
Sources: National Credit Regulator, Johannesburg, http://www.ncr.org.za/; Banking Association of South 
Africa, Johannesburg, http://www.banking.org.za/.
Box 5.3.  The Consumer Protection Framework in South Africa (continued)
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tests on financial institutions before credit may be extended. However, such regula-
tions impose regulatory compliance costs on financial institutions, might prevent 
the broadening of the financial system, and require additional institutional capac-
ity among the relevant authorities. South Africa adopted this approach in 2007 
through the passage of the National Credit Act and the establishment of the na-
tional credit regulator, who is responsible for consumer protection in the area of 
consumer credits, whether they are extended by banks or by nonbank financial in-
stitutions, an experience discussed in box 5.3.
A final set of rules imposes certain minima or maxima on the costs of financial 
services, including usury interest rates. Such interest rate ceilings (in the case of 
credit) or floors (in the case of savings products) can, however, easily turn into a 
restrictive tool that reduces access to services by riskier customers and customers 
who need smaller transactions and who are thus costlier for financial institutions. 
According to the Making Finance Work for Africa survey, a third of countries in 
Africa still have usury ceilings in place, and a fourth impose deposit interest rate 
floors. This high rate is driven by UEMOA, which caps lending rates at 18 percent 
for banks and 27 percent for nonbank financial institutions and MFIs, regardless of 
the purpose or recipient of the loans. Yet, few countries impose limits on fees. This 
obviously makes interest rate ceilings and floors less effective because fees are a 
popular escape route for banks facing restrictions on interest rates.
In consumer protection, one size does not fit all. Middle-income countries such 
as South Africa can afford sophisticated institutional structures. Given the rapid 
increase in reliance on consumer credit, there is also a stronger need for protection 
mechanisms in these economies. In the specific case of South Africa, this has also to 
be seen in the context of the consumer credit boom the country experienced in the 
early 2000s. Small and low-income countries, in contrast, might not have the nec-
essary resources and capacities to implement such a system and have to rely more 
on disclosure standards and self-regulatory initiatives. In large and middle-income 
countries, additional emphasis might have to be put on detecting pyramid schemes 
in the formal and informal financial services sector.
In terms of institutional structures for simplicity and accountability, it is best to 
have only one institution to which consumers can submit complaints about finan-
cial services (Rutledge 2010). In line with the motto that one size does not fit all, 
this could be part of an industry association, the regulatory authority, or a separate 
entity. Dealing effectively with complaints is critical in this context because it is 
through the complaint process that most consumers will have direct contact with 
the consumer protection agency, and dealing ineffectively with complaints can lead 
to cynicism and a general aversion for financial services. However, there might also 
be a useful link with financial literacy programs, as they can teach (potential) con-
sumers of pitfalls, possible abuse, and remedial opportunities.
Accountability among financial service providers for the products and the in-
formation they supply and for the sales processes they rely on is paramount in the 
protection of consumers. This includes prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices. 
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Simplicity is key. Disclosure requirements can accomplish much; however, they 
must be clear and easy to understand and enable users to compare similar products 
and services. Providing key fact statements, with a summary of the most important 
terms and conditions written in plain language, and developing standardized con-
tracts can be helpful. It is essential to offer comparable, standardized information 
about the services provided by financial institutions, for example, the costs of open-
ing, maintaining, and using bank accounts for typical user groups. Financial insti-
tutions should also offer contact points where consumers can present complaints.
In terms of consumer protection, all financial institutions should be covered by 
business conduct regulations, independent of whether they are subject to pruden-
tial regulations or not. Obviously, conduct of business regulations and supervision 
are not as extensive as prudential regulations, so that more emphasis has to be 
placed on the initial registration process and on following up closely on any com-
plaint. Such a registration process should focus on the integrity and qualifications 
of  the  provider.  However,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  protecting  consumers 
through a regulatory framework on business conduct and imposing unnecessary 
regulatory burdens on financial service providers. One has to distinguish among 
different target groups. Specifically, institutions aiming for the low end of the mar-
ket certainly deserve closer scrutiny than providers for the high end of sophisti-
cated investors. Put bluntly, caveat venditor should apply to low-end financial insti-
tutions, caveat emptor for the high end. Pyramid schemes pop up on a regular basis 
throughout the developed world and the developing world; continuous monitor-
ing by regulators is therefore required.
Consumer protection is also a critical element in the design of financial infra-
structure components such as credit registries. Consumers and businesses need an 
easy and inexpensive way to verify the positive and negative information that is 
being collected about them in credit registries, as well as a transparent and swift 
process to contest information that they think is in error.
Conclusions
The three main messages we discuss in previous chapters also apply to this chapter, 
though from a somewhat different perspective. In the previous chapters, we advo-
cate for a greater reliance on competition within and across different segments of 
the financial system so as to reap the benefits of financial innovation. This should 
not imply that regulators should not follow developments closely and step in when 
risks to financial stability arise. Allowing competition exerts strain on the regula-
tory  framework  and  requires  more  flexibility  and  more  ability  in  adapting  to 
changing market structures.
While recognizing the potential trade-off between stability and innovation in 
the financial system, this book advocates a preference for the latter. This also im-
plies, however, that more competition will impose a greater burden on regulators 
and supervisors. Looking beyond existing institutions and markets to service pro-
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vision is also important in safeguarding finance. Deposit-taking institutions should 
be subject to prudential regulations and supervision, no matter whether they call 
themselves banks or not, though the exact nature of the regulatory framework can 
vary; it must not cause regulatory arbitrage, however. Finally, addressing demand 
constraints through a greater focus on consumer protection is important in safe-
guarding finance because this helps expand access and lengthen contracts.
Different countries have different priorities. Countries with more developed fi-
nancial systems are more likely to have more capacity, but also more need and 
therefore more motivation to follow closely the regulatory and supervisory up-
grades proposed in the G20 reform process and to expand the regulatory perimeter 
beyond banking. Low-income countries have more immediate needs in regular 
bank supervision. Consumer protection is important across all countries, though 
the institutional possibilities and options vary significantly, as we argue. As Africa’s 
financial systems develop, the regulatory and supervisory framework has to adapt 
to changing circumstances and requirements.
Notes
1.  “In a systemic banking crisis,” according to Laeven and Valencia (2008, 5), “a coun-
try’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial   
institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, 
nonperforming loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system 
  capital is exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as 
equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the crisis, sharp increases in real 
interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In some cases, the crisis is trig-
gered by depositor runs on banks, though, in most cases, it is a general realization that sys-
temically important financial institutions are in distress.” A nonsystemic crisis, meanwhile, 
affects only (large) financial institutions, without additional negative repercussions on the 
rest of the financial system.
2.  For the following discussion, see Fuchs, Hands, and Jaeggi (2010); Fuchs, Losse- 
Müller, and Witte (2010).
3.  See Making Finance Work for Africa (database), Partnership Secretariat, African De-
velopment Bank, Tunis, http://www.mfw4a.org/.
4.  In addition to the direct implications of the regulatory reform debate for regulation 
and supervision in Africa, there are also indirect repercussions. One implication of the Basel 
reforms described above is that, because smaller banks and banks from developing countries 
are, on average, less likely to possess sophisticated risk management systems, they will already 
face a competitive disadvantage in crossborder markets in this respect and will be confronted 
by higher capital charges as they transition to Basel II and, ultimately, Basel III. Therefore, the 
Basel capital requirement reforms essentially raise the cost of international bank financing 
for developing countries and may also reduce their access to external financing.
5.  At high cost, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda had to renationalize previously 
privatized banks because the respective purchasers—various multinational banks—turned 
out to be too weak (World Bank 2001).
6.  Lukonga (2010) documents trends in and the characteristics of large African con-
glomerate financial institutions and analyzes the stability risks that these pose. As the ex-
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ample of Europe shows, a rapid expansion of large, conglomerate financial institutions 
throughout the continent can raise a number of risks for regional stability that are not ade-
quately mitigated by the current practice in regulatory oversight. These risks mainly arise 
from (a) the nontransparency of corporate structures, which creates the potential for the 
unnoticed buildup of group risks and for financial contagion to other banks stemming from 
problems in separate parts of the corporate group; (b) inadequacies in the risk management 
of the vulnerabilities inherent in banking and other operations; and (c) potential exogenous 
shocks from the economic and political environment in which the corporate group oper-
ates. The effectiveness of overall supervision is undermined by the inconsistencies in pru-
dential regulation and the lack of supervisory coordination that create opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage, by weaknesses in accounting infrastructure, and by the absence of a 
crisis management framework, an absence that, in the resolution process, could raise the 
costs of failure.
7.  It is important to expand the regulation and supervision of previously unregulated 
segments of the financial system, such as MFIs and SACCOs, in an incentive-compatible 
order, that is, first licensing and regulation, before expanding any deposit guarantees to these 
segments, which could result in large fiscal contingencies and aggressive risk taking.
8.  For a discussion relating directly to Africa, see Quintyn and Taylor (2007).
9.  In contrast to the caveat emptor approach, the caveat venditor approach (let the seller 
beware) implies that the seller of the financial product is liable for negative consequences 
and has to check the financial capacity of buyers.
10.  For the following, see the discussion in Rutledge (2010).
11.  The World Bank has prepared Good Practices for Financial Consumer Protection, 
which is to be released as a consultative draft for comment by international financial regula-
tors and other stakeholders. See http://go.worldbank.org/CJU6DTRZ20.
12.  Detailed diagnostic work has been done on the status of consumer protection in 
several African countries; see Engels (2011). 
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T
he financial sector challenges described in this book are not new. Africa’s 
informal economy, lack of scale, volatility, and governance problems have 
been discussed extensively. Not new either is a long list of solutions that 
have been tried in one form or another. Many solutions have been discredited in 
one decade only to become the preferred flavor of financial reform in the next. Yet, 
the challenge of limited and costly finance in Africa persists. The importation and 
application of solutions being implemented on other continents today is not taking 
place in Africa at a rate sufficient to make a substantial and sustainable impact on 
the availability of affordable finance.
We argue in this chapter that the problem has not been in the choice of the solu-
tions, but, rather, the direction and quality of the application of these solutions to 
Africa’s local circumstances and the failure to build or scale up homegrown solu-
tions. Or, as one of the leading political economists of our time has put it, “the 
problem of underdevelopment cannot be solved by economists coming up with 
better policies for poor countries to adopt. . . . The problem is that they are not 
adopted” (Robinson 2009, 8). We therefore caution in this chapter that, unless there 
are changes in the politics of financial reform in Africa, even the recent opportuni-
ties of globalization, technology, and regional integration will suffer the same fate 
as others that once offered promise to resolve Africa’s financial constraints.
Modernist Reform Policies: Africa’s Achilles Heel
For far too long, the modernist policy agenda discussed by Honohan and Beck 
(2007) has held sway in far too many African financial systems. Governments, reg-
ulators, and development partners, encouraged by international financial institu-
    227
Chapter 6
All Financial  
Sector Policy Is Local
06--chapter 6--227-258.indd   227 8/18/11   9:52:08 AM228  Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond
tions, have all focused on policies aimed at modernizing the macroeconomic, con-
tractual, and information framework, with the objective of reducing information 
asymmetries, improving legal certainty, and lengthening the planning horizon of 
investors. This agenda has included updating the laws governing financial contracts 
and ensuring their proper and reliable enforcement through judicial reforms to 
make certain that property rights are clearly defined and enforceable, both in gen-
eral terms and as they apply to specific modern financial instruments.
The choice of policy instruments has been appropriate. Modernization repre-
sents the bedrock of any credible vision for national financial sectors, whether in 
Africa or elsewhere. The problem has been the application of the modernist agenda 
according, primarily, to the premise that modernization is equivalent to the best 
practice of the advanced market economies. Although all stakeholders acknowl-
edge that transplanting best practice that is benchmarked against developed econ-
omies is likely to take time, this agenda has been pursued, and the shift in this di-
rection has been accepted as progress. A second problem has centered on the fact 
that these reforms are necessary, but far from sufficient. They constitute the needed 
framework in which private providers of financial services can flourish, thus deep-
ening and broadening financial systems. However, they are not sufficient for sup-
plying the required incentives to realize this framework; moreover, they ignore 
other constraints, including demand-side constraints. As has become clear through 
our three main messages, financial sector policy has to move beyond the modernist 
policy agenda, in addition to adjusting it to the African context.
Unless policy makers and the development partners who work with them delib-
erately redefine progress in financial sector development to suit local African con-
ditions, the modernist agenda will continue to overreach in Africa. We neglect Af-
rica’s real local constraints at our own peril. It is not enough that we continue to 
tweak overambitious structures imported from advanced economies. The evidence 
of this overreach is clear in the design of African stock markets, in capital regula-
tory standards for banks, in collateral requirements and the requirements for open-
ing accounts, and in the exclusive nature of payment systems, which are influenced 
by what is held to be best practice in advanced economies.
Unfortunately, there are numerous examples of real political economy consider-
ations—all well intentioned—that feed the modernist agenda. These include, but 
are not limited to the following:
•		 The global financial architecture: The well-intentioned work of international 
standard-setting bodies and international financial sector assessments such as 
the joint Financial Sector Assessment Program of the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank naturally lend themselves to the modernist view. In-
stead of international standards being judged as benchmarks for certain types 
of economies and financial institutions, they soon evolve into minimum re-
quirements for all economies.
•	 	 International efforts in anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financ-
ing:  The work of the Financial Action Task Force in combating money laun-
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dering and terrorist financing, which includes the listing of noncompliant 
countries,  has  reinforced  the  desire  of  all  countries,  especially  developing 
countries, to comply with a minimum set of standards even if it has been ex-
plained that these standards ought to be tailored to national circumstances.
•		 National regulatory incentive and cost structures: National regulators, often the 
central banks, do not have the incentives or the resources to design and de-
velop regulations that suit national requirements. Regulatory and supervisory 
skills are in short supply and are often remunerated at less than the rates avail-
able in private financial institutions. The cost of adapting regulations to na-
tional circumstances can be high; plus there is the additional risk that one 
may have to explain to ministers of finance and parliaments why the stan-
dards fall short of international best practice.
•		 The globalization of financial institutions, products, and personnel: The number 
of global financial institutions, products, and finance experts has increased 
tremendously. With the full range of destinations demanding their resources 
and skills, these experts will first gravitate to countries where standard inter-
national best practice is already embedded. National regulators who want to 
continue attracting international finance and talent are obliged to hesitate be-
fore considering any tempering of international standards.
As significant as these pressures are, Africa must overcome them if it is to make 
meaningful progress in increasing the availability of affordable finance for markets 
and for growth. All financial sector policy in Africa is local. The failure to pay atten-
tion to the real national context undermines efforts to build the foundations of an 
effective financial system for the long run. In the rest of this chapter, we discuss 
some options for stakeholders involved in financial sector development in Africa. 
We also discuss the politics of financial sector reform and the various challenges 
that countries with diverse profiles face in Africa.
The Activist Reform Agenda Revisited:  
Larger, More Efficient, and Stable Financial Markets
According to Honohan and Beck (2007), the activist perspective on finance is con-
cerned with achieving results in areas where the anonymous private financial sec-
tor is not conspicuously successful: finance for agriculture and the rural economy, 
for microenterprises and small enterprises, and for low-income households, as well 
as long-term finance in general. Inherent difficulties, risks, and costs impede the 
effectiveness of private financial markets in each of these areas. The activist agenda 
sees the need for special interventions to help correct market failures. These well-
intentioned interventions include enacting protective legislation and efforts at es-
tablishing competent and politically independent prudential regulators to guard 
against  the  weak,  reckless,  or  corrupt  management  of  financial  intermediaries   
that could cause the collapse of these intermediaries. The activist agenda also   
sometimes advocates the establishment of a variety of special public, charitable, or 
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otherwise privileged intermediaries who—it is hoped—can help push the financial 
system toward the frontier in these areas.
Because of the disappointing performance of many publicly owned financial 
institutions (all too often subverted through politicized management or through 
corruption), the risk of overreaching in this regard is well known and has caused 
the activist agenda to be viewed with admirable suspicion (that is, noble in its in-
tentions, disastrous in its unintended consequences). This view is not unwar-
ranted, but it is incomplete. African finance needs a new and positive activist re-
form  agenda,  one  that  expands  the  reach  of  financial  markets  and  lengthens 
financial contracts, yet honors the progress that has been made in making finan-
cial systems more stable, one that enables markets rather than replacing them. 
African finance calls for an activist reform program that is true to the realities of 
Africa’s political economy. While this does not exclude learning from the experi-
ence of other regions, such as East Asia (box 6.1), it emphasizes the need to adjust 
these lessons to the African reality.
The short-term election cycle of African politics is at natural odds with the long-
term nature of financial sector development and reform. So is the plethora of po-
The East Asian miracle has often been heralded as proof that unorthodox government inter-
ventions can have a positive impact on growth. Specifically, on top of sound macroeconomic 
policies, many East Asian countries adopted policies that ran counter to the modernist ap-
proach,  including  targeted  and  subsidized  credit,  interest  rate  floors  and  ceilings,  and 
  government-owned banks (World Bank 1993). Most East Asian economies relied on develop-
ment finance institutions (DFIs) as a catalyst for funding investment projects. What, if any, 
lessons does the East Asian success story hold for Africa?
There are several important lessons from East Asia for Africa (World Bank 1993). First, 
macroeconomic stability was key to the success of the East Asian economies. Second, poli-
cies to encourage savings in East Asia, accompanied by efficient financial intermediation, 
were a critical part of the success. Beyond these two important and mostly uncontroversial 
dimensions, however, East Asian governments intervened heavily in markets. The success of 
these interventions relied on complementing market-based competitiveness with goverment- 
induced contests that combined cooperation with competition (World Bank 1993). Rewarding 
industries and firms that used subsidies successfully, often judged by their ability to export, 
while withdrawing subsidies from failing enterprises was a critical part of the approach. So, 
unorthodox instruments were applied, but they were continued only while there was evi-
dence of success, and exports were considered a good indicator and easy to monitor. More 
importantly, these measures were removed when they did not or no longer worked.
Many of the unorthodox policies successfully implemented in East Asia have not worked 
in Africa. Financial repression and industrial policies have had little, if no positive impact on 
financial and economic development in Africa. On the contrary, financial repression has de-
pressed savings and resulted in the misallocation of credit. As discussed above, directed 
credit and government-owned banking have not only resulted in large losses, but have dis-
Box 6.1  Learning from the East Asian Miracle
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litically convenient financial sector policies and programs that are incompatible 
with market-based financial sector development. Ill-designed agricultural subsi-
dies, expensive technological platforms, and poorly governed state-owned financial 
institutions, to name but a few, continue to act to the detriment of sustainable fi-
nancial sector policies.
Even if policies have been designed to leverage technical insights, there has been 
weak implementation. While this weak implementation is partly caused by the 
shortage of qualified personnel in certain key areas, it is largely caused by inade-
torted credit markets and resource allocations, with negative repercussions for economic 
growth and equity.
Why have government interventions worked in East Asia, but not in Africa? Most activist 
government interventions have not taken place accompanied by the necessary macroeco-
nomic stability as a fundament; rather, they have undermined stability through large contin-
gent and actual fiscal losses. Decisions on whether to start or continue specific interven-
tions have not been driven by performance criteria, but mostly by political considerations. A 
more in-depth structural comparison of Africa and East Asia also highlights more deeply un-
derlying factors. First, the lack of scale and limited geographical connectivity reduce the 
possibility  to  apply  such  a  contest  cum  cooperation  approach  in  most  African  countries. 
Second, limited implementation and monitoring capacity has undermined the success of ac-
tivist government interventions. Most importantly, however, ethnic fractionalization in most 
countries of the region explains why the necessary political stability and institutions do not 
exist that are so critical for the success of government interventions (Easterly and Levine 
1997). Ethnic fractionalization can result in uncoordinated rent-seeking activity, exacerbate 
common pool problems, and lead to the suboptimal provision of public goods. Government 
interventions are not informed and driven by economic policy objectives, but by private in-
terest; contest cum cooperation is not feasible in such an environment. The reliance of many 
African economies on natural resources increases the incentives for rent-seeking activity 
and undermines political stability.
East Asia, however, also offers negative lessons for Africa, especially in the wake of the 
East Asian crisis. Accompanying financial deepening with appropriate regulation and super-
vision, as well as disclosure and transparency standards, is critical to ensuring sustainable 
credit growth and growth-conducive financial development and avoiding bubbles ending in 
financial fragility.
In summary, the East Asian experience underlines the potential for a role for government 
beyond  macroeconomic  management  and  institution  building.  It  also  shows  the  requisite 
conditions needed to make government intervention work. It shows the potential for the suc-
cess of activist policies if these are combined with the necessary safeguards, implementa-
tion and monitoring capacity, and, most importantly, governance structures. Many activist 
policies have not worked in the African context. Context-specific and cautious government 
interventions that try to crowd in rather than replace the market might therefore be more 
promising in these cases. Recent achievements in macroeconomic stability and bank restruc-
turing in Africa might serve as a basis for more active government participation, with the ca-
veat that any government intervention should not undermine these same achievements.
Box 6.1  Learning from the East Asian Miracle (continued)
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quate incentives and sanctions and by the pervasive failure to apply appropriate 
laws and regulations and adhere to established systems and procedures (Ablo, Vant-
zos, and Sharif 2004).
Regulators routinely acknowledge complete awareness of the technically ap-
propriate policy decisions that are needed to impact the access to and the cost of 
finance, but are unable to implement them for a host of political economy reasons, 
the most common of which include the centralized nature of policy making, po-
litical patronage, the lack of freedom of expression, and the dominant political 
elites. These political realities manifest themselves differently across the continent, 
but, in all cases, they prevent the implementation of optimal solutions.
Instead, the political realities call for the design and development of second-best 
solutions that go beyond the preoccupation with, for many countries, unachievable 
optimal policies and that take these governance realities into account more system-
atically. A study on governance, political economy, and economic development in 
Zambia (World Bank 2008c) has identified three complementary approaches that 
can help identify a way forward for financial sector reform in Africa generally,   
as follows:
• 	 		First, seek out incremental reform options that are feasible given political econ-
omy realities. To contend with political economy realities, a reform agenda 
must take the interests of stakeholders into account. For instance, stakehold-
ers are generally not interested in achieving some abstract and notionally ef-
ficient systemic optimum. Their interests are in achieving better results in re-
lation  to  concrete  goals  that  matter  for  them.  From  this  perspective,  the 
challenge is to identify specific reforms that can meet both the economic im-
peratives of improving service provision, reducing poverty, and helping move 
economic development forward and the political imperatives of enjoying the 
support of influential stakeholders and not generating widespread opposi-
tion. Generally, such reforms tend to be incremental. In the financial sector, 
efforts to establish collateral registries, especially land registries, provide a 
useful example. This has long been a focus of donor efforts to support reform 
in the hope that these might unlock credit from the banking sector, with lim-
ited success. From a political economy perspective, this failure can be ex-
plained in large part by the great number of political and bureaucratic stake-
holders  that  benefit  from  the  existing  arrangements  for  land  and  by  the 
potentially destabilizing consequences of disrupting a long-standing compro-
mise between customary and statutory arrangements. However, while com-
prehensive reform may be infeasible, the prospects may be better for an ap-
proach that focuses more narrowly on enhancing the transparency of the 
rules of the game by which individuals gain access to land titles. This would 
formalize the current system of informal tribute into a set of rules that explic-
itly support national interests, without challenging directly all the elite inter-
ests associated with the current status quo on land.
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•	 	 Second, draw on the knowledge of economically optimal policies in the design of 
reform. While a necessary step in uncovering politically feasible approaches 
to reform involves loosening the grip of optimal models as a guide for the 
design of reform, the point is not to set these models aside entirely. Their 
normative logic is a useful point of reference, a North Star to help navigate 
change. Yet, as with ocean-going navigation, the journey is long, and the best 
route is not necessarily the most direct one. In the financial sector, for ex-
ample, it is expedient to draw on existing model legislation or policies in the 
interest of cost-effectiveness and aligning the country to international best 
practice. Unfortunately, politically, this approach can sabotage internal do-
mestic buy-in into the spirit of the proposed legislation or policies. Expen-
sive as it may be, first strengthening the analytic capacity behind a national 
policy within and outside government may be more sustainable. Given the 
dynamics of national decision making, having technically strong policy-
making voices inside and outside government that enjoy the respect of na-
tional elites could offer a real opportunity to influence public decisions for 
the better and could help alleviate the ideologically polarized (and not al-
ways well-informed) edge that currently characterizes the discourse between 
development partners and governments.
•	 	 Third, consider the options for strengthening institutions. The tension between 
efficient, pro-poor policy on the one hand and governance realities on the 
other is universal; the quality of a country’s governance institutions helps 
shape the extent to which the result supports or undermines development. 
Economic development is easier to achieve in countries where political and 
bureaucratic institutions are strong. So, to support better policy making and 
implementation, a focus on feasible policies should be complemented by an 
effort to seek out feasible options for institutional strengthening. In financial 
sectors where institutions are weak, the key is dependent upon credible mutual 
commitment among subgroups of the elite to take reciprocal actions. To illus-
trate, consider the high costs of financial services in many African countries. 
Part of the problem is consumer acceptance of these high costs of financial 
services as a given. Yet, currently, the costs are so high that they prohibit greater 
access to finance. Moreover, despite the high costs of financial services, con-
sumers are unwilling to change banks; not without reason, they view the costs 
of closing current bank accounts and opening new bank accounts also as too 
high. A credible commitment to financial literacy and consumer protection is 
therefore necessary to overcome long-standing public skepticism and the as-
sociated resistance to resisting high banking prices. This would require system-
atic engagement in the reform of the consumer-demand side of the market.
This policy reform agenda requires the deliberate involvement and partnership 
of key stakeholders on the continent in establishing and executing the reform 
agenda: politicians, regional bodies, national regulators, international develop-
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ment partners, and beneficiaries of any broadening and deepening of financial 
services, such as civil society and consumer associations. Before discussing the 
role of the various stakeholders, however, we turn our attention to the politics of 
financial sector reform.
The Politics of Financial Sector Reform
Throughout the book, we discuss the policy reforms necessary to expand finance 
and lengthen contracts, while safeguarding financial systems. However, it is not 
obvious that policy makers will make the appropriate reform decisions. The view 
focusing on the public interest has argued that politicians should act to maximize 
public welfare, but the evidence accumulated by economists, historians, and politi-
cal scientists has shown a contrary reality.
1 Politicians primarily maximize private 
interests, whether the interests of their voters or special interest groups. Short-term 
election cycles undermine the focus on long-term financial development objec-
tives; objectives that maintain the dominant position of elites undermine the in-
centives of these elites to undertake reforms that can open up financial systems 
and, thus, dilute the dominant position of the elites.
Path dependence in political structures and the underlying socioeconomic dis-
tribution of resources and power make the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, 
such as financial sector policies, difficult or impossible if the policies threaten to 
reduce the relative dominance of the incumbent elites.
2 The financial sector is crit-
ical for an open, competitive, and contestable economy because it provides the nec-
essary resources for new entrants. Numerous examples in the history of finance 
have supported the idea that open and thriving financial markets are unhealthy for 
closed political and economic systems. An incumbent elite that is not willing to be 
subjected to checks and balances will not be able to agree not to expropriate hold-
ers of financial claims against it and will not allow private financial markets to 
flourish that might provide financing to competing groups.
3
The three overarching messages of this book are closely related to the discus-
sion on the politics of financial sector reform. An important effect of financial 
sector deepening and broadening is the increase in competition and contestability 
throughout the economy (Rajan and Zingales 2003). New players, new markets, 
and new products undermine the rents of the incumbents not only in the finan-
cial sector, but throughout the economy. Having access to transaction and savings 
services allows larger segments of the population to participate in the modern 
market economy. Broader access to credit is conducive to a more competitive real 
economy by fostering new entrants and contestability. The financial infrastructure 
propagated by the modernist agenda, such as collateral and credit registries, re-
duces the rents that incumbents gain from their privileges of wealth, a track 
  record, and connections. Thus, creating competition in the financial system fos-
ters competition throughout the economy and ultimately fosters private sector 
development, which is so crucial for economic growth and poverty reduction; the 
06--chapter 6--227-258.indd   234 8/18/11   9:52:10 AMAll Financial Sector Policy Is Local  235
critical role of competition, however, makes competition more difficult to achieve 
because incumbent elites are not interested in competition if it will potentially 
undermine their position.
Pushing a financial system beyond banks toward new providers and products 
creates the same resistance from incumbent financial institutions, most promi-
nently from banks. Banks typically oppose the introduction of positive informa-
tion in credit registries because the registries harness the competitive effect of in-
formation  sharing.  Attempts  to  extend  credit  registries  and  payment  systems 
beyond banks will also meet with resistance from banks because these registries 
and systems will undermine the dominant market position of banks within African 
financial systems. Similarly, banks might undermine the emergence of powerful 
capital markets because these markets constitute a threat to the privileged position 
of banks in bank-based financial systems.
An essential role—we link now to our third message—will be played by the 
constituency of financial sector reform. The traditional beneficiaries of African fi-
nance—blue chip businesses, multinational enterprises, and wealthy individuals—
will not push for any financial sector reform that expands financial services, be-
cause they also obtain their services from outside the country. Small enterprises 
and previously unbanked segments of the population constitute the main potential 
beneficiaries of reform. In the long term, it is crucial to identify and seek the sup-
port of the constituency for financial sector reform, which consists of the beneficia-
ries of a broadening of financial services. Financial literacy can be important in this 
context, and financial journalists can be major actors in this effort (box 6.2).
The role of technology and globalization
Political economists such as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) have stressed 
the importance of path dependence, whereby dominant elites formulate policies 
that help entrench their socioeconomic and political power. However, they also 
point to exogenous influences that can shift the equilibrium of influence. Most 
prominently and related to the themes of our book, globalization and technology 
can be game changers not only because of the possibilities they represent for deep-
ening and broadening financial systems, but also because they move the playing 
field. They help create growth coalitions that benefit from financial deepening and 
broadening. Globalization and regional integration can lead to new opportunities 
and, thus, new potential winners who will depend on thriving financial institutions 
and markets to exploit the opportunities. Regional integration and globalization 
can also help distance the financial sector from the political sphere at the level of 
financial institutions and at the level of regulators. They are certainly not a pana-
cea, as has been demonstrated by the initial, failed privatization of Uganda Com-
mercial Bank in favor of a foreign investor that was tainted by connected lending 
and looting. Nonetheless, they offer policy space for financial sector reform. Simi-
larly, technology can create new opportunities and winners rather swiftly, which 
may give the process of financial broadening critical momentum.
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Over the short term, activist policies have to take into account the trade-offs we 
discuss above. In the long term, the objective must be the creation of a constituency 
for financial sector reform through growth coalitions. While the short-term ap-
proach would therefore consist in focusing on homegrown reform agendas that are 
already supported by political and economic actors, the medium- to long-term ap-
proach would include institution building supported by broader growth coalitions.
What is the role of regional integration?
Throughout the book, we point to the benefits of regional integration. Regional 
integration can help reduce the scale diseconomies stemming from the fixed costs 
in financial service provision and the fact that most African economies are small. 
The scale economies of regional integration can be reaped at the level of financial 
institutions, such as multinational banks, and at the level of financial markets 
through regional and cross-listing arrangements. However, they can also be reaped 
at the level of financial infrastructure, including payment systems, credit registries, 
and even the regulatory and supervisory framework (World Bank 2007a; Irving 
2005). Delegating certain politically charged tasks to a supranational platform can 
Financial sector issues are rarely treated in the popular media across most of Africa despite 
the fact that they affect most people’s daily lives. At the same time, there is a large knowl-
edge gap on financial sector issues among the population at large. For this reason, the Mak-
ing Finance Work for Africa Partnership, with support from the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  of  Germany  and  in  cooperation  with  DW-Akademie  of 
Deutsche Welle, an international news broadcaster, is now offering training courses on fi-
nancial reporting for radio and television journalists from across the African continent. The 
program seeks to support financial literacy and a better understanding of financial sector 
topics among the African audience. Thus far, 40 television and radio journalists from 24 sta-
tions in 11 African countries have been trained in financial reporting for television, radio, and 
online. During training courses, the journalists have produced over two dozen television and 
radio reports, as well as online multimedia dossiers on topics ranging from financial capabil-
ity to microinsurance, the informal financial sector, and access to finance.
a
The challenge is not so much teaching journalists the technical skills to understand and 
then report on financial sector issues, but sharing information about everyday problems in-
volving financial sector issues. The ability to describe and communicate real stories is criti-
cal so that people can relate financial sector issues such as inflation, high bank fees, or mi-
crocredit  to  their  routine  experiences.  Explaining  financial  sector  issues  in  simple,  easily 
understandable language helps reach the audience. Journalists can thus play a major role 
in expanding awareness about relevant financial sector issues beyond specialists and the 
interested (and often incumbent) elites.
a.  See http://mfw4ghana.wordpress.com/ and http://www.mfw4zambia.blogspot.com/ for the dossiers.
Box 6.2  Financial Journalism
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also mitigate the political tensions and conflicts of interests that naturally occur in 
a sensitive sector such as finance. This becomes most obvious in the area of DFIs, in 
which subregional entities, such as the East African Development Bank, have fared 
much better than national DFIs. The benefits of regional integration arise across 
the three aspects of finance on which we focus in this book. Regional financial in-
tegration helps expand financial systems by enabling the spread of new products 
and delivery channels and by enabling larger segments of the population to trans-
fer money across borders, fostering economic integration. Regional financial inte-
gration can help lengthen contracts by providing a larger scale. Regional integra-
tion is necessary in regulation and supervision in light of the growing role of 
regional banks.
What are the practical steps to regional integration? One size does not fit all. 
Some parts of Africa, most prominently the currency unions of Central Africa and 
West Africa, already have structures in place that can be used to advance integra-
tion. In other parts of Africa, most prominently East Africa and southern Africa, 
there is political impetus for more regional integration. Building on a World Bank 
study (2007a), we argue that much can still be achieved without waiting for politi-
cal integration by focusing on the following:
•		 Private sector–led efforts: In many countries, foreign financial institutions have 
been purchasing local intermediaries. Some now have subsidiaries in several 
countries within individual regions, and a few have networks that spread 
across much of Sub-Saharan Africa. These institutions are establishing them-
selves as regional leaders in integration by the private sector. By addressing 
intercountry barriers, policy makers should support the efforts of these enti-
ties to reduce costs. To reduce costs, institutions need to establish back offices 
to manage customer relationships, lending, balance sheets, and other business 
activities on a regional basis.
•	 	 The technical harmonization of regulations: Policy-level integration is moving 
slowly on the continent, and more can be achieved. In southern Africa, regula-
tors have started discussing harmonized regulations and a financial reporting 
framework for banks and insurance companies. Information-sharing agree-
ments are in place; there is crossborder participation in supervision; and there 
are instances, at least in principle, of single license regimes for financial service 
firms among groups of countries. This process can be accelerated by encour-
aging more frequent formal and informal meetings among regulators. Even in 
the absence of bilateral political agreements, regulators can develop common 
policies and approaches to supervision on a wider range of issues. Reaching 
formal and informal standards on ownership, corporate governance, the treat-
ment of nonperforming loans, and other technical issues will make it easier 
for private sector institutions to cross borders and integrate markets.
•		 The physical standardization of financial infrastructure: While accepting that a 
regionally integrated payments system may be more efficient and more stable 
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than a purely national one, we recognize that, in many regions, such a system 
remains an aspiration. The legal framework as a regional solution alone would 
need to include (1) laws and regulations of broad applicability that address 
issues such as insolvency and the enforcement of contractual relationships; 
(2) laws and regulations that have specific applicability to payments systems 
(such as legislation on electronic signatures, the validation of netting, and 
settlement finality); and (3) the rules, standards, and procedures to which the 
participants in a payments or securities system agree. While working toward 
such a framework, regulators can agree on the standardized physical specifi-
cations of the physical payment systems infrastructure. (In southern Africa, 
many have already done so.) This principle can be applied to other financial 
sector infrastructure, including credit bureaus. At the regional level, the avail-
ability of crossborder credit information would enhance the ability of finan-
cial institutions to compete as they do at the national level, but in a larger 
market; this would encourage competition in both price and innovation and 
would also benefit borrowers and increase access.
•	 	 Upgrade of information and communication technology (ICT): To harvest the 
benefits of technology in the financial sector, it is imperative that efforts be 
undertaken to upgrade and collaborate in the regional development of ICT 
networks. ICT is the backbone and future of affordable financial services. A 
World Bank study of mobile banking services (or m-banking) in southern 
Africa found countries at different levels of ICT development (see Stone et al. 
2009). ICT sectors among the middle-income countries such as South Africa 
and Namibia were comparatively better developed. In other countries, the 
telecommunications sector is still mainly characterized by the monopoly of 
state-owned operators or service providers. Only a few countries in the region 
have an extensive telecommunications backbone that employs a combination 
of microwave radio relays and fiber-optic cables; other countries are at an 
advanced stage in deploying such a backbone. Numerous countries in the re-
gion are landlocked (for example, Malawi and Zambia) and do not have the 
possibility of direct connections to submarine fiber. Such countries will have 
to rely on expensive satellite links for international traffic and may be unable 
to afford or access high-bandwidth links. Few countries have an extensive, 
high-speed backbone and access network to reach out to many users, which 
creates an artificially low demand for bandwidth. Even where an extensive 
broadband-capable backbone and access network exist, such as in Namibia 
and South Africa, the price of high-speed connectivity is substantial and well 
beyond the means of the majority of the population. Thus, most telecommu-
nications providers in the region aim for low volume and high margins rather 
than high volume and low margins in the provision of services.
It is a positive that many of these steps are already under way and that there is 
renewed energy in addressing some of the long-standing barriers to financial inte-
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gration within four regional economic communities, namely, the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Southern Africa Customs 
Union, the Southern African Development Community, and the West African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) (Wakeman-Linn and Wagh 2008). Between 
2000  and  2008,  the  share  of  Sub-Saharan  African  intraregional  exports  (non  -
mining) in the total exports of the region increased from 23.3 to 27.7 percent, con-
tinuing the trend toward greater intraregional trade since the beginning of the 1990s 
(Gurcanlar 2010). At the same time, as we discuss in chapter 2, a growing number of 
private banks headquartered in Sub-Saharan Africa are expanding their networks 
across the region. For example, Ecobank (Togo) has 600 branches in 29 countries in 
the region; Bank of Africa (Mali) has 105 branches in 10 countries; and Kenya Com-
mercial Bank has 194 branches in five countries (though most are in Kenya). South-
South investment by Nigerian and South African banks is playing a large and ex-
panding role. There is also a growing trend toward the regionalization of stock 
exchanges, especially an increase in the cross-listing of major companies on several 
Africa stock exchanges, particularly in Angola, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. The issuance of regional bonds by sovereign-linked 
entities and by large corporations in CEMAC and UEMOA is increasing.
These developments are largely market driven and are occurring in an environ-
ment marked by a complex web of overlapping regional trade arrangements. Many 
countries in Africa belong to several regional trade arrangements with wide varia-
tion in country coverage and scope. These range from existing economic and mon-
etary unions such as CEMAC, UEMOA, and the South African Common Monetary 
Area within the Southern Africa Customs Union to the rapidly emerging common 
market of the East African Community and the complex trade arrangements of the 
Economic Community of Western African States, which includes states that are 
members of UEMOA and states that are not.
The expansion of intraregional trade and the emergence of crossborder banking 
institutions and capital market operations in this complex environment is remark-
able and is testimony to the power of competition among private nonfinancial and 
financial corporations in increasing private and financial integration across the re-
gion, albeit from a low base. However, the small share of intraregional trade in total 
trade, the limited number of private banks with significant crossborder branch 
networks, the weak commitment of member states in the case of some regional 
economic communities as shown by the continued presence of barriers to intra-
regional payments even within the two CFA franc currency zones in Central Africa 
and West Africa, the small number of corporations with cross-listings across stock 
exchanges in the region, and the limited number of countries benefiting from the 
emergence of regional bond markets are signs of the gaps in private banking and 
financial integration resulting from the multiplicity of overlapping regional trade 
arrangements and the wide variation across the legal, regulatory, supervisory, and 
institutional frameworks facing nonfinancial and financial companies. While the 
overlapping nature of regional trade arrangements in Africa is an inescapable po-
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litical reality, the progressive harmonization of the legal, regulatory, supervisory, 
and institutional framework in existing trade arrangements with best international 
standards would reduce the variation in business conditions faced by nonfinancial 
and financial institutions operating across borders in the region and allow these 
institutions to reap the benefits of scale resulting from deeper integration within 
and across trade groups (World Bank 2011b).
The Stakeholders
What is the role of the stakeholders in the financial reform process?
Domestic policy makers
As gatekeepers to Africa’s financial systems, national regulators have a tremendous 
responsibility for the sustainable development of financial sectors in the region. 
They hold the balance between effective modernist and activist financial sector de-
velopment strategies. However, they operate in a broader political setting of do-
mestic policy makers, including ministries of finance.
The findings of this book suggest that national regulators in many countries 
deserve credit for their role in strengthening financial systems across the continent. 
Today, most African banking systems are stable, well capitalized, and liquid. Africa 
has left behind the traumatic experiences with bank fragility of the 1980s and 
1990s, and its resilience during the recent financial crisis is testimony to the effec-
tiveness of the lessons it has learned.
Nonetheless, Africa’s challenges are significant. The challenge for regulators is to 
achieve stability, while pursuing financial deepening and inclusion. This book’s 
findings suggest that regulators should pursue a holistic approach to financial sec-
tor reform that begins with a change in perceptions about financial institutions, 
products, and services in Africa and, subsequently, a change in policies, legislation, 
regulations, and supervisory practices. In table 6.1, we recap our three main mes-
sages and their implications for domestic policy makers across the three themes of 
the book: expanding access, lengthening contracts, and safeguarding finance.
Table 6.1  Innovation Can Come from Unexpected Quarters
 Policy Expanding access Lengthening contracts Safeguarding finance
Fostering  
competition
1.    Innovation can come 
from an unexpected 
quarter
4.    The need for new pro-
viders and products




2.    Services matter, but not 
who provides them
5.    Look beyond traditional 
providers





3.    Financial literacy 6.    Business develop- 
ment, including skill 
  development
9.    Consumer protection
Source: Author compilation.
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Innovation can come from unexpected quarters: Licensing legislation ought to 
recognize that financial innovations are no longer the exclusive preserve of banks 
and  financial  institutions.  Telecommunications  companies,  grocery  stores,  bus 
companies, and other actors that play a significant role in the economic life of 
  Africa have the potential and ought to be encouraged to provide formal and semi-
formal financial services without having to convert to a formal bank or financial 
institution as long as the resources put at risk do not represent public savings. The 
definitions of financial services in current bank-centric legislation need to be re-
vised to accommodate the transformational impact that technology has had on the 
ability of nonbank actors to provide financial services. Definitions are important 
and have significant cost implications for service providers. For example, in a num-
ber of African countries, licensing requirements still carry physical inspection re-
quirements that are accompanied by costly compliance costs for potential service 
providers.
Services matter, not who provides them: Connected to the point above, national 
regulators should focus on the specific financial services offered or proposed, not 
the nature of the institution providing or aiming to provide the services. This view 
encourages the unbundling of financial services across banks and nonbank actors. 
As long as the risk of consumer abuse is adequately catered for, different actors 
should be encouraged or at least not discouraged from providing narrowly defined 
services such as the deposit collection services offered by sole proprietors for infor-
mal retailers, the payment services and foreign exchange services of domestic and 
international bus companies, the mobile financial services of telecommunications 
companies, the credit and crop insurance services of agricultural input supply trad-
ers, and the narrow regional or community-based banking services of cooperative 
associations.
Financial literacy: Broadbased financial literacy programs for children at a young 
age should be endorsed by national regulators in Africa. Ideally, such programs 
should be provided by the private sector and agencies other than regulators. The 
reality of the resource limitations in Africa suggests that national regulators will 
need to take the first step in developing these programs. Specific roles for regulators 
include (1) facilitating regular diagnostic reviews of national financial literacy stan-
dards to establish regular benchmarks for financial literacy and consumer behavior 
and (2) working with industry to develop financial consumer awareness campaigns. 
Specific activities might include the design of graphic tables with comparative in-
formation on the full pricing of financial products, community and village road 
shows to explain major financial concepts, training on the delivery of financial ed-
ucation by retail officers, financial literacy messages in m-banking systems, cam-
paigns on new pension systems, basic brochures on financial services, the inclusion 
of financial literacy in school curricula, campaigns on the management of debt and 
the avoidance of overindebtedness, and campaigns on the economics and the ben-
efits of the insurance market. Only with a much higher level of financial awareness 
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and improved financial behavior will consumers be able to make informed finan-
cial decisions in the context of their specific economic and social circumstances.
The need for new providers and products: Encouraging new products and services 
is an art, not a science. It involves regulators’ signaling to market participants that 
the market is open to product innovations without opening the gates to fraudulent 
products and Ponzi schemes that, after their collapse, leave the public with less 
confidence in financial services. On the other hand, the government development 
of specific new institutions and products should (1) be limited to wholesale facili-
ties, (2) enjoy strong private sector buy-in and participation, and (3) be subject to 
clear sunset clauses and, in the interim, be managed using sound corporate gover-
nance structures. State financial institutions, credit guarantee schemes, and mort-
gage refinancing facilities have a place in the financial system if they meet these 
three basic criteria.
Look beyond traditional providers: As long as Africa is dominated by banks, fi-
nance will remain short term, expensive, and limited in reach. Africa needs to be-
come a laboratory for innovation that provides solutions to the unique problems 
of the continent in financial sector development, especially with regard to long-
term finance. There are many options, including adopting innovative products and 
solutions in m-banking, enhancing the availability of long-term savings products 
for recipients of remittances (for example, encouraging investment in housing or 
insurance products), facilitating the development of housing finance (for instance, 
providing liquidity facilities such as the one currently being established in Tanza-
nia), significantly deepening the exchange of credit information to encompass sup-
plier credit and thereby enhance the access to formal finance markets, or creating 
partnerships in such areas as the finance of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and 
local capital market development. Regulators need to signal to the market their ap-
petite for experimentation and then act upon it.
Business development, including the development of entrepreneurial skills: Firms 
need to be enabled to identify investment opportunities, assess their own financing 
needs, and present attractive business proposals to potential financiers. Improving 
financial capability and the bankability of firms will strengthen the knowledge, un-
derstanding, skills, attitudes, and, especially, the behavior requisite to making sound 
financial decisions and being more attractive as potential borrowers.
Mitigate the risks of competition: Competition is vital to efficiency in the provi-
sion of financial services and to expansion in the depth of financial markets. The 
development and outreach of financial service provision depend on important is-
sues in public policy that regulators must address not only by licensing more banks, 
but also by more effectively monitoring the behavior of   current market partici-
pants and making unwarranted anticompetitive behavior public. Allowing more 
competition also involves risks, however, because national regulators have to adjust 
constantly to changing market structures, new products, and new providers. The 
idea is to allow more competition by adopting a more flexible regulatory frame-
work, which allows risk-based supervision, but also more immediate intervention 
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where necessary. This pressure on supervisors can be increased if the competition 
of international players is allowed.
Supervise according to risk, not name: In pursuit of the modernist agenda, there 
are many regulatory structures in Africa that are far more unwieldy than the risk 
they are established to mitigate. Today, for example, nonbank supervision depart-
ments supervise microfinance sectors that are miniscule components of the finan-
cial sector, and bank inspectors still inspect the physical premises of rural branches 
to assess the risk of physical theft although commercial insurance can cover most 
of these physical risks, many of the risks have migrated to technological risks, or the 
risks should be the primary responsibility of service providers. The increasing 
complexity of financial institutions and instruments requires greater emphasis on 
risk-based supervision methods that allocate only limited supervisory resources to 
assessing the magnitude of risks. National regulators should be encouraged peri-
odically to review their staffing requirements, update their procedures for assessing 
industry risks, and determine appropriate legislative, regulatory, and supervisory 
responses.
Consumer protection: As African markets become more sophisticated, national 
regulators need to strengthen the consumer protection framework in their coun-
tries. For many, this should start with a diagnostic review of consumer protection 
and financial literacy in each country and be followed by the drafting of appropri-
ate regulations and standards to address weaknesses in the current framework that 
are collectively agreed by the government, regulators, and the financial sector. At a 
minimum, the regulations are likely to include (1) prohibiting unfair credit and 
credit-marketing practices and (2) promoting responsible credit granting and use 
and, for this purpose, prohibiting reckless credit granting. Operationally, two spe-
cific elements of an effective consumer protection regime are (1) the identification 
of an agency or department to implement education campaigns, conduct research, 
develop policies, investigate complaints, and ensure compliance with the law and 
(2) the establishment of an effective mechanism for receiving and resolving consumer 
complaints. An effective system for handling, analyzing, monitoring, and resolving 
consumer complaints and disputes will have a strong impact on financial institu-
tion behavior. Potential areas of work would include delineating the rules for fi-
nancial service providers in handling consumer complaints; developing a central-
ized  system  to  register,  track,  and  analyze  data  on  complaints  and  complaint 
resolution; and advising on the creation of an out-of-court mechanism to resolve 
consumer disputes. In most African countries, there are currently no established 
procedures for handling consumer complaints within financial institutions and no 
out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms.
International development partners
If policy makers are to implement the reforms approach discussed above properly, 
then development partners must adopt an equally different approach in the way 
they provide technical assistance for financial sector reforms in Africa.
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•		 The selectivity of the focus on policy reform: First, there must be greater selec-
tivity and more careful application of best practice models across heteroge-
neous African countries. While African financial sector policies share a com-
mon thread and common pillars, the interpretation and application may 
differ according to whether a country is fragile, landlocked, resource rich, 
governance constrained, or middle income (Addison et al. 2005; Maimbo 
2007). Every financial sector strategy should be designed and developed so as 
to identify the specific limitations within the particular context and seek ways 
of addressing them that are tuned to local circumstances. At the same time, 
financial sector policy tools do not need to be reinvented for each country,   
but need to be adapted and sequenced correctly. The specific needs of African 
financial sectors require experimentation and innovation to generate African 
solutions. International best practice has often failed to have an impact in 
Africa. To this end, development partners need to leverage the diversity of 
country characteristics to harvest diverse solutions tested in different markets 
and then scale up in countries with similar characteristics.
•		 Policy-based assistance: Development partners should pursue more policy-
based assistance. This change in direction is necessary to achieve the goal of 
integrated financial sector reform. The need for deeper, comprehensive finan-
cial sector policy reform has increased as countries have completed first- 
generation reform. Many of the challenges African financial systems face 
today are structural in nature, and this has implications for broad policy re-
form. In deepening the financial sector reform agenda, many countries have 
been confronted with a range of issues relating to governance (for example, 
the cross-ownership of banks and pension funds and the exposure to loss-
making state-owned enterprises). They have also been confronted by un-
funded (implicit) contingent liabilities, particularly in pensions, as well as 
unaddressed policy issues relating to transparency in reporting and disclo-
sure and the accountability standards of regulators. Policy-based lending op-
erations are central to embedding financial sector reform within broader 
structural reform in the economy and ensuring that the reforms are aligned 
with national development strategy. It is important to highlight that many 
types of budget-support loans to governments may not be the best vehicle for 
supporting financial sector reform. Although the focus of this instrument has 
shifted in recent years toward a growth agenda (as opposed to social sector 
and public sector reforms), the financial sector remains a modest component 
of the effort: often only limited attention is paid to the financial sector in 
these multisectoral operations. Given the long-term and politically conten-
tious nature of financial sector reform and in the absence of complementary 
support through other vehicles, financial sector reform may not receive the 
focus, the sustained commitment, and the close supervision needed for suc-
cess. Policy-based operations are also well aligned with the Paris Declaration 
principles of (1) reinforcing the ownership of the policy agenda, (2) strength-
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ening harmonization across development partners, (3) customizing programs 
to suit the circumstances of countries, and (4) selecting only critical actions 
for government intervention, while encouraging private sector solutions. 
4
•		   Investing in capacity development and financial sector deepening: Policy-based 
assistance must not supersede traditional technical assistance activities, how-
ever. Development partners should continue to invest in the capacity develop-
ment of country authorities and regulators to enable them to implement pol-
icy, safeguard financial sector growth, and create an enabling environment 
that motivates innovation and ensures stability. Yet, to achieve the ambitions 
espoused in this book, the technical assistance needs to be broadened to sup-
port the entry of new players and expand outreach by requiring the increased 
use of outreach facilitation instruments, such as partial credit facilities to 
  encourage banks to engage with small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or li-
quidity facilities to provide banks with longer-term funding to deepen the 
market for mortgage finance. Promoting innovation will require greater use of 
instruments that work directly with the private sector to incentivize and sup-
port innovation (participation in challenge funds, the funding of product de-
velopment, and so forth). The targeted scale-up of transaction services will 
require additional investments in market infrastructure such as regional pay-
ment systems, collateral registries, and credit reference infrastructure.
An example of an area in which development partners have the resources and 
scale to make a significant impact is regional integration. However, given the wide 
variations  in  regional  economic  communities,  development  partners  need  to 
adopt a differentiated approach to regionalization. In existing economic and mon-
etary zones, development partners can focus on strengthening regional institu-
tions, developing crossborder banking, and integrating market infrastructure. In 
economic communities with a strong political commitment, development part-
ners can support a greater spectrum of activities, including legal and regulatory 
harmonization,  mutual  supervisory  recognition,  infrastructure  integration,  re-
gional securities markets, regional financing facilities for priority sectors, and re-
gional institutional capacity strengthening for policy formulation and coordina-
tion. In communities with weaker political commitment, development partners 
can initially focus on a narrower range of activities, such as regional payment sys-
tems, cross-listing, and cooperation on capital markets, and progressively expand 
toward a broader financial integration agenda in line with the deepening of politi-
cal commitment to integration.
Redefine the Role of Government with the Necessary  
Safeguards
Guided by the generally agreed principle that government intervention should 
support rather than distort the incentives for the private sector provision of finan-
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cial services, a formal redefinition of the role of government in the financial sector 
in each country is proposed. This approach, labeled market-friendly activism, re-
stricts financial service provision by government-owned institutions to a few, se-
lected, and time-bound interventions in areas in which gaps and market failures 
remain, while policy actions are taken to fill the gaps and remove the market fail-
ures, thus opening the market to private initiatives.
5 This approach recognizes that, 
in some countries, there might be room for well-designed, restricted interventions, 
in  collaboration  with  the  private  sector,  to  foster  financial  development  and 
broaden access to financial services.
It is important to stress that the space for market-friendly activism varies across 
countries (Dafe 2011). In general, such policies can be more successful in countries 
with conditions favorable to minimizing the governance trap. This is typically the 
case in countries with checks and balances, including beyond the political sphere.   
A strong private sector can be such a check, as can a thriving media sector that 
critically analyzes government decisions and programs. More diverse countries 
have the potential to provide more checks and balances, although they are often 
also the backdrop for ethnic politics that can easily lead to the abuse of activist 
policies.
One option often discussed is to move the responsibility for activist policies   
and market interventions away from the political sphere to (1) donors, (2) supra-
national regional institutions, or (3) nonprofit organizations. All three options 
offer advantages in terms of reducing the risk of corruption and graft; all three op-
tions, however, also raise concerns among national taxpayers about transparency 
and   accountability.
In summary, in the short to medium term, the conditions in many African 
countries, especially countries with severe governance challenges, may be such that 
the responsibility for adopting activist policies and programs will be rather outside 
the political sphere or, at a minimum, in the political sphere but with strong moni-
toring and oversight by a third party that does not report to the political sphere. In 
the long term, however, it is preferable that the necessary country-level checks and 
balances be developed.
Many governments are turning to the private sector to design, build, finance, 
and operate infrastructure facilities hitherto provided by the public sector. PPPs 
offer policy makers an opportunity to improve the delivery of services and the 
management of facilities. There is no reason why the same principles cannot be ap-
plied more intensively to state-owned financial institutions. Indeed, in many coun-
tries, this is already taking place, albeit often narrowly centered on the privatization 
option discussed above.
A holistic review and restructuring of current government institutions and pro-
grams could yield substantial economies of scale and reduce the current contami-
nation of private sector–led efforts to increase the access to financial services. Rather 
than establish a new program each time the government prioritizes a particular   
sector, region, or activity, the government should focus on using a single agency or 
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institution to prepare and draft the eligibility criteria for the program and then 
tender the retail implementation of the program to interested institutions. All 
bank and nonbank financial institutions would be eligible to bid for the tender. By 
leveling the retail financial sector landscape in this manner, the government would 
increase pricing and product transparency in the microfinance sector and increase 
the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of commercially sustainable 
programs.
There are several well-defined types of PPP and, increasingly, many permu-
tations and combinations. One of the strengths of PPPs is their flexibility in ad-
dressing specific situations. Types of PPPs that are relevant for the financial sector 
include PPPs for service contracts, management contracts, leasing, and joint ven-
tures and partnerships. We discuss several options in box 6.3.
One Size Does Not Fit All
As we emphasize throughout the book, one size does not fit all. While there are 
commonalities across Africa, as we document in chapter 2, and similar challenges 
in expanding access, lengthening contracts, and safeguarding finance, there are also 
significant differences. We cannot design a financial sector strategy for each of the 
53 countries of the continent, but we can point to commonalities across groups of 
countries. The groups are not geographical; rather, we have composed the groups 
based on the prominence of characteristics of African finance we have identified as 
challenges. These are size, informality, volatility, and governance, plus any special 
circumstances. Table 6.2 summarizes the challenges and priorities facing some of 
these countries.
Low-income countries versus middle-income countries
On average, the financial systems of low-income countries are smaller and less well 
developed than those of middle-income countries, and the financial reform priori-
ties of the two sets of countries therefore vary. The priorities of countries at low 
levels of financial development will naturally tend to be included in the Finance for 
Markets agenda rather than the Finance for Growth agenda, that is, the priorities 
will be focused on basic short-term financial services.
6 In addition, low-income 
countries often also face severe capacity gaps, which may prevent the buildup of 
regulatory  institutions  and  other  elements  of  financial  infrastructure.  Middle- 
income countries, meanwhile, can focus more attention on the Finance for Growth 
agenda, that is, on long-term financial transactions. Given the higher-income level 
of  middle-income  countries,  scale  diseconomies  can  be  more  easily  overcome. 
Many middle-income countries can therefore expand their financial systems more 
easily beyond the banking sector toward capital markets and contractual savings 
institutions. Middle-income countries also have more room to address demand-
side constraints, including larger financial literacy campaigns and the necessary in-
stitutional structures for consumer protection. Low-income countries should focus 
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While many African countries have privatized commercial banks, others have recapitalized 
them.  In  addition,  many  countries  still  maintain  DFIs,  though,  for  every  active  one,  there 
seems to be one that is moribund.
In line with a new role of government, that is, away from a market-replacing activity to a 
market-enhancing activity, what are the options for state financial institutions? The following 
are some of the possibilities and the related opportunities and challenges.
Rationalization
First of all, governments need to identify and separate subsidies aimed at solving market fail-
ures from the actual financing flowing through financial institutions. Often, subsidies aimed 
at increasing the use of credit do not address any of the underlying causes of the problems 
in access. In most countries, governments have provided loans to small producers either 
through public banks or by using directed credit programs at subsidized rates, while failing 
to address other business constraints.
Management contracts
Under a management contract, a private firm assumes the overall responsibility for the op-
eration and maintenance of a service delivery system and retains the freedom to make day-
to-day management decisions. In many cases, this involves managing the employees of the 
state  financial  institution  who  are  employed  in  the  service  delivery  system.  Management 
contracts generally do not require the implementation of significant institutional changes. 
Rather, the existing public enterprise generally remains in place, and the personnel of the 
management contractor assume the line management responsibilities. Whereas the goal of 
service contracts is to reduce the operating costs of an organization, the goal of manage-
ment contracts is typically to improve the internal management and operations of an organi-
zation. Because this change requires time to implement and take effect, the typical duration 
of a management contract is three to five years.
In Africa, management contracts have typically been used as precursors to privatization. 
Yet, there is no reason why they cannot be used as an ongoing renewable arrangement until 
the institution is able to hire and retain its own qualified management staff. In some coun-
tries, preprivatization management contracts have worked so well that the privatization op-
tion has been delayed.
In Tanzania, after the performance of the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) began to ex-
ceed expectations under management contractors, the privatization of the NMB lost momen-
tum and became more difficult. As the profits of the NMB rose, so did the voices expressing 
opposition to the privatization. The government was unable to maintain support for the original 
plan of privatization that called for the sale of 70 percent of NMB shares to a strategic inves-
tor. At the height of the heated political debate, the board of directors of the NMB, who had 
been appointed by the president of Tanzania, publicly expressed their opposition to the priva-
tization. The president responded by replacing the entire board. The result of these political 
challenges,  apart  from  the  delays  in  the  privatization  by  one  and  a  half  years,  was  an 
amended privatization strategy, calling for the sale of only 49 percent of NMB shares to a 
strategic investor. Another 21 percent was to be sold to Tanzanian citizens at a later date.
Box 6.3  What to Do with State Financial Institutions?
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As a consequence of the delays in the privatization, the contract for the NMB manage-
ment contractors was extended several times. The original contract was due to end in April 
2001. It was extended to April 2002, April 2003, April 2004, April 2005, and, finally, to Decem-
ber 2005, or until privatization had taken place, whichever came first. Privatization finally 
took place in September 2005, and the contract was closed.
Privatization
There are various ways to privatize a state financial institution, as follows: (1) sale to a sin-
gle strategic investor; (2) sale, in part or in whole, to an employee stock ownership plan; and 
(3) sale of shares to the public through an initial public offering. Each option carries advan-
tages and risks. Strategic investors can inject capital and skills but may be obliged to deal 
with a public perception that the government has “sold out,” especially if the strategic in-
vestor is a foreign-owned entity. Employee schemes typically work best as part of an overall 
privatization  scheme,  lest  the  new  entity  be  left  with  insufficient  capital.  Public  offerings 
have the additional advantage of supporting the development of local capital markets, but 
empirical evidence suggests that governments typically underprice the shares in an effort to 
entice public participation in the market (Caprio et al. 2004).
The lessons of successful privatization efforts suggest the importance of (1) conducting 
a comprehensive market survey of viable sale options through due diligence of the investor’s 
market reputation (not merely the investor’s capital strength), as well as understanding the 
investor’s future intentions in regard to strengthening the capital and management of the 
bank; (2) involving international bank managers and professional specialists in advising the 
government on the transaction; (3) dealing swiftly and decisively with nonperforming loans 
and reversing the weak repayment ethic among borrowers at state banks; and (4) under-
taking the privatization process within a strong legal and regulatory framework and supported 
by an independent central bank.
On the road to privatizing banks, it is necessary to enforce the regulations on all banks, 
to reveal the weaknesses of the state bank, publish audits, and avoid rapid privatization and 
excessive delays (Caprio et al. 2004). In the case of Uganda Commercial Bank, the privatiza-
tion process took too long, and the bank was sold to a buyer without capital, banking repu-
tation, or expertise. The buyer secretly assigned shares to another bank, thereby weakening 
the sector. This delay impeded competition and efficiency in the credit market and led to a 
loss of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) during restructuring in 1998. On the politi-
cal front, the privatization problem of Uganda Commercial Bank was aggravated by the re-
luctance of politicians to undertake reform because of the fear that they would lose their 
political influence, as well as their benefits that were associated with directed credit.
Corporatization
Corporatization refers to the transformation of state assets or agencies into state-owned 
corporations so as to introduce corporate management techniques into the administration of 
these  assets  or  agencies.  The  corporatization  process  involves  the  sale  or  attribution  of 
shares to corporate entities by listing the shares of the state-owned corporation as publicly 
Box 6.3  What to Do with State Financial Institutions? (continued)
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traded stocks on stock exchanges. A common model involves corporatizing a state institu-
tion so that it is operated as an autonomous joint-stock company, while the state remains 
majority stockholder and the institution is run by state entities that are separate from the 
central government administration (Stoyan and Zhang 2002).
A revealing experience is the case of the NMB in Tanzania, which was initially offered for 
sale to the private sector in 1997 (see above). The government, with the support of the World 
Bank, sought external managers to lead a restructuring that was intended to make the NMB 
more attractive to investors. Some NMB products were revamped, which generated an im-
provement in performance standards, product profitability, and public confidence. There was 
a concern that the weak credit culture could damage NMB’s loan performance, but new loan 
products were researched, designed, tested, and rolled out. The NMB progressed from a 
loss-making institution to a profit-making one.
Ownership policy
As the rationalization of existing institutions and programs is taking place, the authorities 
may wish to examine proposals for state-owned banks in the future within the framework of 
a formal ownership policy. A case in point is Malawi. The recently proposed Malawi Devel-
opment Fund, the Financial Inclusion in Malawi Project, and the National Guarantee Scheme, 
as well as other, future institutions and programs need to be evaluated against an ownership 
policy  that  maintains  the  spirit  of  divesting  government  of  retail  activities.  Such  a  policy 
should define the government’s overall ownership objectives and the government’s role in 
governance and clarify how the objectives and the role should be realized. The ownership 
policy should be published and should not be subject to frequent change. Specifically, it is 
important that the government undertake a holistic review of the sector and, for each insti-
tution and program, ask the following questions:
•	 	 Mandates: Are the policy mandates and objectives clear? These must derive from an 
adequate assessment of needs. Are perceived market gaps, missing markets, and so 
on well understood?
•	 	 Options: Once the gaps have become well understood, alternative means of meeting 
the needs should be considered. Is a government institution or program the most cost-
efficient means? Can the private sector be leveraged as an alternative means of distri-
bution instead? An assessment of the efficiency of a government institution or program 
in this regard must explicitly assess the costs inherent in building and maintaining an 
adequate governance framework in terms of human resources, investment in systems, 
and maintenance costs.
•	 	 Financing: How are the policy objectives (subsidies) to be funded? Subsidies must be 
made explicit. Allowing funding through cross-subsidies (from the profits on nonpolicy 
activities) invites mission creep and private financial sector displacement.
Corporate governance
The corporate governance structure for the institution or program must foster complemen-
tary private sector support for the institution or program and minimize the risk of political 
Box 6.3  What to Do with State Financial Institutions? (continued)
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on achieving economies of scale so as to expand payment services and basic credit 
among the population and capacity building among supervisory authorities.
While the Finance for All agenda is important for low- and middle-income 
countries, the priorities are different in the two sets of countries. In low-income 
countries, the priority will be on basic transaction services, while it will be on 
more advanced savings and credit services in middle-income countries. Middle-
income countries are also able to pay more attention to specialized areas of fi-
nance, such as housing finance and infrastructure finance.
The policy priorities therefore also vary between low- and middle-income 
countries. Low-income countries focus on basic infrastructure elements, such as 
payment systems, credit registries, and the regulatory and supervisory framework, 
while  middle-income  countries  can  more  easily  expand  the  regulatory  realm   
toward other segments of the financial system and toward consumer protection 
institutions. Donors also have a different role in low- and middle-income coun-
tries: they take a much more prominent role in the former and adopt more of an 
  interference. A key aspect of this process is ensuring that the management and board of 
  directors are not only competent, but also able to exercise autonomy in the management of 
the institution or program. This will require key matters to be addressed, as follows:
•	 	 What is the composition of the board, and how is the board nominated and selected? 
Patronage or professionals?
•	 	 How  is  the  chief  executive  officer  appointed  and  compensated?  Appointment  by 
shareholders—common among DFIs—affects the quality of the board. The board must 
be empowered to hire and fire the chief executive officer.
•	 	 How well are commercial practices embedded in the governance structure in terms, 
for example, of internal control, risk management, internal and external audit, and so 
on? The board must be held accountable for these issues under the legal framework 
and in practice.
•	 	 Do risk management systems simulate the impact of alternative policy programs and 
the pricing of the same—the level of the subsidies—on the value of the capital so as to 
enable the provision of quantitative backing to management and the board in making 
the trade-offs between policy objectives and commercial principles and objectives?
•	 	 Is an independent, professional external audit planned? The state auditing agency is 
no substitute.
•	 	 Is  there  a  performance  measurement  procedure?  Financial  and  commercial  perfor-
mance  measures  and  policy  performance  measures  should  be  defined  in  concrete 
terms. Objective methods for the measurement and evaluation of performance should 
be established and embedded in the compensation system.
Source: Maimbo and Saranga (2009).
Box 6.3  What to Do with State Financial Institutions? (continued)
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Table 6.2    Country Characteristics and the Primary Areas for Financial Sector 
Policies
Country type Primary challenge Focus areas for financial sector policies
Income low income: provide  






middle income: deepen 
















large: expand the  
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Resource rich turn natural wealth into 
other forms of wealth
•    strengthen the provision of longer-term finance, for 





















advisory and analyst role in the latter. Low-income countries often need donor 
support to implement financial sector strategies and to strengthen retail financial 
institutions, such as decentralized microfinance institutions, that show potential 
in the effort to increase outreach and push out the access frontier. Donor support 
is often provided to middle-income countries in more specialized technical areas. 
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Basic   capacity building is critical for low-income countries, while upgrading skills 
and ongoing training is more the challenge in middle-income countries.
Small versus large countries
Policy makers in small economies (for example, Seychelles) face different opportu-
nities and challenges relative to policy makers in large economies.
7 In small, low-
income countries, the challenges discussed above are exacerbated. The solutions are 
more costly, and the necessary scale is less likely to be reached. Small financial sys-
tems are more concentrated and therefore less competitive. Smaller countries there-
fore stand to gain more from regional integration in terms of higher-quality and 
lower-cost financial services. Participating in a regional exchange and a joint re-
gional regulatory framework can help lower costs and extend the access to financial 
services. These countries may lose some independence in the integration process, 
but they will gain greater access to a broader range of financial services. Similarly, 
landlocked countries stand to benefit more from regional integration, including 
integration beyond financial integration, than countries with direct access to the 
ports and thus better transportation options.
Smaller countries also stand to gain more from globalization because of the entry 
of foreign banks. Multinational banks can rely on shared technology and back-office 
facilities with parent banks and subsidiaries in neighboring countries. Costs thus 
become lower. However, such gains have often not been exploited fully because of 
regulatory constraints and differences across countries. Because the market is too 
small for domestic financial service providers, small countries have to rely more 
heavily on outside financial service providers, such as foreign insurance companies 
and international equity funds. Capital account liberalization is more important 
for small countries needing to attract funding, which puts a higher premium on 
the macroeconomic safeguards necessary to deal with the ensuing volatility.
On the other hand, larger countries with a critical mass can be more ambitious 
in creating diverse financial systems beyond banking, especially through contrac-
tual savings institutions and capital markets. Larger countries are more likely to 
have sufficient scale for the private funding of infrastructure and to be able to sup-
ply the tools necessary for banks and markets.
Larger countries can offer policy makers more room for activist policies because 
there are likely to be better checks and balances in these countries. There is also 
more room for affirmative regulatory actions to push banks toward the frontier 
without running the risk that the banks will exit the market. Policy makers in large 
markets can thus be more ambitious, and they have a larger permissible margin of 
error. As Honohan and Beck (2007) point out, there is likewise more room for an 
active financial sector dialogue with a larger number of stakeholders and partici-
pants and, often, in a more vibrant media landscape.
Sparsely populated countries
Population density is an important predictor of financial development, as we dis-
cuss in chapter 2. If a large share of a country’s population lives in rural areas or if 
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the population is widely dispersed, this exacerbates the challenges of scale. As 
Honohan and Beck (2007) indicate, it is important to look beyond population 
density to the population distribution within a country: is it concentrated in a 
small area, leaving large parts of the country uninhabited, such as in Algeria or 
Chad, or is it distributed in smaller population centers across the country, as in 
Tanzania? One must also look at the income distribution in population centers 
because less-populated areas may have more resources and, accordingly, the neces-
sary scale to justify financial service provision.
A widely distributed population is especially challenging for the Finance for All 
agenda because outreach becomes more costly in this case. Innovative solutions are 
especially important, some of which we discuss in chapter 3. Mobile bank branches, 
agency agreements, and technological solutions can help overcome the challenges 
of scale. Viewing beyond the banking system to microfinance institutions and 
semiformal institutions such as savings and credit cooperatives may be important.
For donors, this is challenging, too. An emphasis on microfinance in rural areas, 
rather than full-fledged banks, may be useful. Though this may be tempting in such 
countries, one must not concentrate solely on the capital city area.
The resource rich
The economic structure of many African countries is dominated by commodities, 
such as aluminum (Mozambique), copper (Zambia), or oil (Algeria and Equatorial 
Guinea). This dependence on commodity exports might make these countries 
achieve significantly higher GDP per capita than other countries in the region, but 
also subjects them to a much larger fluctuation in income levels. Consistent with 
the Dutch Disease hypothesis, many of these countries also suffer from high real 
and volatile exchange rates that crowd out noncommodity sectors and industries. 
Recent cross-country comparisons have shown that economies relying on natural 
resources benefit as much from financial development in terms of pro-poor growth 
as other economies and that manufacturing industries more reliant on external 
funding benefit from financial deepening in resource-based economies more than 
do corresponding industries in other economies (Beck 2011). This implies that fi-
nancial sector policies are as important for commodity-exporting countries as they 
are for other countries. Yet, cross-country comparisons have also shown that com-
modity exporters have smaller financial systems than predicted by the level of GDP 
per capita and macroeconomic stability and that banks are more liquid, more well 
capitalized, and more profitable, but give fewer loans to firms. There is thus a pre-
mium on financial sector reform in economies dependent on natural resources;   
the challenge will be to transform natural wealth into other forms of wealth; the 
domestic financial system will have a critical role.
Because of the long-term nature of natural resource extraction, a focus on long-
term intermediation capacity is important. Sovereign wealth funds can play a major 
part, though appropriate governance structures are crucial, including the establish-
ment of limits on the contribution of these funds to public deficits so as to ensure 
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long-term sustainability and intergenerational equity. Similarly, other long-term 
instruments, such as pension funds and insurance companies, can provide key in-
puts. However, there is a premium on fostering access to credit by SMEs. While 
some of the commodity exporters have high GDP per capita, income distribution 
is often highly skewed, and access to financial services is often restricted to a small 
segment of the population.
Among policy priorities, governance tops the agenda because of the Dutch Dis-
ease  effect  on  the  governance  agenda  that  has  been  observed  in  commodity- 
exporting countries throughout the world. Large amounts of money invite graft 
and corruption; the proper handling of these resources for the benefit of the popu-
lation at large is therefore decisive. Another important priority is macromanage-
ment, that is, carefully managing the capital inflows related to commodity exports 
and avoiding an overvaluation of the exchange rate. Donors can have a pivotal role 
in financial sector policy by advising on macropolicy and helping in the design of 
governance structures, but also by pushing intensely for financial sector reform. 
Ultimately, commodity-exporting countries could be the drivers of regional finan-
cial integration.
Countries affected by conflict
Financial transactions are being undertaken even in the presence of violent con-
flict and the absence of state authority, which is the case in Somalia. Finance for 
Markets exists even under the most adverse circumstances; however, it is costly, 
inefficient, and often excludes large parts of the population. Wherever formal fi-
nancial systems break down, informal networks expand and take over. Where na-
tional currency loses its value completely, foreign exchange takes over. Formal fi-
nancial service provision is often reduced to urban areas or even limited to the 
capital city as banks abandon rural areas. Commercial banks often collapse be-
cause borrowers are unable to repay and their branches are being looted. A similar 
fate often hits central banks. The postconflict authorities are presented with de-
stroyed physical and financial infrastructure.
What are the first priorities in the financial sector after a conflict? The priorities 
of Finance for Markets loom large; among them is the challenge of reestablishing a 
stable national currency that can be used as a medium of exchange throughout the 
country, beyond establishing mechanisms of monetary policy that might include 
the even more basic challenge of reintroducing coins and bills. High on the list is 
the challenge of building the necessary infrastructure for Finance for Markets, such 
as the payment system and a basic regulatory and supervisory framework. Simplic-
ity is key in this context given the limited human and financial resources. Often, 
these challenges consist as much in building physical infrastructure as in building 
human and organizational infrastructure. However, a chaotic postconflict environ-
ment also offers openings for shady businesspeople and shady deals, so that strict 
rules on anti–money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism might 
be even more important in the context of postconflict countries than elsewhere.
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Rebuilding the formal banking sector is another daunting task. Old bankers 
might have left for good or are associated with the old regime. The licensing of new 
banks with appropriate fit and proper standards will be vital. Promoting the entry 
of reputable and experienced multinational banks from the region or beyond can 
be useful in rebuilding the financial system; at the same time, it is important to keep 
the system contestable and open for future domestic or international entrants.
Finance for All challenges also loom large in fragile and postconflict countries. 
Informal financial arrangements will dominate the financial landscape for many 
years to come, and the challenge will be to create links between formal and infor-
mal  financial  service  providers.  Given  the  destroyed  infrastructure,  the  formal 
banking system will face a difficult task in seeking to expand beyond urban areas. 
Promoting the outreach and coverage of microfinance seems a more promising 
route in this context than focusing on bank outreach. Technology seems a particu-
larly useful instrument in this context of destruction.
8
Rebuilding the basics of the financial sector is often not on the immediate 
agenda for postconflict governments and donors, but can play a consequential role 
in jump-starting the private sector and rebuilding an inclusive market-based econ-
omy. Government-to-person payments are often important in the context of re-
building economies, as are rebuilding contracts given to local contractors, which 
might require short-term financing. Donors have a decisive role in postconflict 
economies, but careful hand-holding and supervision are certainly necessary. It is 
important to focus on basic structures, while developing a comprehensive financial 
sector strategy with a long-term outlook.
9 Capacity building should top the agenda 
so as to avoid long-term donor dependence.
Conclusions
Financial sector policies have again moved to the center stage of the development 
agenda in many African countries. The challenges are similar: expanding access 
and lengthening contracts, while safeguarding the financial system. However, the 
circumstances and contexts vary from country to country. The main messages   
developed in this book are general and have to be translated into specific policy 
formulations for each country.
Africa’s financial systems are on the move. There is a lot to be gained. There is 
ample evidence that deeper and broader financial systems can help African prog-
ress out of poverty. Accepting the opportunities that globalization, regional inte-
gration, and technology offer can result in steeper growth trajectories. As we argue 
in this concluding chapter, these opportunities require a redefinition of the roles of 
the private sector, the public sector, and donors. They require a look beyond the 
dichotomy of modernist and activist approaches toward an approach that recog-
nizes that all financial sector policy is local. Reaping the benefits of these opportu-
nities requires a recognition of the politics of financial deepening and the creation 
of constituencies for financial sector reform. Financing Africa demands that we 
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look beyond the crisis toward the structural challenges and opportunities the con-
tinent presents.
Notes
1.  For a discussion of these two views in the context of financial sector policy, see Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine (2006). For a more general survey on the role of politics in financial de-
velopment, see Haber and Perotti (2007).
2.  The general point about path dependence in political and institutional   structures is 
most eloquently and convincingly made by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004).
3.  One of the most prominent examples is the greater ease with which the United King-
dom was able to gain access to war finance after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, given that 
the taxation power was not held by the king, and the checks and balances made a default on 
government debt less likely.
4.  “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, 
Results and Mutual Accountability,” High-Level Forum, Paris, February 28–March 2, 2005, 
http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2005/7033_international_community_aid/paris_ 
declaration.pdf.
5.  The term market-friendly activism was first used in the Latin America region; see de 
la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2007).
6.  This does not imply that these countries do not need long-term resources, but rather 
that the priorities are in the Finance for Markets area.
7.  There are large low-income countries, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, but also small 
middle-income countries, such as Botswana and Mauritius.
8.  Donors in Haiti have recently focused on technological solutions for the payouts for 
government assistance after the recent earthquake.
9.  The Iraqi reconstruction offers an interesting example: the objective of introducing 
the technically most advanced infrastructure for stock exchange trading was repudiated by 
traders in favor of a simple blackboard solution.
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he environment in which African financial systems operate has changed dra-
matically over the past years. The global financial system has undergone a major 
transformation after the recent financial crisis, with the center of economic and 
financial power shifting from developed to several emerging countries, including 
China, India, and Brazil. Additionally, the crisis has led to regulatory reform discus-
sions among developed and emerging countries, with repercussions on financial 
sector regulation in Africa. Finally, technology has changed the economics of retail 
banking, revealing its potential to increase access to financial services dramati-
cally, but also posing new regulatory challenges. 
Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond takes a fresh look at Africa’s finan-
cial systems in light of these recent changes. Benefiting from better data and a 
wide array of experiences across the continent, the book looks at the challenges of 
expanding the outreach of financial systems, lengthening financial contracts, and 
safeguarding financial systems. The authors identify three priority areas for policy 
action: the positive role of innovation and competition; a stronger focus on nontra-
ditional financial service providers; and more emphasis on addressing demand-side 
constraints. Recognizing that all financial sector policy is local, the authors carefully 
distinguish between different country groupings, differentiating between low- and 
middle-income and small and larger economies among others, with a special focus 
on resource-based economies and post-conflict countries. And unlike other publi-
cations on this topic, this book includes analysis of the North African countries.
A joint collaboration between the African Development Bank, BMZ (Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development), and the World Bank, this book is a 
valuable asset to practitioners, development partners, and policy makers concerned 
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